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ANALYSIS OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT
THROUGH EVACUATION ORDERS IN GAZA

CIR THEMATIC REPORT

3 September 2025

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CIR has investigated the use of displacement orders by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Gaza between 1 January 2025 and 31 July 2025. Specifically, CIR has analysed the proportion of Gaza that has been included within IDF evacuation orders or the IDF-designated buffer zone, the nature of military activity in both evacuated areas and purported 'safe' locations, and the permanence of displacement orders.

This report forms the initial stages of CIR's investigation, covering the analysis of the following indicators of displacement. A follow-up report is due to be sent to the FCDO later this September 2025, which will include analysis of further indicators, and high-level analysis of all indicators of displacement.

DISPLACEMENT ORDER STATISTICS ([Section 3](#))

- During the investigation period, CIR identified **74** displacement orders published by the IDF, consisting of **61** evacuation orders and **13** buffer zone announcements.
- Of the **623** IDF-designated Blocks in Gaza, **500** Blocks were included within displacement orders (**80%**). 478 Blocks (**77%**) were evacuated on multiple occasions, up to 11 times.
- The IDF-designated buffer zone expanded from approximately **115km²** (32% of Gazan land) to around **276km²** (76%) between January and July 2025, representing a **139% increase**.
- Additionally, the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone decreased by **67%** from **74km²** in January 2025 to **24km²** in July 2025.

STATEMENTS AND IDF ANNOUNCEMENTS ([Section 4](#) and [Section 5](#))

- CIR identified **51 statements** from Israeli ministers which advocated for the emigration or displacement of Palestinians from Gaza.
- Within the 74 IDF displacement orders, CIR noted threats of violence, threats to life, the use of commanding language, and references to "terrorist" presence and "dangerous combat zones".
- Within the 61 IDF evacuation orders, CIR observed trends instructing civilians to move southwest, away from the Israel-Gaza border, and a decline in the use of terms such as "humanitarian zone" and "shelters".¹

¹ CIR defines 'civilian population' in accordance with [Additional Protocol II](#) of the [Geneva Conventions](#): "The definition of civilians as persons who are not members of the armed forces is set forth in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I, to which no reservations have been made".

MILITARY ACTIVITY IN EVACUATED AREAS AND ‘SAFE’ LOCATIONS (Section 6)

- Of the **215** incidents verified by CIR in Gaza in this period, **120 (56%)** took place outside of the IDF-designated military area.²
- Of these 215 incidents, **21 (10%)** occurred within evacuated areas during the five days following a displacement order.
- Further, **20** incidents (9%) occurred in the safe areas that individuals were directed towards, including **four** incidents in the al-Mawasi humanitarian block (Block 88).

ACCESS TO HOSPITALS FOLLOWING DISPLACEMENT ORDERS (Section 7)

- CIR identified **195** hospitals and medical clinics in Gaza. The number of medical facilities located within the IDF-designated military area increased from **58 (30%)** in January 2025 to **105 (54%)** in July 2025.
- CIR identified **17** incidents that directly affected medical facilities and/or their surrounding vicinity during the reporting period, **47%** of which occurred within the IDF-designated military area.

INDICATORS OF THE PERMANENCE OF DISPLACEMENT (Section 8)

- At least **88%** of evacuated areas during the investigation period were later incorporated into the IDF-designated buffer zone, which civilians are warned not to approach.
- CIR identified **35** likely IDF military sites within the expanding Israeli-designated buffer zone from satellite imagery captured between June and August 2025, including sites within former residential areas away from the Israel-Gaza border.
- As noted in prior CIR reporting, demolitions and damage to infrastructure have been observed in evacuated areas, including areas where likely Israeli military infrastructure has been developed.

² The “military area” refers to areas of the Gaza Strip which were either designated as a buffer zone or listed as evacuation areas.

2 REPORT DETAILS

2.1 LOCATION SCOPE

Within this report, CIR has analysed displacement orders and their effects throughout the Gaza Strip, part of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs).

This report also makes reference to Block numbers within Gaza. Since 1 December 2023, the IDF has referenced a map of Gaza which divides the Strip into numbered Blocks, “as a means of identification that the residents of Gaza rely on for information and news”.³ The IDF uses these Block numbers in its displacement orders, instructing individuals present in specific areas to evacuate. As of 31 July 2025, a total of 623 blocks are included in the IDF’s map.⁴ Figure 1 shows a map of Gaza, divided into the IDF-designated Blocks.

2.2 DATE SCOPE

CIR has analysed incidents and displacement orders made from 1 January 2025 until an intelligence cut-off of 31 July 2025. This timeframe is also referred to as the investigation period.

³ [SAT1290](#)

⁴ *Ibid*



Figure 1: A map of Gaza divided into the 623 IDF-designated Blocks. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024.

2.3 REPORT METHODOLOGY

CIR has developed a methodology aimed at assessing indicators of forced displacement of the civilian population in Gaza.⁵

CIR has primarily focused on Israeli-issued displacement orders in Gaza between January and July 2025. For the purpose of this report, CIR adopts the term '**displacement orders**', which has been used by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), to refer to any announcements issued by Israeli officials which communicate guidance to civilians to leave or avoid a defined geographic area.⁶

CIR defines '**displacement orders**' as any announcements issued by Israeli officials which communicate the risk of danger to civilians in a defined geographic area. These include:

- **Israeli-issued evacuation orders (EOs)**: Communications encouraging civilians to leave an area in anticipation of potentially dangerous military operations in these areas.
- **Israeli-imposed 'buffer zone'**: An Israeli-declared zone where civilian presence is prohibited.

Overall, CIR identified **74** displacement orders, consisting of **61** evacuation orders and **13** buffer zone announcements.

Combined, both areas form what is referred to as the '**military area**', constituting the extent of Gazan territory where Israel has issued instructions to the civilian population that their presence in these areas could place them in danger. For this assessment, CIR has collected and analysed the statements issued on X by the IDF Spokesperson for the Arab Media, Avichay Adraee between 1 January 2025 to 31 July 2025.⁷

Evacuation orders are not prohibited under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Parties to the conflict are required "to the maximum extent feasible [...] take necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations".⁸ Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV specifies that evacuated persons shall be "transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased".⁹

In order to assess possible indicators of non-compliance with IHL, CIR has:

⁵ CIR defines 'civilian population' in accordance with Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions: "The definition of civilians as persons who are not members of the armed forces is set forth in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I, to which no reservations have been made".

⁶ SAT4423, SAT4424 and SAT4425

⁷ SAT4433

⁸ SAT4434

⁹ SAT4435

- A. Compiled online open-source information relating to the issuance of displacement orders by Israeli officials, including both the evacuation orders and statements made by senior administration officials;
- B. Assessed the nature of military activities within areas placed under such orders, consisting of activity within evacuated areas and areas persons were directed towards;
- C. Considered any restrictions placed on access to infrastructure protected under IHL, including hospitals;
- D. Assessed indicators of the apparent permanence of displacement orders;
- E. Considered the conditions of life in relocation areas;
- F. Assessed the presence of conditions unsuitable for the return of displaced peoples to areas placed under such orders.

The specific methodology for each Section is detailed at the relevant location.

This reporting series will be delivered in two reports. The first report, contained herein, will present an analysis of selected indicators outlined above. The second report will provide an analysis of further indicators, as well as a high-level analysis of all indicators in relation to possible forced displacement processes in Gaza.

3 OVERVIEW ANALYSIS OF ISSUED DISPLACEMENT ORDERS IN GAZA

3.1 OVERVIEW OF IDF DISPLACEMENT ORDERS

> DISPLACEMENT ORDER INSIGHTS

During the current Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza, starting on 7 October 2023, the IDF's displacement orders have been published on social media by Lieutenant Colonel Avichay Adraee, the head of the Arab media division of the IDF Spokesperson's Unit. CIR has logged all displacement orders published by Adraee on X between 1 January and 31 July 2025 (CIR's investigation period); the same displacement orders were also published to Adraee's Telegram and Facebook pages.¹⁰

During the investigation period, the IDF published a total of **74** displacement orders within Gaza. At least one displacement order was published during each month between January and July 2025; a breakdown of the number of displacement orders published per month is shown in Figure 2.

¹⁰ [SAT4338](#) and [SAT4339](#)

The number of displacement orders decreased during the Israel-Hamas ceasefire between 19 January and 18 March 2025.¹¹ The IDF published **seven** displacement orders during this time period, which prohibited individuals in Gaza from approaching the IDF-designated buffer zone, including the Philadelphi Crossing.

Two displacement orders, on 27 January and 10 February 2025, stated that “residents will be permitted to return on foot to the northern Gaza Strip via Salah al-Din Street”.¹² However, during the week following 18 March 2025 (when the Israel-Hamas ceasefire was concluded), multiple displacement orders were issued to areas within northern Gaza, including Jabalia, Beit Lahia, and Beit Hanoun.¹³




Figure 2: A breakdown of the months when displacement orders were published by the IDF during the investigation period. A total of 74 displacement orders were published across the period.

As well as the displacement orders’ date of publication, CIR also tracked the time of day at which displacement orders were published. This analysis showed that the most common hours of publication by Avichay Adraee were from 08:00-08:59, 14:00-14:59, and 22:00-22:59 local time (**six** times each). With the exception of 01:00-07:00, displacement orders were published at all hours of the day, with no apparent identifiable pattern (Figure 3).

CIR has also reviewed **215** verified incidents in Gaza between January and July 2025, assessing their timing in relation to displacement orders and whether they took place in areas subject to such orders or to areas where individuals were told to evacuate towards. This analysis is provided in [Section 6](#).

¹¹ [SAT4346](#), [SAT4347](#) and [SAT4345](#)

¹² [EO0136](#) and [EO0138](#)

¹³ [SAT4347](#), [SAT4345](#), [EO0097](#), [EO0100](#), [EO0105](#) and [EO0106](#)




Figure 3: The IDF's displacement orders during the investigation period were published between the hours of 07:00 and 01:00.

> INSIGHTS INTO EVACUATED AREAS

Of the **623** IDF-designated Blocks in Gaza, **500** Blocks were included within the IDF's displacement orders published between 1 January and 31 July 2025 (**80%**). Of these 500, **478** Blocks were evacuated on multiple occasions. The most affected Blocks were 1814 and 1816, which were each evacuated **11** times. A breakdown of the number of instances each Block was evacuated is provided in Figure 4.

The most commonly evacuated Blocks (those evacuated nine times or more) are also listed in Figure 5. This analysis indicates that areas in northern Gaza, such as Jabalia, Beit Hanoun, and Gaza City, were the most commonly evacuated areas within the Strip.




Figure 4: A map of the 623 Blocks in Gaza, showing the number of times each Block was evacuated between 1 January and 31 July 2025.

Most commonly evacuated blocks	Number of times included in EOs	Location
1814	11	Jabalia
1816	11	Jabalia
1770	10	Beit Hanoun
1797	10	Jabalia
1817	10	Jabalia
719	9	al-Tuffah, Gaza City
1803	9	Southern Jabalia
1806	9	Jabalia

Figure 5: A list of the most commonly evacuated blocks in Gaza between 1 January and 31 July 2025.

During the review of Avichay Adraee’s displacement orders, CIR found several inconsistencies in how evacuation warnings were communicated. This likely impacted the nature of how displacement orders were interpreted on the ground in Gaza. Some examples include:

- There were inconsistencies in the format of how the warnings were communicated. Sometimes, the relevant Blocks to be evacuated were detailed within the text, either in the image or the post’s description, but were not displayed as highlights on the accompanying map.¹⁴ For consistency, CIR considered the Blocks visible within the maps.
- There were inconsistencies with the level of detail visible on the evacuation maps. Sometimes the highlighting was detailed to the Block boundaries, and at others, the highlights would cut through the corners or lines.¹⁵ For the most representative assessment of the orders themselves, CIR mapped the highlights as they were displayed on the IDF maps.
- If a Block was half-highlighted, whether mentioned within the evacuation text or highlighted on the map, such as Block 131 in EO0114, CIR considered the whole Block as having been issued a displacement order.¹⁶

¹⁴ For example, Block 100 in [EO0160](#) is mentioned in the text, but is not highlighted on the evacuation map.

¹⁵ For example, [EO0159](#).

¹⁶ [EO0114](#)

3.2 OVERVIEW OF THE IDF-DESIGNATED BUFFER ZONE

CIR mapped change to the buffer zone between January 2025 and July 2025, where the IDF announced that non-military presence is prohibited.

- Figure 6 shows that a decline in the buffer zone area coincided with the beginning of the ceasefire period from 19 January 2025 to 10 February 2025.
- However, between 10 February and 18 March 2025, the buffer zone expanded from **63km²** to **140km²**, preceding the resumption of the conflict and renewed military activity in Gaza.
- The buffer zone grew from covering approximately **115 km² (32% of Gaza's 364 km²)** in January 2025 to around **276 km² (76%)** on 27 July 2025, representing a **139%** increase.




Figure 6: Area of the IDF's buffer zone measured in km² during the investigation period from January 2025 to July.

3.3 OVERVIEW OF THE MILITARY AREA

The 'military area' refers to areas of Gaza claimed as being unsafe or operational by official IDF communications. This consists of Blocks either designated as part of the buffer zone, evacuation areas, or dangerous combat zones.

- CIR recorded a baseline value of **177km²** in January 2025, where the military area accounted for approximately **49%** of Gaza's 364km² area. CIR noted a **71%** increase by July 2025 to **303km²**.
- The **65%** reduction in the size of the military area between January 2025 (177km²) and February 2025 (63km²) was followed by an expansion from **63km²** to **222km²** between February 2025 and March 2025, as the temporary ceasefire period concluded (Figure 7).




Figure 7: Area of the IDF's military area, measured in km², during the investigation period from January 2025 to July 2025.

3.4 OVERVIEW OF THE AL-MAWASI HUMANITARIAN ZONE

A humanitarian zone, referred to in IHL as a “hospital and safety zone”, is defined as “a space intended to shelter the wounded, the sick, and civilians from the effects of conflict, and is meant to be far removed from military operations”.¹⁷ In Gaza, the designated humanitarian zone is known as the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone.

In 2025, the IDF issued two displacement orders mapping out the area designated as a humanitarian zone, on 1 January 2025 and 15 January 2025.¹⁸ As the military area expanded throughout the investigation period, any Blocks issued with an order to evacuate were removed from the original al-Mawasi humanitarian zone.

Therefore, the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone decreased in size during the investigation period. In January 2025, it covered 74km² of Gaza, but by July 2025, its size had decreased by 67%, to 24km² (Figure 8).

CIR has also included maps showing the humanitarian zone’s reduction in size throughout the investigation period in Figures 9-15.




Figure 8: Area of the humanitarian zone in Gaza measured in km² during the investigation period from January 2025 to July 2025.

¹⁷ [SAT4436](#)

¹⁸ [EO0180](#) and [EO0133](#) respectively




Figure 9: Map of the military area and the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone in January 2025, showing the percentage of Gaza's territory designated as the area and zone. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024.




Figure 10: Map of the military area and the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone in February 2025, showing the percentage of Gaza's territory designated as the area and zone. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024.




Figure 11: Map of the military area and the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone in March 2025, showing the percentage of Gaza's territory designated as the area and zone. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024.




Figure 12: Map of the military area and the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone in April 2025, showing the percentage of Gaza's territory designated as the area and zone. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024.




Figure 13: Map of the military area and the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone in May 2025, showing the percentage of Gaza's territory designated as the area and zone. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024.




Figure 14: Map of the military area and the al-Mawasi zumanitarian zone in June 2025, showing the percentage of Gaza's territory designated as the area and zone. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024.




Figure 15: Map of the military area and the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone in July 2025, showing the percentage of Gaza's territory designated as the area and zone. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024.

4 ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENTS

CIR identified a total of **51 statements** from Israeli ministers during the investigation period **which advocated for the emigration or displacement of Palestinians from Gaza**. This statements' list is joined to the report in a spreadsheet format.

Over the reporting period, July 2025 saw the highest number of recorded statements calling for Palestinians' displacement: 22 statements (Figure 16). The higher proportion of statements in July 2025 could possibly be attributed to the encouragement and incitement of Israel Katz, the Israeli Defence Minister, who at the time advocated for the reallocation of "all Palestinians in the Gaza Strip into a 'humanitarian' zone in Rafah".¹⁹ Further, he called for a "humanitarian city" to be "built on the ruins of Rafah in southern Gaza [which would] initially house some 600,000 displaced Palestinians who have been forced to evacuate to the al-Mawasi area" (PD1457).²⁰




Figure 16: Number of statements advocating for the immigration or displacement of Palestinians from Gaza collected over the investigation period from January 2025 to July 2025.

Examples of the statements advocating for the emigration or displacement of Palestinians from Gaza over the reporting period include:

¹⁹ SAT4401

²⁰ SAT4402

- In a post on X on 13 January 2025, Israeli Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich, stated, “This is the time to continue with all our might, to occupy and cleanse the entire Strip, to finally take control of humanitarian aid from Hamas, and to open the gates of hell on Gaza until Hamas surrenders completely and all the hostages are returned” (PD1146).²¹
- In his remarks at the start of a government meeting on 30 March 2025, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated, “We will see to the general security in the Gaza Strip and will allow the realization of the Trump plan for voluntary migration. This is the plan. We are not hiding this and are ready to discuss it at any time” (PD1229).²² The ‘Trump plan’ refers to the Trump Administration’s proposal for the “voluntary” relocation of Palestinians from Gaza to “other countries or secure zones”.²³
- In an interview with the Channel 14 news outlet on 3 July 2025, the Israeli Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, spoke about reports that a ceasefire deal may be reached between Israel and Hamas. In the interview, Ben-Gvir stated, “We need to occupy all of Gaza and encourage immigration. Enough with the excuses - this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity” (PD1351).²⁴
- As reported by the Israeli Maariv news outlet on 7 July 2025, the Israeli Defense Minister, Israel Katz, stated, “We want to harm Hamas in three ways: Hamas leaders around the world will pay; the immigration plan that will be implemented, the Prime Minister is already leading attempts to look for countries that will absorb them; and taking territory and disarming the Gaza Strip of weapons and means of warfare” (PD1379).²⁵

²¹ [SAT2944](#)

²² [SAT3658](#)

²³ [SAT4421](#)

²⁴ [SAT4163](#)

²⁵ [SAT4233](#)

5 ANALYSIS OF DISPLACEMENT ANNOUNCEMENTS

CIR analysed displacement orders collected over the reporting period to examine and highlight specific language employed in the dataset. From the analysis, **four** thematic categories were identified, including: threat of violence, threat to life, “terrorist” presence and dangerous combat zone.

Further, of the **74** displacement orders published over the investigation period, **61 (82%)** were considered to be evacuation orders, as they included instructions on the areas to evacuate and where to evacuate to. Within these 61 evacuation orders, CIR noted general trends that individuals were ordered to evacuate to the south and west, away from the Israel-Gaza border.

5.1 EVACUATION ORDER SENTIMENT ANALYSIS

CIR conducted sentiment analysis of the collated evacuation orders during the reporting period. From the analysis, five key thematic categories were identified. It is important to note that these categories were not mutually exclusive and were identified across multiple evacuation orders.

The categories are as follows:

EVACUATION ORDER CATEGORIES	LANGUAGE EXPLANATION	EVACUATION ORDER EXAMPLE
Threat of violence	Statements referencing the use of extreme force or highlighting that movement from the Block/s is required for civilians' safety.	"The IDF is operating with extreme force in the area and will attack any area used to launch rockets towards the State of Israel. For your security, evacuate immediately to the west and refrain from returning to dangerous combat areas". ²⁶
Threat to life	Statements warning that remaining in the specified Block/s creates a risk to life.	"In light of the terrorist activities in the area, the Defense Army is expanding its operations through maneuvering ground forces and intensifying sudden and concentrated firepower. For your safety, you are requested to evacuate immediately westward". ²⁷
"Terrorist" presence	Statements including references to the presence of a designated terrorist organisation or militant group in the Block/s included in the EO.	"The Defense Army continues to operate with great force to destroy the enemy's capabilities and terrorist infrastructure in the area, as it expands its activities in this region to operate in an area it has not operated in before". ²⁸
Dangerous combat zone	Statements including reference to dangerous combat zones. A combat zone refers to an area experiencing ongoing hostilities, including armed conflict operations. ²⁹	"Urgent warning to everyone who has returned or intends to return to the areas of Beit Lahia, Jabalia, Beit Hanoun, Shuja'iyya, Daraj, the Old City , Al-Tuffah, Al-Zeitoun and their neighbourhoods. The aforementioned areas are dangerous combat zones!". ³⁰

²⁶ [EO0172](#)

²⁷ [EO0127](#)

²⁸ [EO0131](#)

²⁹ [SAT4406](#), [SAT4407](#), and [SAT4422](#)

³⁰ [EO0173](#)

<p>Use of commanding language</p>	<p>Statements including the use of directive or imperative wording in an evacuation order, specifically in terms that express urgency or obligation.</p>	<p>"#Urgent To all those present in the Khan Yunis area in the neighbourhoods of Al-Jalaa, Hamad City, Al-Nasr and Al-Qarara 6 in blocks 36, 40, 89: The IDF is operating with great force to destroy the terrorist organisations in the area and will attack any area used for launching rockets. [...]For your safety, evacuate immediately north to the known shelters in Deir al -Balah and do not return to the dangerous combat areas . The terrorist organisations continue to bring disaster upon you - evacuate immediately".³¹</p>
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An analysis of the displacement orders collected over this reporting period shows the following trends, as represented in Figure 17:

- The use of commanding language and threat to violence was the most commonly identified category in the displacement order dataset.
- References to a threat of violence saw a gradual increase in use, with the exceptions of a decrease in May 2025 and no recorded use in February 2025. In addition, references to a threat of violence were most commonly seen in displacement orders which also contained commanding language.
- In April and May 2025, each of the five categories were used in all identified displacement orders.

³¹ [EO0169](#)




Figure 17: A breakdown of sentiment analysis categories from January to July 2025 when displacement orders were published by the IDF. A total of 74 orders were published during the investigation period.

5.2 EVACUATION ORDER INSTRUCTIONS

Of the 74 displacement orders published by the IDF, 61 were considered to be evacuation orders.³² These EOs contained a map of the evacuated area, including an arrow to show the direction in which evacuees should travel.

CIR analysed the following instructive elements of the 61 evacuation orders:

1. The cardinal direction in which evacuees are instructed to travel within the order's text.
2. The 'safe' location mentioned within the text, where evacuees are told to travel towards.
3. The mention of shelters within the named 'safe' location.
4. The cardinal direction of the arrow shown within the order's map.
5. Whether the cardinal direction of the arrow shown within the announcement's map matched the direction listed within the order's text.

These elements are highlighted in an example within Figure 18. The accompanying tables also break down CIR's findings relating to the 61 evacuation orders' instructions.

³² The remaining 13 evacuation orders only showed the general buffer zone within Gaza, or provided general announcements relating to military activity in the Strip.



Direction listed in text	Number	Percentage
North	1	2%
South	20	33%
West	21	34%
West then south	1	2%
Not mentioned	18	30%

Arrow direction in map	Number	Percentage
North	2	3%
Northeast	4	7%
Northwest	13	21%
Southwest	26	43%
Southwest and northwest	2	3%
West	14	23%

Arrow and text matching	Number	Percentage
Yes - Match	57	93%
No - Don't match	4	7%

Shelters in safe location	Number	Percentage
Mentioned	31	51%
Not mentioned	30	49%

The IDF's evacuation orders instructed evacuees to move south and west, away from the Israel-Gaza border.

In four evacuation orders, the direction mentioned within the text did not match the direction shown with an arrow in the accompanying map.

Around half of the EOs advised evacuees to move to known shelters. The majority of EOs mentioning shelters were published in March and April (71%), after which the mention of shelters declined.

Figure 18: An example of the instructions included within the IDF's evacuation orders. Source: EO0169.

'Safe' location	Number	Percentage	Cluster number	Cluster percentage
Humanitarian zone	2	3%	31	51%
Al-Mawasi	29	48%		
Gaza City	8	13%	12	20%
Gaza City - Centre	1	2%		
Gaza City - West	3	5%		
South of Gaza Valley	1	2%	2	3%
Southern Gaza Valley	1	2%		
Khan Younis	1	2%	1	2%
Deir al-Balah	1	2%	1	2%
Gaza City - West and Khan Younis	2	3%	2	3%
Not mentioned	12	20%	12	20%

The above table lists the 'safe' locations mentioned within the text of IDF evacuation orders. This indicates an overall desire for evacuees to move southwards. Notably, the term "humanitarian zone" was only used in two EOs published in January 2025 and has not been mentioned since; instead, evacuation orders have referred to the area as al-Mawasi.³³

6 NATURE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

6.1 APPROACH OF ASSESSING MILITARY ACTIVITIES

CIR has identified material indicating the nature and timing of military activities in areas placed under displacement orders and in 'safe' locations individuals were directed towards. This analysis leverages CIR's dataset of incidents within Gaza over the investigation period. The dataset only features incidents where CIR has gathered visual open-source material which meets the threshold of verification by passing two tests:

- Geolocation test: Visual open-source material has been situated at a specific set of coordinates.
- Originality test: Visual open-source material appears to be original and relevant. The material has not previously been uploaded in reference to a different context or incident.

³³ [EO0133](#) and [EO0180](#)

Any incidents with material that passes these tests meet the project's threshold of verification. Any incidents with material that has been geolocated to areas placed under displacement orders have been analysed in this section.

A notable limitation of CIR's methodology is that it focuses exclusively on visual open-source material. This availability bias means that incidents not captured on camera are often not reflected in the dataset. Evacuation orders can limit CIR's ability to verify incidents, as individuals who have been ordered to leave evacuation areas may not have been present in those areas to capture visual material.

Furthermore, where incidents on the ground have been documented, there are instances where the available footage is of poor quality, making it difficult to independently verify the location or clearly determine what is depicted. CIR has highlighted cases where a full verification has not been possible.

In order to mitigate these limitations, CIR has also collected allegations and testimonies shared by media outlets, conflict actors, and journalists, to provide context to events which have not been captured on camera. During this investigation, CIR has identified allegations which claim that military activity has taken place in evacuated areas, including those where footage of incidents has not been captured. Whilst these allegations do not meet CIR's threshold of verification, this process will provide further insights into areas where military activities have occurred and, conversely, where military activity has not been reported.

Therefore, CIR's assessment of military activity within or near evacuated areas provides an indication of the activity occurring on the ground, rather than a comprehensive evaluation of all activities.

6.2 INCIDENTS OUTSIDE THE MILITARY AREA

CIR verified 215 incidents in Gaza between 1 January and 31 July 2025. Of the 215 incidents, 120 (**56%**) took place outside of the IDF-designated military area.³⁴

- February 2025 had the highest proportion of incidents outside of the military area, with 13 of the 14 incidents being located outside of the designated area (**93%**).³⁵ This month coincided with the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, which came into effect on 19 January 2025 and ended on 18 March 2025 (Figure 19).
- Despite the increase in the size of the military area in June 2025 and July 2025 (as detailed in [Section 3.3](#)), **more than 50%** of incidents occurred in areas without displacement orders, outside the military area.

³⁴ The "military area" refers to areas of the Gaza Strip which were either designated as a buffer zone or listed as evacuation areas.

³⁵ The 13 incidents outside the military area are IPIN2615, IPIN2626, IPIN2631, IPIN2662, IPIN2668, IPIN2683, IPIN2689, IPIN2709, IPIN2713, IPIN2715, IPIN2754, IPIN2696 and IPIN2673. The incident within the military area is IPIN2759




Figure 19: A comparison of incidents occurring within and outside of the military area between January 2025 and July 2025.

6.3 NATURE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY FOLLOWING DISPLACEMENT ORDERS

To assess the nature of military activity following official Israeli orders, CIR examined whether incidents occurred in areas where displacement orders were issued. CIR also noted whether any military actions were identified in ‘safe’ locations to which people were directed within displacement orders.

> INCIDENTS IN AREAS ISSUED WITH DISPLACEMENT ORDERS

CIR assessed its list of verified incidents in relation to the 74 identified displacement orders between January 2025 and July 2025.

- Of the recorded 74 displacement orders across Gaza, 17 (**23%**) had one or more incidents occur within the five days following their issuance.
- Of the 215 verified incidents across Gaza during the same timeframe, 21 (**10%**) occurred within evacuated areas during the five days following a displacement order. This includes incidents in areas that were either issued evacuation orders or which fell within the IDF-designated buffer zone. For the remaining 194 incidents (**90%**), CIR did not identify a displacement order before the incident.
- **Four** incidents within CIR’s dataset occurred in areas evacuated by more than one displacement order:

INCIDENT	INCIDENT DATE	RELEVANT DISPLACEMENT ORDERS
IPIN3093 shows an air-dropped munition landing on a multi-story residential building, resulting in an explosion, on Ebad Alrahman Street, Jabalia. ³⁶	22/05/2025	EO0113 - 21/05/2025 ³⁷ EO0153 - 22/05/2025 ³⁸
IPIN3210 shows damage to the Jaffa Secondary School for Boys, in al-Tuffah, Gaza City. ³⁹	30/06/2025	EO0125 - 29/06/2025 ⁴⁰ EO0168 - 30/06/2025 ⁴¹
IPIN3236 shows a residential building reduced to rubble, at least one adult casualty, and one possible covered casualty, in Khan Younis. ⁴²	08/07/2025	EO0172 - 06/07/2025 ⁴³ EO0127 - 08/07/2025 ⁴⁴
IPIN3245 shows at least six casualties being carried into Nasser Hospital, including four minors, in Khan Younis. ⁴⁵ While CIR did not identify footage from the location where the casualties sustained their injuries, according to Palestinian Journalist Abdallah Alattar (IP13731), who shared footage of their arrival at Nasser Hospital on 9 July 2025, their injuries were sustained by “the tent of the Joudeh family near Bir 19 in Mawasi, Khan Yunis”. ⁴⁶ Therefore, it is likely the incident location falls within the area mapped by both evacuation orders.	09/07/2025	EO0172 - 06/07/2025 ⁴⁷ EO0127 - 08/07/2025 ⁴⁸

- From March 2025 onwards, the number of incidents occurring within Blocks with issued displacement orders gradually increased, with **two** incidents in March 2025,⁴⁹ **three** in April 2025,⁵⁰ **four** in both May 2025⁵¹ and June 2025,⁵² and **six** in July 2025.⁵³

³⁶ [IP12792](#)

³⁷ [EO0113](#)

³⁸ [EO0153](#)

³⁹ [IP13384](#) and [IP13385](#)

⁴⁰ [EO0125](#)

⁴¹ [EO0168](#)

⁴² [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13542](#), [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13560](#), [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13553](#) and [IP13561](#)

⁴³ [EO0172](#)

⁴⁴ [EO0127](#)

⁴⁵ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13588](#) and [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13731](#)

⁴⁶ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13731](#)

⁴⁷ [EO0172](#)

⁴⁸ [EO0127](#)

⁴⁹ IPIN2893 and IPIN2939

⁵⁰ IPIN2944, IPIN2945 and IPIN2949

⁵¹ IPIN3091, IPIN3093, IPIN3107 and IPIN3115

⁵² IPIN3210, IPIN3211, IPIN3137 and IPIN3138

⁵³ IPIN3236, IPIN3245, IPIN3255, IPIN3277, IPIN3278 and IPIN3290

- An assessment of the number of days between the issue date of a displacement order and the occurrence of incidents found that most incidents (**57%**) occurred on the same day the order was announced (Figure 20).⁵⁴ This figure includes the four incidents which were related to more than one displacement order.




Figure 20: The number of days incidents occurred after following a displacement order's issue date.

- Of the 21 incidents occurring in areas mapped out by displacement orders, nine (**43%**) involved 'Damage to residential buildings'⁵⁵ and five (**24%**) involved the 'Use of force against unarmed persons or degrading treatment' (Figure 21).
- The incidents following displacement orders occurred across **19** IDF-designated Blocks,⁵⁶ with Blocks 132 (Deir al-Balah) and 731 (Gaza City) having **two** incidents each. These blocks were concentrated in **nine** different locations (Figure 22), with the most incidents documented in the Jabalia area (**5** incidents) and Gaza City (**4** incidents).

⁵⁴ IPIN2433, IPIN2939, IPIN2944, IPIN2945, IPIN2949, IPIN3093, IPIN3115, IPIN3137, IPIN3210, IPIN3211, IPIN3236 and IPIN3278

⁵⁵ IPIN2433, IPIN2945, IPIN2949, IPIN3093, IPIN3107, IPIN3211, IPIN3236, IPIN3277, and IPIN3290

⁵⁶ IDF-designated Blocks 107, 112, 116, 132, 148, 256, 606, 614, 731, 975, 980, 1770, 1793, 1804, 1808, 1809, 2334, 2370 and 8803

Category of incidents that occurred within areas mapped by displacement orders




Figure 21: Category of incidents that occurred within areas mapped by displacement orders.




Figure 22: Twenty-one incidents followed displacement orders between January 2025 and July 2025. Source: Google Earth Pro, Airbus, 01/12/2024.

> INCIDENTS IN 'SAFE' AREAS PERSONS WERE DIRECTED TOWARDS

CIR assessed the number of verified incidents which occurred in 'safe' areas, as designated within the 61 identified evacuation orders between January 2025 and July 2025. The 13 buffer zone announcements were not included in this analysis, as they did not provide information on the direction individuals should evacuate towards.

- Of the 61 evacuation orders recorded across Gaza, **27 (44%)** had one or more incidents occur in the safe areas that individuals were directed towards, during the five days following the order's issuance.
- Of the 215 verified incidents across Gaza during the same timeframe, **20 (9%)** occurred in the safe areas individuals were directed towards (Figure 25).⁵⁷ Of these, **four (20%)** occurred in Block 88, the Block designated for part of the al-Mawasi humanitarian area.
- Of the 20 incidents that occurred in areas designated as safe by evacuation orders, **six (30%)** involved 'Damage to shelters'⁵⁸ and **five (25%)** involved the 'Use of force against unarmed persons or degrading treatment' (Figure 23).⁵⁹
- March 2025 and April 2025 had the most incidents occur in areas communicated as being safe, with **five**⁶⁰ and **eight**⁶¹ incidents, respectively.

Eleven incidents within CIR's dataset occurred in areas identified as a safe cardinal direction under more than one evacuation order.⁶² For example, **IPIN3278** shows considerable damage to a World Health Organisation (WHO) warehouse, in Am Dhair, Deir al-Balah, within IDF-designated Block 132,⁶³ following an alleged Israeli strike on 20 July 2025.⁶⁴ This incident occurred: two days after EO0130 was issued,⁶⁵ three days after EO0128 was issued,⁶⁶ and five days after EO0129 was issued.⁶⁷

All three of these evacuation orders directed individuals to the south towards the al-Mawasi area. To reach the al-Mawasi area, individuals would likely have to travel through Deir al-Balah, where the warehouse was located, especially since areas east of Salah al-Din Street were incorporated within the IDF-designated buffer zone.

⁵⁷ IPIN2849, IPIN2891, IPIN2892, IPIN2896, IPIN2935, IPIN2943, IPIN2948, IPIN2960, IPIN2975, IPIN2983, IPIN3009, IPIN3013, IPIN3019, IPIN3070, IPIN3091, IPIN3175, IPIN3187, IPIN3193, IPIN3278 and IPIN3290

⁵⁸ IPIN2849, IPIN2892, IPIN2960, IPIN3070, IPIN3175 and IPIN3193

⁵⁹ IPIN2935, IPIN2975, IPIN3019, IPIN3091 and IPIN3187

⁶⁰ IPIN2849, IPIN2891, IPIN2892, IPIN2896 and IPIN2935

⁶¹ IPIN2943, IPIN2948, IPIN2960, IPIN2975, IPIN2983, IPIN3009, IPIN3013 and IPIN3019

⁶² IPIN2891, IPIN2892, IPIN2935, IPIN2948, IPIN2960, IPIN2983, IPIN3013, IPIN3019, IPIN3175, IPIN3278 and IPIN3290

⁶³ [IP13753](#) and [IP13756](#)

⁶⁴ [SAT4272](#) and [SAT4273](#)

⁶⁵ [EO0130](#)

⁶⁶ [EO0128](#)

⁶⁷ [EO0129](#)

However, Block 132 was also issued an evacuation order on 20 July 2025,⁶⁸ meaning that this incident falls both within a cardinal direction communicated as safe, and subsequently a zone warned for upcoming military activity. These possible conflicting instructions could cause uncertainty for individuals on the ground. This was the case with two more incidents:

- This incident showing damage to the WHO warehouse is connected with IPIN3290, where an alleged Israeli strike impacted a WHO staff residence on 21 July 2025, a day after the warehouse damage.⁶⁹ Footage shared on 25 July 2025 shows a significantly damaged residential building located 180 metres from the warehouse in Am Dhair, Deir al-Balah.⁷⁰
- Footage shared on 21 May 2025 shows one adult casualty lying motionless on the side of al-Hekker Street in Deir al-Balah refugee camp, within IDF-designated Block 148 (IPIN3091).⁷¹ The incident occurred on the same day as EO0128,⁷² which directed persons southward toward the al-Mawasi area, but also three days after EO0114 issued an evacuation order for the same Block.⁷³

⁶⁸ [EO0131](#)

⁶⁹ [SAT4325](#)

⁷⁰ [IP13834](#)

⁷¹ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP12790](#) and [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP12791](#)

⁷² [EO0128](#)

⁷³ [EO0114](#)




Figure 23: Category of incidents that occurred in areas communicated as safe in evacuation orders.

An assessment of the number of days between the issue date of an evacuation order and the occurrence of incidents in areas communicated as being safe found that:

- **Ten** incidents (**29%**) occurred **three** days after the order was announced (Figure 25).⁷⁴ This figure includes the incidents which were related to more than one evacuation order.
- **Seven** incidents (**20%**) occurred on the same day an evacuation order was announced.⁷⁵




Figure 24: The number of days incidents occurred after in areas communicated as being safe following an order's issue date.

⁷⁴ IPIN2891, IPIN2982, IPIN2935, IPIN2983, IPIN3019, IPIN3175, IPIN3278 and IPIN3290

⁷⁵ IPIN2849, IPIN3009, IPIN3013, IPIN3091, IPIN3175, IPIN3187 and IPIN3193




Figure 25: Twenty incidents following evacuation orders in areas communicated as being safe between January 2025 and July 2025. Source: Google Earth Pro, Airbus, 01/12/2024.

7 ACCESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTED UNDER IHL - HOSPITALS

Based on the consolidated mapping of displacement orders between January 2025 and July 2025, CIR has identified infrastructure protected under IHL which has been placed under displacement orders. This report has focused specifically on hospitals that have been placed under specific evacuation orders or are now encompassed by displacement orders of any kind. CIR's follow-up report will analyse further types of infrastructure protected under IHL, including Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities.

CIR analysed incidents affecting medical facilities to assess how they were impacted by the expansion of the military area. CIR also assessed cases where exemptions for medical facilities were issued within evacuation orders. This includes an evaluation of satellite imagery and user-generated content (UGC) to identify any subsequent military activity at or around the hospitals despite these exemptions.

7.1 MEDICAL FACILITY LOCATIONS ASSESSMENT

CIR aimed to assess the extent to which hospitals and other medical facilities have been affected by evacuation orders and the expansion of the military area. CIR collected data from Open Street Maps (OSM), which provided the location of hospitals, medical centres and clinics across Gaza. This data was also cross-referenced with other open-source data platforms, including Humanitarian Data Exchange and CIR's verified dataset of incidents. CIR also verified the presence of field hospitals during the investigation period using SkySat Imagery from Planet Labs. For the purpose of this report, CIR included all medical infrastructure regardless of its operational status.

CIR then identified the number of hospitals and clinics located within the military area for each month from January 2025 to July 2025. OSM distinguishes hospitals as "institutions for health care providing treatment by specialised staff and equipment" and clinics as "a medical centre, with more staff than a doctor's office, that does not admit inpatients".⁷⁶ Verified incidents from CIR's incident list were also extracted and analysed according to whether they occurred within or outside the military area.

> DATA INSIGHTS

CIR identified a total of **195** medical facilities across Gaza, comprising **48** hospitals and **147** clinics (map of locations in Figure 26).

⁷⁶ [SAT4431](#) and [SAT4432](#)




Figure 26: A map showing the location of medical facilities across Gaza. Source: Google Earth Pro, Airbus, 28/12/2024.

CIR mapped the locations of medical facilities in relation to each monthly military area (Figures 28-31). Based on this mapping, the percentage of Gazan medical facilities falling within the military area was calculated for each month to highlight the following trends (Figure 27):

- Between January 2025 and February 2025, the number of facilities within the military area fell by **95%**, from 58 to three out of 195. This coincided with the ceasefire period from 19 January 2025 to 18 March 2025, when the IDF reduced the military area to roughly **17%** of Gaza's border area (refer to [Section 3.3](#) for further context).
- Following the ceasefire, the number of medical facilities within the military area increased sharply at two intervals. Between February 2025 and March 2025, the figure rose from **three** to **52** as the IDF resumed military operations. A further rise occurred between April 2025 and May 2025, from **53** to **91** facilities, followed by a steady upward trend in the subsequent months as the military area continued to expand.



Figure 27: Line chart showing the monthly percentage of medical facilities in Gaza located within the military area. The reporting period covers January to July 2025.




Figure 28: A map showing the location of medical facilities across Gaza in January (left image) and February (right image).
 Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 28/12/2024.




Figure 29: A map showing the location of medical facilities across Gaza in March (left image) and April (right image).
 Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 28/12/2024.



Figure 30: A map showing the location of medical facilities across Gaza in May (left image) and June (right image).
 Source: Google Earth Pro, Airbus, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 28/12/2024.




Figure 31: A map showing the location of medical facilities across Gaza in July.
 Source: Google Earth Pro, Airbus, CNES / Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 28/12/2024.

> VERIFIED INCIDENTS

CIR verified 17 incidents that directly affected medical facilities and/or their surrounding vicinity during the reporting period, based on CIR's incident list (Figure 32).

- Nearly half (**47%**) of the incidents occurred within the military area, as designated by the IDF on each respective incident date.⁷⁷
- Nasser Hospital was the most affected facility with the highest number of incidents (**four**).⁷⁸
- An incident at Al-Ahli Baptist Hospital (IPIN3138) resulted in the greatest number of casualties across all recorded cases, with 12 adult casualties and one minor.⁷⁹
- CIR calculated that **76%** of the identified incidents resulted in damage to medical facilities. The 13 incidents showing damage to healthcare facilities are listed in the table below.

⁷⁷ Gaza City; IPIN2971, IPIN2995, IPIN3138, IPIN3191, and IPIN3235. Jabalia; IPIN3083, IPIN3120, IPIN3137, and IPIN3071

⁷⁸ IPIN2891, IPIN2950, IPIN3058, and IPIN3082

⁷⁹ IPIN2971, IPIN3138, and IPIN3191

LOCATION	IPIN AND DATE	COORDINATES	BLOCK NUMBER	CASUALTIES	RELEVANT EVACUATION ORDERS	DAMAGE
Nasser Hospital	IPIN2891 23/03/2025	31.3471, 34.2930	107	Yes - three adults, two unknown, one possible covered	In the area individuals were directed towards in EO0139 and EO0140	Yes
	IPIN2950 07/04/2025	31.3477, 34.2939	107	Yes - one adult	No	No
	IPIN3058 13/05/2025	31.3471, 34.2930	107	Yes - two adults	No	Yes
	IPIN3082 19/05/2025	31.3482, 34.2938	107	No	No	Yes
Al-Ahli Arab Baptist Hospital	IPIN2971 13/04/2025	31.5046, 34.4618	614	No	No	Yes
	IPIN3138 05/06/2025	31.5048, 34.4614	614	Yes - 12 adults, one minor	No	No
	IPIN3191 17/06/2025	31.5051, 34.4611	612	Yes - seven adults	No	No
Indonesian Hospital	IPIN3083 19/05/2025	31.5353, 34.5088	1770	No	No	Yes
	IPIN3137 04/06/2025	31.5352, 34.5088	1770	No	No	Yes
Al-Aqsa Hospital	IPIN3134 04/06/2025	31.4197, 34.3597	128	No	No	Yes
Turkish	IPIN2887	31.4778, 34.4167	674	No	No	Yes

Friendship Hospital	20/03/2025					
HEAL Palestine - Al-Kuwaiti Specialist Field Hospital	IPIN2983 15/04/2025	31.3581, 34.2794	88	Yes - two adults	Yes - EO0107, EO0148 & EO0149	Yes
Al-Dorrah Children's Hospital	IPIN2995 22/04/2025	31.5145, 34.4805	719	No	No	Yes
Al-Shifa Hospital	IPIN3235 07/07/2025	31.5237, 34.4423	707	Yes - one adult, one minor	No	No
European Hospital	IPIN3066 13/05/2025	31.3029, 34.3207	76	Yes - one adult	No	Yes
Al-Tawba Clinic	IPIN3071 15/05/2025	31.5394, 34.4965	1810	Yes - two adults, one unknown age & four possibly covered	No	Yes
Noura al-Kaabi Dialysis Centre	IPIN3120 01/06/2025	31.5354, 34.5107	1770	No	No	Yes




Figure 32: A map showing the location of incidents at medical facilities, or within their close proximity, involving damage to medical facilities, vehicles, use of force or degrading treatment, and damage to shelters. Source: Google Earth Pro, Airbus, 28/12/2024.

7.2 HOSPITAL EXEMPTIONS

A hospital exemption is a provision that permits hospitals to remain operational despite a general evacuation order requiring persons to leave designated areas.

Between 1 January 2025 and 31 July 2025, two hospitals were located in areas affected by displacement orders, but were exempted from evacuation: Nasser (Block 107) and Al-Amal (Block 108). Both hospitals are located in Khan Younis, southern Gaza.

> NASSER HOSPITAL

As shown in the timeline below, CIR identified three EOs advising residents to evacuate Block 107, where the Nasser Hospital is located. Avichay Andraee shared these EOs between 26 May 2025 and 23 June 2025. However, in all three orders, the Nasser Hospital was exempted from evacuation.

CIR identified allegations of incidents involving damage to Nasser Hospital, or military activity within its proximity, including during the days following a displacement order which exempted the hospital from evacuation. At the time of writing, CIR did not identify user generated content of these incidents and therefore could not verify these allegations. **Allegations of incidents** are coloured in green below, with **official announcements** by Avichay Adraee coloured in black.

13 and 19 May 2025

On 28 May 2025, Medical Aid for Palestinians reported that on 13 and 19 May 2025 that “Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis was hit on 13 May [2025] in its burn unit. It was attacked again on May 19 [2025], damaging its medical warehouse. The hospital has been struck three times within the last two months”.⁸⁰

CIR identified one incident that occurred on 13 May 2025 which showed at least two adult casualties and considerable damage to the Nasser Medical Complex.⁸¹ Further, CIR identified an incident on 19 May 2025 which showed the apparent aftermath of two audible explosions, heard from the Nasser Hospital Complex with one video depicting a plume of smoke rising near a warehouse on the north side of the Nasser Hospital Complex.⁸² However, these incidents occurred before the hospital was exempted from a displacement order.

10 June 2025

On 10 June 2025, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières reported: “Israeli forces’ displacement orders and bombings in the close vicinity of Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis have forced Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) to adjust its operations in the hospital and move part of its burn and orthopedic activities to our field hospital in Deir al-Balah”.⁸³

⁸⁰ [SAT4029](#)

⁸¹ [IPIN3058](#); [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP12653](#); and [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP12601](#)

⁸² [IPIN3082](#) and [IP12710](#)

⁸³ [SAT4412](#)

**13 and 19 May
2025**

On 28 May 2025, Medical Aid for Palestinians reported that on 13 and 19 May 2025 that “Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis was hit on 13 May [2025] in its burn unit. It was attacked again on May 19 [2025], damaging its medical warehouse. The hospital has been struck three times within the last two months”.⁸⁰

CIR identified one incident that occurred on 13 May 2025 which showed at least two adult casualties and considerable damage to the Nasser Medical Complex.⁸¹ Further, CIR identified an incident on 19 May 2025 which showed the apparent aftermath of two audible explosions, heard from the Nasser Hospital Complex with one video depicting a plume of smoke rising near a warehouse on the north side of the Nasser Hospital Complex.⁸² However, these incidents occurred before the hospital was exempted from a displacement order.

12 June 2025

On 12 June 2025, Avichay Adraee posted an EO to X advising residents to evacuate “Blocks 63, 64, 100, 107, 108” claiming “the IDF is operating with great force in the areas where you are located to destroy the capabilities of the terrorist organizations”. The post also noted that the “evacuation orders do not include Nasser Hospital”.⁸⁴

12 June 2025

On 12 June 2025, Haaretz stated, “Employees reported that several days ago, the IDF dropped a bomb about 150 meters from the hospital that caused a ceiling to collapse and shattered windows”.⁸⁵ At the time of writing, CIR did not identify any footage related to this allegation.

13 June 2025

On 13 June 2025, the New Arab reported, “In Gaza, Israeli forces continued airstrikes on Nasser Hospital, a refugee camp in Nuseirat, and at the Sanfour junction east of Al-Tuffah in Gaza City”.⁸⁶

Further, on 13 June 2025, the Wafa News Agency claimed, “In the south, Israeli forces bombarded the vicinity of Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis with multiple artillery shells, while issuing evacuation threats, raising alarms of an imminent forced displacement of civilians in the area.”⁸⁷

23 June 2025

On 23 June 2025, Avichay Adraee posted an EO to X advising residents to evacuate “Blocks 107, 108, 109” as “the IDF is operating with extreme force”. The EO also noted that “the evacuation order does not include Al-Amal and Nasser hospitals”.⁸⁸

2 July 2025

A ReliefWeb update, published on 2 July 2025, stated that on 14 June 2025, “Khan Yunis city and governorate, the vicinity of Nasser Hospital was hit by Israeli forces gunfire and artillery shelling”.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ [EO0160](#)

⁸⁵ [SAT4413](#)

⁸⁶ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [SAT4409](#)

⁸⁷ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [SAT4408](#)

⁸⁸ [EO0165](#)

⁸⁹ [SAT4410](#)

While CIR did not identify any incidents at Nasser Hospital between 13 May 2025 and 23 June 2025, satellite imagery shows what appears to be a reduction in temporary shelters within the immediate surroundings and wider vicinity of the hospital between 10 June 2025 and 20 June 2025 (Figure 33).



Figure 33: Satellite imagery from 10 June 2025 and 20 June 2025 showing a reduction in temporary shelters near the Nasser Hospital.

> AL-AMAL HOSPITAL

The following timeline shows two identified EOs which advised residents to evacuate Block 108, where the Al-Amal Hospital is located, and its surrounding blocks. Avichay Andraee shared these EOs between 2 June 2025 and 23 June 2025. For both identified EOs, the Al-Amal Hospital was exempted from evacuation.

CIR additionally identified two allegations, noting the impact military activity had on the operational capacity of Al-Amal Hospital. At the time of writing, CIR did not identify user-generated content of these incidents. As mentioned previously, **allegations of incidents** are coloured in green below, with **official announcements** by Avichay Andraee coloured in black.

2 June 2025

On 2 June 2025, Avichay Andraee posted an EO to X advising residents to evacuate “Blocks 47, 106, 108, 109” stating that “the IDF will operate with extreme force” in these areas. The EO also stated that the “evacuation order does not include Al-Amal Hospital”.⁹⁰

9 June 2025

On 9 June 2025, the Director-General of the World Health Organisation, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, stated, “Al-Amal Hospital in Khan Younis, #Gaza, is now essentially out of service due to increasing hostilities in its vicinity.

Access to the hospital is obstructed, preventing new patients from reaching care, and leading to more preventable deaths. The hospital still has patients who need care, but is not accepting new ones. Two emergency medical teams - one national, the other international - are still doing their best to serve the remaining patients with the limited medical supplies left on the premises”.⁹¹

Further reporting from 9 June 2025 claimed “at least seven Palestinians were killed and seven others injured on Monday [9 June 2025]” after an “Israeli drone strike targeted a tent sheltering displaced people west of Khan Younis”.⁹² Nabd, an Arabic news aggregator, also stated that “13 citizens were killed” after “Israeli occupation forces’ shelling of several areas in Khan Younis”.⁹³

12 June 2025

On 12 June 2025, Haaretz reported that the Al-Amal Hospital “is located in an area that the IDF has ordered evacuated, meaning that it is unable to receive new patients and is expected to close”.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ [E00154](#)

⁹¹ [SAT4414](#)

⁹² [SAT4411](#)

⁹³ [SAT4417](#)

⁹⁴ [SAT4415](#)

23 June 2025

On 23 June 2025, Avichay Adraee posted an EO to X advising residents to evacuate “Blocks 107, 108, 109” as “the IDF is operating with extreme force”. The EO also noted that “the evacuation order does not include Al-Amal and Nasser hospitals”.⁹⁵

Satellite imagery between 17 May 2025 and 28 June 2025 shows what appears to be a reduction in temporary shelters and buildings within the vicinity of Al-Amal Hospital (Figures 34-35). In addition, CIR identified a possible military forward operating base (FOB), with at least 20 vehicles visible, approximately 1.7 kilometres to the northeast of al-Amal Hospital.

⁹⁵ [EO0165](#)




Figure 34: Satellite imagery from 17 May 2025 and 20 June 2025 showing a reduction in temporary shelters, buildings and a possible FOB near Al-Amal Hospital.



Figure 35: Satellite imagery from 20 June 2025 showing a possible FOB and at least 20 vehicles approximately 1.7 kilometres from Al-Amal Hospital.

8 ASSESSING EVACUATION ORDERS' PERMANENCE AND CONDITIONS SUITABLE FOR CIVILIANS' RETURN

CIR has sought information which clarifies the possible permanence of displacement orders. CIR has assessed the following indicators of permanence, some of which will be addressed in CIR's follow-up report. This report tackles the following:

- A. **The absorption of evacuated areas into the Israeli-designated buffer zone:** CIR analysed the frequency at which evacuation orders fell within the boundaries of the Israeli-imposed, so-called 'buffer zone' between January and July 2025.
- B. **The presence of Israeli military infrastructure in areas placed under evacuation:** Planet Labs satellite imagery has been analysed to indicate the presence or development of military infrastructure in areas of Gaza placed under evacuation orders. Such infrastructure represents a possible indicator of sustained presence of forces within Gazan territory and the failure to institute conditions appropriate for the return of displaced persons.

8.1 ABSORPTION OF EVACUATION ORDERS INTO THE BUFFER ZONE

Based on the assessment of evacuation orders, including orders relating to the presence of 'dangerous combat zones', CIR found that the vast majority of areas placed under evacuation orders were later absorbed into the IDF-designated buffer zone.

Between January and July 2025, **302km²** of Gazan territory had been placed under evacuation orders. Of this area, **267km²** was located within the extent of the IDF-designated buffer zone as of 27 July 2025.

This indicates that at least **88%** of the areas placed under evacuation orders announced between 1 January and 31 July 2025 had been absorbed into the buffer zone by 27 July 2025.

Israel has repeatedly communicated risks to individuals who approach the buffer zone.⁹⁶ The incorporation of areas placed under evacuation orders into the buffer zone may be viewed as an indication that conditions unsafe for the civilian population continue to be imposed in areas intended to be evacuated only on a temporary basis.

⁹⁶ Examples include, [EO0138](#), [EO0136](#) and [EO0134](#)

8.2 PRESENCE OF MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE IN AREAS PLACED UNDER EVACUATION ORDERS

CIR has considered likely Israeli military infrastructure as a possible indicator both of the possible permanence of evacuation orders, as well as an indicator of the failure to create conditions appropriate for the return of displaced persons, based on the presence of what appears to be Israeli armed forces embedded within these areas.

For the purpose of this investigation, military infrastructure is defined as locations which appear to have been fortified or otherwise developed for military activities. Fortification processes, like the construction of defensive earthworks or the creation of roads between fortified sites, provide a possible indicator of the permanence of these positions within Gaza (Figure 38). CIR has primarily focused on what appears to be forward operating bases (FOBs) within Gaza.

CIR identified 35 likely IDF military sites within Gaza by 31 July 2025. By assessing satellite imagery, 18 of these sites were observed within the 26 January 2025 IDF-designated buffer zone (Figure 36). All 35 sites were observed within the 27 July 2025 buffer zone (Figure 36).




Figure 36: Map of likely IDF military infrastructure in Gaza, based on Planet Labs Skysat satellite imagery from June, July and August 2025.⁹⁷
 Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 23/12/2024.

⁹⁷ Imagery selected based on optimal coverage of Gaza.

Whilst many of the sites appeared to be situated close to the Israel-Gaza border fence, a number of sites had been established deeper into Gazan territory, including within residential areas (Figure 37), often following evacuation orders.

The development of likely IDF military sites situated deeper within Gaza has followed the evacuation orders in some areas. CIR identified likely IDF FOBs in Rafah and near Khan Yunis, which appear to have been constructed after the areas were initially placed under evacuation orders in March 2025, then absorbed into the military area from May 2025 onwards (Figure 37).⁹⁸




Figure 37: Map of likely IDF military infrastructure in Gaza, based on Planet Labs Skysat satellite imagery from June, July and August 2025. Shown in relation to CIR's mapping of March 2025 evacuation orders. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, 01/12/2024.

⁹⁸ For example, [EO0140](#) and [EO0143](#).

8.3 MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE

In some locations, IDF military infrastructure has been developed within former residential areas, much of which has been extensively destroyed. In some cases, earthworks and military vehicles can be seen in satellite imagery near buildings that appear to have been undamaged, despite high levels of destruction in the surrounding area (Figure 38). This may indicate possible use of civilian buildings as IDF FOBs, resulting in a failure to bring about conditions suitable for the return of civilians.



Figure 38: Satellite imagery of an identified possible IDF FOB near Gaza City. Source: Planet Labs.



Figure 39: Satellite imagery of a possible FOBs in former residential areas near Khan Younis. Source: Planet Labs.

Prior CIR reporting has quantified high levels of destruction in the built environment in areas where likely Israeli military infrastructure has been developed. In its report on damage to the built environment in Rafah, CIR observed high levels of destruction in settlements near the IDF's Morag Corridor, an area comprising newly developed roads and FOBs. The area was placed under an evacuation order on 31 March 2025.⁹⁹

Damage to the built environment in close proximity to the newly developed Morag Corridor was especially notable. CIR analysed two villages, selected based on their proximity to the Morag Corridor, that experienced levels of destruction above the norm for their zone, based on a more extensive survey of the wider area (Figure 40).




Figure 40: Villages assessed by CIR in proximity to the Morag Corridor. Source: OpenStreetMaps.

⁹⁹ [EO0111](#)

Locale 1, a small village of 158 mapped structures in Block 21, contained only four destroyed structures as of 1 February 2025. That figure rose to 151 by 11 May 2025, with 95.6% of mapped structures within the area classified as destroyed, approximately 10% higher than the rate of destruction recorded for Zone 21 as a whole (85.85%)

Locale 2, a village of 443 mapped structures comprising Block 30 and Block 32, contained only five destroyed structures as of 1 February 2025. That figure rose to 321 destroyed structures by 11 May 2025, with the large-scale earthworks of the Morag Corridor passing through an area formerly composed of apparent residential structures and polytunnels (Figure 41). Locale 1 experienced slightly higher levels of destruction (72.9%) relative to the average for Zone 30 (67.8%) and Zone 32 (69.4%).



Figure 41: Analysis of damage incurred to a village in proximity to the Morag Corridor. Source: Planet Labs.

ANNEX - METHODOLOGY

CIR ensures all information collected is preserved, verified, analysed, investigated and reported in a manner consistent with the guidelines published by the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).¹⁰⁰ These guidelines detail the best practices for human rights evidence safekeeping and reliance for later judicial use. The diagram below illustrates this methodology:



COLLECTION OF FOOTAGE

CIR has developed a dataset of verified incidents in Israel, Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon from open-source information. All incidents highlighted within this report have been verified and archived within CIR's dataset of incidents.

CIR conducts extensive searches in Arabic, Hebrew and English across UGC and social media platforms, including X, Facebook, YouTube, and Telegram, to identify potential human rights violations. Each piece of content verified by CIR is assigned an IP number, which links to the original footage or image. Each incident, often comprising multiple IP numbers, is also assigned an IPIN number.

CIR also collects statements from politicians and military leaders and allegations and testimonies from media outlets. These sources provide contextual information regarding the human impact of incidents. Each statement, allegation or testimony is assigned a SAT number, which also links to the original source and is archived within CIR's database. Official evacuation orders published by the IDF are separately archived within CIR's database and are assigned an EO number.

CIR categorises all pieces of content into five graphic levels, which are also noted within CIR's spreadsheet of incidents:

¹⁰⁰ [SAT2455](#)

1	None - Infrastructural destruction or low-level violence.
2	Mild - Verbal or minor physical violence and derogatory behaviour.
3	Moderate - Offensive verbal violence, derogatory behaviour, minor abuse of individuals, or minor injuries in which blood is not visible.
4	Severe - Graphic, subtle displays of deceased individuals or injuries.
5	Graphic - Very graphic displays of deceased individuals or severe injuries.

VERIFICATION OF FOOTAGE

CIR aims to verify the location and date of all pieces of content within its spreadsheet.

Geolocation is the process of determining the specific location of a piece of content using online tools and techniques, such as satellite and street-view imagery. By comparing footage of an incident with this online imagery, CIR geolocates the latitude and longitude of incidents and provides the coordinates of each location, up to six decimals.

This report contains several visuals showing how footage has been geolocated. In these images, coloured boxes are used to show how landmarks or distinguishing details correspond with satellite imagery in that location. A red pin indicates the precise location where the incident occurred.

CIR confirmed the date when a piece of content was captured by identifying when it was first uploaded online and cross-referencing this with local reporting. To do so, CIR completed reverse image searches using screenshots from UGC and analysing when they first appeared online. CIR also conducted metadata analysis in an attempt to identify the original recording date.

In some cases, CIR could not independently verify the date when a piece of content was recorded. In these instances, CIR notes the date when a piece of content was uploaded online.