



MYANMAR WITNESS

A project by



CENTRE for  
INFORMATION  
RESILIENCE

INTERNALLY DISPLACED: WHERE DO WE  
GO?

Assessing The Internal Displacement Crisis In Myanmar

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## Assessing The Internal Displacement Crisis In Myanmar

30 December 2025

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	2
2 MAP	3
3 INTRODUCTION	5
4 METHODOLOGY	7
4.1 DATA COLLECTION	9
4.1.1 DUPLICATION CHECKS	11
4.1.2 VILLAGE IDENTIFICATION	11
4.2 LIMITATIONS	11
4.2.1 INVESTIGATION SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS	11
5 KEY FINDINGS & MAIN THEMES	12
5.1 IDP CAMPS UNDER DIRECT THREAT	13
5.1.1 KALE TOWNSHIP IDP CAMP ATTACK	15
5.2 ATTACKS/THREATS NEAR IDP HOUSING	17
5.2.1 SAFETY CONCERN	18
5.3 IDP CREATION - THREAT OF VIOLENCE	20
5.3.1 RECURRING ATTACKS	22
5.4 REGIONAL SPIKES	25
5.4.1 MAGWAY REGIONAL SPIKES	26
5.4.2 BAGO REGIONAL SPIKE	26
5.5 CASUALTIES AMONG IDPS	27
6 CONCLUSION	28
7 ABBREVIATIONS	29

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## 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Myanmar Witness investigated internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Myanmar between January and June 2025, due to the spread of internal displacement-related reports being shared online since the 1 February 2021 coup, and the subsequent violent crackdown on civilians.

Across the studied period, the investigation analysed 284 open-source events documenting village- and/or camp-level impacts of internal displacement. Four main impact themes were also identified, which were:

- IDP creation
  - Events in a village or villages that resulted in residents fleeing their homes.
- IDP camps impacted
  - Events affecting formal or semi-formal camps specifically designed to shelter IDPs.
- IDP housing impacted
  - Attacks on, or damage to, specific buildings being used as temporary shelters for IDPs, including monasteries and schools
- IDP casualties
  - Events resulting in injury or death among IDPs.

Of Myanmar's 15 states and regions, 12 were highlighted in the investigation. Mon State, Naypyidaw Union Territory, and the Yangon Region were not recorded. This absence is likely attributable to the Myanmar military's territorial [control](#) over those areas, rather than an omission of risk to IDPs.

Based on Myanmar Witness's investigation, the key findings indicate:

- IDP creation was the most frequently reported impact, representing 256 of the 284 reports (approximately 90%).
- Reports involving IDP camps accounted for 12 of the 284 reported events.
- IDP housing impacts were identified in 15 entries, while IDP casualties were reported in 23 events.
- Magway (84), Sagaing (79), and Bago (57) recorded the highest number of internal displacement impacts, largely corresponding with a reported high Myanmar military ground presence.

- March 2025 (81) and June 2025 (66) recorded the highest monthly concentrations of internal displacement, likely linked to reported military campaigns in Magway and Bago, respectively.
- Only 31 out of 284 reported events were verified through both geolocation and chronolocation. An additional 17 were geolocated only, and 18 were chronolocated only. The remaining 218 stayed as claimed, largely due to cloud coverage, limited User-Generated Content (UGC), or lack of geolocatable markers (e.g. resulting from extensive destruction or remote locations).

Taken together, these findings suggest that there are few to no locations within Myanmar that can be considered consistently safe for civilians. Early crackdown days saw cities in Yangon and Naypyidaw under the Myanmar military's control. Additionally, since then, the use of aerial attacks and ground-based military campaigns has demonstrated that even geographically remote areas are impacted and remain vulnerable to violence, thus contributing to rising internal displacement and limiting prospects for sustained civilian safety.

This report will highlight the measures driving internal displacement impacts in Myanmar and assess how unsafe the country is for civilians living within the internal conflict.

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## 2 MAP

The map below illustrates the extensive distribution of internal displacement-related impacts recorded between January and June 2025 in Myanmar (figure 1). These recorded events appear mostly concentrated in central regions, including Magway, Sagaing, and Bago. Moreover, these patterns reflect focal points of sustained military activity and [operations](#), highlighting the nature of displacement-related risks.

## Geographic distribution of IDP-related impact events in Myanmar by region/state, January - June 2025




Figure 1: A map illustrating how each state or region was represented within the investigation results.

Magway (central dark blue region) was identified as the most affected area regarding internal displacement-related impacts, followed by Sagaing (upper dark blue region) and then Bago (lower dark blue region), respectively (map created using Datawrapper).

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## 3 INTRODUCTION

Myanmar has experienced sustained violence since the 1 February 2021 coup, beginning with violent crackdowns on anti-coup [protesters](#). Myanmar Witness has collected, archived, and reported on various themes of violence seen within the country, ranging from [airstrikes](#), [arson](#) attacks, [beheadings](#), [massacres](#), and mass [imprisonment](#). Through all these attacks and severe incidents, internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been on the [rise](#), with regular mentions highlighted throughout User-Generated Content (UGC) collected and analysed by Myanmar Witness.

The [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees](#) (UNHCR) has continuously reported on IDP creation in Myanmar, with frequent updates on statistics. As of 24 November 2025, the total number of IDPs reported across the country was an estimated 3,628,900 (figure 2), with Sagaing Region and Rakhine State reporting the highest levels. In addition to these displacement figures, [UNHCR](#) also tracks reported returns. As of 30 June 2025, 261,420 individuals were reported to have returned to their places of origin within Myanmar. This figure, in comparison to the total number of IDPs, highlights how difficult it has become for displaced civilians to return home once violence reaches their communities.

While UNHCR provides regular updates on displacement, less is known about how displaced individuals are affected by the ongoing conflict in the country, such as whether the places they seek shelter are actually safe. Therefore, understanding the impact and how IDPs are affected is imperative to assessing civilian harm in Myanmar.

## Total Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

JSON 

# 3,628,900

Last updated 08 Dec 2025

Source - UN in Myanmar

## IDPs by State/Region

JSON 










Location name	Source	Data date	Population
<b>Sagaing Region</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 36.1% <b>1,309,200</b>
<b>Rakhine State</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 12.4% <b>448,900</b>
<b>Magway Region</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 7.3% <b>265,400</b>
<b>Kayin State</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 7.3% <b>264,700</b>
<b>Tanintharyi Region</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 6.6% <b>241,300</b>
<b>Kachin State</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 6.6% <b>239,500</b>
<b>Bago (East) Region</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 6.1% <b>220,300</b>
<b>Kayah State</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 3.9% <b>139,900</b>
<b>Chin State</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 2.9% <b>104,800</b>
<b>Shan (South) State</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 2.9% <b>103,700</b>
<b>Mon State</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 2.7% <b>96,600</b>
<b>Mandalay Region</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 2.6% <b>93,200</b>
<b>Shan (North) State</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 1.4% <b>50,900</b>
<b>Bago (West) Region</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 0.7% <b>23,800</b>
<b>Ayeyarwady Region</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 0.6% <b>22,800</b>
<b>Yangon Region</b>	<i>UN in Myanmar</i>	8 Dec 2025	 0.1% <b>3,900</b>

Figure 2: UNHCR report on total IDPs in each of Myanmar's states/regions as of 8 December 2025.

Sagaing Region and Rakhine State lead in the number of total IDPs (source: [UNHCR](#)).

Myanmar Witness analysed documented events and incidents from January and June 2025, using its archive database. Although the database is not designed to track IDPs specifically, as it focuses solely on recorded human rights abuses within the country, it still provides critical insight into how potential human rights violations can create both displacement and place IDPs at further risk.

The investigation examined four themes of internal displacement impacts, including displacement events, the impact on formal IDP camps and shelters, temporary shelters and incidents resulting in IDP casualties.

Between January and June 2025, at least 284 villages were connected with reported displacement-related impacts across 12 of Myanmar's 15 regions and states. This represents around 80% of the country. Of these 284 reports, Magway (82), Sagaing (70) and Bago (57) recorded the highest number of IDP-related events (figure 3). It is worth highlighting that three regions and states were not reflected in the investigation data. These locations were Mon State, Naypyidaw Union Territory, and

Yangon Region. However, this absence is likely attributed to reporting dynamics and the Myanmar military's territorial [control](#) over those areas, rather than there being a lack of risk to IDPs. Overall, this raises a central question relevant to the humanitarian crisis in the country that underpins the report's findings: Where can civilians go for safety?

This investigation analyses the most significant patterns and events that resonated within the studied timeframe. These findings include: attacks on IDP camps, recurring violence in the same villages, regional spikes due to a high level of incident activity, and the persistent threat of violence near or on shelters housing IDPs.





Figure 3: Chart depicting the various levels of verification conducted within the internal displacement impacts investigation between January and June 2025 across Myanmar.

## 4 METHODOLOGY

Myanmar Witness follows a methodology of digital preservation and rigorous, replicable analysis. Digital content is collected and archived in a secure database and hashed to confirm authenticity and prevent tampering.



Myanmar Witness uses a confidence judgment system to describe the extent of independent verification of footage:

- **Very High:** Myanmar Witness is 85-95% sure that the event took place as described in the claims. Footage is independently geolocated and mostly chronolocated by Myanmar Witness, with strong corroborating evidence on details of the claim.
- **High:** Myanmar Witness is 70-80% sure that the event took place as described in the claims. The footage is geolocated by Myanmar Witness. Other reliable sources confirm the time and date, but it cannot be independently chronolocated. Other details of the claim have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
- **Medium:** Myanmar Witness is 50-60% sure that the event took place. The event is somewhat verified, but significant gaps remain, such as the inability to identify or geolocate the mechanism of attack linked to the damage.
- **Low:** The geolocation and chronolocation process has shown the location or timing of the footage to be inaccurate.
- **Unknown:** There is not sufficient evidence for the investigator to make a confident judgement.

Myanmar Witness has also assigned confidence levels to responsible actors, including:

- **Very High:** Actors confess to the action, and Myanmar Witness has verified evidence of their involvement.
- **High:** Myanmar Witness is at least 80% confident of the actor's involvement, without their admission. This may be based on factors such as exclusive mechanism of attack (e.g. airstrike) or observed insignia, etc.
- **Medium:** Multiple sources suggest involvement, and some evidence from related User-Generated Content (UGC) supports this, but confidence is not complete.
- **Low:** Evidence suggests the alleged actor was not involved.

- **Unknown:** Insufficient evidence to confidently assess the actor's involvement, and/or no allegations of a perpetrator exist.

For the avoidance of doubt, this verification system only refers to Myanmar Witness's ability to independently geolocate or chronolocate footage. Incidents marked as unverified may still be substantiated by multiple eyewitness reports. Myanmar Witness also collates and assesses unverified information, including claims on social media. This information is presented as claims, rather than verified facts.

This report contains figures showing how footage has been geolocated. In these images, coloured lines are used to represent the left and right arcs of vision. Coloured boxes show corresponding landmarks or distinguishing details in each piece of footage or data. Geolocation is conducted using an array of open-source tools, such as Google Earth, to match satellite imagery with visual features identified in the footage or images. Geolocations are peer-reviewed.

Chronolocation is conducted using metadata, contextual analysis, weather patterns, and shadow analysis. Through this, possible time frames are deduced. For example, by orienting geolocated content and identifying the sun's position, time can be determined.

Myanmar Witness follows rigorous ethical standards: obscuring identifying information about individuals involved; censoring private information and images where appropriate; blurring graphic imagery; removing links to private individual accounts; and archiving digital content securely.

## 4.1 DATA COLLECTION

Myanmar Witness collected and analysed human rights violation entries from the archive database that referenced internal displacement between January and June 2025. The dataset focuses on human rights violations throughout Myanmar, not just on IDP incidents, but it does record events that include and affect IDPs.

Five keywords were used to collect entries for analysis:

- စစ်ဘေးရှောင် (refuge)
- ထွက်ပြုး (escape/flee)
- တိမ်းရှောင် (escape/flee)
- Displaced
- IDP

From an initial collection of 150 entries, a total of 284 events were identified, and each was individually analysed due to several entries containing multiple claims or events. Furthermore, the analysis also attempted to:

- Rule out false positives,
- Verify events (geolocation and chronolocation),
- Determine the number of villages represented,
- Identify duplicate reportings and
- Assess how each event impacted IDPs in Myanmar.

False positives were identified and excluded if the use of the keywords did not correspond to internal displacement impacts within the January to June 2025 timeframe. This included mentions where:

- Displacements did not involve civilians (e.g. military troops fleeing a location)
- IDPs were mentioned only in broad terms or in an unrelated context.

Entries were verified through geolocation and chronolocation or both. Verification focused on confirming events such as airstrikes, fires, arson or raids that resulted in housing/camp destruction or IDP creation.

If Myanmar Witness could not confirm the location and chronolocation timeframe, the entry was kept as a claimed event. In some cases, if an entry lacked verifiable UGC or was otherwise difficult to assess, corroborating material from the same source post (but not captured by the keyword search) was used as supporting evidence where it could be independently verified.

Each verified or claimed entry was categorised into one of the following impact types:

- IDP creation
  - Events in a village or villages that resulted in residents fleeing their homes.
- IDP camps impacted
  - Events affecting formal or semi-formal camps specifically designed to shelter IDPs.
- IDP housing impacted
  - Attacks on, or damage to, specific buildings being used as temporary shelters for IDPs, including monasteries and schools.
- IDP casualties
  - Events resulting in injury or death among IDPs.

#### 4.1.1 DUPLICATION CHECKS

To avoid duplication, checks were carried out by reviewing the state/region, township, and incident month. If two or more entries shared the same given information, then the specific date and village(s) were cross-checked to determine whether reports/posts referred to the same event. Entries that were too vague and referenced only the township/state (no village name) were excluded from analysis due to being unable to rule out repeats and duplicates.

#### 4.1.2 VILLAGE IDENTIFICATION

Final counts on village- or camp-level internal displacement impacts were confirmed through Burmese language review checks and by cross-referencing reported village names with the Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) dataset. If villages were not listed in MIMU, Google Maps was used to confirm the village name.

### 4.2 LIMITATIONS

Myanmar Witness obtains information from an area of ongoing conflict. Resultantly, selection bias may occur due to internet outages, lack of connectivity, fear of reprisal, or restrictions on media. Myanmar Witness strives to eliminate bias by collecting digital content from multiple sources, including pro- and anti- regime news and social media.

#### 4.2.1 INVESTIGATION SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS

- The dataset came from the Myanmar Witness archive database, which focuses on human rights violations throughout Myanmar, not just on IDP incidents. This led to extra effort toward verifying incidents as well as analysing broader internal displacement impacts.
- Potential limitation in entries collected with keywords, as only five keywords were used.
- Challenges in the verification process due to poor footage quality and a lack of updated satellite imagery available online.
- If the reported attack occurred in an IDP camp, the number of villages was difficult to count; thus, a camp was counted as one village.
- The village and township names mentioned in the social media posts were not consistent, and many were difficult to confirm. This was due to misspellings, colloquial terms for locations and regional dialects used. The difference between the pronunciation of the village names in the video and the written version was also a challenge in identifying the villages.

- The villages named in ethnic languages, especially in Kayin state (Karen language), were difficult to confirm.
- Some villages are not in MIMU, and Google Maps places were used to confirm them.
- Cloud coverage for May and June 2025 limited full verification and chronolocation efforts, resulting in lower statistics for these verification statuses.
- UGC depicting large-scale arson destruction in villages made geolocation difficult or impossible, thus leading to lower full verification and geolocation statistics.
- Myanmar Witness could not confirm the total number of IDP casualties due to a lack of reporting casualties at all, or not specifying which casualty counts were just IDPs compared to non-IDPs when both groups were impacted.

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## 5 KEY FINDINGS & MAIN THEMES

This analysis highlights the four main IDP impact themes: displacement creation, impacts on IDP camps, impacts on housing and sheltering IDPs, and IDP casualties. The distribution of the main internal displacement impact themes across Myanmar's states and regions is illustrated in figure 4.

Between January and June 2025, Magway (84), Sagaing (79), and Bago (57) recorded the highest number of instances of internal displacement-related impacts at the village or camp level. These figures differ from the number of reported displacement events, as several individual incidents could involve multiple impact types, such as housing damage and casualties.

These main themes and high rates in certain locations will be explored in the following sections with sensitivity towards IDP camps and other areas where displaced people sought safety.

The [7.7 magnitude earthquake](#) that struck central Myanmar on 28 March 2025 was identified only once as directly contributing to internal displacement impacts in this investigation (source removed due to privacy concerns). As a result, it was not examined further in this report.

## The number of IDP impact types per region/state




Figure 4: Chart illustrating the distribution of internal displacement impact themes throughout regions and states in Myanmar between January and June 2025.

### 5.1 IDP CAMPS UNDER DIRECT THREAT

The phrase “IDP camp” is not unfamiliar to Myanmar. Before the coup, there were already several established IDP camps in areas like [Kachin](#) State and [Rakhine](#) State. After the military coup in 2021, however, the number of displaced people significantly [increased](#) due to the ongoing armed conflict and as reported violence intensified across the country. Many displaced civilians sought [safety](#) at different locations, including at new IDP camps that have emerged nationwide. Since then, these IDP camps have [reportedly](#) been attacked by the Myanmar military.

Between January and June 2025, there were at least 12 reported incidents involving attacks on IDP camps, according to Myanmar Witness’s data collection (figure 5).

Among them, five incidents were recorded in Kayah State, three in Sagaing Region, two in Shan State and one in Mandalay Region. The type of incidents regarding impacts on IDP camps included airstrikes, artillery attacks and arson. The most reported incidents were airstrikes, with eight instances, followed by artillery attacks with three and arson with one.

In Kayah State, all documented events (nine) were in Demoso Township, where numerous IDP camps were [reportedly](#) located. Of these nine events, five involved reported attacks on IDP camps (see figure 4 above). This concentration indicates that Demoso Township may represent a particularly high-risk area for IDP camps.

Sagaing Region recorded the second-highest number of events with four (figure 5). This is consistent with previous Myanmar Witness documentation, as the region has been identified as an [epicentre of violence](#). Moreover, according to [UNHCR](#), this region is known to host the highest number of IDPs across the country; therefore, this may explain why there could be a higher number of IDP camps and thus increased exposure to potential threats.

### IDP camp impacts per region/state in Myanmar




Figure 5: A chart highlighting the four regions and states that reported IDP camp impacts between January and June 2025 in Myanmar. Kayah State represents the most camp impacts with five instances, followed by Sagaing Region with four.

From a verification perspective, two incidents were fully verified, which means the locations were both geolocated and chronolocated. Two were only geolocated, one was only chronolocated, and the remaining incidents remain as claimed. Multiple sources attributed all eleven incidents to the Myanmar military; however, Myanmar Witness could not fully verify those claims because of footage and UGC limitations.

### 5.1.1 KALE TOWNSHIP IDP CAMP ATTACK

An airstrike verified by Myanmar Witness impacting an IDP camp in Kale Township, Sagaing Region, further highlights the risks faced by IDPs. According to Myaelatt Athan Broadcasting, nine IDPs were [reportedly](#) killed, and more than 30 were injured in an airstrike event impacting an IDP camp on 31 January 2025.

Myanmar Witness geolocated and chronolocated the reported damage (figure 6). Based on the appearance of the buildings and the timing of their construction, the incident location is assessed as likely being an IDP camp. Myanmar Witness also identified a total of eight dead bodies, with at least four appearing to be women and three appearing to be children, from available UGC. There were also remnants related to the incident, and identified as two fins from a tail section of an air-dropped bomb. The airstrike was likely carried out by the Myanmar Air Force (MAF) and hit the IDP camp, resulting in casualties, including women and children.




Figure 6: Verification work for the reported airstrike on an IDP camp in Kale Township, Sagaing Region (Sources: Google Earth Pro; Sentinel-2 via Copernicus Browser [27 January](#) 2025, [1 February](#) 2025; Google Earth Pro - CNES/Airbus ©2025 (30 November 2021) and Airbus ©2025 (8 January 2025); image source: removed due to privacy concerns).

IDP camps are often one of the only options available to displaced people seeking safety during a conflict. The findings presented above show that IDP camps in Myanmar do not guarantee protection from attacks, disruption or repeated displacement. This raises serious concerns not only for IDPs residing in formal shelters but also for those staying in informal areas where protection may be even more limited.

## 5.2 ATTACKS/THREATS NEAR IDP HOUSING

Since 2021, the conflict has displaced a large number of people throughout the country. According to a [Humanitarian Action](#) report, published on 4 December 2024, only 15% of total IDPs were staying at formal camps in Myanmar. While many people, according to the report, were staying in jungles and other informal shelters, like monasteries and schools. Religious and educational buildings have also [become](#) an option as shelters for displaced people. However, those buildings can not guarantee safety for IDPs since the Myanmar military has been known to [conduct](#) aerial bombings on these types of infrastructure, including religious buildings and schools.

At least 15 events affecting housing sheltering IDPs were recorded between January and June 2025. The reported impacts on housing sheltering IDPs occurred across four states and three regions out of 12 (figure 7). Sagaing Region has the most reported events with five entries, followed by Mandalay, Magway, Rakhine, and Shan, all with two. There is one in each of Kachin and Kayah States. Most of them were reportedly committed by the Myanmar military.

Among the buildings reportedly used to shelter IDPs:

- Seven were monasteries,
- Five were civilian houses,
- And the remaining three were school buildings.

Across the 15 events, 196 casualties were documented. Multiple media outlets, including [Myanmar Now](#), have claimed that many of those affected were IDPs. However, Myanmar Witness was unable to verify casualty figures or confirm the status of the civilians affected. Despite these limitations, the reporting of casualties at locations sheltering IDPs highlights that indiscriminate attacks on buildings used by IDPs pose a serious risk to civilians trying to seek refuge (see Section 5.5).

## IDP housing impacted per region/state in Myanmar




Figure 7: A chart showing the number of IDP housing that was negatively impacted per region and state in Myanmar between January and June 2025. Sagaing Region had the greatest number of reported IDP housing impacts, with five.

The types of incidents which have been reported to affect housing sheltering IDPs include airstrikes, artillery attacks and arson. This is very similar to the reported impacts on IDP camps. Among the 15 events recorded, one involved damage to a monastery sheltering IDPs caused by the 28 March 2025 earthquake. Myanmar Witness verified 11 of 15 incidents, while two were only geolocated, and the remaining two stayed as claimed. Multiple sources reported that the Myanmar military was the actor behind 14 of the incidents. Myanmar Witness could not fully verify those due to the limitations of the footage. Nevertheless, Myanmar Witness can conclude that the infrastructure sheltering displaced people was affected by both man-made attacks and natural disasters.

### 5.2.1 SAFETY CONCERN

A potential safety concern is that large local infrastructure capable of sheltering IDPs may also be used for other purposes. Online reports, including an article in [The New Humanitarian](#), and social media content, suggest that the Myanmar military and

resistance forces, including the People's Defence Force (PDF), are using such premises to house their troops or for operational purposes.

If these armed groups use these facilities in similar ways, for operational or accommodation reasons, in areas with concentrations of civilians and IDPs, then these areas could face heightened risk. Such safety concerns may be increased where families remain in close proximity to resistance forces in order to stay together. Examples illustrating this pattern are provided below.

Myanmar Witness identified two events in which resistance forces were assessed as likely to be close to a displaced population.

The first incident, on 20 April 2025, involved a reported airstrike by the MAF on a school building, which reportedly resulted in casualties among IDPs (source removed due to privacy concerns). Myanmar Witness geolocated and chronolocated the damage to the school building, but investigators were unable to verify the number of casualties or definitively attribute the airstrike to the MAF. In one piece of recorded footage, showing the interior of the damaged school building, camouflage uniforms were visible. This has been assessed as likely connected to resistance forces (see the left image of figure 8).

The second incident, dated 8 May 2025, involved a reported airstrike on a monastery at a time when resistance forces were allegedly trying to rescue IDPs trapped inside the religious building (source removed due to privacy concerns). Myanmar Witness geolocated and chronolocated the incident. Based on damage characteristics and further analysis, Myanmar Witness assessed the damage as likely resulting from an airstrike. The MAF is the likely actor in the event, especially as they are the primary actor in Myanmar with the capability to conduct airstrikes in the country using fighter jets and attack helicopters (note: drone attacks have not been included in this study). In the video footage, the people observed, including children, are likely to be civilians, but they are believed to have a connection with the local armed resistance forces (potential PDFs) (see the right image of figure 8).



Figure 8: [Left] Camouflage uniform is visible inside the damaged school building (see red box) (source: redacted due to privacy concerns); [Right] People, including children, likely to be civilians, were visible near the armed resistance forces (Source: redacted due to privacy concerns).

Even though Myanmar Witness cannot fully verify why IDPs and resistance forces were located in close proximity to each other in these two events, the incidents nevertheless highlight the broader safety concerns for civilians in Myanmar. Moreover, while such risks are not well-documented within the context of the conflict in Myanmar, they do raise questions regarding the dual use of public facilities and the potential targeting of such buildings and civilian harm.

### 5.3 IDP CREATION - THREAT OF VIOLENCE

When a village or a cluster of closely located villages is attacked in any given area, whether it be from aerial attacks or Myanmar military ground troop campaigns, the fear and threat of further violence also follows. For example, [Radio Free Asia](#) reported that due to the immense violence inflicted in three townships in Sagaing and Magway in January and February 2025, 30,000 people fled their homes.

In parts of Myanmar where clashes between the Myanmar military and resistance forces are prevalent, indirect fire, such as [artillery fire](#), appears to pose a greater concern than direct ground offences. With multiple nearby villages reporting direct violence in unison, civilians will certainly face significant challenges in identifying where safe areas are for refuge from the conflict.

Between January and June 2025, Myanmar Witness documented 256 out of 284 events which led to IDP creation in Myanmar (see figure 9). These events follow similar geographic patterns to the most represented regions overall, with Magway, Sagaing, and Bago accounting for the highest concentration of displacement-related events.

## IDP creation per region/state in Myanmar




Figure 9: Chart illustrating the number of IDP creation events in Myanmar per region and state. Magway, Sagaing, and Bago represent the highest reported locations.

During the studied timeframe, violence was reported in various locations and detailed a wide range of events. Many internal displacement reports highlighted:

- [Aerial attacks](#), including airstrikes and paramotor activity.
- Myanmar military ground troop activity:
  - [Raids and looting](#).
  - A reported [shooting of local villagers](#).
  - Arson on housing.
- Forced [military conscription](#).
- [Clashes](#) between the Myanmar military and resistance forces near villages.

When considered alongside past reports of extreme violence, such as [beheadings](#) and the [burning](#) of bodies, the level of violence seen throughout Myanmar becomes increasingly evident.

The following section will explore two themes tied to IDP creation: recurring attacks and regional spikes in Myanmar military ground troop activity. Each assessment examines various activities and incidents that may cause civilians to flee their homes.

### 5.3.1 RECURRING ATTACKS

It is heavily reported that the Myanmar military is known for carrying out repeated attacks within a specific township in a short period of time, particularly where there is known armed resistance. At times, entire villages have been destroyed and usually by fire.

The repeated use of airstrikes and arson brings not only violence, but the threat of violence to a wider region around the attack centre. Figure 10 illustrates the number of townships per region/state that reported repeat attacks that in turn led to internal displacement-related harm in Myanmar between January and June 2025.

#### Recurrent attacks in townships per region/state in Myanmar




Figure 10: Chart showing the number of townships per region/state which reported repeat attacks in Myanmar between January and June 2025.

In eight of the 12 regions and states, displacement impacts were recorded in multiple townships. Sagaing had the highest recurrent count with 13, while Magway and Mandalay were second with four. Unsurprisingly, Sagaing Region recorded the highest number of recurrent attacks because, as already mentioned, it has become an area documented as the epicentre of violence within Myanmar. This finding emphasises that violent events leading to internal displacement often recur in the same location.

This pattern of recurrence is also highlighted by a key finding in this investigation, whereby three villages (two of which are case studies below) reported repeated attacks between January and June 2025. Whether the reported incidents occur over multiple days or with a short gap between attacks, such continuous violence instils fear across a wide region. One particular case study involving recurring attacks on two specific villages came from Thabeikkyin Township in Mandalay Region.

### 5.3.1.1 YAE HTWET VILLAGE & LEIK KYA VILLAGE ATTACKS

#### 5.3.1.1.1 APRIL ATTACKS

On 16 April 2025, Yae Htwet (ရော်ကုတ်) village, and a nearby village, Leik Kya (လိပ်ကျေ), Thabeikkyin Township, Mandalay Region, were reportedly hit by [airstrikes](#). Multiple attacks in the area were observed in these villages and nearby, which resulted in an initial IDP creation impact.

Furthermore, on 19 April 2025, the MAF reportedly bombed the central market in Yae Htwet village, killing dozens of civilians, including women and children. [Shwe Phee Myay News Agency](#) reported that at least 30 people were killed, with 25 more injured. Myanmar Witness geolocated the damaged area in Yae Htwet village to [22.769105, 96.053029], with some buildings showing full destruction, seen in the graphic below (figure 11). Sentinel-2 false colour imagery from [14 April](#) compared to [24 April](#) 2025 (the next clear day) shows changes around the damaged centre, supporting the claims of an attack.

These several days of ongoing attacks not only caused violent destruction and damage, but also fear throughout the area, leading to civilians fleeing the area.

#### 5.3.1.1.2 MAY ATTACKS

On 7 May 2025, both Leik Kya and Yae Htwet villages documented additional [attacks](#) by the MAF. Myanmar Witness was able to verify the Yae Htwet village incident, when an explosion hit an intersection at around 12:00 local time, damaging five houses and injuring 10, including seven men and three women. Geolocation work shows damage to a building [22.770254, 96.047161] with further footage showing more building damage (figure 11).




Figure 11: Verification and geolocation work for both reported attack days (19 April 2025 and 7 May 2025) in Yae Htwet village, Thabeikkyin Township, Mandalay Region. (Sources: Google Earth Pro; Sentinel-2 via Copernicus Browser [14 April](#), [24 April](#); Airbus ©2025; [top image] [Mandalay Free Press](#), [bottom image] [Mandalay Free Press](#)).

These two villages illustrate both concurrent and recurrent violent impacts occurring across short- and longer-term timeframes. The April 2025 attacks took place over approximately four consecutive days, while the latter attack in May 2025 took place

weeks later - thus continuing a pattern of violence that not only destroyed housing and caused significant casualties, but ultimately led civilians to leave their homes over the course of a month.

#### 5.4 REGIONAL SPIKES

Myanmar Witness analysed regional spikes based on region or state between January and June 2025 to identify potential focal locations for the Myanmar military during this time. Figure 12 below indicates regional spikes in Magway (82), Sagaing (70), and Bago (57). It was estimated that Sagaing Region would be one of the higher reported regions within the country, and Magway is also known as a [resistance](#) focal point in Myanmar, alongside Mandalay. However, Bago was an unexpected result, with [resistance force activity](#) reports only appearing in the past year.

Further analysis of the drivers behind the regional spikes, particularly in Magway and Bago during March and June 2025, was conducted.

Regional spikes between January and June 2025 per region/state in Myanmar




Figure 12: Chart depicting monthly reports of internal displacement impacts within each region, highlighting Magway, Sagaing, and Bago as the highest reported.

#### 5.4.1 MAGWAY REGIONAL SPIKES

In the Magway Region, 49 of the 82 reported internal displacement impact events occurred in March 2025 alone. Of these, 41 events were concentrated in Salin Township, with the remaining seven events reported in Yesagyo Township. (These numbers are not connected to earthquake-related impacts.) This high number suggests an elevated operational tempo, potentially involving multiple attacks per day. This pattern is consistent with a large-scale Myanmar military campaign in Magway during March 2025.

[Burma Human Rights Network](#) reported that Magway Region had the highest fatality statistic in the country at 42 in March 2025 (it is unknown how the earthquake affected this data, which is included in this statistic). From online reports and Myanmar Witness's own analysis of the human rights database, Magway Region appeared to be a major focal point for [aerial attacks](#) (airstrikes and paramotor attacks) and ground military troop arson activity throughout March 2025 (source removed due to privacy concerns). From reviewing Myanmar Witness's archive database, at least 19 aerial attacks were reported in the region with accounts of several casualties and internal displacement impacts (source removed due to privacy concerns). Additionally, between 2 March 2025 and 30 March 2025, at least 10 large-scale fires resulting in village damage or destruction were reported in the region. This provides further indication of a potential military campaign.

The combination of reported aerial attacks and ground operations involving arson supports the high levels of IDP creation claims in Magway Region during March 2025. However, it remains unknown if any of the residents were able to return home, especially as, given the extent of damage typically associated with both attack types, Myanmar Witness assesses that it is highly likely that many civilians were unable to do so due to the widespread destruction.

#### 5.4.2 BAGO REGIONAL SPIKE

In Bago Region, 43 out of the 57 reported internal displacement impact events were reported in June 2025 alone. Out of these, 42 entries took place in Minhla Township, with the remaining one in Taungoo Township. Similar to Magway in March 2025, this high number suggests that there could potentially be multiple attacks per day.

This pattern indicates a likely Myanmar military campaign within the Bago Region during June 2025, particularly in Minhla Township. For example, reports on Minhla Township in June 2025 indicated a high presence of Myanmar [military](#) and Pyu Saw Htee forces, alongside clashes with the PDF and other resistance groups. Among

these, 42 villages in Minhla Township reported displacement from their homes following alleged actions by the Myanmar military (source removed due to privacy concerns). Such reports from June 2025 referenced specific arrests, killings, arson on houses, the alleged use of human shields, and shootings directed at civilians.

To also note, on 11 June 2025, Myanmar military ground troop activity was observed in Taungoo Township with reports of [arson attacks](#) on civilian housing, specifically in Ma Gyi Pin Inn မာဂါပိုင်အင်း village [19.007759, 96.263344], thus reportedly causing IDP creation. The fires were reportedly started by the Myanmar military, following clashes between local PDF resistance forces in the village.

With the reporting of resistance groups taking action against the Myanmar military and Pyu Saw Htee forces, escalation of violent Myanmar military troop activity appears to be the likely cause of the IDP creation spike in Bago for June 2025. These spikes in regions show that any form of resistance in Myanmar is faced with extreme measures that not only inflict damage and destruction but also instil fear into the surrounding area.

## 5.5 CASUALTIES AMONG IDPS

The term casualty is used here to refer to individuals reported as either dead/killed, or injured. Myanmar Witness was unable to confirm exact casualty figures linked to internal displacement impacts within the study timeframe, due to the complexity of information sharing, overlapping reports of violent events, and uncertainty regarding whether reported casualties were IDPs or not.

Between January and June 2025, there were at least 23 events which were reported incidents that led to IDP casualties in Myanmar (figure 13). Seven of the 12 regions and states represented in this report showed IDP casualty impacts, with Sagaing Region reporting the most incidents, followed by Shan State.

## Number of events that resulted in IDP casualties per region/state in Myanmar




Figure 13: Chart showing events that caused IDP casualties in Myanmar between January and June 2025. Sagaing reported the most events that caused casualties.

Despite having massive regional spikes in their areas, Magway and Bago had low or no count towards incidents causing IDP casualties. This is likely because most of the IDP mentions in those regions were concentrated on IDP creation. Civilian casualties caused by IDP creation events were not integrated into this report to prevent bias and skewing of results.

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## 6 CONCLUSION

IDP creation dominated the statistics found in this IDP impacts investigation, highlighting that violent events around the country are negatively impacting civilian livelihoods. Aerial attacks and Myanmar military ground troop activity are reported to be the two major causes of IDP impacts in Myanmar, with military campaigns sweeping over Magway, Sagaing, and Bago, particularly.

Besides IDP creation, civilians connected with other internal displacement impact factors often experienced repeated exposure to violence, including situations in which various communities were attacked after displacement for reasons that remain

unclear. This pattern suggests that once a location is affected by violence, the risk of subsequent harm is then increased.

Areas once impacted by the Myanmar military appear to remain exposed to further negative impacts. Despite lower representation within this IDP investigation, the existence of reports and evidence emphasising damage, destruction, and death tied to IDPs is enough to be extremely concerning.

The limited level of verification achieved in this investigation highlights the lack of content specifically focused on IDPs and the inherent challenges of verifying human rights violations in Myanmar. These challenges are then further compounded by the rapidly changing landscape, including burned villages, and the emergence of temporary camps that are often not visible in satellite imagery.

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## 7 ABBREVIATIONS

Internally Displaced Person(s)	IDP
Myanmar Air Force	MAF
Myanmar Information Management Unit	MIMU
People's Defence Force	PDF
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR
User-Generated Content	UGC