



SEEN Association for Civil Peace

In collaboration with



CENTRE for
INFORMATION
RESILIENCE

REPORT Hate Speech in the Syrian
Digital Space (2025)

Hate Speech in the Syrian Digital Space (2025)

Report Prepared by: Department of Documentation and Studies – SEEN Association for Civil Peace.

Head of Department: Dommar al Soleman.
Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) Unit Supervisor: Youssef Wannous.

In collaboration with:
Centre for Information Resilience (CIR).

24 March 2026

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Hate Speech in the Syrian Digital Space (2025)	1
Legal Notice and Disclaimer	3
1 Preliminary and Methodological Framework	3
1.1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
2 Key Findings	4
3 Introduction and Context	5
4 Methodology	6
1.4.1 Study Design:	6
1.4.2 Data Collection, Lexicon Building, and Spatio-Temporal Mapping:	6
1.4.3 Forensic Integrity and Study Limitations	6
4.1.1 Study Limitations:	6
5 Theoretical Framework and Epistemic Value	7
5.1 Research Problem and Questions	7
6 Findings and Analysis: Organizational Structures, the Engineering of Retributive Imagination, and Semantical-Linguistic Analysis	8
6.1 The Language of "Dehumanization" and Precursors to Physical Violence	8
6.2 Analysis of the "Five Cases": Channels as Parallel Sovereign Tools	9
6.3 Criteria for Channel Selection and Processing Methodology	9

6.4	The "Orchestra of Hate" via Telegram and Facebook.....	9
6.4.1	The Zeno Yasser Al-Mahameed Channel.....	9
6.4.2	Audience Growth and the "Information Authority" Dynamic.....	14
6.4.3	The "SNA" Network: Manufacturing "Dark Mythology" and Existential Stigmatization.....	16
6.4.4	The "Presses" (Makabis) as a Tool of Existential Stigmatization.....	17
6.4.5	Purificatory Violence and Imaginary Retribution:.....	19
6.4.6	Historical Reframing and the Ancestry of Stigma.....	20
6.4.7	The "Alawite Mountains" Network: The Radicalization of Fear and the Doctrine of Preemptive Defense.....	23
6.4.8	Omar Al-Talawi's Platforms: Local Mobilization and Cross-Platform Impact.....	26
6.4.9	The Semiotics of "Howling" and the Engineering of Indignity.....	26
6.4.10	The Discourse of Permissibility and the "Policy of the Symbolic Hostage": The Facebook Page of "Journalist Wahid Yazbek".....	28
6.4.11	The Semiotics of "Ta'feesh" (Looting): Reversing Accusation as a Defensive Strategy.....	29
6.4.12	"Crowd Coercion" and the Monopolization of the Victim's Voice.....	30
6.4.13	From Occupational Description to Structural Stigma: "Bojji" as a Mechanism of Ethno-Class Supremacy.....	30
7	The Semiology of Discrimination and the Human Rights Perspective: A Socio-Legal Analysis.....	32
7.1	The Semiology of Discrimination and Sectarian Differentiation.....	33
7.1.1	Invoking Historical Antagonism as a Tool for Legal Disenfranchisement	35
7.1.2	The Gendering of Symbolic Violence and the Economy of Permissibility	35
8	Strategic Recommendations.....	38
9	Conclusion.....	39

LEGAL NOTICE AND DISCLAIMER

This report is based on Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) methodologies, as well as semiotic and human rights analysis tools. The mention of specific individuals, accounts, or digital channels within this research is intended exclusively to document "discourse patterns" and their role in inciting hatred. Such mentions do not constitute a final judicial verdict of guilt, as that remains within the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent judicial authorities. All digital evidence presented herein has been preserved in accordance with forensic reliability standards (The Berkeley Protocol), and the aforementioned parties bear full responsibility for the content published via their respective platforms.

1 PRELIMINARY AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study provides an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of hate speech in Syria during the transitional phase following the collapse of the regime in 2025, establishing a direct correlation between digital escalation and violent field events.

The report does not approach hate speech as a transient linguistic phenomenon; rather, it identifies it as a structural instrument that facilitates the cognitive and ethical groundwork for collective violence. Through extensive large-scale digital data analysis, this research reveals how techniques of dehumanization, sectarian stigmatization, and historical reframing are deployed to justify violations and transform victims into "legitimate targets" within the collective consciousness.

Utilizing advanced OSINT methodologies and forensic archiving compliant with the Berkeley Protocol, the report ensures its outputs are viable for legal proceedings, public policy formulation, and early prevention programs.

The research aims to produce procedural outputs that transcend theoretical description through the following pillars:

- **Advocacy and Policy:** Providing evidence-based practical recommendations to support the enactment of legislation criminalizing hate speech, thereby reinforcing pathways for transitional justice and sustainable civil peace.

- Visual Documentation: Developing a suite of data visualizations that illustrate the diffusion maps of hate speech, alongside its sectarian and gendered trends across temporal and geographic dimensions.
- Enhancing Human Rights Competency: Constructing early-warning monitoring tools that link discourse analysis with indicators of field escalation, in accordance with the Berkeley Protocol and Data Protection requirements (GDPR).
- Legal Accountability: Preparing archived data and digital evidence suitable for submission to competent judicial authorities to substantiate patterns of incitement and their associated liabilities, upon request.

2 KEY FINDINGS

- The study analyzed over 200,000 posts on Telegram and Facebook using OSINT methodologies and forensic archiving in accordance with the Berkeley Protocol. In one network alone, 24,764 posts were examined, revealing that 5,031 (approximately 20%) contained explicit hate speech.
- The sample encompassed five primary actors: the Zeno Yasser Al-Mahameed Network (Telegram), the SNA "Syrian News Activists" Network (Facebook), the Alawite Mountains Network (Telegram), Omar Al-Talawi (Facebook), and Wahid Yazbek (Facebook). The follower count across these entities ranged from approximately 25,000 to 691,000, reflecting the breadth of influence between the smallest and largest accounts in the sample. For instance, the Zeno channel reached 470,000 subscribers and recorded over 600 posts in a single day during the coastal massacres in March (a point analyzed extensively in later sections). The report maintained a methodological balance by ensuring the sample reflected a diversity of sectarian and political backgrounds.
- The data demonstrates a clear temporal correlation between the escalation of hate speech and the occurrence of sectarian massacres in 2025. On a single channel during the coastal massacres in March, views exceeded 101 million. Similarly, during the events in As-Suwayda in July, views on one channel surpassed 173 million, with more than 80 hate-speech posts recorded daily at the peak of the escalation.
- The accounts systematically employed dehumanizing language and sectarian re-labeling, such as "The Makabis Sect" (Al-Ta'ifa al-Makbasiya), "Al-Alwlulu" (a derogatory play on 'Alawite'), and "Bani Sumayya" (invoked as a sectarian slur). The study documented the use of a specific derogatory

descriptor targeting the Druze community 511 times by a single channel over eight months, while the tag "Sunni Fascism" was utilized 1,403 times within one network.

- Furthermore, the report documented a pattern of Gender-Based Digital Violence (GBDV) targeting female activists, journalists, and human rights defenders. This included sexual defamation, threats of rape, intimidation of family members, and coordinated harassment campaigns that forced several women to deactivate their accounts permanently.

3 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

This research examines the complex interactions of hostile dynamics during the critical transitional phase following the collapse of the Syrian regime in late 2024.

The study proceeds from a central hypothesis: hate speech in this context is not merely a linguistic reflection of existing political polarization; rather, it is inherently a "procedural linguistic system" and an effective mechanism for generating "symbolic violence". This system functions as the cognitive and ethical foundation for subsequent physical violence. From a legal and human rights perspective, such discourse outlines the "Mental Element" (Mens Rea) of a crime, where concepts are engineered to construct the "Other" and normalize their exclusion and stigmatization.

The research moves beyond static monitoring to reveal an organic link between "hate speech" and the "gross violations" witnessed in 2025. This relationship becomes starkly evident during major points of crisis, such as the massacres in the Coast, As-Suwayda, and North-east Syria. During these periods, a collective and organized shift toward what we term "Animalization Discourse" was observed. In these moments, victims were systematically dehumanized through descriptors such as "dogs= (كلاب) : [Ki-lâb]" or "pigs= (خنزير) : [Kha-nâ-zîr]". This indicates that the digital word was either paving the way for—or subsequently sanctifying—criminal acts on the ground, effectively transforming virtual space into a "laboratory" for testing mechanisms of symbolic extermination before their physical execution.

The significance of this work stems from its precise positioning at the intersection of three overlapping fields: Digital Media Studies, the Sociology of Conflict, and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) investigations. The objective is to uncover the mechanisms through which digital discourse is weaponized into a tool for direct and public incitement, capable of shifting power dynamics and entrenching a "culture of permissibility" (istibāḥa).

4 METHODOLOGY

The research adopts a "Mixed Methods" approach to ensure statistical precision alongside analytical depth, structured as follows:

1.4.1 STUDY DESIGN: Mixed Methods and OSINT The study design integrates large-scale quantitative analysis with in-depth qualitative analysis, leveraging Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) tools to analyze digital content and map it against specific field and temporal contexts.

1.4.2 DATA COLLECTION, LEXICON BUILDING, AND SPATIO-TEMPORAL MAPPING: A large-scale quantitative analysis was conducted on over 200,000 posts across Facebook and Telegram. Based on this data, the research team initiated the construction of a specialized Semantic Lexicon that accounts for local Syrian dialects and the novel linguistic codifications emerging in 2025. This lexicon was instrumental in reaching the current findings; the team continues to refine it while performing Spatio-Temporal Mapping to track discourse shifts in relation to real-world events.

The 2025 Lexicon categorizes hate speech into precise dimensions—ethnic, gendered, political, and sectarian—where each term is assigned a "Signal" reflecting its severity and prevalence in contemporary Syrian vernacular.

1.4.3 FORENSIC INTEGRITY AND STUDY LIMITATIONS A "Dual-Archiving System" was implemented: original copies are preserved in HTML and JSON formats from Telegram, and compatible formats from Facebook, with data stored in two distinct locations (Cloud and Local storage). Selected samples underwent a double-blind peer review to ensure texts were not removed from their anthropological context. This process ensures that the outputs comply with the Berkeley Protocol as digital evidence admissible in legal proceedings.

4.1.1 STUDY LIMITATIONS:

1. Limited forensic archiving options provided by social media corporations.
2. Potential platform bias in content moderation/deletion.
3. The complexity of "implicit language" and the dynamics of "closed accounts" which impede full data access.
4. A scarcity of software tools capable of efficiently processing the nuances of the Arabic language.
5. Note: This report focuses exclusively on "Linguistic Felonies" (Hate Speech), excluding visual media produced over the past year. This is a methodological

necessity due to the technical resources required for visual deconstruction, which exceed the current scope. This remains a future objective.

5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EPISTEMIC VALUE

This study transcends classical descriptive approaches to establish an analytical model linking Digital Semiology to forensic field outcomes. The framework deconstructs discourse as an "Infrastructure for Violation" via two axes:

FROM THE SEMIOLOGY OF INDIGNITY TO "COGNITIVE PREPARATION FOR ATROCITY": The research posits that language in the 2025 Syrian digital space functions as an "Execution Protocol" that legitimizes violence before and during its occurrence. We are not dealing with language that merely describes reality, but language that "creates" a symbolic space, stripping the victim of legal and moral protection. This structural link between the "Semiotics of Indignity" (e.g., digital howling) and physical violation provides the research with its forensic character, documenting the Mental Element (Mens Rea) and elevating discourse from mere verbal abuse to evidence of Criminal Intent in Crimes Against Humanity.

SOCIOLOGICAL Analysis of MODERNIZED CODIFICATIONS: The qualitative value of this work lies in the "Academicization" of local slurs and codes, transforming them into analytical tools. By deconstructing 2025 neologisms (e.g., Makabis, Bani Umayya, Al-Wululu), the research moves these terms from "slang" to "Measurable Sociological Indicators". This framing allows us to understand how "Dark Mythology" (e.g., Sednaya narratives, racial hierarchies) is invoked to re-engineer power dynamics.

5.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTIONS

The core problem lies in demonstrating that hate speech is a primary force in shaping reality. The research seeks to answer the following:

- Quantitative & Qualitative:¹ How can we monitor the surge in hostile content post-regime collapse? What fundamental shifts occurred in its trajectory?

¹ According to DataReportal data on the adoption and use of digital technologies in Syria for the years 2024/2025: the number of internet users in Syria reached 8.51 million at the start of 2024, representing a penetration rate of 35.8%. The total number of active mobile connections stood at 17.21 million at the beginning of 2024, equivalent to 72.3% of the total population. This figure rose to 19.5 million mobile connections by early 2025, or 77.6% of the population. As for the number of internet users, it reached 9.01 million at the beginning of 2025, maintaining a penetration rate of 35.8%.

- Actors & Networks: What leadership role do influential "inciter channels" play in engineering this discourse? How do these networks interact with their audiences?
- Dark Mythology: How are unverified narratives (e.g., "The Makabis Sect") or degrading auditory symbols used as dehumanization tools? To what extent does this "Engineering of Indignity" succeed as a cognitive precursor to crimes against human dignity?

6 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES, THE ENGINEERING OF RETRIBUTIVE IMAGINATION, AND SEMANTICAL-LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

This chapter aims to transition from the quantitative monitoring of violations to the structural deconstruction of hate speech production mechanisms in the 2025 Syrian digital space. This analysis moves beyond descriptive documentation of verbal content to trace the functional relationship between digital discourse and violent practices on the ground. It achieves this by analyzing the trajectory of "linguistic units" as they transform from expressive tools into procedural instruments that dehumanize the victim and provide the cognitive and moral justifications for physical extermination (Istibāḥa).

6.1 THE LANGUAGE OF "DEHUMANIZATION" AND PRECURSORS TO PHYSICAL VIOLENCE

The danger of the recorded hate speech lies in its capacity to transform human beings into "non-human entities". The systematic use of terms such as "dogs", "monkeys", "descendants of apes", and "pigs" constitutes a conscious practice of "criminal priming" and "structural violence".

This derogatory lexicon is intrinsically linked to field events, specifically the coastal massacres in March 2025 and the As-Suwayda massacres in July of the same year. Monitoring words like "dogs" or "pigs" in reference to victims or residents of a specific region is not merely an insult; it is an explicit act of dehumanization designed to render the target "less than human". This is the documented first step in all major genocides, as seen in the Rwandan context.

The invocation of the Rwanda model here is not a mere historical analogy but a disclosure of a terrifying similarity in how language is used to prepare for slaughter. Much like the RTL (Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines) in Rwanda, contemporary Syrian digital channels are converting "local insults" into procedural instruments aimed at stripping victims of their humanity and justifying assaults against them.

In reality, this practice is not a recent development but a strategy deployed extensively over the past fifteen years. Throughout these years, hate speech has functioned as an "infrastructure" that paved the way for the violations we continue to witness. A "Dictionary of Hate" was built and developed incrementally, breaking down moral barriers over time and transforming the "Other" from a fellow citizen into a "permissible" enemy awaiting liquidation.

6.2 ANALYSIS OF THE "FIVE CASES": CHANNELS AS PARALLEL SOVEREIGN TOOLS

Monitoring revealed the emergence of central actors on Facebook and Telegram, including Zeno Al-Mahameed, Alawite Mountains, Wahid Yazbek, Omar Al-Talawi, and SNA (Syrian News Activists). These channels and pages no longer function as traditional news outlets; they have evolved into "Parallel Sovereign Tools". Their danger lies in their supreme ability to "Frame" events; news is not transmitted as neutral information but is charged with exclusionary connotations that transform "Dark Mythology" into a daily collective consciousness and a driver of public behavior.

6.3 CRITERIA FOR CHANNEL SELECTION AND PROCESSING METHODOLOGY

These channels were selected based on the criteria of "Impact, Continuity, and Mobilization Capacity". They represent various factions across the conflict map, allowing the research to study hate speech as a "trans-alignment" phenomenon (crossing political divides). In terms of data handling, these cases were subjected to rigorous Forensic Archiving in accordance with the Berkeley Protocol. This ensures that volatile digital content is converted into stable legal evidence that links the moment of incitement to the moment of field response.

6.4 THE "ORCHESTRA OF HATE" VIA TELEGRAM AND FACEBOOK

The accounts on Facebook and Telegram were processed and archived using a unified methodology, while accounting for the technical variations inherent to each platform's data structure and retrieval mechanisms. This section examines the five primary channels individually, highlighting their intersections and the shared instruments utilized in the orchestration of hate speech.

6.4.1 THE ZENO YASSER AL-MAHAMEED CHANNEL

This Telegram channel was established in 2021. By the time of the regime's collapse in 2025, its following had reached 320,000, a significant figure within the Syrian digital landscape. The network is managed by several accounts under the supervision of Zeno Al-Mahameed, an individual whose identity and management

of the network have been verified by our team. While there are unconfirmed indicators of links to a Gulf state, the team has not been able to verify these claims independently. His electronically circulated biography—though not fully verifiable—identifies him as a journalism academic and trainer with two decades of experience in investigative work. Al-Mahameed leverages this perceived professional background to legitimize the channel's content, utilizing his presumed expertise in media influence to enhance the discourse's capacity for digital mobilization and mass incitement.

Our monitoring of the "Zeno Yasser Al-Mahameed News Network" observed multiple accounts managing the channel at different intervals. Furthermore, the volume of content, the frequency of posts, and the coordination of affiliated sub-channels suggest a highly organized, collective effort rather than individual management.

The channel's content fluctuates between news coverage and the publication of local grievances; the inbox receives numerous complaints regarding service and security conditions, particularly from Northwest Syria. The channel frequently adopts a satirical tone in its reporting and acts as an overt supporter of extremist groups, attacking authorities whenever they impose restrictions on these entities.

The channel experienced two distinct surges in followers and engagement:

- March 6–10, 2025: During the coastal massacres, followers increased to 400,000.
- Late July 2025: Following the As-Suwayda massacres, the count peaked at 470,000.

Analysis of the network's 2025 activity reveals a clear pattern in its coverage of field events. During any security or military tension, the channel initiates a broadcast of rumors and disinformation designed to incite against a specific group, positioning them as an "enemy that must be eradicated".

For example, at the onset of the As-Suwayda events on July 13, the network published an audio recording of an individual insulting religious symbols. Notably, similar recordings were previously weaponized during violent episodes in April in Sahnaya, Jaramana, and the As-Suwayda countryside, where they served as justification for attacks on students from As-Suwayda at the Homs university dormitories. Following the audio leak, the channel began disseminating graphic footage of killings and images of corpses the next morning, claiming these were crimes committed by armed groups in As-Suwayda against the Bedouin tribes. Subsequent verification proved that the vast majority of this visual material originated from previous incidents outside of Syrian territory.




Figure 1: After exploiting the pretext of a recording insulting the Prophet in April, following the events in Sahnaya, Zeno reused the same tactic via another audio recording on July 13, at the very onset of the tensions in Sweida. He subsequently intensified his inflammatory rhetoric on July 14, going as far as issuing a direct call for the 'Faz'a'. (Cultural and Legal Note: The 'Faz'a' [Faz-â] is a traditional call for urgent tribal mobilization. In this context of digital hatred, it functions as a paramilitary mobilization order aimed at triggering immediate violent action on the ground.)




Figure 2: Daily Posting Volume.

The chart illustrating the daily volume of posts published by the channel reveals a marked escalation during several periods. However, the peak occurred on March 7, 2025, with the number of posts exceeding 600 in a single day. This surge represents the zenith of information and video dissemination regarding the massacres in the coastal region.

Between March 6 and March 10, 2025, the coastal region witnessed a bloody military escalation initiated by a coordinated attack by groups linked to the former regime. These attacks targeted security and vital centers in Lattakia and Tartus, resulting in the killing and kidnapping of dozens of General Security personnel.

The Transitional Government responded by deploying security reinforcements, a move that coincided with the declaration of "general mobilization" by various local actors and armed groups.

During this window, the coastal region and the western Hama countryside witnessed acts of sectarian mass killings. Evidence confirmed the involvement of factions affiliated with the government and its auxiliary forces in summary executions and collective retributive acts of a sectarian nature.

According to reports issued by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI)², these massacres claimed the lives of approximately 1,400 people, the majority of whom were civilians, including 100 women. Furthermore, the documentation team at SEEN Organization recorded at least 41 child fatalities. Most of these victims perished in massacres spanning a wide geographic area, alongside other forms of violence including looting, arson, and forced displacement.

The Zeno Al-Mahameed channel was—if not the first to publish graphic footage of these violent massacres—among the most prominent in their circulation, as demonstrated in Figure (3).




Figure 3: Views of posts in total by day.

This graph illustrates the number of views recorded by the publications on Zeno Al-Mahameed's channel. We observe that the highest audience rates were reached during the period between March 7 and March 10, 2025, coinciding with the massacres perpetrated in the coastal region; the number of views on the channel then rose to 101,102,444.

Similarly, the number of views during the period from July 13 to July 20 reached approximately 173,133,337, a phase marked by an intensification of violence alongside the massacres committed in the province of Sweida. During this period, more than 80 posts per day containing hate speech were recorded.

² <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session59/a-hrc-59-crp4-ar.pdf>




Figure 4: Subscribers number growth.

This graph illustrates the steady increase in the channel's subscriber count. We observe a surge of 49,137 new subscribers during the period from March 5 to March 10 (coinciding with the coastal massacres). This figure saw an even more meteoric progression between July 12 and July 22 (Sweida massacres), with a gain of 123,089 new subscribers.

6.4.2 AUDIENCE GROWTH AND THE "INFORMATION AUTHORITY" DYNAMIC

The chart illustrates a significant surge in the channel's subscriber base. During the period of March 5–10 (the coastal massacres), the follower count increased by 49,137. A more dramatic spike occurred between July 12 and July 22 (the As-Suwayda massacres), with the acquisition of 123,089 new followers.

The data indicates that the channel strategically utilized hate speech, incitement, and graphic violent footage to achieve rapid growth in both reach and followership. This success incentivized the administrators to replicate this pattern during every security disturbance or military escalation in Syria. Furthermore, the channel's posts are characterized by a distinct, prominent watermark/logo placed in the center of the screen, reinforcing its brand identity.

The danger of the "Zeno Yasser Al-Mahameed" channel extends beyond its local mobilization capacity; it has evolved into a "Cross-Platform Information Authority".

International news networks and televised channels have frequently relied on the visual materials broadcast by this channel as a "primary source".

This reliance by traditional media grants the hate speech embedded within these videos a "false legitimacy" and contributes to its internationalization. When a video clip sourced from this channel—which actively practices the "semiotics of indignity" and dehumanization—is aired on global news bulletins, the imagery is stripped of its original inflammatory context and presented as a neutral "news document".(journalistic document).



Figure 5: Screenshot from CNN Türk.

(Note: This image illustrates the broadcasting of content from Zeno Al-Mahameed's channel by international media outlets, thereby granting them global visibility.)



Figure 6: Screenshot from Israeli channel "Channel 14".

The preceding digital and temporal data indicate that the "Zeno Yasser Al-Mahameed" channel does not function as a news platform merely reporting on events; rather, it acts as a "Dynamic Accelerator of Violence". The direct correlation between the occurrence of massacres (in the Coast and As-Suwayda) and the exponential leaps in views and subscribers reveals a "digital economy" that thrives on bloodshed and incitement.

By normalizing and internationalizing scenes of killing, this network contributes to the "atrophy of empathy" and provides moral cover for perpetrators on the ground. Consequently, this pattern of organized and sustained management of hostile content transcends the boundaries of "freedom of expression" to enter the realm of "criminal complicity". It establishes itself as an infrastructure for collective incitement, where the digital word is transformed into a direct targeting tool that legitimizes sectarian permissibility (Istibāḥa) and obstructs the pathways toward civil peace in Syria.

6.4.3 THE "SNA" NETWORK: MANUFACTURING "DARK MYTHOLOGY" AND EXISTENTIAL STIGMATIZATION

The "SNA Backup" page on Facebook represents an advanced model of "Incitement Journalism", which blends news reporting with the engineering of "Labeling". Established in 2018, the page is managed by 12 accounts belonging to activists who identify themselves as actors within the context of the Syrian Revolution. Although its following stabilized at 31,000 by the end of 2025, its qualitative weight is not measured by its direct audience size, but by its capacity to export a "semantic load" that was subsequently adopted by the largest incitement channels in the Syrian digital space.

The criminal and sociological danger of this platform lies in its role as the "primary source" for launching and establishing one of the most complex dehumanization strategies of 2025: "Instrumental Stigmatization" through the terms "The Makabis Sect" and "Sons of the Presses".

This terminology transcends the boundaries of a transient insult to enter the realm of "Existential Stigmatization". The page did not limit itself to political criticism of the adversary; instead, it worked to imprison an entire social component within a "criminal icon" derived from the narratives of the former regime's prisons (the Makabis or industrial presses). This linguistic innovation led by SNA represents the "liquidation of dark mythology", where a perceived instrument of execution is transformed into an "identity" that pursues the targeted group. This process legitimizes the concept of "purging/extirpation" within the collective imagination of its followers.

Based on tracking the diffusion paths of this term, the research team has confirmed that SNA functioned as the "central supplier" of this verbal arsenal.

These terms were subsequently picked up by other platforms (such as the Zeno Al-Mahameed channel), confirming the existence of an unannounced "discursive alliance" working to unify an inflammatory lexicon aimed at narrowing the horizons for civil peace.




Figure 7: Screenshot illustrating Page Transparency and SNA collective management

Note: This image shows that the page is administered by 12 distinct accounts, thereby confirming that it is an organized media effort and not an individual initiative.

6.4.4 THE "PRESSES" (MAKABIS) AS A TOOL OF EXISTENTIAL STIGMATIZATION

The Liquidation of Myth: These terms rely on a widely circulated narrative regarding the use of industrial "presses" (Makabis) in Sednaya Prison for the disposal of victims' remains. Regardless of the fact that this narrative remains within the realm of an unverified social imaginary, it has been functionally deployed in the digital space to transform an entire sect from a "social entity" into a "complicit mass". This transition from "individual action" to "predetermined stigma" aims to cultivate transgenerational animosity; an individual becomes a Makbasi (Presser) not for what they have done, but for what they "represent" within this dark mythology.

Instrumental Stigmatization and the Strategy of Objectification: Labeling the "Other" as a Makbasi serves to enact a structural "Objectification" of the adversary. It transforms the person from a human being with agency into a mere component of a deaf, "repressive apparatus" that must be dismantled. Within this discursive framework, the individual is not judged based on legal culpability; instead, the entire group is imprisoned within a "semantic cell" that merges location (the prison) and instrument (the press). This instrumental framing strips the target of their human status, reducing them to a "cog" in a killing machine, thereby lowering the moral barriers for "extirpation".




Figure (8): Screenshot illustrating the legitimization of violence and the dehumanization of protesters.

This image constitutes direct evidence of the glorification of violence on the ground. A channel administrator justifies the act of running over peaceful protesters by employing a strategy of dehumanization. By labeling the victims with terms such as "Foloul" (remnants) or "Abnâ' al-Makâbis" (sons of the presses), the criminal act is presented as a "purifying act". This publication demonstrates the platform's role as a moral incubator, providing justifications for grave violations under the pretext of vengeful justice.

6.4.5 PURIFICATORY VIOLENCE AND IMAGINARY RETRIBUTION:

The term "The Presses" (Makabis) facilitates a form of "Purificatory Symbolic Violence". By envisioning the "Other" as a Makbasi, the user of this discourse grants themselves a moral justification to employ the most extreme forms of violence against the target as a mode of "Imaginary Retribution". The danger of this rhetoric lies in its ability to dissolve the boundaries between reality and digital fantasy. This renders it "incitement to violence that mandates a ban" under Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as it establishes the cognitive foundations for crimes of genocide or ethnic cleansing.

Field monitoring confirms that the SNA Network was the primary originator and architect of this term, a fact explicitly corroborated by the page's own historical posts.




Figure 9: The "Poll" Mechanism: Crowdsourcing Dehumanization.

The provided screenshot displays a Poll published on the SNA platform, designed to gauge follower opinions on replacing the term "Alawite" with the label "The Makabis Sect". This procedure represents a zenith in the production of hate; the platform's interactive tools are deployed not for information gathering, but to "Normalize Stigmatization" and provide it with the veneer of "Popular Consensus". By transforming a social identity into a subject for referendum, the platform engages in a systematic practice of Existential Delegitimization against the targeted group.

6.4.6 HISTORICAL REFRAMING AND THE ANCESTRY OF STIGMA

The Facebook post by one of the page administrators utilizes a process of "Historical Reframing". It reviews the formal transition of the group's nomenclature from "Nusayri" to "Alawite" in 1921. However, the post exploits this historical context to legitimize a modern derogatory label, asserting that in the "Post-Liberation" phase of 2025, the group is now defined as "Sons of the Presses" (Abnā' al-Makābis). The text is accompanied by an archival photograph (preserved in the Albert Kahn Museum in France) depicting three French Mandate officials alongside several Alawite notables and clerics from that era. The inclusion of this image reflects a deliberate attempt to weave a thread between historical colonial associations and contemporary stigmatization.

Figure (10) The widespread prevalence of this expression is evidenced by its frequent recurrence across various networks and channels, including the aforementioned Zeno Yasser Al-Mahameed Network. This cross-platform adoption confirms the transition of the term from a niche insult to a standardized component of the broader incitement lexicon.



Figure 10: Screenshot of a Facebook post from one of the page administrators.

This post illustrates the use of "Historical Reframing"; it outlines the official transition of the community's designation from "Nusayris" to "Alawites" in 1921. However, the post weaponizes this historical context to legitimize a new form of

stigmatization, claiming that in the post-liberation era (2025), they are now identified as the "Sons of the presses" (Abnâ' al-Makâbis). The text is accompanied by an archival photo (held at the Albert-Kahn Museum in France) showing three French Mandate officials alongside Alawite notables and religious leaders of that era. This juxtaposition aims to establish a fallacious link between historical facts and current stigmatization.

The scale of the dissemination and circulation of this expression is evidenced by its massive use across various networks and channels, particularly within the aforementioned Zeno Yasser Al-Mahameed channel.



Figure 11: Screenshot of the "Zeno Yasser Al-Mahameed" Telegram channel illustrating the use of the term.

This image constitutes material evidence of the circulation of a hate lexicon across different platforms. It shows this channel's adoption of the term "Sons of the presses" (Abnâ' al-Makâbis), originally produced by the SNA network. This recurring usage confirms the synergy between actors of incendiary discourse to generalize the use of a dehumanizing vocabulary on a large scale.

This transition signifies the successful "lexicalization" of the slur; it has moved beyond its origins as a niche social media experiment to become a standardized tool in the digital arsenal of incitement. The appearance of the term on a channel with hundreds of thousands of subscribers exponentially increases its "social validity" among followers, further entrenching the dehumanization of the targeted group within the collective digital consciousness.



Figure 12: Screenshot illustrating the symbolic instrumentalization of the term "Sons of the presses" during natural disasters.

This screenshot provides a stark example of the symbolic deployment of the term "Sons of the Presses" (Abnā' al-Makābis) in conjunction with natural catastrophes (the Coastal Fires of July 2025). The slur is paired with an image of a wild animal—a hyena—fleeing the flames.

The objective of this visual-linguistic association is to enact a systematic process of "Animalization" against the targeted group. By reducing a human tragedy to the imagery of a pariah animal, the platform transforms a disaster that should elicit empathy into a scene that reinforces "Existential Stigmatization". This framing ensures that the suffering of the targeted component is viewed not as a human

crisis, but as the natural plight of a "scavenger" or "outcast", thereby justifying the denial of humanitarian concern.

6.4.7 THE "ALAWITE MOUNTAINS" NETWORK: THE RADICALIZATION OF FEAR AND THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTIVE DEFENSE

The "Alawite Mountains" digital network—comprising channels such as Alawite Mountains_Articles, Alawite Mountains, and Syrian News 313—serves as the mobilization arm for what can be termed "Offensive Victimhood Discourse". The central channel (Articles) was established on January 11, 2025, and reached 25,815 followers in record time. However, the true indicator of its danger lies in its rates of "compulsive engagement". The platform recorded a peak of 1,439,312 views in November 2025, coinciding with calls for protests (Called for by Ghazal Ghazal, an alawite clerk), signaling the channel's role as a "command center" for steering public sentiment during crises.

The research team analyzed 24,764 posts, identifying 5,031 instances of hate speech (approximately 20% of the channel's total output).

The network's discursive strategy relies on "The Engineering of Existential Fear"—a systematic practice aimed at isolating the social component (the Alawites) by portraying their surroundings as a permanent threat. Functionally, this manifests in the excessive and organized use of the hashtag #Sunni_Fascism, which our team documented 1,403 times during 2025 on this channel alone. This intensive usage escalated following the coastal massacres (March 2025), reframing the field events not as a criminal act, but as evidence of a non-negotiable "eternal antagonism".

This discourse transcends the boundaries of "self-defense" to enter the realm of "Cognitive Preparation for Zero-Sum Conflict". By linking "historical victimhood" with "combat mobilization", the channel legitimizes the concept of "Preemptive Violence". Any future physical violence is depicted as an existential necessity to stave off annihilation. This pattern places the network administrators in the position of "Co-conspirators in Incitement", as they provide the moral incubator and intellectual justifications for field violations under the pretext of "Preventive Defense". This constitutes a blatant violation of Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) regarding the prohibition of incitement to national and religious hatred.



Figure 13: This screenshot exemplifies the nature of the graphic and shocking visual content promoted by the "Alawite Mountains" network.

The image shows that the Telegram platform has automatically obscured the content behind a technical warning (Sensitive Content Warning), requiring manual interaction to view due to its graphic nature.

The presence of this warning is a digital indicator of the high level of "Visual Violence" employed by the network. By disseminating unedited, high-violence imagery, the channel aims to maintain a state of permanent "trauma-based mobilization" among its followers. This technique serves to reinforce the "existential threat" narrative, using the shock value of the imagery to bypass rational analysis and trigger immediate, visceral emotional responses that favor radicalization.

This technical measure serves as an "External Indication of Culpability", confirming that the visual material in circulation transcends the boundaries of journalistic documentation. Instead, it enters the realm of the "Semiotics of Extreme Violence", designed to maintain the audience in a state of permanent mobilization through visual shock.



Figure 14 and 15: The provided screenshots document the recurrent and multi-contextual use of the hashtag #Sunni_Fascism (#الفاشية_السنية) across the "Alawite Mountains" network. This evidence confirms that the term is not a spontaneous reaction to a single event, but a deliberate "Linguistic Pillar" of the network's discursive strategy.

By documenting its use on over 1,400 occasions, the research demonstrates that the hashtag serves several strategic functions:

- Sovereign Labeling: It creates a rigid political-religious category that merges a major sect with a criminal ideology (Fascism), thereby stripping the "Other" of political legitimacy.
- Generalization of Guilt: By applying the hashtag to various events—ranging from political protests to military skirmishes—the network enacts a process of "Collective Incrimination", where individual actions are attributed to an entire group's "fascist nature".
- Constructing a Permanent Threat: The repetitive nature of the tag serves to entrench a "State of Exception", convincing followers that they are in a constant struggle against an ideological enemy that cannot be reasoned with, only defeated.

6.4.8 OMAR AL-TALAWI'S PLATFORMS: LOCAL MOBILIZATION AND CROSS-PLATFORM IMPACT

The digital platforms managed by Omar Al-Talawi (known as "Abu Farouk") on Facebook represent a vital model of local actors capable of exerting influence that far exceeds their raw follower counts. His core activities are divided between two accounts: the primary account established in 2016 (15,000 followers) and a secondary account created during the critical phase of October 23, 2025 (9,000 followers).

Al-Talawi presents himself as a "press activist" dedicated to documenting the Syrian Revolution in Homs and its countryside. While his numerical reach is moderate compared to other actors, our research revealed a wide "Cluster Diffusion" of his posts; they are shared and recirculated extensively across local Telegram and WhatsApp groups. This organic circulation pattern indicates that Al-Talawi possesses "Social Capital" within the Homs community, granting his discourse an exceptional capacity to mobilize and steer local public opinion.

6.4.9 THE SEMIOTICS OF "HOWLING" AND THE ENGINEERING OF INDIGNITY

Al-Talawi's promotion of the term "Al-Wululu" (العلوولوولو) represents the zenith of the semiotic weaponization of hate speech in 2025. This transcends mere "insulting" to reveal a process of "Auditory Engineering of Indignity" merging sectarian identity with animalistic sounds in a linguistic structure designed to crush the human dignity of the adversary.

- Onomatopoeia and Animalization: The deliberate elongation of the "W" sound (Al-Wuuuuu) is a conscious exercise in "Auditory Classical Conditioning". By mimicking a "howl", the receiver is forced to associate the

mentioned sect with a "dog". This results in immediate "forced dehumanization" where the victim ceases to be a human with voice and language in the collective consciousness of Al-Talawi's followers, becoming instead a "howling" creature whose persecution is permissible.

- Language as a Procedural Catalogue (From Digital Space to Field Practice): This discourse gains a shocking forensic dimension when linked to documented field events post-regime collapse. The documentation department at SEEN observed a recurring pattern of violations against Alawite victims, where they were forcibly coerced into "howling" as a condition for survival or as part of degrading torture rituals before being killed. What Al-Talawi does digitally is "Normalize the Torture Protocol". He suggests to his audience that "howling" is the natural and only utterance for this group, transforming field torture from an "atrocious crime" into a "satirical scene" consistent with the digital myth he constructed.
- The Assassination of Empathy through Satire: The danger of this discourse lies in its ability to carry out a "Preemptive Execution of Human Empathy". When the identity of the "Other" is reduced to an animal sound, the victim is robbed of their capacity for "human protest". Consequently, the screams of pain and pleas for help from victims are transformed in the minds of the inciters into mere "howls" that do not warrant pity.



Figure 16: Screenshot illustrating the context of use for the term [Al-wooo-looo] and the mechanics of "sonic dehumanization".

6.4.10 THE DISCOURSE OF PERMISSIBILITY AND THE "POLICY OF THE SYMBOLIC HOSTAGE": THE FACEBOOK PAGE OF "JOURNALIST WAHID YAZBEK"

The discourse adopted by the Facebook page titled "Journalist Wahid Yazbek" represents a complex pattern of hate speech that conceals itself under the mantle of "Defensive Victimhood". This platform does not incite solely through direct external attacks; rather, it functions by reproducing fear and utilizing it as a tool for discipline and control within the Alawite community, effectively transforming sectarian identity into a "Symbolic Garrison".

The page was established on March 15, 2018, and currently commands a following of 691,000. Historically, the platform functioned as a prominent propaganda outlet for the former regime before its collapse. In the current 2025 context, it identifies itself as the voice of "Alawite Victimhood". Technical indicators confirm that the page is managed by at least two individuals based in Lebanon, a fact substantiated by the high volume of daily posts. Furthermore, the page is directly linked to a community group titled "Lost Items in Homs - Correspondence of Journalist Wahid Yazbek" (Arabic: Mafqoudat Homs - Bared al-l'ami Wahid Yazbek).



Figure 17: Screenshot illustrating the relationship and positioning of the page relative to the former regime.

6.4.11 THE SEMIOTICS OF "TA'FEESH" (LOOTING): REVERSING ACCUSATION AS A DEFENSIVE STRATEGY

The page employs a form of "Inverse Incendiary Framing" through the reappropriation of the term "Ta'feesh" (the systematic looting of property). Rather than allowing the term to remain a stigma historically associated with pro-regime forces, the platform recycles and reprojects the accusation onto "everyone", generalizing the behavior across all other social and political components.

This semiotic maneuver aims to achieve several strategic goals:

- **Universal Moral Culpability:** By claiming that all sides engage in looting, the discourse creates a state of "Moral Equivalence". This suggests that if everyone is guilty, no one is uniquely "criminal", thereby diluting the specific accountability of the former regime's loyalists.
- **Neutralizing Stigma:** The strategy functions to "exhaust" the term. When a slur or accusation is used against everyone, it loses its specific descriptive power and forensic weight, effectively shielding the original perpetrators behind a wall of generalized chaos.
- **Fueling Reciprocal Hatred:** By projecting the image of the "looting Other", the platform justifies its own community's past or present transgressions as a defensive or retaliatory necessity, further entrenching the cycle of sectarian permissibility.



Figure 18: Screenshot illustrating an example of the use of the term "Ta'feesh" to describe the looting operations that accompanied the events in Sweida.

6.4.12 "CROWD COERCION" AND THE MONOPOLIZATION OF THE VICTIM'S VOICE

The page performs an exceptionally dangerous dual role, characterized in this research as "Crowd Coercion". On one hand, it exploits the genuine suffering of residents in Alawite villages to present them as victims. On the other hand, it effectively forces them to project the image of a "monolithic bloc" loyal to the former regime. This process strips these individuals of their human agency and their capacity to express their authentic grievances outside of a pre-defined political framework.

Yazbek's discourse does not protect the victims; rather, it imposes a "symbolic and material siege" upon them. He frames their existence within a political economy that thrives on the sustainability of conflict to ensure the survival of influence and illicit gains. Ultimately, this transforms human suffering into a "bargaining currency" within the digital marketplace of hatred.

6.4.13 FROM OCCUPATIONAL DESCRIPTION TO STRUCTURAL STIGMA: "BOIJI" AS A MECHANISM OF ETHNO-CLASS SUPREMACY

Our monitoring reveals a systematic and coordinated deployment of the term "Boiji" (shoe shiner) as a tool of "Symbolic Violence" directed against the Kurdish community. This term emerges as a core element in the discourse of several monitored and analyzed channels, revealing a clear ideological alignment among pro-authority accounts. These entities adopt a shared vision aimed at the digital "disciplining" of the Kurdish component during moments of military escalation in Northern and Northeastern Syria.

The term "Boiji" cannot be dismissed as a transient insult; it must be analyzed as an instrument of symbolic violence that reproduces racial hierarchies through the lens of marginal economies. While the term has historical roots in the popular imagination, it has undergone a digital transformation in its frequency. Data indicates its concentrated use in specific crisis contexts, reflecting a methodical invocation of stigma during periods of political tension.

The discourse operates along two overlapping axes:

- **Functional Reduction:** An entire ethnicity is confined to the profession of "shoe shining". This reductionism does not merely aim to shame an individual for their poverty; rather, it seeks to "fix identity" within a space of menial service. This creates a psychological and social barrier that prevents the Kurdish individual from being perceived as a partner in the public sphere or as a legitimate Political Agent.
- **Delegitimization:** By practicing "Class-based Subordination", Kurdish political demands are framed as "illegitimate". The implicit logic of this discourse suggests that a group relegated to this imagined social rank lacks the eligibility to demand sovereign rights or equal citizenship.

1.



Figure 19:

The provided image displays a sample of posts utilizing the "Boiji" (shoe shiner) stigma. In the background, a photograph shows a protester holding a shoe-shining box during a demonstration.

Based on chronological tracking, it is evident that the term "Boiji" is not merely a linguistic relic of the past; it is a "Rhetorical Weapon" activated digitally with high intensity. Its purpose is to forcibly return the "Other" to their "presumed status" whenever they attempt to cross the boundaries drawn for them within the socio-political structure.

This organic link between "digital utterance" and "coercive field practice" indicates that these channels are not exercising freedom of expression. Instead, they appear to be managing a "laboratory for the normalization of symbolic genocide". This framework makes it easier to characterize the administrators of these platforms as "direct partners" in the "engineering of indignity" to which the Syrian individual is subjected.

7 THE SEMIOLOGY OF DISCRIMINATION AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE: A SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS

This chapter builds upon the observations of previous sections, transitioning from the stage of "Digital Documentation" to a "Sociological Dissection" of the discourse. Here, words are not treated as tools of communication, but as "Symbolic Weapons" functioning to reshape the Syrian collective consciousness in the post-collapse era of 2025.

The danger of the semiotic (symbolic) processes monitored lies in their ability to monopolize the definition of the "Other". Through precise semantic engineering, identity is stripped from its broad human context and confined within rigid "semantic shackles". These shackles aim to divest victims of their entitlements to citizenship and their fundamental rights guaranteed by international covenants.

In the following paragraphs, we deconstruct these mechanisms along two axes: the first examines 'linguistic felony' through the invocation of historical antagonisms to legitimize current violence; the second analyzes 'gendered violation' as a tool for the eviction of civil and feminist forces from the public sphere.

7.1 THE SEMIOLOGY OF DISCRIMINATION AND SECTARIAN DIFFERENTIATION

The analysis reveals that physical violence is consistently preceded or accompanied by a linguistic preamble aimed at "Identity Framing" within rigid, exclusionary templates. The semiotic analysis of the 2025 Syrian lexicon shows that digital discourse first practices "Categorical Target Identification". Within this framework, the individual ceases to be a "citizen", a "neighbor", or a "partner in the land"; instead, they are reduced to a mere "Tag" that carries connotations of "Otherness" or "Alienation".

The deployment of terms such as (Nusayri, Rawafid, Khawarij, Bani Manyouk³) transcends the boundaries of transient theological debate. Instead, it functions as a "Primary Sorting Mechanism" (Primary Screening) that determines who remains within the boundaries of the national community and who is exiled beyond them.

³ Historically, the Druze community has been known by the appellation 'Bani Ma'rouf,' a name deeply rooted in their collective imagination and carrying moral and social connotations that define their identity. Conversely, certain digital channels propagate the derogatory term 'Bani Manyuk'; this does not constitute a mere nickname, but rather serves as a tool of incitement aimed at attacking honor and exercising moral stigmatization against this community."



Figure 20: Screenshot showing a sample of Omar Al-Telawi's Facebook posts, illustrating the context of use for the terms [Rawafid and Nusayris].

Our team observed that the "Zeno Yasser al-Mahamid" channel was among the first on Telegram to employ the descriptor "Bani Manyouk" (an offensive sexual slur) to refer to the Druze community during the Iran-Israel (12 days war) war. The channel subsequently resumed its use as tensions escalated in Suwayda, redeploying this phrase 511 times within an eight-month period.

7.1.1 INVOKING HISTORICAL ANTAGONISM AS A TOOL FOR LEGAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT

The danger of invoking concepts such as "Nusayri" or "Rawafid" lies in their capacity to wrench the individual from their contemporary civic context and acquired rights, forcibly casting them into the furnace of ancient historical conflicts. Through this "Hostile Archiving", targeting the "Other" in the present is transformed from a criminal act into a "deferred historical entitlement" or an "ancient vendetta" that must be reclaimed. Consequently, modern legal protections collapse, and concepts of citizenship and human rights vanish, replaced by the law of "Historical Retribution", which renders aggression against the "Other" a legitimate and historically justified act.

On a deeper level, the digital lexicon works to transform identity from an "affiliation" into a "Capital Crime" through extremely harsh terms, such as "Calf-Worshippers" (Abadat al-Ijl) directed at the Druze, or "Bani Sumayya" directed at the Sunnis. These terms do not merely aim to insult; they seek to create an "Existential Other" with whom reconciliation is impossible.

This framing is what paves the way for subsequent "Physical Exclusion". When language succeeds in transforming the "Other's" very existence into a "sin", their "absence" (whether through killing or displacement) becomes the only possible and logical solution in the eyes of the inciting group.

7.1.2 THE GENDERING OF SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE AND THE ECONOMY OF PERMISSIBILITY

Digital monitoring reveals a systematic pattern of "Gender-Based Violence" (GBV) targeting women active in the Syrian public sphere. This pattern runs parallel to sectarian and ethnic targeting, focusing specifically on female activists, journalists, human rights defenders, and content creators. This violence is manifested through a strategy of "Moral Assassination" embedded in the discourse's structure; women are not targeted solely for their political positions, but through the "politicization of the body" and the transformation of their private lives into a primary battlefield.

This strategy relies on an arsenal of degrading semiotic tools, including:

- Sexual Objectification: Through the use of direct, sexually-charged ridicule and commentary. This reduces a woman's intellectual or political agency to her physical existence, aiming to shame her into silence.
- Moral Stigmatization: The systematic dissemination of rumors regarding "honor" and personal conduct. This is a calculated attempt to destabilize the victim's social credibility and isolate her from her support networks.

- Visual Violation: The circulation of manipulated (deepfake) or decontextualized private images used as tools for pressure and blackmail.
- Direct Physical Intimidation: Through threats of rape or "family shaming" (exposing family members to social stigma). This serves as a "Criminal Preamble" that psychologically legitimizes physical violations on the ground.



Figure 22: Screenshot showing a sample of the dozens of harassment messages and threats received by a female political activist.

This dynamic does not merely aim to exclude the "individual" woman from circles of influence; it seeks to engineer a collective "deterrent message" that raises the

This pattern of targeting transcends direct verbal abuse, entering the realm of "Forced Exclusion" from the public sphere. The symbolic violence directed at Syrian female activists and journalists functions as a mechanism for "Moral Assassination", where patriarchal rhetoric and social stigmatization are weaponized to compel active women into withdrawal and silence.

This voluntary retreat behind "walls of silence" is not merely a personal reaction; it is the direct result of an "Economy of Permissibility". Women are targeted in their "Symbolic Capital" (reputation, social standing, and academic status) specifically to shatter their political agency. Functionally, these organized waves of digital violence aim to reproduce traditional hierarchies, transforming the digital space into a hostile environment that repels women. Consequently, silence is transformed from a personal choice into a defensive strategy imposed by inciting forces to strip women of their right to participate in shaping the national narrative.

8 STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

- Legal Path and Criminal Accountability

The analyses provided in this research, and the legal proposals emanating from them, are based exclusively on International Human Rights Law standards, specifically Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), regarding the prohibition of incitement to hatred.

SEEN for Civil Peace emphasizes that the monitoring and analysis of the accounts and channels included in this study sample do not target individuals in their personal or legal capacities. Instead, the focus remains on the functional roles these platforms play in producing and disseminating inflammatory content that threatens civil peace.

The reliance on the "Berkeley Protocol" for archiving digital evidence aims to ensure the highest levels of integrity and neutrality, transforming digital content into objective evidence that meets the standards of international criminal proof. Furthermore, the research management clarifies that referencing the identities of channel administrators is based on Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for the purpose of identifying paths of legal responsibility, without prejudice beyond the discursive and forensic analysis presented herein.

- Categorization of "Collective Incitement"

Work to convert the outputs of this research (the lexicon and documented screenshots) into legal files that support the principle of "Individual Criminal

Responsibility" for the aforementioned actors, as they are partners in the cognitive preparation for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

- Activation of the "Berkeley Protocol"

Adopting the digital archiving presented in this research as forensic evidence before competent courts to establish the "Causal Link" between "Hate Speech" and "Criminal Results on the Ground".

- Technical Path and Platform Policies

Updating Monitoring Algorithms: exerting pressure on Meta and Telegram to update their linguistic databases based on the updated 2025 lexicon (e.g., terms like Al-Makabis, Al-Wululu, Boiji). This ensures the automatic flagging or removal of content that utilizes "Dehumanization" as an incitement tool.

Future Horizons: Addressing Syrian Legislative Deficiencies

This research posits that the next complementary step involves a "Critical Review of the Syrian Legal System", which suffers from structural deficiencies in confronting hate speech, through:

- Analyzing the Legislative Vacuum

Exposing the absence of explicit legal texts that define "Hate Speech" according to international standards. Current Syrian laws (such as the Penal Code or the Cybercrime Law) rely on vague and broad terminology that fails to address the specificities of sectarian and ethnic incitement.

- Monitoring the Absence of "Deterrent Measures"

Documenting the failure of existing mechanisms to provide justice for victims and the lack of precautionary measures (such as restraining orders or progressive fines) against habitual inciters.

- Proposal for the "Syrian Civil Peace Law"

Developing a draft alternative law that criminalizes "Dehumanization" and "Incitement based on Black Mythology". This proposal would ensure that Syrian legislation is aligned with Article 20 of the ICCPR, providing a robust legal framework for the protection of all social components.

9 CONCLUSION

This research demonstrates that hate speech in the Syrian context cannot be understood merely as a linguistic aberration or a transient lapse of expression in the digital sphere. Rather, it constitutes a central form of "Symbolic Violence" that

precedes physical violence and establishes its cognitive and moral foundation. The gravity of this discourse lies in its supreme capacity to redraw power dynamics within society by creating a new hierarchical order. This order grants specific actors the authority to "define" and "judge", while relegating targeted groups to a status of "inferiority" or permanent "existential threat".

The results of both the quantitative and qualitative analyses confirm that the Syrian digital space does not function merely as a mirror of events. Instead, it acts as an active field in reshaping the conditions that make violence possible by redistributing meanings and determining who is stripped of their moral and legal eligibility for protection. This form of symbolic violence contributes to the entrenchment of long-term social divisions that transcend the current political moment. It leaves a cumulative impact on the collective memory, deeply affecting the social contract and the prospects for rebuilding trust. Consequently, addressing and deconstructing this discourse is a fundamental and essential prerequisite for any serious path toward civil peace and transitional justice.

Accordingly, the research concludes that confronting hate speech should not remain confined to narrow regulatory or legal approaches. Instead, it must be integrated into a broader understanding of systems of structural violence, viewed as a foundational stage in a chain that begins with symbols and the redistribution of power, and does not necessarily end at the borders of the digital screen.

From this vantage point, the project provides an analytical and methodological framework for developing preventative policies and early warning tools that rigorously link discursive analysis with legal accountability. This contributes to curbing the reproduction of violence in its various forms within the Syrian context and similar conflict environments. The research concludes that the five channels under study function as infrastructures for collective incitement.