Afghan Witness recently collaborated with the Guardian on the data contained in this article. Read their coverage here. Below is a summary of our findings. Scroll to the bottom of the page to download the full investigation (PDF file).
Land clearance in Kabul
3 min read
Afghan Witness
Above image: Before and after land clearance of the Kodakistane Bagrami and Nasaji Bagrami camps in PD 8 [34.503577, 69.245080]. Images © 2024 Planet Labs Inc. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted with permission.
Officially framed as infrastructure development, the demolition campaign forces vulnerable populations out, erasing informal settlements and impacting minority neighbourhoods.
Between 15 August 2021 and 15 August 2024, since the Taliban assumed control of Afghanistan, the Kabul Municipality has cleared 1,569,483 square metres of land located in 15 out of 22 of the city’s Police Districts (PDs).
AW verified and mapped the demolitions, showing that almost half (44 percent (%)) of the destroyed properties were residential, and over a third (34%) were Kabul Informal Settlements (KIS) housing Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and displaced Afghans returning to the country from neighbouring states (returnees). Commercial properties accounted for just 15% of destroyed properties, and farmland accounted for 6% of the cleared areas.
Kabul West accounted for the majority of destruction, with 605,327 square metres of land cleared. Kabul North and East followed with 517,291 and 352,366 square metres of demolished properties, respectively. South Kabul contained the smallest amount of demolished area, with 94,499 square metres of land cleared.
In the Kabul North and East regions, the primary focus appeared to have been clearing KIS, comprising 42% of the cleared land in the North, and 79% in the East. By contrast, clearances of the Kabul South and West regions focused predominantly on the clearance of residential properties, with 81% in the South, and 61% in the West falling under this category.
Ostensibly, the clearances of residential properties are part of a land design and planning framework intended to improve the city’s road infrastructure. However, AW notes that, out of the six PDs where over 50,000 square metres of verified residential property clearance was documented, three were located in Hazara communities, and two in Tajik communities, leading to a perception among residents and campaigners – echoed in media – that the clearances are targeted at ethnic minorities in Kabul.
While the Taliban claim to offer compensation in exchange for legal proof of ownership of residential properties, the authorities simultaneously claim that 80% of land ownership deeds in the country are legally invalid, in effect displacing large numbers of residents under the guise of conformity with the law.
The demolitions of KIS, however, were found to be widespread, with demolitions of multiple camps recorded across the North, East and West, leaving thousands of families homeless. The predominant reason Taliban officials give for the demolition of these camps is that the land belongs to the de facto authorities and those living there are “usurpers and opportunists.” AW notes that the KIS land clearance was unrelated to road construction projects.
Many of these evictions in KIS were reportedly violent. Residents who attempted to film the demolitions were reportedly beaten, and in one case, a resident claimed that his niece died of exposure due to a lack of shelter following the demolition of their homes, which took place during the heat of summer. Unlike responses to residential property demolitions, the Taliban authorities have made no pretence of offering compensation or alternative accommodation for displaced camp residents.
In July 2023, the Taliban’s Land Grabbing Prevention and Restitution Commission reportedly announced that, out of eight million acres of land surveyed in the country, 7.5 million had been “misappropriated.” The Commission determined that this land belonged to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, not private individuals. Reports from September 2022 in Baghlan and, more recently, in August and September 2024 of land clearance projects taking place in Kandahar City and Jowzjan Province, reveal that demolitions are not localised to Kabul. When combined with the commission’s figures, this suggests a wider trend that is likely to continue into the future.