



MYANMAR WITNESS

A project by



CENTRE for
INFORMATION
RESILIENCE

SCAM COMPOUNDS IN MYANMAR

Trafficking Into Scam Compounds In Myanmar Since The
2021 Coup

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28 April 2026

WARNING: This report analyses sensitive topics, including human trafficking and forced labour, which some readers may find distressing. Where possible, public references have been cited to support key findings; however, many sources have been withheld or redacted due to privacy and safety concerns. All personal details have been redacted from this investigation.

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Myanmar Witness has identified more than 137 suspected scam compounds primarily in Myanmar (102 sites), as well as 25 relevant sites across the wider Southeast Asian region, in its investigation. Around half of the sites show indicators of forced labour, trafficking, torture, or other forms of abuse. This investigation is the first of a series and reflects both the scale of the scam economy and the systemic nature of the harm reported within it.

Scam compounds¹ in Myanmar are not strictly uniform in architecture, as Myanmar Witness identified a range of site types, from fortified compounds and prison-like structures to smaller rural and concealed sites. However, across these different appearances and forms, the same core features remain, with perimeter fortification, restricted movement, strict surveillance and reports of coercive control.

What this investigation also confirms is that scam compounds sustain operations through a recruitment-to-coercion lifecycle. This is done by targeting individuals through false job advertisements on social media platforms, including Facebook, TikTok, Telegram and Viber and is often carried out with promises of legitimate, high-paying work abroad. Once individuals are recruited, they are transported through overland routes, river crossings, and informal checkpoints, where their passports and personal possessions are often confiscated on arrival. Within this, physical and emotional abuse has been documented, including armed guarding, CCTV surveillance, electrocution, food deprivation, sexual violence, threats against family members and the sale of workers between operators.

This report also conveys how the scam ecosystem is adapting following clearance operations in key hubs such as Myawaddy, Kayin State, and how operations have since dispersed into more rural and less monitored areas. Meanwhile, recruitment has shifted towards younger audiences across online platforms, such as TikTok, which has become a growing vehicle for false job advertising. Telegram and Viber continue to remain important as tools for private follow-up and final recruitment.

Myanmar Witness has also observed how artificial intelligence (AI) is also reshaping and driving scam compound evolution, through expanding language capabilities, 'AI model' recruitment, roles, and the employment of tools such as Starlink to help maintain connectivity in remote areas.

¹ Myanmar Witness has collected claims related to scam 'compounds' and 'centres', which have been used interchangeably by different outlets. Myanmar Witness has chosen to refer to these sites as 'scam compounds', as it more directly reflects their physical geography and the built environment inside them, including housing, shops and multiple businesses that may be present.

2 OVERVIEW OF SCAM SITES AND GEOGRAPHY

Myanmar Witness has compiled an [interactive geospatial map](#) documenting 38 Myanmar-based compounds of the 137 suspected scam compounds, each assessed and categorised by confidence level based on visual evidence, media reporting, and open-source indicators (see Methodology). As Myanmar Witness's evidence collection expands to 137 scam compounds across Southeast Asia, with targeted analysis of the broader region, the map will be updated regularly.

2.1 GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTERS & MAPS

Scam site operations cluster around [several border hubs](#), where [weak governance](#), [armed group control](#), and cross-border movement converge (figure 1).




Figure 1: A snapshot of the [interactive visual map](#) Myanmar Witness has produced of scam compounds in Myanmar only. This map demonstrates the geographic clustering of scam compounds in Kayin and Shan States.

With this, Myanmar Witness identified three primary concentrations:

Myawaddy-Mae Sot Corridor (Kayin State): The most heavily documented area in Myanmar Witness's work, and it reflects [historic trafficking routes](#). It is also home to high-profile sites such as Shwe Kokko, Apollo Park and KK Park.

Shan State (China border): Significant clusters are also present along Myanmar's border with China, and this is highlighted in an internal Myanmar Witness's 2023 investigation focusing on scam and organised crime activity in this area. Moreover, family-based networks are historically linked to several cyberscam operations in this area.

Regional Shift (Cambodia and Myanmar): In December 2025, following the military's clearance operations in [KK Park](#) and Shwe Koko, recruitment and operations have increasingly shifted to Cambodia and rural Myanmar locations. However, these sites have not yet been included in Myanmar Witness's public map at the time of writing.

2.2 SCAM COMPOUND TYPES

Scam compounds in Myanmar do not physically appear the same; they range from large fortified parks to more prison-like compounds, casino styles and smaller concealed sites. What links all of them together is not a single appearance but rather a shared system of confinement, restricted movement for victims, and surveillance. To help confirm their function type, Myanmar Witness has classified scam compounds into five main types based on their architecture and appearance from satellite imagery and user-generated content (UGC), along with specific visual indicators.

Type	Appearance	Visual Indicators	Example Sites
Fortified Scam Parks	Large self-contained compounds that look like industrial estates or gated towns	High perimeter walls, internal roads and dormitory blocks, CCTV, armed guards and controlled gates	KK Park, Myawaddy, Kayin State [16.629936, 98.555437]

Survivors described in a [February 2026 UN Report](#) being held in immense compounds resembling self-contained towns that were made up of heavily fortified multi-storey buildings with barbed wire-topped high walls. They added that they were guarded by armed and uniformed security personnel. This type of compound is similar to that of KK Park in Kayin State.



Figure 2: An image of KK Park [16.629936, 98.555437], an immense compound split into several developed sections, resembling self-contained towns, with visible walls and separations within the park. (Mapping created by Myanmar Witness, inspired by a map produced by [Martin Nway Oo Swe](#) via Facebook).

Type	Appearance	Visual Indicators	Example Sites
Prison-like compounds	Rigidly enclosed sites	Internal fences, repetitive housing blocks with watchlike tower structures and guard posts	Huanya Park, Myawaddy, Kayin State [16.646166, 98.519812]

Satellite imagery reveals prominent features, including high and low surrounding fences/walls, internal sectioning similar to prison-like structures, and watchtowers built both near external and internal fences.



Figure 3: Satellite imagery shows that Huanya Park, Myawaddy, Kayin State,[16.646166, 98.519812] is divided into multiple sections. Orange, yellow, and red denote internal fences, while dark blue lines indicate outer walls/fences. The light blue box highlights a likely gate between access roads. Green boxes mark the western and southern access points into the park (Source: Google Earth Pro, © 2025 CNES/Airbus).



Figure 4: Close-up satellite imagery of Huanya Park, showing a high-walled section at [16.646166, 98.519812] with seven watchtower-like structures (yellow boxes) and a likely road gate (white box). The presence of several multi-story buildings suggests there is potential capacity for housing individuals, though this cannot be confirmed. (Source: Google Earth Pro, © 2025 CNES/Airbus).

Type	Appearance	Visual Indicators	Example Sites
Casino/Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Style	High-rise developments mimicking hotels or casinos	Tall blocks in tight rows, large parking areas, walled urban compounds with limited entry points	Myanmar New Yum, Laukkaing, Shan State [23.691960, 98.766940]

These casino-style sites are typical tall-walled compounds which can cover several city blocks with multiple potential large dormitory high-rise buildings arranged in tight rows. The parks can also contain an internal courtyard and pathways, another characteristic of a self-contained enclosed city.




Figure 5: An image of Myanmar New Yum, with a compact design, resembling a hotel and casino structure at [23.691960, 98.766940] (Source: Google Earth Pro, © 2025 CNES/Airbus).

Type	Appearance	Visual Indicators	Example Sites
Rural/Concealed Parks	Fragmented sites merged into the terrain	Tree cover, temporary structures surrounding the site, with river proximity for border access	Qingson Park, Myawaddy, Kayin State [16.427589, 98.63444]

These rural compound types tend to be surrounded by trees and vegetation, perhaps in a dip or clearing area. This could be analysed as an attempt to avoid detection. Furthermore, early development and progress are indicated with temporary structures such as tents set up outside of the park walls. For example, Qingson Park [16.427589, 98.63444], also known as Thai Hoa Garden, according to [The Standard](#), was a site of relocation following the destruction of KK Park in October and November 2025.



Figure 6 Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC of Qingsong Park to around [16.427589, 98.63444] in Myawaddy, Kayin State (Source: [Top] Image © 2025 Planet Labs Inc. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted by permission, [Bottom], [The Standard](#)).

Type	Appearance	Visual Indicators	Example Sites
Small controlled Units	Compact office-type enclosed sites	Single-walled section, low-rise blocks with marked guard buildings	Apollo Campus (Park), Myawaddy, Kayin State, [16.776539, 98.483179]

Small controlled units often comprise a single large enclosed section, with walls and fences separating it from the surrounding area. Satellite imagery of Apollo Campus [16.776539, 98.483179], for example, depicts this as the compound's layout, suggesting a controlled internal hierarchy (figure 7). The red box highlighted in

figure 7 appears to mark a small structure recorded on OpenStreetMap as an “armed guard” post, while the yellow boxes are buildings labelled as offices, and the orange box appears to show dormitory-style infrastructure, likely to house the workers.



Figure 7: Satellite imagery of Apollo Campus [16.776539, 98.483179] shows a single large enclosed section, with walls and fencing separating it from the surrounding area. (Source: Google Earth Pro, © 2025 CNES/Airbus)

2.3 SITE EVOLUTION

As this report indicates, these scam compounds can vary in appearance, but their operations are dynamic and resilient. Myanmar Witness has been monitoring consistent expansion patterns since 2021, with new sites emerging despite apparent high-profile clearance efforts by regional authorities and the military. The following types of expansion analysed indicate how these scam operations are expanding faster than crackdowns can disrupt them.

Such an example is Apollo Campus, a compound that appears to be largely stable since February 2025, with only limited additional construction visible in the south. This assessment is based on Myanmar Witness’s analysis of satellite imagery from

February 2025 to March 2026, which showed no clear indication that the site had been shut down (figure 8).

27 February 2025

9 March 2026



Figure 8: Apollo Campus [16.776539, 98.483179], as observed from low-resolution satellite imagery, does not appear to show significant damage or an indication of a shutdown. The orange box highlights a new building in the south of the park (Sources: [Left] Contains modified Copernicus [Sentinel](#) data [2025],[Right] Contains modified Copernicus [Sentinel](#) data [2026])

Additionally, Huanya Park, also referred to as Media Asia International City, [16.646166, 98.519812] continues to show infrastructure updates, as supported by low-resolution Sentinel-2 imagery from 18 February 2025 and 4 March 2025, compared to March 2026 imagery, which illustrates new roofing and a river border-crossing development (figure 8).

18 February 2025

4 March 2026




Figure 8: [Left] Satellite imagery from 18 February 2025 compared to low-resolution Sentinel-2 imagery from [Right] 4 March 2026 at [16.646166, 98.519812] showing recent updates to the infrastructure around Huanya Park (Sources: [Left] Google Earth Pro, © 2025 CNES/Airbus, [Right] Contains modified Copernicus [Sentinel-2](#) data [2026]).

Following the operation of KK Park clearance in 2025, there are indicators of emerging hotspots, with sites shifting toward more fragmented and rural areas. Qingsong Park is a good example of this, as it shows a significant expansion from 23 April 2025 to 24 November 2025 (figure 10), including the addition of white roofing items, which suggest Starlink deployment (figure 11).

23 April 2025

24 November 2025



Figure 10: Myanmar Witness observed several expansions of Qingsong Park [16.427589, 98.63444] between April 2025 and November 2025, after clearance operations had occurred. This suggests the park may have been designed in aid of dispersing KK Park actors once clearance operations commenced (Source: [Left] Contains modified Copernicus [Sentinel-2](#) [2025] [Right] Contains modified Copernicus [Sentinel-2](#) [2025]).



Figure 11: Qingsong Park [16.427589, 98.63444] appears to have Starlink devices attached to the roofing already, as observed in high-resolution imagery (Sources: © 2025 Vantor) [Right] [Starlink](#)).

Publicised crackdowns, such as Cambodia’s July 2025 operation labelled “[reform theatre](#)”, the Myanmar military’s raid on KK Park in October 2025, and Thai power cuts, have been largely ineffective. For one, their method focuses more on the physical destruction of sites than on the systemic cessation of operations by scam actors in the area. While the buildings were deemed destroyed by the State and Security Peace Commission (SSPC), satellite imagery shows that core infrastructure remains intact, thus enabling the option for rapid rebuilding. Additionally, victims reported that scam compound leaders received a warning of upcoming raids and [relocated](#) operations to nearby compounds. For example, according to the [AFP](#), a few hundred people allegedly left KK Park and arrived at a compound on 23 October 2025, only three kilometres away, which likely refers to Huayna Park. Myanmar Witness geolocated images alleged to have been from this migration (figure 12).



Figure 12: Myanmar Witness geolocated claims of individuals being moved across sites as military clearance operations of KK Park were ongoing at around [16.630574, 98.537467] (Source: removed for privacy reasons).

2.3.1 “INACTIVE” SITES

Even “inactive” sites show some form of adaptation. For example, following power cuts, scam compounds appear to have adapted and utilised Starlink satellite

internet (figure 13) and suspected under-river cables from Thailand to the Myanmar-side compounds, like Huanya Park. In March 2026, authorities in Moe Sot town discovered internet cables secretly connected via underground pipes under the Moei River, running from a parking lot near Thaung Yin River in Mae Tao village to the Myanmar side, which Myanmar Witness geolocated (figure 14).

Other “inactive” sites, such as Apollo Campus, reportedly show no observable shutdown damage depicted in Sentinel-2 imagery from February 2025 and March 2026. Moreover, reports claim that [victims](#) are still trapped there. Interestingly, [land sales](#) are also continuing through IMyanmarHouse Company Limited, a company that funded the Myawaddy City Projects back in 2020, with Telegram job ads targeting Kayin and Shan States (figure 15).



Figure 13: [Left] Starlink devices allegedly arriving in Mae Sot and KK Park roofing with visible Starlink devices attached at [16.631925, 98.558366] (Source: [Left] redacted due to privacy concerns, [Right] Google Earth Pro, © 2025 CNES/Airbus).



Figure 14: Thai authorities cutting internet cables and destroying suspected clandestine pipelines near Huanya Park, geolocated by Myanmar Witness to [16.650252, 98.523518] (Sources: [Left] [KIC](#) via Facebook, [Right] [จังหวัดตาก 24 ชั่วโมง](#) via Facebook).

Properties for sale in Myawaddy Township



Will the owner quickly sell 4 acres of land in Myawaddy Township, the best investment opportunity for th

3,500 million (Kyats)

📍 Myawaddy | Karen State

🏠 Plot of land, yard



Four plots of land in the Myawaddy New Town project, ideal for investment, for sale quickly

4,500 million (Kyats)

📍 Myawaddy | Karen State

🏠 Plot of land, yard

Figure 15: IMyanmarHouse Company Limited selling plots of land in Myawaddy in 2026 (Source: [imyanmarhouse](#)).

2.3.2 BORDER CROSSINGS

Border crossings are another type of evolution across multiple parks. For example, Huanya Park, which, as stated, remains active despite crackdowns, has a border crossing that could facilitate human trafficking and construction material imports.

Satellite imagery from February 2025 shows three distinct crossings in the area, two of which are within the park's boundaries [16.649835, 98.521878] and [16.649423, 98.518294] (figure 16 and 17). One is southeast [16.641016, 98.523874], and includes new ramps and walking paths (developed since 2021 and 2022) (figure 18). This observation coincides with the park's construction timeline.

Additionally, reports of Thailand's continued export of cement powder and ready-mixed concrete to Myanmar (the [highest reported output as of 2025](#)) support the notion of rapid building, while victims claim being [transported](#) across these expanded border crossings during clearance operations.



Figure 16: Satellite imagery from February 2025 shows an entrance from the crossing point into the Huanya Park complex at [16.649835, 98.521878]. In the images, the red-roofed structures within the orange box appear to have reached full construction by February 2025 and may function as a guardpost. (Sources: [Left] Google Earth, © 2025 CNES/ Maxar Technologies [Right] Google Earth, © 2025 CNES/Airbus).

5 January 2021



18 February 2025




Figure 17: A crossing in the vicinity of Huanya Park [16.649423, 98.518294] showing activity since 5 January 2021 (Sources: [Left] Google Earth, © 2025 CNES/Maxar Technologies, [Right] Google Earth, © 2025 CNES/Airbus).

21 November 2021



18 February 2025



Figure 18: A third nearby crossing at [16.641016, 98.523874], which may be linked to Huanya Park via a shared wall extending from the southern boundary of the park to the western side of the crossing (Source: Google Earth, © 2025 CNES/Airbus).

3 RECRUITMENT

Regional cyber-enabled fraud and other online crime operations are [deeply implicated](#) in the trafficking of persons for [forced criminality](#) and [labour](#). There has been extensive reporting on cases where people have been tricked into scam compounds through fake job offers, forced to work, sold between operators or even

trapped, if they entered willingly as a result of economic coercion.

Myanmar Witness examined social media posts to identify potential indicators of human trafficking through fraudulent job advertisements. These have shown to promise high-paying salaries, legitimate roles in customer service, translation, technology, hotel work, or modelling and primarily target economically vulnerable individuals. Furthermore, Myanmar Witness has observed how these adverts and social media posts evolve to evade detection amidst the growing awareness of Myanmar scam compounds.

3.1 RECRUITMENT METHODS

A consistent recruitment method that has been found through Myanmar Witness's investigations and is widely reported on is the use of fraudulent job listings by individuals involved in the trafficking of humans for labour, promising high-paying roles in offices, casinos, hotels or other cyber-related work. These adverts are often circulated through social media groups and popular messaging apps such as Facebook, Telegram, Viber and WeChat and are frequently posted by anonymous or fake accounts. Job posts often appear attractive and urgent, offering unusually good pay, company transport, accommodation and visas, while also asking for language or technical skills, making it seem legitimate. For example, one anonymous profile advertised for identical jobs across multiple Facebook groups and also spammed specific groups in January and February 2023, before going completely inactive (figure 19).



Figure 19: This Facebook account displays characteristics consistent with a potential sockpuppet, including repeated job advertisements with indicators of possible falsehood. The account became inactive after its last post on 14 February 2023. (Source redacted due to privacy concerns).



Figure 20: A likely fake Facebook account, presenting as a female profile, shares advertisements for Myawaddy-based jobs requiring typing skills. Although the account joined Facebook in November 2016, visible activity did not begin until 20 March 2018, coinciding with the emergence of scam operations in Shwe Koko (Source redacted due to privacy concerns).

Myanmar Witness observed, through the collection of posts from TikTok primarily that women, especially those of a younger age who make up a higher percentage of TikTok's user base, are likely being targeted through aspirational messaging and "influencer-style" accounts about earning money. Some adverts specifically sought women for roles in AI modelling, typing, "female hygiene" work at hotels, or even tasks framed as surveillance or engineering positions.

Recruitment does not always rely on deception alone, as Myanmar Witness also notes from several posts of witness or third-party accounts of trafficking, that it leverages social engineering through trusted contacts. From Myanmar Witness's evidence collection, posts about victimisation have included accompanying friends to "meet a client", and factory owners are selling employees under business relocation pretexts. Additionally, traffickers have been noted as young as 17 years old, or fake online boyfriends have gone on to build prolonged relationships before trafficking from Shanghai via Hong Kong and Bangkok to Myanmar.

3.2 PLATFORM EVOLUTION

As of 2025, the recruitment process has remained broadly consistent, with scams forwarded to one or more private or secure channels, such as Telegram. TikTok has also gained traction as a recruitment platform, with job postings increasingly appearing alongside older patterns of false advertisements on Facebook groups before shifting to Telegram or Viber (figure 21). Since 2021, these adverts have consistently shared indicators of human trafficking through hallmarks including urgent language, unusually high overseas pay, and being posted anonymously.




Figure 21: TikTok advertisements promoting jobs in Myawaddy display several suspicious indicators, including imagery resembling KK Park, the use of women and office settings, animated elements, and urgent text overlays. Some videos also feature individuals speaking directly to the camera (source: TikTok)

As the sophistication of the scam compounds has changed, so have job titles. [INTERPOL](#)'s June 2023 analysis shows the progression from basic call centre work to skilled IT/digital sales roles. This has been mirrored in Myanmar Witness's observations of "AI models," a term used in adverts for individuals to act as visible fronts or otherwise be involved in [AI modelling work](#) linked to scam operations, to make the roles appear more legitimate. Myanmar Witness also documented related terms such as "chatting/FineChat" and language-specific ads targeting women, likely indicating romance scam work framed as customer relations or online chatting positions. (figure 22). Furthermore, developments in AI and large language models such as ChatGPT are also reportedly leveraged by scam compounds and recruiters to make coercion seem more credible. This pattern is persistent and remains visible on Telegram and Facebook in jobs linked to Myanmar and Cambodia through October 2025 (figure 23).

[REDACTED]

04:30



[REDACTED] 29.05.2025 09:44:35

For those who want to work with a good salary at the new AA site

Location – AA site 4 Finding Girl urgently

Finding Girl urgently Finding Girl urgently
Finding Girl urgently
Chinese English – Myanmar Model girl urgently
Chinese English Myanmar interpreter Chinese English
Myanmar interpreter Chinese English Myanmar
interpreter Chinese English Myanmar interpreter
If you don't have a meal card, you can also pay for the meal
6000 Interview requirements – typing 40–45 No
need to have E skills Agents can also come and contact us
Ph – [REDACTED] Tlg – [REDACTED]

A job vacancy for a new Cambodian company

04:00

Those without work experience are welcome to apply We don't ask
for any skills, no probation,
you can work with confidence, the company is directly involved, we
provide more responsibility and guarantee Required

skills
Computer Typing Test (Easy) 1min–30wpm
English basic
English and Myanmar
must be able to translate well

1 AI Model urgently needed (Chinese + English)
Basic salary 200000 baht

Chatting (girl/man/couple)
Basic salary 800 dollars + percentage %

Finding (girl/man/couple)
Basic salary 700 dollars + 800

Myanmar Myanmar We also call for Myanmar who speak Chinese.
We also call for those without experience.
Myanmar boy or girl are called

There are no releases during the probation period

Figure 23: Telegram advertisements for jobs linked to KK Park promoting roles for 'AI models' as well as 'chatting' positions, requiring Chinese and English language skills. The postings appear to target women (Source redacted due to privacy concerns).

3.3 RECRUITER PROFILES & INFRASTRUCTURE

Recruiters frequently use attractive female profiles or sockpuppet profiles not only for job adverts but also to build followers and credibility (figure 24). These have been consistently linked to private Telegram contacts. It has been identified that various accounts uploading this content on social media before going inactive and are then replaced by another profile (figure 25).

Reports indicate that women are occasionally recruited by other women, potentially in a bid to gain [psychological trust](#), and Myanmar Witness also found videos of women advertising for mixed-gender roles that showed many female and male profiles interacting with this content.

It is important to note that not all workers were deceived, as Myanmar Witness observed that economic coercion due to limited options often plays a role in recruitment. For example, Burmese youths were reportedly joining scam jobs over military service, according to the [Irrawaddy](#). While reports Myanmar Witness collected claims that people are tricked into their roles, which is sometimes true, it has also been observed that individuals may join scam compound work as a form of earning money in an office/'respectable' setting. Furthermore, authorities reported rescuing trafficking victims from 22 countries, but individuals largely from Kayin and Shan States form the largest local workforce, which could indicate some Burmese workers may not have been deceived into working there.



Figure 24: A Telegram message advertising the sale of multiple fake accounts and verified SIM numbers for online use, translated by Myanmar Witness's Chinese language translator (Source redacted for privacy reasons).




Figure 25: A selection of TikTok recruiters advertising jobs that display indicators consistent with potential scam-related activity (source redacted for privacy reasons).

Other accounts appear to be real influencers, potentially to gain credibility, using a secondary account to promote scams. Myanmar Witness identified that this has been taking place with one job-posting account claiming affiliation with a TikTok influencer and focusing exclusively on high-reach Myawaddy scam adverts (figures 26 and 27). While we initially suspected this influencer was having her account ‘piggybacked’ by someone pretending to be her, reposting her content, the original influencer does appear to mention the second account, suggesting there is some affiliation and that real women are being used to attract workers.




Figure 26: A TikTok influencer with around 140k followers. A fake job posting account claims affiliation with her profile, and in one video she appears to confirm this affiliation by mentioning the second account. (Source redacted due to privacy concerns).




Figure 27: The secondary account posts the same influencer-style content as the first and achieves unusually high viewership (red) for the Myawaddy job posting videos, interspersed among lower-view 'regular' content. (Source redacted due to privacy concerns).

3.4 GEOGRAPHIC SHIFTS

Post-crackdown, recruitment significantly pivoted from Myanmar to Cambodia while maintaining the same process. For example, after action by the Myanmar military in Myawaddy in late 2025 against scam compounds, job adverts shifted to Cambodian jobs, also guaranteeing transport, visas and high-paying salaries. This is significant as it demonstrates that these recruitment accounts are linked to the wider recruitment service for other scam sites not located in Myanmar (figure 28). Additionally, sites such as KK Park continued its recruitment process, despite the ongoing clearance operations in October 2025, as its social media channels consistently advertised jobs. This signals a type of recruitment resilience.




Figure 28: An example from a TikTok user posting false job adverts, previously in Myanmar, in January 2026, demonstrating a shift in content, advertising instead for jobs in Cambodia, as opposed to Myanmar (source redacted due to privacy concerns).

4 TRANSIT ROUTES

Once individuals were recruited, Myanmar Witness documented how they were transported to scam compounds through transit routes reported by some testimony to conceal their final destinations in Myanmar or Cambodia. These routes, arranged by traffickers, sometimes involved flights, informal border crossings, accommodation and car pickups, which appear to make the process

legitimate. While this is taking place, some victims reported being told they are heading to Thailand or China.

Since the KK Park clearance operation, Myanmar Witness has observed a trend in the site's recruitment Telegram channels. Channels increasingly advertised ride-hailing and taxi services in Myawaddy, with some explicitly mentioning transport to Apollo Park, KK Park and Shwe Kokko (figure 28).




Figure 29 Telegram advertisement from taxi drivers offering pick-up and drop-off services for residents and non-residents in and around known scam park locations such as Royal Dragon Bay 107, Apollo Campus and Shwe Koko (Source redacted due to privacy concerns).

4.1 KIDNAPPINGS AND COERCION DURING TRANSIT

Myanmar Witness collected documented instances of individuals kidnapped across borders after being coerced into jobs. For example, Myanmar Witness collected evidence of a reported male Chinese national kidnapped by a group (of 10 individuals in the footage) in Mae Sot for transport into the Myawaddy Region. In the video footage, one of the individuals can be heard saying in Burmese, "လက်ထိပ်ခတ်လိုက်" (handcuff him). Myanmar Witness geolocated the incident near the Moei River (a border river view), at approximately [16.685804, 98.517415], with a CCTV timestamp of 21 October 2025 (figure 30). The original post claims that this is related to scam activities and the trafficking of this individual, though Myanmar Witness cannot verify the details of and reasoning behind the incident.




Figure 30: Myanmar Witness geolocated an alleged kidnapping incident in Mae Sot at around [16.685804, 98.517415], October 2025. It is believed this kidnapping is related to the coercion of individuals across the border into Kayin State (Source redacted due to privacy concerns).

Additional reports collected by Myanmar Witness describe victims being drugged in cars upon arrival. Investigators also identified supporting public accounts of traffickers posing as either employers or [ride-hailing drivers in Chiang Mai](#). Additional documented cases Myanmar Witness collected include victims being allegedly beaten and forced into vehicles, or in one instance, abducted at gunpoint by armed men at a roundabout in Cambodia.

4.2 PRIMARY ROUTES

Myanmar Witness documented claims of multiple cases that indicate that Bangkok is the initial starting point, with victims flying from countries such as China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Africa and elsewhere [to Bangkok, Chiang Mai or Chiang Rai](#), as further supported by public reporting. The Mae Sai–Tachileik checkpoint in Chiang Rai has historically been [flagged](#) as a well-known route for trafficking and illicit activity. Individuals are sometimes taken overland to Mae Sot for the Moei River night crossing into Myawaddy. Myanmar Witness collected a claim that includes a case where one group had travelled across mountains and rivers at night, not realising they had entered Myanmar.

Myanmar Witness collected alternative routes documented from social media and these include:

- **China to Myanmar:** Which can include travel to Laos, Thailand, Kayin State in Myanmar, Mengping/Wa State directly, and one claim mentioned Laukkai (Shan State) via a 530km militia-escorted journey.
- **Indonesia to Myanmar:** Which can include travel from Batam in Indonesia to Johor or Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, then Bangkok or Mae Sot
- **Cambodia** cases sometimes mention travel from Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville, Koh Kong and Poipet

However, other routes are alleged to exist. Public reporting mentions that in [October 2023](#), Ugandan law enforcement reported that several citizens were taken to Dubai, allegedly for employment, before being diverted to Thailand and then Myanmar. There, the victims were handed over to an online fraud syndicate and kept under armed guard while being taught to defraud banks.

4.2.1 DETECTION AVOIDANCE

According to [OHCHR](#), traffickers utilise informal crossings, staggered small-group movements, checkpoint corruption, and train victims to claim tourism/work purposes if stopped. Following the 2021 coup, [Myanmar Peace Monitor](#) stated that routes shifted from the Asian Highway to the Kawkareik-Nabu-Htilon-Hpa-An hill route, bypassing official trade zones and checkpoints (such as the Myawaddy Trade Zone, Koe Taing X-Ray checkpoint, Gyaing Bridge, Indus and Hpa-An checkpoints).

4.2.2 BORDER ANALYSIS

As part of several sites' expansions, Myanmar Witness also identified potential river crossing points near scam compounds (figure 31).




Figure 31: Myanmar Witness's identification of border crossing sites (red triangles) in [Left] Shan State and [Right] Kayin State, situated close to scam-related geographies (white pinpoints) as visualised in Google Earth Pro.



Figure 32: Geolocation of TTM Park in Myawaddy Kayin State at [16.715281, 98.494753], showing a nearby border crossing and river boats potentially used for human trafficking into the scam park (Sources: [Left] redacted due to privacy concerns, [Right] Google Earth Pro, © 2025 CNES/Airbus).

5 PATTERNS IN HUMAN TRAFFICKING REPORTING

Myanmar Witness's dataset documents victim testimonies, missing persons reports, and incident records related to cyber fraud compounds across Southeast

Asia, primarily Myanmar, Cambodia, and Thailand. Data was predominantly collected from social media, supplemented by official reporting where possible.

5.1 VICTIM DEMOGRAPHICS

The dataset represents victims from numerous nationalities, with Chinese, Myanmar, Indian, Filipino, Indonesian, Vietnamese, Thai, Malaysian, Laotian, Japanese, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Nepalese and Kenyan nationals documented. These align with long-standing trafficking patterns around Myanmar, as mentioned in [ASEAN 2009 reporting](#), although since then, public sources indicate expanding [African](#) victimisation from [Ethiopia](#) and Uganda. Furthermore, a February 2026 [UN report](#) estimates that at least 300,000 people from 66 countries are currently forced to work in online scam operations.

Among the reports in Myanmar Witness's dataset, the youngest documented individual was reportedly a 14-year-old male. The report alleges severe abuse, including toe amputation and genital mutilation. Additionally, two 15-year-old girls from Hunan, China, were reportedly trafficked through Vietnam, and a 16-year-old was taken to Myanmar. One reported case was a victim with schizophrenia and hearing impairment, who was reportedly unable to work and was recruited. This highlights the potential targeting of disabled individuals.

Myanmar Witness acknowledges that the victim demographics presented in the dataset are based on a limited collection of human trafficking-related posts, which themselves were drawn from a narrow range of sources. For example, the apparent majority of Chinese nationals among trafficked individuals in Myanmar likely reflects the reliance and use of Chinese-speaking platforms such as Douyin, as well as Southeast Asian and Chinese relationship news sites and Telegram groups. Hence, this section does not suggest that these groups constitute the majority of trafficked victims, but rather that these demographics have been documented as affected by trafficking.

5.1.1 GENDERED HARMS

Myanmar Witness's dataset of collected claims from social media indicates that victims are predominantly male. This is significant because it could signal that gendered exploitation not only operates through sexualised or feminised targeting, but also through expectations that men should provide financially, and accept risky work. The dataset does not show strong evidence of recruitment adverts aimed exclusively at men, but instead, male victims appear to be drawn in through broadly targeted job advertisements. This is indicated through mixed-gender online spaces.

In certain cultural contexts, an 'office job' may appear to offer a better alternative to labouring work, as well as a route to improved status and income. As a result, male

victims may be lured and, once recruited, then subjected to the same coercive conditions and abuse once inside the compounds.

There are also examples collected from article reviews of men being targeted through [romantic partners](#), suggesting that emotional bonds can be exploited alongside financial pressure. This aligns with Myanmar Witness's findings that some recruiters use conventionally attractive female profiles, both genuine and fake, to build credibility around job advertisements and make the offers seem friendly, trustworthy and legitimate.

Myanmar Witness has observed through public reporting that there are female cases frequently involved in [sexual exploitation](#), [forced prostitution](#), and romance scam [facilitation](#) and [targeting](#), implying distinct gendered patterns in scam compound operations. For example a public report highlights claims that four Thai women were [kidnapped and extorted](#) by a Chinese criminal gang in Apollo Campus, while at another compound, others were [reportedly](#) forced into prostitution and then required to pay the equivalent of 25,000 baht (579.00 GBP) each to leave. Others reportedly endured long-term '[sexual slavery](#)' conditions.

Women also face harms similar to those of men in these compounds, such as a Malaysian woman who received electric shocks for failing to meet fraud targets. One woman was denied sanitary products when missing quotas, and a Filipino woman was arrested in the Philippines in 2025 after escaping. It was mentioned that she was treated as both a victim and a scammer in repatriation efforts.

Additionally, Myanmar Witness's investigation highlights that recruitment patterns do reinforce gendered targeting. For example, 'AI modelling' and acting jobs explicitly request female workers, using language likely to attract women while concealing true working conditions. Supporting Myanmar Witness' observations is a [Forbes](#) report mentioning that Chinese models were paid to sit in on video calls without understanding their purpose.

In this investigation, Myanmar Witness geolocated a potential sexual exploitation site in Shan State, though its scam compound connections remain limited at the time of writing.

5.2 COMPOUND CONDITIONS

Myanmar Witness documented claims whereby, upon arrival at the scam sites, individuals would immediately fall under strict financial control, passports are confiscated along with luggage and phones, and families are reportedly faced with ransom demands. While workers report receiving little to no pay after initial inducements, they instead accrue fines for lateness, poor performance or poorly maintained fake social media accounts.

Labour conditions within the scam compounds have been described with commonalities from some collected social media posts, such as 18-hour shifts from [08:00 - 02:00](#) local time, with individuals managing between four and 22 phones and following scripts for fraud operations. As part of the job, individuals are given monthly quotas for defrauding targets, with one case requiring defrauding the equivalent of 1 million yen (4,726.00 GBP) before being given a phone for personal use. This drives for relentless pressure. In addition, Myanmar Witness collected reports suggesting new arrivals undergo one-month training in scam techniques, including “pig butchering”, romance scams, and cryptocurrency fraud, with reported strict supervision of personal phone use, with no passwords permitted on devices. Finally, Myanmar Witness also collected reports that, individuals were trained to claim they worked in either in either China or Bangkok in order avoid raising suspicion.

5.3 PHYSICAL ABUSES

Myanmar Witness collected reports documenting physical abuse as the core method of control at these sites, where beatings were commonly recorded as a way of punishment for not meeting targets, as well as for any escape attempts or work refusal. Electric shocks have been logged across multiple compounds, as well as food deprivation, with individuals facing severe restriction, such as one meal a day. Individuals were also subjected to solitary confinement in dark rooms, while in other areas, such as Huanya Park, they reportedly endured “water dungeon” torture.

More extreme abuses documented also include nail pulling, eardrum burning, and amputations. Public beatings and torture were used as warnings to other workers, and severe cases would reportedly occur in private offices to avoid witnesses. Supporting this collection are reports such as one from [Amnesty International](#) in January 2026, that identified torture, rape, forced abortions and murder across dozens of compounds. Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC from a known scam compound, Yulong Bay International Park [16.752725, 98.474923], showing a deceased individual who appears to have fallen, or, as suggested in the post, could have been pushed, and died as a result (figure 33). However, Myanmar Witness cannot independently verify the death of said individual, as the footage is also taken allegedly after the fall occurred.



Figure 33: Douyin UGC of Yulong Bay International Park [16.752725, 98.474923] showing an individual who appears to have fallen, or allegedly been pushed, from an office building. Myanmar Witness cannot independently verify the incident. (Source redacted for privacy reasons).

5.4 WORKER COMMODIFICATION

In Myanmar Witness's collection of social media claims a there appears to be a theme of commodification of workers; victims are assigned monetary values and sold between compounds when they underperform. For example, one victim was allegedly told to recruit two more Chinese under 30 in order to be released, while one escapee from Shwe Kokko sought Myawaddy police help, only to be resold to Apollo Campus. One Chinese businessman, who had escaped, was allegedly recaptured and then sold to a Burmese businessman before returning to his original park for the equivalent of 300,000 yuan (32,920 GBP).

This buying and selling dynamic severely complicates matters when it comes to family tracking and international repatriation efforts, according to Myanmar Witness, as individuals are seen to move fluidly between traffickers and operators.

6 ACTOR & FUTURE WORK OVERVIEW

Myanmar Witness is aware of how the scam compound ecosystem involves a layered network of actors operating at multiple levels. At the highest level, criminal enterprises establish and manage major compounds. For example, Shwe Kokko exemplifies this structure, born from a 2017 deal between Karen National Army

leader Saw Chit Thu and a Chinese company. These operations rely heavily on armed groups for territorial control and security, most prominently the Kayin State Border Guard Force (BGF), which dominates border areas in Kayin State

While some larger businesses were involved in scam operations, in Shan State, for example, family-based networks enable cyberscam operations, from managing trafficking to treatment of workers within their compounds. Since Myanmar Witness's initial 2023 investigation, several actors have faced sanctions, arrests, and reported executions. Future reporting will prioritise mapping these major actors to specific compounds.

As a result, Myanmar Witness continues to investigate [criminal groups](#) that appear to be operating collaboratively within the compounds, renting entire buildings, floors or individual offices within scam compounds. These groups form a tight ecosystem inherently tied to the scam operations. Alongside this, financial intermediaries play a critical facilitation role, which Myanmar Witness will examine, such as companies like [Xinbi](#). This company has been observed as a 'Tongdao' financial gateway connecting scam operations to money laundering through several networks via Telegram-based underground markets. These advertise mule accounts, e-wallets, and QR code-based laundering infrastructure.

7 CONCLUSION

Myanmar Witness's investigation reveals an industrial-scale and highly adaptive criminal ecosystem operating across at least 137 suspected scam-related compounds in Myanmar and Southeast Asia. At least half of the sites show indicators of forced labour, human trafficking, and abuse. As stated, these areas thrive where governance is weak.

The physical infrastructure of scam parks varies considerably: from casino-style buildings (Myanmar New Yum City), to prison-like (Huanya Park), and deliberately concealed rural compounds (Qingsong Park). However, what connects them is the shared fortified perimeters, surveillance and strict movement restriction. Satellite imagery documents their continued border expansion, despite the reported military clearance operations. For example, KK Park's destruction in 2025 scattered operations, but not the network and recruitment was observed to resume within days.

The recruitment pipeline feeding these compounds has proven resilient, with false job advertisements migrating across public platforms such as Facebook and TikTok to more private communication channels, including Telegram. Additionally, the evolution from call centres to 'AI modelling' and 'chatting' roles, and the deployment of sophisticated sockpuppets targeting vulnerable youth. When Myanmar gained notoriety, recruiters simply pivoted to generic destinations in Southeast Asia.

Victims drawn from dozens of nationalities are subjected to passport confiscation, debt bondage, food deprivation, physical torture, sexual exploitation, and in some reported cases, death. Workers are bought and sold between compounds, and are often doubly penalised as victims and perpetrators. Women face distinct harms and are sometimes reportedly subjected to sexual exploitation.

Technological escalation further compounds scam operations. Starlink devices are installed on rooftops before centres are even fully operational, and AI tools expand the linguistic and geographic reach of fraud operations. Underground Telegram markets offer fake account packages and money-laundering infrastructure on demand. The ecosystem is professionalising, and the gap between its technical sophistication and enforcement efforts is widening.

Physical clearance operations on these sites fail without dismantling the financial networks, armed group relationships, and recruitment infrastructure. Sustained transnational action must target actors, money flows, and platforms, and address gendered levels that enforcement routinely overlooks.

Myanmar Witness will continue to monitor and investigate actors, financial intermediaries, gendered harms and the evolution of scam practices utilising AI in the forthcoming reports.

8 METHODOLOGY & LIMITATIONS

Myanmar Witness follows a methodology of digital preservation and rigorous, replicable analysis. Digital content is collected and archived in a secure database and hashed to confirm authenticity and prevent tampering.



Myanmar Witness applies a four-tier classification system to describe the extent to which footage has been independently verified by Myanmar Witness. This is as follows:

In addition, Myanmar Witness uses a confidence judgment system to describe the extent of independent verification:

- Very High: Myanmar Witness is 85-95% sure that the event took place as described in the claims. Digital content is independently geolocated and mostly chronolocated, with strong corroborating evidence on details of the claim.

- High: Myanmar Witness is 70-80% sure that the event took place as described in the claims. Digital content is geolocated. Other reliable sources confirm the time and date, but it cannot be independently chronolocated. Other details of the claim have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Medium: Myanmar Witness is 50-60% sure that the event took place. The event is somewhat verified, but significant gaps remain.
- Low: The geolocation and chronolocation process has shown the location or timing of the digital content to be inaccurate.
- Unknown: There is insufficient evidence for the investigator to make a judgment.

For the avoidance of doubt, this verification system only refers to Myanmar Witness's ability to independently geolocate or chronocate footage. Incidents marked as unverified may still be substantiated by multiple eyewitness reports. Myanmar Witness also collates and assesses unverified information, including claims on social media. This information is presented as claims, rather than verified facts.

This report contains figures showing how footage has been geolocated. In these images, coloured lines are used to represent the left and right arcs of vision. Coloured boxes show corresponding landmarks or distinguishing details in each piece of footage or data. Geolocation is conducted using an array of open-source tools, such as Google Earth, to match satellite imagery with visual features identified in the footage or images. Geolocations are peer-reviewed.

Chronolocation is conducted using metadata, contextual analysis, weather patterns, and shadow analysis. Through this, possible time frames are deduced. For example, by orienting geolocated content and identifying the sun's position, time can be determined.

Myanmar Witness follows rigorous ethical standards: obscuring identifying information about individuals involved; censoring private information and images where appropriate; blurring graphic imagery; removing links to private individual accounts; and archiving digital content securely.

8.1 SCAM SITE MAPPING

This study employed a structured decision-making framework to classify suspected scam-compound locations using a combination of geolocated visual material and open-source intelligence (OSINT). The process began with the requirement that all entries must be supported by visual evidence containing reliable geographic coordinates, ensuring that every assessment was anchored to a

verifiable physical location. Once a location met this threshold, it was evaluated through a tiered system of evidentiary checks.

The first analytical stage considered whether traditional media sources, such as investigative and news reports, or official public statements, had identified the site as associated with scam activities. When such reporting existed, the location was checked against official or government sources reflecting this information.

1. Sites confirmed through official sources were categorised as “certain,” reflecting the highest confidence level.
2. Locations mentioned in traditional media and social media but not present in official records were instead assessed for additional supporting indicators. These included Google Maps business icons or user reviews, satellite imagery suggesting fortification, verifiable on-site video footage, and recruitment advertisements linked to scam operations. Locations with such supporting evidence were classified as “almost certain,” while those lacking any additional indicators were designated as “likely.”
3. If traditional media did not reference the site, the second stage examined whether social media sources suggested that the location might be associated with scam activity. When social media indicated such a link, the same supporting evidence criteria were applied. Locations with corroborating indicators were also classified as “almost certain,” while those without supporting evidence were excluded from the map as “possible” in our database, due to insufficient verifiable information.
4. Finally, if neither traditional nor social media sources suggested that the site was related to scam operations, the assessment relied solely on the presence or absence of supporting evidence. Locations displaying some indicators, such as satellite imagery of fortifications or geolocatable footage, were categorised as “possible,” reflecting a low but non-negligible level of assessment or “monitoring” if we have little information other than the geographic analysis itself of a site that could be scam-related. This also included sites with potential relevance, meaning they were not included on the map but would be observed for any future developments. Myanmar Witness collected a lot of ‘newer’ scam parks classified in this manner to be monitored as development continues.

Myanmar Witness has included a graph depicting the database classification of the 137 scam compounds. Nine sites are classified as “certain”, and nine as “almost certain”. An additional 34 sites are deemed “likely”, 60 are “possible,” and 25 remain under “monitoring” for any future developments.




Figure 34: Myanmar Witness's classification of 137 scam compounds from its collection database. It shows distribution across "certain", "almost certain," "likely," "possible", and "monitoring" categories.

This methodological approach ensured transparency and consistency in classifying suspected scam sites. By assigning locations to clearly defined evidence-based categories ranging from "certain" to "monitoring," the framework captured varying degrees of confidence and avoided overinterpretation of weak or unverified claims. This system also enabled the research to integrate diverse sources of information while maintaining rigorous standards of verification.




Figure 35: Methodological flow chart of decision-making for scam sites verification utilised by Myanmar Witness.

8.2 TEMPORAL SCOPE

Myanmar Witness assesses claims of scam compounds active after the February 2021 coup. Pre-existing sites are included if they are relevant to post-coup operations, claims of human trafficking, human rights violations and related crimes have only been collected from February 2021 onwards.

8.3 TRAFFICKING-RELATED CLAIMS AND RECRUITMENT

Myanmar Witness collected more than 100 social media posts across Telegram, TikTok, Douyin and Facebook that presented indicators of scam job advertisements. These included:

- Anonymous or newly created accounts with an **inconsistent** posting history
- Urgent language and unusually high overseas salaries
- No discussion on VISA/passport requirements
- Locations in known scam areas (e.g., Myawaddy, Kayin State, KK Park)

These recruitment posts were identified using keyword searches established primarily in Burmese and Chinese Mandarin words associated with jobseeking, regions of interest and the names of compounds themselves.

Additionally, Myanmar Witness collected posts from third parties, victims themselves and media reports on victims in English, Thai, Burmese, Chinese and Cambodian. These totalled over 104 individual reports; however, due to being collected from some sources such as Chinese/SEA news sites, there is bias present in patterns of reporting for age and ethnicity, primarily. Thus, Myanmar Witness has not included these as a central focus of its reporting, instead supplementing its analysis with third-party literature review and media articles. These sources provided additional information on trafficking routes, recruitment and pick-up experiences, and conditions within the scam compounds, including the physical abuse and exploitations of workers. Myanmar Witness utilised a small dataset from social media; the analysis of this comes from a qualitative assessment, with reports collected often in line with wider media reporting on victim experiences. This does not necessarily make this sample representative, but a sample of experiences.

8.4 LIMITATIONS

Myanmar Witness obtains information from an area of ongoing conflict. Consequently, selection bias may occur due to internet outages, lack of connectivity, fear of reprisal, or restrictions on media. Myanmar Witness strives to

eliminate bias by collecting digital content from multiple sources, including pro- and anti-regime news and social media.

The scam compound research specifically is subject to several methodological limitations that may affect the completeness of Myanmar Witness's investigations. First, during the collection phase, posts were gathered in Chinese and other languages. Myanmar Witness does not have native language speakers for all languages represented, which could result in the loss or misinterpretation of nuanced content. This is especially regarding sensitive materials such as online testimonies of human trafficking. While both machine translation tools and human translators have been employed where possible, machine translation can introduce inaccuracies, particularly around colloquialisms, criminal terminology, and proper nouns. These limitations reduce one's ability to fully interpret the intent, context, and detail of source materials, including one geolocated case of death, where it remains unclear whether the post implies suicide or a crime against the individual.

In the mapping phase of the work, identifying and cataloguing individual scam operation sites presented a recurring challenge as many sites share similar names, or are reported under multiple/the same names. This is not to mention the rebranding of sites, or sites operating under multiple aliases simultaneously; this is possibly even a deliberate tactic used by operators to evade detection and complicate monitoring efforts. To mitigate this, we have used updated Keyhole Markup Language (KML) overlays in Google Earth to map and spatially distinguish individual compounds, which allow for more reliable differentiation of physical sites. Despite this, duplicate entries or misattributed names are possible. Myanmar Witness has not included all identified scam-related geographies at the time of publication of this report due to our its rigorous methodology, which necessitates only including entities when they have reached the threshold of 'likely' to be a scam compound.

In this phase, investigators also encountered issues with the verification of physical site conditions, as this is heavily dependent on satellite imagery availability to a standard which Myanmar Witness could analyse in-depth. Major imagery providers frequently update coverage at irregular intervals, and in many cases, cloud cover over Southeast Asian regions can complicate monitoring efforts. Sites identified recently usually only have low-resolution satellite imagery that can be observed through open-source. This makes it difficult to detect or confirm indicators of fortification, such as the construction of perimeter barriers, guard posts, surveillance infrastructure, or other physical changes consistent with coercive compound operations, which our verification workflow relies upon. As a result, temporal verification, or confirming what conditions existed at a specific point in

time, is often not feasible and many sites remain currently verified as 'possible', due to the inability to confirm them directly.

In the second stage of Myanmar Witness's investigation, assessing individual testimonies and reports from victims, survivors, or informants, this section of work is particularly difficult to verify independently. Rather than relying on single accounts, Myanmar Witness pivoted to a pattern-based approach of collecting multiple reports corroborating patterns across different sources and geographic locations. Myanmar Witness uses consistency across reporting and experience accounts as a proxy indicator of reliability, covering similar sites, methods of recruitment, or conditions of confinement. The transnational nature of human trafficking means that many specific claims, victim number estimates and nationality breakdowns cannot be independently verified via OSINT. This research therefore refrains from presenting trafficking-related figures as definitive, instead contextualising this within the broader body of evidence available.