



CENTRE for
INFORMATION
RESILIENCE

FOLLOW-UP REPORT:
ANALYSIS OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT
THROUGH EVACUATION ORDERS IN GAZA

CIR THEMATIC REPORT
26 September 2025

FOLLOW-UP REPORT: ANALYSIS OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT THROUGH EVACUATION ORDERS IN GAZA

CIR Thematic Report

26 September 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	3
2 REPORT DETAILS.....	4
2.1 LOCATION SCOPE.....	4
2.2 DATE SCOPE.....	4
2.3 REPORT METHODOLOGY.....	6
3 OVERVIEW ASSESSMENT.....	7
4 INDICATORS OF CONDITIONS OF LIFE IN RELOCATION AREAS.....	12
4.1 AIR-DROPPED MUNITION STRIKES IDP CAMP IN GAZA CITY IPIN2894.....	12
4.2 DRONE DROPS OBJECTS CAUSING SMOKE AT GAZA CITY REFUGEE CAMP IPIN3070.....	14
4.3 BURNING TENTS AND ONE CASUALTY OBSERVED AT AL-MAWASI IDP CAMP IPIN2988.....	15
4.4 DRONE REMNANTS AT THE SITE OF A DAMAGED TENT IN AL-MAWASI ZONE IPIN3226.....	17
4.5 SEVERELY DAMAGED TENT AND SCORCH MARKS AT AL-MAWASI IDP CAMP IPIN3175.....	19
5 INDICATORS OF CONDITIONS TO RETURN TO EVACUATED AREAS.....	21
6 ACCESS TO OBJECTS PROTECTED UNDER IHL - WASH INFRASTRUCTURE AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.....	23
6.1 ACCESS TO OBJECTS PROTECTED UNDER IHL - WASH INFRASTRUCTURE	23
6.2 VERIFIED INCIDENT CASE STUDIES - WASH INFRASTRUCTURE.....	24
6.2.1 EXCAVATOR APPEARS TO DAMAGE WATER TOWER IN ABASAN AL-KABIRA.....	24

6.2.2 AT LEAST SEVEN CASUALTIES AMONGST DAMAGED WATER INFRASTRUCTURE IN GAZA CITY.....	26
6.2.3 IDF STRIKE CAUSES CASUALTIES AT WATER DISTRIBUTION POINT IN NUSEIRAT, GAZA.....	28
6.3 ACCESS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.....	29
6.3.1 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INSIGHTS.....	30
6.3.2 MARKETPLACES.....	32
> AT LEAST 29 CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE TO MARKET STALLS IN GAZA CITY	33
> FOUR CASUALTIES AT REPORTED MARKET ON JAFFA STREET, GAZA CITY..	35
6.3.3 GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS.....	36
> IMPACT CRATER AT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR BUILDING, KHAN YOUNIS.....	36
> ONE POSSIBLE CASUALTY AND DAMAGE TO THE DEIR AL-BALAH MUNICIPALITY COMPOUND IN DEIR AL-BALAH.....	38
> AT LEAST 11 CASUALTIES ON AL-WAHDA STREET IN NORTH RIMAL, GAZA CITY.....	40
7 EVACUATION AND DISPLACEMENT DURING THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD.....	41
7.1 DISPLACEMENT ORDERS AND BUFFER ZONES DURING THE CEASEFIRE..	41
7.2 INCIDENTS DURING THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD.....	47
7.2.1 PALESTINIAN JOURNALISTS RUN FROM GUNFIRE AND IDF TANK IN BEIT HANOUN.....	47
7.2.2 FIVE CASUALTIES AND BOMB REMNANTS WITHIN DESTROYED VEHICLE IN BEIT LAHIA.....	49
7.2.3 MINOR CASUALTY AFTER ALLEGED IDF DRONE STRIKE IN RAFAH.....	51
8 AL-MAWASI AND BUFFER ZONES SINCE JULY 2025.....	52
8.1 AL-MAWASI HUMANITARIAN ZONE.....	52
APPENDIX A - MORE TEMPORARY STRUCTURES IN AL-MAWASI AFTER IDF ANNOUNCEMENT ON 27 AUGUST 2025.....	57
APPENDIX B - INCREASE IN TEMPORARY STRUCTURES IN AL-MAWASI AFTER IDF ANNOUNCEMENT ON 10 SEPTEMBER 2025.....	59
8.2 IDF-DESIGNATED BUFFER ZONE.....	61
8.3 FURTHER INSIGHTS SINCE JULY 2025.....	62
9 PROPOSED AREAS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION.....	63
ANNEX - METHODOLOGY.....	65
COLLECTION OF FOOTAGE.....	65
VERIFICATION OF FOOTAGE.....	66

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report forms the second part of CIR's investigation into the use of displacement orders by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Gaza between 1 January 2025 and 31 July 2025.

CIR's first report on this subject was submitted to the FCDO on 3 September 2025 and provided an overview of IDF displacement orders, statements, and military activity, and analysis of civilians' access to hospitals and the permanence of displacement.¹ This follow-up report provides more detailed analysis and case studies relating to the **conditions of life in relocation areas** ([Section 4](#)); the **conditions of return to evacuated areas** ([Section 5](#)); **civilians' access to critical infrastructure** ([Section 6](#)); and **displacement during the ceasefire period** ([Section 7](#)). [Section 8](#) also provides an **overview of displacement in Gaza since 31 July 2025**, and [Section 9](#) contains suggestions of **areas for further research**.

Alongside the areas of further analysis provided in this report, CIR has outlined its initial conclusions relating to possible forced displacement in [Section 3](#), based on inferences and evidence gathered within both parts of this investigation. CIR's main conclusions are summarised as follows:

- 1) CIR considers it more likely than not that civilians across most of Gaza were instructed to evacuate or face significant risks to life.
- 2) CIR considers it more likely than not that Israel failed to provide sufficient clarity or detail within its evacuation orders, likely causing confusion amongst civilians in areas placed under these orders.
- 3) CIR finds inconclusive evidence relating to the imperative military rationale of Israel's evacuation orders in Gaza.
- 4) CIR considers it more likely than not that Israel failed to guarantee appropriate conditions within 'safe areas' established to accommodate displaced persons.
- 5) CIR considers it more likely than not that the frequency with which areas placed under evacuation orders were absorbed into the buffer zone indicates widespread and systematic displacement of Gaza's civilian population over the medium to long term.
- 6) CIR considers it more likely than not that civilians are largely unable to return to their homes due to Israeli military activities in areas placed under long-term displacement orders.

¹ CIR defines '[civilian population](#)' in accordance with [Additional Protocol II](#) of the [Geneva Conventions](#): "The definition of civilians as persons who are not members of the armed forces is set forth in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I, to which no reservations have been made".

2 REPORT DETAILS

2.1 LOCATION SCOPE

Within this report, CIR has analysed displacement orders and their effects throughout the Gaza Strip, part of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs).

This report also makes reference to Block numbers within Gaza. Since 1 December 2023, the IDF has referenced a map of Gaza which divides the Strip into numbered Blocks, “as a means of identification that the residents of Gaza rely on for information and news”.² The IDF uses these Block numbers in its displacement orders, instructing individuals present in specific areas to evacuate. As of 31 July 2025, a total of 623 blocks are included in the IDF’s map.³ Figure 1 shows a map of Gaza, divided into the IDF-designated Blocks.

2.2 DATE SCOPE

CIR has analysed incidents and displacement orders made from 1 January 2025 until an intelligence cut-off of 31 July 2025. This timeframe is also referred to as the investigation period.

At the FCDO’s request, CIR has also included a summary of changes to the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone and the buffer zone since 31 July 2025 in [Section 8](#).

² [SAT1290](#)

³ *Ibid*



Figure 1: A map of Gaza divided into the 623 IDF-designated Blocks. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024.

2.3 REPORT METHODOLOGY

CIR has developed a methodology aimed at assessing indicators of forced displacement of the civilian population in Gaza.⁴

CIR has primarily focused on Israeli-issued displacement orders in Gaza between January and July 2025. For the purpose of this report, CIR adopts the term '**displacement orders**', which has been used by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), to refer to any announcements issued by Israeli officials which communicate guidance to civilians to leave or avoid a defined geographic area.⁵

CIR defines '**displacement orders**' as any announcements issued by Israeli officials which communicate the risk of danger to civilians in a defined geographic area. These include:

- **Israeli-issued evacuation orders (EOs)**: Communications encouraging civilians to leave an area in anticipation of potentially dangerous military operations in these areas.
- **Israeli-imposed 'buffer zone'**: An Israeli-declared zone where civilian presence is prohibited.

Overall, CIR identified **74** displacement orders, consisting of **61** evacuation orders and **13** buffer zone announcements.

Combined, both areas form what is referred to as the '**military area**', constituting the extent of the Gazan territory where Israel has issued instructions to the civilian population that their presence in these areas could place them in danger. For this assessment, CIR has collected and analysed the statements issued on X by the IDF Spokesperson for the Arab Media, Avichay Adraee, between 1 January 2025 and 31 July 2025.⁶

Evacuation orders are not prohibited under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Parties to the conflict are required "to the maximum extent feasible [...] take necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations".⁷ Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV specifies that evacuated persons shall be "transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased".⁸

⁴ CIR defines 'civilian population' in accordance with Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions: "The definition of civilians as persons who are not members of the armed forces is set forth in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I, to which no reservations have been made".

⁵ SAT4423, SAT4424 and SAT4425

⁶ SAT4433

⁷ SAT4434

⁸ SAT4435

In order to assess possible indicators of non-compliance with IHL, CIR has:

- A. Compiled online open-source information relating to the issuance of displacement orders by Israeli officials, including both the evacuation orders and statements made by senior administration officials;
- B. Assessed the nature of military activities within areas placed under such orders, consisting of activity within evacuated areas and areas to which persons were directed towards;
- C. Considered any restrictions placed on access to infrastructure protected under IHL, including hospitals, WASH infrastructure and marketplaces;
- D. Assessed indicators of the apparent permanence of displacement orders;
- E. Considered the conditions of life in relocation areas;
- F. Assessed the presence of conditions unsuitable for the return of displaced peoples to areas placed under such orders;
- G. Analysed how and when displacement orders were communicated during the ceasefire period.

This reporting series for this investigation has been delivered in two reports. This report forms the second part of CIR's investigation, covering further indicators of displacement, as well as a high-level analysis of all indicators in relation to possible forced displacement processes in Gaza.

In Part 1 of this investigation, CIR reported that it had verified **215** incidents in Gaza between 1 January and 31 July 2025. Since the Part 1 report was submitted, CIR has verified five more incidents from this investigation period: IPIN2414, IPIN2458, IPIN3005, IPIN3109 and IPIN3215. This brings the total number of verified incidents to **220**.

3 OVERVIEW ASSESSMENT

With reference to verified material contained within Part 1 and Part 2 of this reporting series, CIR has reached initial conclusions relating this material to aspects of possible forced displacement. Such conclusions involved drawing inferences based on verified material gathered in the course of this investigation.

Assessment 1: CIR considers it more likely than not that civilians across most of Gaza were instructed to evacuate or face significant risks to life.

- Israel's instructions to evacuate were frequently accompanied with forceful or threatening language. The majority of the 74 displacement orders identified by CIR involved language which indicated that the application of force by Israel in these areas posed a risk of injury or death. Over 80% of

IDF-designated Blocks in Gazan territory were placed under such orders over this reporting period.

- The IDF's Arabic spokesperson, Avichay Adraee, issued a statement on 18 January 2025, which made clear that "It is forbidden to approach Israeli territory and the buffer zone. Approaching the buffer zone is extremely dangerous".⁹ Similar warnings were repeated throughout this reporting period.
- Considering the intensity of the application of force often used in Gaza by the IDF, the threat of such force in areas placed under displacement orders has presented civilians with dangerous circumstances that could be interpreted as withdrawing their agency, often leaving civilians with no real choice but to evacuate.¹⁰ Instructions by Israeli spokespersons appear to prohibit Gazans from safely accessing the vast majority of Gazan territory without the threat of violence.

Assessment 2: CIR considers it more likely than not that Israel failed to provide sufficient clarity or detail within its evacuation orders, likely causing confusion amongst civilians in areas placed under these orders.

- Evacuation orders were issued often and regularly contained contradictions, meaning that they likely caused confusion amongst civilians in areas placed under these orders.¹¹ In the week following the ceasefire, seven evacuation orders were published in seven days, covering 88 Blocks.¹² Four of these did not provide a location to evacuate to;¹³ one showed an arrow pointing in a different direction than the direction mentioned in the text.¹⁴
- During a 12-day period in June 2025 (2 to 12 June), 267 Blocks (43% of total blocks in Gaza) were evacuated across eight separate evacuation orders.¹⁵ Multiple evacuation orders can create confusion, as excessive detail could make it difficult to distinguish safe from unsafe areas. Individuals may also not monitor every order issued, leaving them unaware of the latest changes.

⁹ [SAT3320](#)

¹⁰ Based on information available in open sources, it is not always possible to independently verify the responsible actor. Taking reported allegations and contextual indicators into consideration, this report assesses the activity described as likely attributable to Israeli military operations.

¹¹ On average, an evacuation order was issued every 2.8 days across this entire reporting period. The ceasefire period was included in the calculation of this average.

¹² The seven EOs published in the week after ceasefire were: [EO0097](#), [EO0100](#), [EO0140](#), [EO0139](#), [EO0099](#), [EO0105](#), and [EO0106](#).

¹³ [EO0140](#), [EO0139](#), [EO0105](#), and [EO0106](#)

¹⁴ [EO0105](#)

¹⁵ The eight EOs published during this period were: [EO0154](#), [EO0117](#), [EO0118](#), [EO0155](#), [EO0156](#), [EO0157](#), [EO0158](#), and [EO0159](#).

- Evacuation orders were also often published late into the night, meaning people may not have seen them until the following day, when actions may have already started. Across the investigation period, 13 orders were published later than 22:00 (local time).

CIR was focused on displacement orders published online, and did not review other communication systems used in the dispersal of displacement orders, including, for example, texts and air-dropped pamphlets. Therefore, the assessments offer an indication of the communication environment, rather than a complete picture.

Assessment 3: CIR finds inconclusive evidence relating to the imperative military rationale of Israel's evacuation orders in Gaza.

- CIR found that, of the recorded 74 displacement orders across Gaza, 17 (23%) had one or more incidents occur within the five days following their issuance.¹⁶ This may indicate, in some cases, an absence of imperative military necessity required to justify displacing civilians from these areas.

However, comprehensive research into the amount of military activity undertaken in evacuated areas may be underrecorded in our dataset, given our exclusive focus on open-source material. This methodology relies heavily on audiovisual footage, which is more frequently captured by civilians on the ground who would have theoretically left these areas after an evacuation order has been issued.

Assessment 4: CIR considers it more likely than not that Israel failed to guarantee appropriate conditions within 'safe areas' established to accommodate displaced persons.

- Incidents repeatedly occurred within 'safe areas' that people were directed towards by evacuation orders, including the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone. Twenty incidents occurred within safe areas that individuals were directed towards during the investigation period.¹⁷ Forty-four incidents occurred within the boundary of the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone as outlined by the IDF in January 2025. Case studies also show incidents amongst Internally Displaced Persons' (IDP) tents, with verified IDF weapons shown within the footage.¹⁸

¹⁶ Part 1 - pg. 32

¹⁷ Part 1 - pg. 37

¹⁸ Part 2 - Section 4.1

- The al-Mawasi humanitarian zone decreased in size from 73km² to 24km² over this investigation period.¹⁹ Whilst the size of the military area in Gaza continued to increase throughout the investigation period, 'safe areas' became smaller over time. The increase in the number of displaced persons within these likely placed further strain on aid systems and critical infrastructure within the humanitarian zone.
- CIR found that the number of water wells accessible to displaced people in the humanitarian zone dropped from 79 to just 17, representing just 4% of all wells in Gaza, by July 2025. On one occasion, Israel issued an evacuation order which covered one of the largest remaining desalination plants in Gaza, which was contained within the al-Mawasi Humanitarian Zone.²⁰

Assessment 5: CIR considers it more likely than not that the frequency with which areas placed under evacuation orders were absorbed into the buffer zone indicates the widespread and systematic displacement of Gaza's civilian population over the medium to long term.

- The buffer zone expanded permanently and continuously throughout the reporting period. By 27 July 2025, at least 88% of the areas placed under evacuation orders between 1 January and 31 July had been absorbed into the buffer zone, reflecting a widespread pattern of evacuated areas being incorporated into the buffer.
- The buffer zone only declined in size at one point during a ceasefire in February 2025.²¹ Israel maintained a buffer zone of 63 km², despite a cessation in offensive military activities over this period.
- The continuous expansion of the buffer zone and subsequent prohibitions on civilian access to areas within it threaten Gazan civilians with long-term displacement from most parts of the Strip. This includes areas initially placed under evacuation orders in January 2025, which remain inaccessible to civilians by the end of July 2025 due to their absorption into the buffer zone.

As the scope of the reporting period was limited to seven months, CIR is limited in its capacity to make assessments as to the long-term imposition of these conditions within Gaza. For example, CIR is not able to predict whether the buffer zone may, at some point in the future, be reduced in size if hostilities cease.

¹⁹ Part 1 - pg. 15

²⁰ Part 2, Section 6.1

²¹ Part 2, Section 7.1

Assessment 6: CIR considers it more likely than not that civilians are largely unable to return to their homes due to Israeli military activities in areas placed under long-term displacement orders.

- The expansion of the buffer zone has been accompanied, in some cases, by widespread destruction to the built environment, including residential structures, sites of cultural significance and other civilian objects. In two areas (one in Khan Younis and one in Jabalia) analysed by CIR using satellite imagery, at least 70% of surveyed structures were destroyed, with the vast majority of damage occurring after the areas were added to the buffer zone.²² CIR identified comparable levels of destruction to the built environment in Rafah during the expansion of a key Israeli military passage: the Morag Corridor.²³
- CIR identified 35 likely IDF military sites, including forward operating bases, within the buffer zone between June 2025 and August 2025.²⁴ Sites were identified within former residential areas, some distance from the Israel-Gaza border fence. Many of the bases were constructed within or near civilian objects, including at least one school.²⁵
- The destruction of the built environment and persistent IDF presence within areas placed under displacement orders signals major impediments to the return of civilians to these areas.

²² Part 2 - pg. 21-22

²³ Part 1 - pg. 69

²⁴ Part 1 - Section 8.2

²⁵ Part 1 - pg.65.

4 INDICATORS OF CONDITIONS OF LIFE IN RELOCATION AREAS

CIR has conducted an analysis of the conditions of life in relocation areas over the investigation period. As noted in Part 1 of CIR's investigation, the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone was regularly noted as a 'safe' location for evacuees to relocate to. Of the 61 evacuation orders published by the IDF during the investigation period, 51% (31 orders) instructed persons to travel to al-Mawasi.²⁶ The IDF has referred to the area as "the safer zone" and has repeatedly told civilians that they "must move [to al-Mawasi] for their safety" due to the presence of "terrorist organisations".²⁷ At the time of writing, CIR could not independently verify the presence of a designated terrorist organisation or militant group in the area.

The IDF has also instructed civilians to move to "known shelters in Gaza City" in 20% (12 orders) of the 61 evacuation orders.²⁸ The IDF has not provided further details regarding the nature or specific locations of these shelters. At the time of writing, CIR could not independently verify the presence of a designated terrorist organisation or militant group in the area.

In order to assess the conditions of life within these relocation areas, CIR has analysed incidents resulting in damage to temporary structures and casualties within the al-Mawasi area, and within IDP and refugee camps in Gaza City. The following case studies are not an exhaustive list of all incidents which occurred within 'safe' relocation areas, but are representative of the types of incidents CIR has verified within these areas throughout the investigation period.

These case studies indicate that conditions within 'safe' relocation areas were often unsafe, given the threat of military activity surrounding shelters and camps for IDPs.

4.1 AIR-DROPPED MUNITION STRIKES IDP CAMP IN GAZA CITY IPIN2894

Footage shared on 23 March 2025 shows an air-dropped munition striking what appears to be a densely populated IDP camp, resulting in a large explosion and at least one minor casualty, in Gaza City.²⁹ Footage of the strike shows debris projected toward surrounding residential buildings and individuals in civilian clothing who run to take cover.³⁰ Aftermath imagery shows a minor casualty being carried by a plainclothed individual with what appears to be smoke and damaged

²⁶ Part 1, Section 5.2

²⁷ [SAT4486](#), [EO0143](#), [EO0119](#), [EO0166](#), [EO0144](#), [EO0152](#), and [EO0132](#)

²⁸ Part 1, Section 5.2

²⁹ [IP11797](#)

³⁰ *Ibid*

residential buildings behind them, approximately 180 metres northwest of the location of the strike.³¹

CIR verified that the air-dropped munition shown within the footage was an MK-80 series unguided bomb with JDAM guidance kit.³²

Footage of the incident was cross-referenced with satellite imagery from Google Earth, which enabled CIR to verify that it was captured adjacent to Omar al-Mukhtar Street in western Gaza City, at the following coordinates: 31.5110, 34.4552 (Figure 2).




Figure 2: CIR's geolocation of IPIN2894, showing an MK-80 series munition landing on an IDP camp in Gaza City, at coordinates 31.5110, 34.4552. Sources: Google Earth Pro, Maxar 2025, 12/01/2024; A: IP11797.³³

The incident's location falls within Block 692 on the evacuation map of Gaza, which was located approximately 2.5 kilometres northwest of the IDP-designated buffer zone at the time of the incident. During the days prior to the incident, on 18 and 19 March 2025, the IDF published two evacuation orders stating, "You must evacuate immediately to the known shelters in western Gaza City".³⁴ This is a similar direction to where the incident occurred.

The IDF continued to direct civilians towards the area the day after the incident, on 24 March 2025, when another evacuation order instructed civilians in Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun to "move immediately west to known shelters"; the

³¹ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP11975](#)

³² [IP11797](#) (0:00-0:02). The IDF is reported to have used this series of munitions since the Israel-Hamas conflict began in October 2023 ([SAT4492](#) and [SAT4493](#)) and CIR has verified their use in multiple other incidents. Examples of other incidents where CIR verified the use of a MK-series air-dropped munition include: [IPIN1997](#), [IPIN2022](#), [IPIN2889](#), and [IPIN3314](#)

³³ [IP11797](#)

³⁴ [EO0097](#) and [EO0100](#)

accompanying arrow on the evacuation order map also pointed in the general direction of Block 692.³⁵

According to Al Arabiya, “The Israeli army targeted a camp for displaced persons after prior warning and the evacuation of families in Omar Al-Mukhtar Street, west of Gaza City”.³⁶ While CIR identified evacuation orders from 18 and 19 March 2025, no other evacuation order was found closer to the incident date. CIR did not identify public statements made in relation to this incident by Israeli politicians or military officials.

4.2 DRONE DROPS OBJECTS CAUSING SMOKE AT GAZA CITY REFUGEE CAMP IPIN3070

Footage shared on 15 May 2025 shows what appears to be at least one quadcopter drone dropping at least two objects, which appear to smoke before landing on tents in the Qatar Charity refugee camp, located in Gaza City.³⁷ Aftermath footage shows plainclothed individuals pouring buckets of water onto charred and smoking tents and objects inside.³⁸

CIR verified that the quadcopter drone shown within the footage is a DJI FlyCart 30. The IDF has reportedly purchased DJI drones in the past, and CIR has verified their use in multiple other incidents in Gaza; however, these drones are also widely available to the public.³⁹

The incident footage was cross-referenced with satellite imagery from Google Earth, which enabled CIR to verify that it was captured within the Qatar Charity refugee camp, in south-west Gaza City, at the following coordinates: 31.4934, 34.4504 (Figure 3).

³⁵ [EO0106](#)

³⁶ [SAT3677](#)

³⁷ [IP12660](#) (0:00-0:10)

³⁸ [IP12660](#) (0:10-0:23)

³⁹ [SAT2753](#) and [SAT2754](#). The IDF is reported to have used DJI FlyCart 30 drones in Gaza since 2018 ([SAT4548](#)) and CIR has verified their use in multiple other incidents. Examples of other incidents where CIR verified the use of DJI FlyCart 30 drones include: IPIN2048, IPIN2371 and IPIN2440.



Figure 3: CIR's geolocation of IPIN3070, showing a quadcopter drone dropping smoking objects over the Qatar Charity refugee camp, Gaza City, at coordinates: 31.4934, 34.4504. Sources: Google Earth Pro, 2025 Airbus, 12/01/2024; A: IP12660; B: Planet Labs SkySat, 16/05/2025.⁴⁰

The incident's location falls within Block 641 on the evacuation map of Gaza, which was located approximately 920 metres outside of the IDF-designated buffer zone at the time of the incident. Two days prior to the incident, on 13 May 2025, the IDF published an evacuation order which instructed civilians in Jabalia to "move immediately to the known shelters in Gaza City".⁴¹ Based on the available information, CIR could not determine. It is unknown whether the IDF considers the Qatar Charity refugee camp as a "known shelter", since no specific locations are mentioned within the IDF's evacuation order.

CIR did not identify public statements made in relation to this incident by Israeli politicians or military officials.

4.3 BURNING TENTS AND ONE CASUALTY OBSERVED AT AL-MAWASI IDP CAMP IPIN2988

Footage shared on 17 April 2025 shows at least one casualty and tents on fire, which appear to house displaced people in Abasan al-Kabira, Gaza. The casualty identified was an adult seen being carried on a stretcher to an ambulance.⁴² Two further possible casualties were observed at the incident location; however, based on the footage and extreme fire damage, it could not be determined whether they were

⁴⁰ [IP12660](#)

⁴¹ [EO0152](#)

⁴² [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP12173](#) (left video, 1:21)

human casualties or had sustained injuries.⁴³ Two ambulances and a fire truck were also seen at the location.⁴⁴

Aftermath footage shows the remnants of an Elbit Skystriker loitering munition drone lying on the ground.⁴⁵ The Skystriker is one of numerous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) produced by the Israel-based arms manufacturer Elbit Systems, which describes its UAVs as “the backbone of the Israel Defense Forces”.⁴⁶

The incident footage was cross-referenced with satellite imagery from Google Earth and Planet Labs, which enabled CIR to verify that it was captured at a likely IDP camp approximately 70 metres east of the al-Rashid Coastal Road in Abasan al-Kabira, at the following coordinates: 31.3842, 34.2913 (Figure 4).



Figure 4: CIR's geolocation of IPIN2988 showing at least one casualty and tents on fire in Abasan al-Kabira, Gaza, at coordinates 31.3842, 34.2913. Sources: A: PlanetLabs SkySat Imagery captured on 15/04/2025; B: PlanetLabs SkySat Imagery captured on 20/04/2025; C: IP12174; D: IP12172.⁴⁷

The incident's location falls within Block 95 on the IDF-designated evacuation map of Gaza. This location also falls within the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone, as designated by the IDF in January 2025.⁴⁸ During the five days leading up to the incident, three separate evacuation orders were issued, which stated to civilians: “For your safety, you must immediately move [...] to the known shelter centres in

⁴³ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP12173](#) (left video, 1:56 and right video)

⁴⁴ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP12173](#) (left video, 1:51 and 1:35)

⁴⁵ [IP12172](#) (0:00-0:13)

⁴⁶ [SAT4477](#). CIR has verified the remnants of an Elbit Skystriker drone in one other incident (IPIN3226), whilst the research group Airwars has also recorded multiple instances of the drone being used by the IDF since April 2025. Examples include: [SAT4479](#), [SAT4480](#) and [SAT4481](#).

⁴⁷ [IP12174](#) and [IP12172](#)

⁴⁸ [EO0180](#) and [EO0133](#)

al-Mawasi”.⁴⁹ Although individuals were directed towards the al-Mawasi area, the incidents that caused casualties demonstrate that effective safety measures were not implemented, raising concerns about the protection typically expected in designated humanitarian zones.

The France 24 news outlet reported on 17 April 2025:

*“Civil defence spokesman Mahmud Bassal said two Israeli missiles hit several tents in the Al-Mawasi area of the southern city of Khan Yunis, resulting in at least 16 deaths, ‘most of them women and children, and 23 others were wounded’”.*⁵⁰

BBC News also reported that, “The Israeli military said on Friday [18 April 2025] that it struck a ‘ Hamas terrorist’ in the area and that the incident was under review”.⁵¹

At the time of writing, CIR did not identify the original IDF statement which made these claims, nor identify the presence of a designated terrorist organisation or militant group near the incident location.

4.4 DRONE REMNANTS AT THE SITE OF A DAMAGED TENT IN AL-MAWASI ZONE IPIN3226

Content shared on 2 July 2025 shows what appears to be a destroyed tent in western Khan Younis, southern Gaza. Content shows a plume of smoke rising from the incident location, with aftermath content showing personal items, such as clothing and blankets, scattered on the ground in addition to tarpaulin and exposed metal.⁵² Remnants of an Elbit Skystriker loitering munition drone were also visible at the site.⁵³

The content showing the incident was cross-referenced with satellite imagery from Google Earth, which enabled CIR to verify that it was captured to the south of al-Bahr Street in western Khan Younis, at the following coordinates: 31.3494, 34.2848 (Figure 5).

⁴⁹ [EO0148](#), [EO0149](#), and [EO0107](#)

⁵⁰ [SAT3814](#)

⁵¹ [SAT3816](#)

⁵² [IP13466](#) and [IP13465](#)

⁵³ *Ibid*




Figure 5: CIR's geolocation of IPIN3226, showing what appears to be a damaged tent in western Khan Yunis at coordinates 31.3494, 34.2848. Sources: Google Earth Pro, 2025 Airbus, 06/03/2024; A: IP13465; B: IP13466.⁵⁴

The incident's location falls within Block 112 on the evacuation map of Gaza, which is part of the IDF-designated humanitarian zone, as communicated in January 2025.⁵⁵ The IDF published four evacuation orders during the five days before the incident, between 28 and 30 June 2025, all of which instructed civilians, "For your safety, evacuate immediately [...] to the Al-Mawasi area".⁵⁶

According to the Wafa News Agency on 2 July 2025:

"[...] Six citizens were killed and others were wounded when the Israeli occupation forces shelled tents for displaced people in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis. Ten citizens, including children, were also wounded when tents sheltering displaced people were shelled in the same area, which is considered a 'safe area' for displaced families, but has been repeatedly bombed in recent weeks".⁵⁷

From the footage available, CIR could not independently identify casualties related to the incident. CIR did not identify public statements made in relation to this incident by Israeli politicians or military officials.

⁵⁴ [IP13465](#) (bottom right image) and [IP13466](#)

⁵⁵ [EO0180](#) and [EO0133](#)

⁵⁶ [EO0126](#), [EO0167](#), [EO0125](#), and [EO0168](#)

⁵⁷ [SAT4162](#)

4.5 SEVERELY DAMAGED TENT AND SCORCH MARKS AT AL-MAWASI IDP CAMP IPIN3175

Content shared on 17 June 2025 shows at least one severely damaged tent, with what appears to be scorch marks on the timber framing, in a temporary camp in the al-Mawasi area, Khan Yunis. Personal items, such as mattresses and blankets, were seen scattered on the ground.⁵⁸

Images of the incident were cross-referenced with satellite imagery from Google Earth and Planet Labs, which enabled CIR to verify that they were captured at an IDP camp adjacent to al-Bahr Street in western Khan Yunis, at the following coordinates: 31.3554, 34.2830 (Figure 6).




Figure 6: CIR's geolocation of IPIN3175, showing what appears to be a damaged tent in western Khan Yunis at coordinates 31.3554, 34.2830. Source: Google Earth Pro, 2025 Airbus, 03/03/2024; PlanetLabs SkySat Imagery captured on 20/06/2025; A: IP13188; B: IP14246.⁵⁹

The incident's location falls within Block 88 on the evacuation map of Gaza, which is part of the IDF-designated al-Mawasi humanitarian zone, as communicated in January 2025.⁶⁰ The IDF published an evacuation order three days before the incident on 14 June 2025, which instructed civilians that, "you must stay in the Al-Mawasi area and not return to the dangerous combat zones".⁶¹

The IDF published another evacuation order on the same day as the incident on 17 June 2025, which stated, "For your safety, evacuate immediately to the Mawasi area".⁶² This evacuation order was published at 22:44 (local time). CIR conducted a

⁵⁸ [IP13191](#) and [IP13188](#)

⁵⁹ [IP13188](#) and [IP14246](#)

⁶⁰ [EO0180](#) and [EO0133](#)

⁶¹ [EO0162](#)

⁶² [EO0163](#)

chronolocation analysis of the incident by examining the direction and length of shadows shown within the content. Through this process, CIR determined that the content was captured between approximately 06:00 and 06:45 (local time) (Figure 7). This indicates that the IDF continued to direct civilians towards the al-Mawasi zone on 17 June 2025, despite the incident that caused damage to an IDP camp within the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone earlier that day.




Figure 7: CIR assessment of the direction and length of shadows indicated that the content of IPIN3175 was captured between approximately 06:00 and 06:45 (local time). An IDF displacement order directed people to the area later that day. Sources: Google Earth Pro, 2025 Airbus, 03/03/2024; A: IP13188.⁶³

Quds News Network reported on 17 June 2025:

*“A Palestinian mother and her three children were killed on Tuesday morning [17 June 2025] when Israeli warplanes bombed their tent in the so-called ‘safe zone’ of al-Mawasi [...]. Local sources said the Israeli strike targeted a makeshift tent in a displacement camp, where clusters of tents sheltered families who had already been displaced”.*⁶⁴

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify the actor responsible. CIR did not identify public statements made in relation to this incident by Israeli politicians or military officials.

⁶³ [IP13188](#)

⁶⁴ [SAT4121](#)

5 INDICATORS OF CONDITIONS TO RETURN TO EVACUATED AREAS

CIR found that areas of Gaza placed under displacement orders have, in some cases, been extensively destroyed. This raises potential challenges when it comes to facilitating the return of civilian communities to their homes. In two areas surveyed by CIR for this report, it was found that at least 70% of the built environment in some neighbourhoods placed under displacement orders or absorbed into the buffer zone were destroyed over the course of this reporting period.




Figure 8: PlanetLabs SkySat imagery of a neighbourhood in the south-west of the Jabalia area consisting of Blocks 1795, 1801, 1802, 1819 and 1820. Satellite imagery captured on 01/01/2025 (left) and 31/07/2025 (right).

A neighbourhood to the south-west of Jabalia, consisting of IDF-designated Blocks 1795, 1801, 1802, 1819 and 1820, contained 821 buildings based on data available from Open Street Maps (OSM). An evacuation order was initially issued for the area on 15 January 2025,⁶⁵ before being absorbed into the buffer zone on 29 May 2025.⁶⁶ Satellite imagery analysis indicates that between 1 January 2025 and 30 July 2025,

⁶⁵ [EO0132](#)

⁶⁶ [EO0116](#)

77% (633) of all structures in the area had been destroyed (see Figure 8), including a school (the Al-Sahaba Religious School), a well and two mosques. The majority of this damage was visible after the area was absorbed into the buffer zone from 29 May 2025 onwards.




Figure 9: PlanetLabs SkySat imagery of a neighbourhood in the Khan Younis area consisting of Blocks 38 and 39. Satellite imagery captured on 01/01/2025 (left) and 27/07/2025 (right).

A similar assessment was conducted for an area of interest to the north-east of Khan Younis, consisting of Blocks 38 and 39 (see Figure 9). The area was originally included in the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone, as communicated by the IDF in January 2025, but was placed under evacuation order on 20 March 2025 and again on 19 May 2025.⁶⁷ Both Blocks were eventually absorbed into the buffer zone on 26 May 2025.⁶⁸ CIR found that, between 7 January and 17 May 2025, 22% (219) of structures within the area were destroyed. This figure rose to 70% (700) destroyed structures between 17 May and 18 July 2025, indicating a rise of approximately 50% after the area was absorbed into the buffer zone.

⁶⁷ [EO0140](#) and [EO0119](#)

⁶⁸ [EO0122](#)

6 ACCESS TO OBJECTS PROTECTED UNDER IHL - WASH INFRASTRUCTURE AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

CIR has conducted an analysis into access to objects protected under IHL, with a focus on WASH and other critical infrastructure. To assess access, CIR has examined incidents showing a reduction or prevention of civilians' access to WASH infrastructure within Gaza.

6.1 ACCESS TO OBJECTS PROTECTED UNDER IHL - WASH INFRASTRUCTURE

Based on data from the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU), the body responsible for water provision in the Gaza Strip, CIR has found that the overwhelming majority of wells, desalination plants and reservoirs remain largely inaccessible to the civilian population. Based on the boundary of the buffer zone declared by Israeli officials as of 27 July 2025:

- Of the 394 water wells in Gaza, 73% (290) fell within the Gazan territory declared as a buffer zone.
- Of the 53 reservoirs in Gaza, 85% (45) fell within the Gazan territory declared as a buffer zone.
- Of the 46 desalination facilities in Gaza, 70% (32) fell within the Gazan territory declared as a buffer zone.

Seventy-nine (79) wells (20% of all wells in Gaza) were located within the extent of the territory declared a humanitarian zone, as communicated by the IDF in January 2025. With the reduction in size of the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone between January 2025 and July 2025, only 17 wells (4% of all wells in Gaza) were located within the boundary of the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone by 31 July 2025, despite the likely growing number of displaced people arriving in the area.

An evacuation order issued by the IDF Arabic spokesperson on 20 July 2025 further limited access to critical water infrastructure in the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone, covering one of the largest desalination plants in Gaza (the Southern Gaza Desalination Plant), several wells and a reservoir.⁶⁹

UN OCHA issued a statement on 20 July 2025, claiming that approximately 30,000 displaced persons were living in displacement sites within the 5.6km² area subject to the evacuation order. In the statement, UN OCHA warned that any damage to water infrastructure within the area “will have life threatening consequences”.⁷⁰ On

⁶⁹ [EO0131](#)

⁷⁰ [SAT4543](#)

22 July 2025, Médecins Sans Frontières claimed that “water distribution trucks could not reach the [Southern Gaza Desalination] [P]lant”.⁷¹

According to the Al-Mezan Centre for Human Rights on 22 July 2025, the Plant has been reliant on solar power since 9 March 2025, after Israel cut off the last power line providing energy to the site. As a result, the water production has allegedly dropped to 15% of its prior capacity.⁷² According to UN OCHA, on 26 July 2025, Israel had restored the supply of electricity to the plant, but limited access to fuel was an obstacle to the proper operation of water distribution trucks.⁷³ In the same statement, UN OCHA wrote that, “inflows of IDPs [...] are relocating faster than WASH interventions can adapt”.⁷⁴

6.2 VERIFIED INCIDENT CASE STUDIES - WASH INFRASTRUCTURE

The following case studies showcase incidents that CIR has verified that prevent civilians’ access to WASH infrastructure within Gaza. These case studies are not an exhaustive list of all incidents showing damage to WASH infrastructure or preventing access to these objects, but are representative of the types of incidents CIR has verified throughout the investigation period.

These case studies further indicate that WASH infrastructure sustained damage within both the IDF-designated military area and non-evacuated areas, despite having the “presumption of civilian status” and benefiting from “the protection accorded to civilian objects” under IHL.⁷⁵

6.2.1 EXCAVATOR APPEARS TO DAMAGE WATER TOWER IN ABASAN AL-KABIRA IPIN2759

Footage shared on 25 February 2025 shows an excavator moving its arm toward a significantly damaged elevated structure with a white box-like feature and supporting legs, most consistent with a raised water storage tank.⁷⁶ The incident occurred in Abasan al-Kabira, southern Gaza Strip. CIR could not verify the make or model of the excavator from the available footage. Black smoke can also be observed in the distance.

A comparison of satellite imagery from 25 February 2025 and 2 March 2025 confirms that the structure sustained damage during this period. Residential

⁷¹ [SAT4544](#)

⁷² [SAT4545](#)

⁷³ [SAT4546](#)

⁷⁴ *Ibid*

⁷⁵ [SAT4495](#)

⁷⁶ [IP11105](#)

buildings in the neighbourhood also appear to have been previously damaged or reduced to rubble. Further satellite imagery analysis indicates that the first signs of destruction in the area emerged on 14 February 2024 and became more extensive by 27 March 2024.

The comparison of satellite imagery with footage of the incident also confirmed that the footage was captured in Abasan al-Kabira's al-Faraheen neighbourhood, in southern Gaza, at the following coordinates: 31.3337, 34.3619 (Figure 10). The incident's location falls within Block 237 on the evacuation map of Gaza, which was located inside the IDF-designated buffer zone at the time of the incident.




Figure 10: CIR's geolocation of IPIN2759, showing an excavator appearing to damage a water storage tank in Abasan al-Kabira's al-Faraheen neighbourhood, at coordinates: 31.3337, 34.3619. Sources: Planet Labs SkySat, 04/03/2025; A: IP11105.⁷⁷

Quds News Network Arabic shared footage of the incident on 25 February 2025 with the caption, "The occupation army demolishes a house and a water tank in the town of Abasan al-Kabira".⁷⁸

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify the actor responsible. CIR did not identify public statements made in relation to this incident by Israeli politicians or military officials.

⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸ Ibid

6.2.2 AT LEAST SEVEN CASUALTIES AMONGST DAMAGED WATER INFRASTRUCTURE IN GAZA CITY IPIN3232

Footage shared on 5 July 2025 depicts at least seven casualties, including one minor, amidst damage to water infrastructure in Gaza City. The content depicts damage to an area fitted with extensive piping, and visible water leaks indicate damage to multiple pipes.⁷⁹ A nearby billboard displays the text: 'Sultan Water Supply and Desalination Company'.⁸⁰ Based on PlanetLabs satellite imagery, the facility appears to have developed over the course of April and May 2025. The affected site is adjacent to an open area densely populated with IDP tents.⁸¹

Five adult male casualties in civilian clothing were pictured in or immediately outside the damaged site.⁸² An additional minor casualty appeared in footage from within the damaged facility.⁸³ One adult male casualty was identified on a street 30 metres to the northeast of the affected facility.⁸⁴

Footage of the incident was cross-referenced with satellite imagery from Google Earth, which enabled CIR to verify that it was captured on Omar al-Mukhtar Street in the Rimal neighbourhood in western Gaza City, at the following coordinates: 31.5186, 34.4446 (Figure 11). The incident's location falls within Block 703 on the evacuation map of Gaza.

⁷⁹ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13517](#) (0:10, 0:22, 0:27, 0:30)

⁸⁰ [IP13532](#) (0:15)

⁸¹ [IP13532](#)

⁸² [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13506](#) (0:12), [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13507](#) (0:00, 0:11, 0:44), and [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13531](#) (0:19)

⁸³ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13507](#) (0:40)

⁸⁴ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13516](#) (0:01)




Figure 11: CIR's geolocation of IPIN3232, showing at least five casualties and a damaged water salination facility in Gaza City's Rimal neighbourhood, at the following coordinates: 31.5186, 34.4446. Sources: Google Earth Pro, 2025 Airbus, 01/12/2024; A: IP13507; B: IP13517.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13507](#) and [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13517](#)

Footage of a report from an Al Jazeera journalist was shared on 5 July 2025, who claimed:

*“An Israeli drone hit the desalination plant with 2 rockets that IDPs and people living in the area are relying on. 3 workers were killed and Al-Shifa hospital reported that 15 were injured due to the attack. Now the plant is out of service”.*⁸⁶

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify the actor responsible. The day after the incident, 6 July 2025, the IDF stated, “In northern Gaza, military structures belonging to terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip were struck”.⁸⁷ However, CIR could not verify whether this statement corresponds to the incident, since it did not specify which areas in northern Gaza were targeted.

6.2.3 IDF STRIKE CAUSES CASUALTIES AT WATER DISTRIBUTION POINT IN NUSEIRAT, GAZA IPIN3251

Content uploaded on 13 July 2025 depicts 14 casualties, including children, in proximity to a site which appears to be operating as a water distribution point in Nuseirat, Gaza.⁸⁸ Of the 14 identified casualties, eight were minors.⁸⁹ The remaining six casualties were adults.⁹⁰ All casualties were seen located within 50 metres of a damaged site, consisting of a destroyed tent-like structure, where dozens of yellow plastic jerry cans can be seen.⁹¹

Footage of the incident was cross-referenced with satellite imagery from Google Earth, which enabled CIR to verify that it was captured near Omar bin Abdul Aziz Street in northwestern Nuseirat, at the following coordinates: 31.4584, 34.3889 (Figure 12). The incident’s location falls within Block 2322 on the evacuation map of Gaza.

⁸⁶ [IP13532](#)

⁸⁷ [SAT4193](#)

⁸⁸ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13629](#)

⁸⁹ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13629](#) (0:02, 0:05, 0:28, 0:40x2, 1:07, 1:16) and [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13617](#) (0:01)

⁹⁰ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13629](#) (0:07, 0:18, 0:23, 0:31, 1:22, 1:26)

⁹¹ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13629](#) (0:11) and [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13617](#)



Figure 12: CIR's geolocation of IPIN3251, showing 14 casualties at what appears to be a water distribution point in Nuseirat, at coordinates: 31.4584, 34.3889. Sources: Google Earth Pro, 2025 Airbus, 30/10/2023; A: IP13629.⁹²

As reported by The Times of Israel:

“Israel’s military said Sunday [13 July 2025] that a strike near a Gaza water distribution point that reportedly killed several children was an accident, as Israeli aircraft pounded targets across the Strip. [...] The IDF admitted it had erred while targeting an operative from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror group.

‘Due to a technical malfunction in the munition, it struck dozens of meters away from the intended target,’ the IDF said, adding that it had opened an investigation and that it ‘makes every effort to minimize harm to uninvolved civilians’.⁹³

6.3 ACCESS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

CIR has investigated how access to other types of critical infrastructure has been restricted during the investigation period, including marketplaces, government buildings, and temporary energy infrastructure. The British Red Cross reported that the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip has “devastated Gaza’s critical infrastructure” resulting in “food insecurity, [...] a water crisis, [and a] healthcare system [that is] near collapse”.⁹⁴ Further, UN OCHA claimed that critical infrastructure, such as “fuel, [...] water and sanitation systems, bakeries and kitchens, telecommunication service [...] and other lifesaving services” are “critically low” throughout the Gaza Strip.⁹⁵

⁹² [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13629](#)

⁹³ [SAT4225](#)

⁹⁴ [SAT4491](#)

⁹⁵ [SAT4490](#)

For the purpose of the investigation, critical infrastructure refers to infrastructure deemed essential to sustaining the socioeconomic livelihood of civilians. While IHL does not provide a specific definition for ‘critical’ and ‘civilian infrastructure’, as outlined in Article 54, it protects “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.”⁹⁶ These include objects such as “foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”⁹⁷

CIR researched the extent to which critical infrastructure has been affected by evacuation orders and the continued expansion of the military area during the reporting period. CIR collected data from OSM, which provided the location of markets, banks, telecommunication buildings, police stations, courthouses, fire stations, ministry and municipality buildings across Gaza. This data was also cross-referenced with other open-source data platforms and CIR’s verified dataset of incidents. CIR also verified the presence of marketplaces using satellite imagery from Google Earth and Planet Labs.

In Gaza, CIR noted references to temporary forms of critical infrastructure not usually captured by mapping systems, such as OSM. User-generated content and media reporting have highlighted the alternative structures and methods civilians relied on when access to formal infrastructure was restricted or unavailable.

6.3.1 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INSIGHTS

CIR identified a total of **199** critical infrastructure buildings across Gaza over the investigation period. This comprised **66** government buildings, **55** financial buildings, **33** law enforcement buildings, **27** marketplaces, **13** telecommunication buildings and **four** emergency service buildings (a map of these locations is shown in Figure 13). As of 31 July 2025, **51%** (**101** buildings) of critical infrastructure were located within the military area.

Similar to the hospital trends outlined in Part 1 of this investigation, CIR observed a downward shift in the number of critical infrastructure buildings within the military area during the ceasefire period from 19 January to 18 March 2025.

⁹⁶ IHL [Article 54](#)

⁹⁷ *Ibid*



Figure 13: CIR identified the locations of 199 critical infrastructure buildings across the Gaza Strip, through OSM data and satellite imagery. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024.

Over the investigation period, CIR identified **10** verified incidents involving damage to critical infrastructure.⁹⁸ CIR did not identify any evacuation orders for the 10 verified incidents, and only one of the 10 incidents was inside the IDF-designated military area.⁹⁹

Four of these ten incidents are detailed below, showing damage to marketplaces and government buildings. These incidents either prevented individuals from accessing critical infrastructure areas outside of the military area within Gaza or resulted in civilians being harmed while attempting to do so.

6.3.2 MARKETPLACES

CIR calculated a **117%** increase in the number of marketplaces within the military area between January 2025 and July 2025, rising from **nine** to **18**. However, CIR identified three incidents,¹⁰⁰ two of which are listed below,¹⁰¹ involving marketplaces outside of the military area. As of 31 July 2025, the remaining nine marketplaces were located within the military area. The two incidents highlighted below were selected by CIR as case studies due to their high casualty count and damage to market infrastructure following the incident, respectively.

CIR also identified user-generated content that did not meet the threshold requirements to translate into a verified incident (IPIN), as it did not fall within CIR's methodology, where the activity did not result in casualties and/or significant impact. Nonetheless, it indicates an impact on critical infrastructure.¹⁰² By using satellite imagery, CIR observed that the Firas Market in Gaza City appears to have been repurposed into a landfill site since October 2023. The site has continued to be used as such throughout 2024 and 2025, likely due to a lack of sufficient waste infrastructure (Figure 14). CIR verified the use of the market as a landfill site using an image shared by the Municipality of Gaza on 7 April 2025 and comparing this with satellite imagery (Figure 14).¹⁰³ As of 29 June 2025, Firas Market is located in the IDF-designated military area, reducing civilian access to the landfill. The latest incident CIR recorded at Firas Market occurred prior to the investigation period on 2 November 2024.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸ IPIN2362, IPIN2414, IPIN2458, IPIN2972, IPIN2992, IPIN3005, IPIN3043, IPIN3109, IPIN3127 and IPIN3222

⁹⁹ IPIN2458

¹⁰⁰ IPIN3005, IPIN3043 and IPIN3222

¹⁰¹ IPIN3043 and IPIN3222

¹⁰² [IP14262](#)

¹⁰³ [IP14262](#)

¹⁰⁴ IPIN1925



Figure 14: Satellite imagery (top images and bottom left) and user-generated content (posted by the Municipality of Gaza on Instagram on 7 April 2025) of the landfill site at Firas Market at coordinates 31.5076, 34.4585. Sources: Planet Labs Skysat [15/10/2023, 24/10/2024, 05/04/2025], IP14262.¹⁰⁵

> AT LEAST 29 CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE TO MARKET STALLS IN GAZA CITY IPIN3043

Footage shared on 7 May 2025 shows at least 29 casualties and damage to market stalls on al-Wehda Street, Gaza City. Of the casualties identified, 24 were adults¹⁰⁶ and five were minors.¹⁰⁷

A minor was also seen being carried from the location with what resembles blood seen on his shirt.¹⁰⁸ However, from the footage available, CIR could not independently verify whether the noted individual had sustained injuries.

¹⁰⁵ IP14262

¹⁰⁶ [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP12514, 0:00; [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP12540, 0:22x2, 0:45x2, 0:54x2; [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP12517, 0:00, 0:22x2; [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP12518, 0:10x2, 0:18, 0:34, 0:38; [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP12533, 0:14x3, 0:19x2; [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP12558, left video, 0:06x2, 0:29, 0:47

¹⁰⁷ [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP12540, 0:19, 0:22; [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP12517, 0:22, 0:51; [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP12518, 0:29

¹⁰⁸ [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP12517, 0:34

What appears to be fragmentation marks were visible on the road surface,¹⁰⁹ and damage to market stalls and goods can be seen.¹¹⁰ Damage was visible to surrounding buildings; however, at the time of writing, CIR could not independently verify whether the surrounding structural damage occurred recently or in prior incidents.

The location is approximately 90 metres southwest of an incident at the Thaiandi restaurant that sustained damage on the same day, resulting in at least 14 casualties.¹¹¹




Figure 15: CIR's geolocation of IPIN3043, depicting damage and casualties to market stalls in Gaza City at coordinates 31.5213, 34.4472. Sources: Google Earth Pro, 2025 Airbus, 12/01/2024 A: IP12533; B: IP12558.¹¹²

At the time of writing, CIR did not identify an evacuation order for the incident or public statements made in relation to this incident by politicians or military.

Al Jazeera reported,

"A reconnaissance drone strike targeted an area near the Thai and Palmyra restaurants on al-Wehda Street in Gaza City on Wednesday [7 May 2025]. Two missiles were fired at two locations at the same time, 100 metres (110 yards) apart, one inside a restaurant and another at an intersection, killing at least 17 people.

Reporting from Gaza City, Al Jazeera's Hani Mahmoud said the attack hit one of the few places where Palestinians are able to get a meal.

¹⁰⁹ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12517](#), 0:23

¹¹⁰ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12540](#); [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12517](#); [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12518](#)

¹¹¹ IPIN3044

¹¹² [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12533](#) and [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12558](#)

'The tables and chairs are all thrown around, and blood stains the ground as a result of severe bleeding,' Mahmoud said, reporting from a crowd of residents and street vendors examining the destruction after the attack".¹¹³

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify the actor responsible. CIR did not identify public statements made in relation to this incident by politicians or military.

> **FOUR CASUALTIES AT REPORTED MARKET ON JAFFA STREET, GAZA CITY IPIN3222**

Footage shared on 28 June 2025 shows at least four casualties on Jaffa Street, al-Tuffah, Gaza City, approximately 70 metres from the Jaffa Secondary School for Boys. Of the casualties identified, two were minors,¹¹⁴ and two were adults.¹¹⁵

An additional individual was visible getting up from the ground;¹¹⁶ however, from the footage available, CIR could not independently verify whether the individual sustained injuries during the incident.

The location is within IDF-designated Block 602.



Figure 16: CIR's geolocation of IPIN3222, showing at least four casualties at a reported market on Jaffa Street, Gaza City, at coordinates 31.5105, 34.4680. Sources: Planet Labs SkySat, 10/07/2025; A: IP13380; B: IP13381.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ SAT3904

¹¹⁴ [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP13380, 0:27; [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP13381, 0:09

¹¹⁵ [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP13380, 0:11; [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP13381, 0:03

¹¹⁶ [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP13381, 0:14

¹¹⁷ [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP13380 and [WARNING GRAPHIC] IP13381

According to the Wafa News Agency:

“Eleven Palestinians were killed and others injured on Saturday afternoon [28 June 2025] when Israeli occupation forces (IOF) shelled a crowd of civilians in a popular market on Jaffa Street in al-Tuffah neighbourhood in Gaza City.

*Medical sources reported that the death toll rose to 11, including four children, after Israeli drones bombed a group of civilians east of the Tuffah neighbourhood in Gaza City”.*¹¹⁸

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify the actor responsible. CIR did not identify official public statements made in relation to this incident by politicians or military.

6.3.3 GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS

CIR also identified two incidents involving government buildings in the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone in Gaza.¹¹⁹

> IMPACT CRATER AT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR BUILDING, KHAN YOUNIS IPIN2362

Footage shared on 2 January 2025 shows what appears to be an impact crater at the Ministry of Interior building, which also houses the Khan Younis Labour Directorate and is adjacent to the municipality in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip. Located approximately 60 metres northeast of the Al-Shorta Mosque, the building exhibits significant damage, including cracks in the ceiling and missing portions of its facade.¹²⁰ A man is seen holding the remnants of a GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb while pointing to what seems to be a pool of blood on the ground, as a crowd gathers around him.¹²¹

The incident occurred within the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone, as communicated by the IDF on 1 January 2025, and within Block 50.

¹¹⁸ [SAT4166](#)

¹¹⁹ [IPIN3262](#) and [IPIN2972](#)

¹²⁰ [IP9507](#), and [IP9509](#)

¹²¹ [IP9508](#)



Figure 17: CIR's geolocation of IPIN2362, showing an impact crater at the Ministry of Interior building, Khan Yunis, at coordinates 31.3441, 34.3101. Sources: Google Earth Pro, Airbus 2025, 06/03/2024, A: IP9507, B: IP9509.¹²²

On 2 January 2025, Al Jazeera reported:

"6 people were killed and 13 injured in an Israeli raid that targeted a building of the Ministry of Interior near the Abu Hamid roundabout area, in the center of Khan Yunis, with a number of missiles".¹²³

At the time of writing and based on the available footage, CIR did not identify casualties related to the incident.

The IDF stated:

"A short while ago [2 January 2025], the IAF conducted an intelligence-based strike on Hamas terrorists who were operating in a control and command center that was embedded inside the Khan Yunis municipality building in the Humanitarian Area.

The command and control center was used by the terrorists to plan and execute attacks against IDF troops and the State of Israel.

Prior to the strike, numerous steps were taken to mitigate the risk of harming civilians, including the use of precise munitions, aerial surveillance, and additional intelligence".¹²⁴

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify whether the building was being used by a designated terrorist organisation or militant group.

¹²² [IP9509](#)

¹²³ [SAT2692](#)

¹²⁴ [SAT2693](#)

> ONE POSSIBLE CASUALTY AND DAMAGE TO THE DEIR AL-BALAH MUNICIPALITY COMPOUND IN DEIR AL-BALAH IPIN2972

Content shared on 13 April 2025 shows what appears to be the remains of at least one casualty and substantial damage to buildings in the Deir al-Balah municipality compound, Deir al-Balah, Gaza.¹²⁵ Footage shows an air-dropped munition landing in the municipality buildings' direction, resulting in a large explosion and a cloud of dust and smoke.¹²⁶ What resembles a crater was visible with concrete slabs and debris covering the area and dust in the air.¹²⁷ Additional footage shows Civil Defence personnel collecting what appears to be organic material,¹²⁸ making up of at least one casualty.¹²⁹

Content shows considerable damage to several municipality buildings,¹³⁰ with crowds of people visible at a market approximately 80 metres from the incident location.¹³¹ The incident occurred adjacent to the Abd Al-Karem Al-Aklook Primary School for Boys.

At the time of writing, CIR could not independently verify whether the surrounding structural damage occurred recently or in prior incidents. The incident was within the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone, as communicated by the IDF in January 2025, in the IDF-designated Block 149. The Deir al-Balah municipality building previously sustained damage on 14 December 2024, resulting in at least four casualties.¹³²

¹²⁵ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12113](#), 0:32

¹²⁶ [IP12114](#), 0:03

¹²⁷ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12112](#), 0:54

¹²⁸ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12113](#), 0:02-0:18

¹²⁹ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12113](#), 0:32

¹³⁰ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12112](#), 0:47-0:58; [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12113](#), and [IP12116](#)

¹³¹ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12112](#), 0:02

¹³² IPIN2244



Figure 18: CIR's geolocation of IPIN2972, showing one possible casualty and damage to the Deir al-Balah municipality compound, at coordinates 31.4171, 34.3503. Sources: Google Earth Pro, Airbus 2025, 30/10/2023; A: IP12113; B: IP12112.¹³³

According to Al Jazeera on 13 April 2025:

“An Al Jazeera Mubasher correspondent reported that three Palestinians were killed on Sunday [13 April 2025] when the occupation forces targeted a building adjacent to the Deir al-Balah municipality in the central Gaza Strip.

*Footage showed the first moments of the building's bombing, the panic caused by the Israeli raid in the vicinity of the municipality after the occupation forces threatened it, and the entire municipality square was evacuated”.*¹³⁴

On 13 April 2025, the IDF spokesperson for the Arab media, Avichay Adraee, stated:

“The IDF and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) recently raided a Hamas terrorist command and control compound in the Deir al-Balah area of the central Gaza Strip.

During the raid, a large number of Hamas terrorists operated inside the compound. They carried out terrorist attacks against IDF forces and Israeli civilians during the war. The targeted terrorists planned to carry out further attacks.

*Prior to the raid, steps were taken to avoid harming civilians, including the use of precision munitions and aerial reconnaissance”.*¹³⁵

¹³³ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12113](#) and [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP12112](#)

¹³⁴ [SAT3758](#)

¹³⁵ [SAT3759](#)

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify whether the targeted infrastructure was being used by a designated terrorist organisation or militant group.

6.3.4 TEMPORARY FORMS OF CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

CIR also identified international media and UN reports signposting alternative methods used by civilians to access essential services.

- UNifeed shared a video documentary on 4 February 2025 showcasing how civilians have shifted to relying on solar energy for better electricity infrastructure.¹³⁶
- BBC News reported on 27 August 2025 that journalists rely on hospital generators to charge their phones and equipment.¹³⁷
- CIR has identified multiple reports by Quds News Network between 28 May 2025 and 4 July 2025 alleging Israeli airstrikes targeted mobile phone charging points in various parts of Gaza.¹³⁸

Over the investigation period, CIR identified one incident involving damage to an alleged mobile charging point. However, at the time of writing, CIR has not verified content showing damage to other alleged charging points.

> AT LEAST 11 CASUALTIES ON AL-WAHDA STREET IN NORTH RIMAL, GAZA CITY IPIN3215

Footage shared on 30 June 2025 shows at least 10 casualties on al-Wahda Street in the north Rimal neighbourhood, Gaza City. Of the casualties identified, eight were adults¹³⁹ and two were minors.¹⁴⁰

Additional footage shows two of the adults and the two minor casualties visible at the incident location arriving at a hospital.¹⁴¹ Footage also shows a further two adult casualties,¹⁴² and one minor casualty¹⁴³ also arriving at the hospital; however, CIR could not independently verify that the casualties were injured in this incident.

The incident occurred within the IDF-designated Block 702.

¹³⁶ [SAT4547](#)

¹³⁷ [SAT4539](#)

¹³⁸ [SAT4551](#), [SAT4552](#), [SAT4553](#), [SAT4554](#) and [SAT4555](#)

¹³⁹ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP13415](#), 0:03x5 [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP13417](#), 0:35x2, 01:19

¹⁴⁰ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP13418](#), 0:00, 0:16 (Note: The original post has been removed from the platform, but an archived version is available upon request).

¹⁴¹ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP13418](#), 0:00-0:24 (Note: The original post has been removed from the platform, but an archived version is available upon request).

¹⁴² [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP13418](#), 0:27, 0:38 (Note: The original post has been removed from the platform, but an archived version is available upon request).

¹⁴³ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP13418](#), 0:36 (Note: The original post has been removed from the platform, but an archived version is available upon request).



Figure 19: CIR's geolocation IPIN3215, showing at least 10 casualties at an alleged mobile charging station, Gaza City, at coordinates 31.5181, 34.4509. Source: PlanetLabs SkySat, 10/07/2025; A: IP13414.¹⁴⁴

On 30 June 2025, footage of the incident was shared on Telegram by Hamza Al-Masry with the caption, "Martyrs and several wounded as the occupation forces bombed a mobile phone charging point near Abu Asi station on Al-Wahda Street in Gaza City".¹⁴⁵

Al Jazeera Arabic reported on 30 June 2025 that, "Al Jazeera's correspondent confirmed the deaths of six Palestinians in two Israeli drone strikes on Al-Wahda Street in Gaza City".¹⁴⁶

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify the actor responsible.

7 EVACUATION AND DISPLACEMENT DURING THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD

7.1 DISPLACEMENT ORDERS AND BUFFER ZONES DURING THE CEASEFIRE

The most recent ceasefire during the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict was in effect from 19 January 2025 until the resumption of the conflict on 18 March 2025. As mentioned during Part 1 of CIR's investigation, the IDF published **seven** displacement orders during this time period, whilst an eighth order on 18 March 2025 marked the resumption of hostilities.¹⁴⁷ These displacement orders were

¹⁴⁴ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP13414](#)

¹⁴⁵ [WARNING GRAPHIC] [IP13415](#)

¹⁴⁶ [SAT4139](#)

¹⁴⁷ The seven displacement orders published during the ceasefire period are as follows: [EO0094](#), [EO0093](#), [EO0135](#), [EO0137](#), [EO0095](#), [EO0136](#), and [EO0138](#).

published on X by the IDF's Arabic spokesperson, Avichay Adraee, as well as Telegram and Facebook.¹⁴⁸

CIR analysed the wording of these displacement orders to assess their possible justification during the ceasefire period. These displacement orders did not mention the presence of Hamas or other “terrorist organisations” within the buffer zone. This indicates that the justification for civilians’ displacement was likely not tied to the locations of armed actors or militant groups such as Hamas.

Based on Adraee’s posts, it appears that the buffer zone covered areas where IDF soldiers were located, as displacement orders repeatedly warned civilians, “Approaching the forces stationed in the sector puts you in danger” and “it is dangerous to approach [...] all areas where forces are stationed”.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, the buffer zone consistently covered areas adjacent to the Israel-Gaza border throughout the ceasefire period, and multiple displacement orders stated, “It is forbidden to approach Israeli territories and the buffer zone”.¹⁵⁰ This indicates that displacement orders during the ceasefire period may have been issued to achieve Israeli strategic or security objectives, rather than for the protection of civilians in Gaza.

The following timeline provides details on the displacement orders from this period, including the extent of the buffer zone in each map and the wording used by the IDF.

19 January 2025

EO0094

At 07:36 (local time), the IDF’s Arabic spokesperson, Avichay Adraee, published an “Urgent statement to the residents of the Gaza Strip regarding the entry into force of the ceasefire at 08:30 am”.¹⁵¹ Within this displacement order, the IDF stated:

“IDF forces will remain deployed in specific areas in the Gaza Strip [...] Do not approach IDF forces in the area until further notice. Approaching the forces puts you in danger. Movement from the south to the north of the Gaza Strip or towards the Netzarim road remains dangerous in light of IDF activities in the area.

[...]

*We urge you not to move towards the buffer zone or towards IDF forces for your own safety. At this stage, moving towards the buffer zone or moving from south to north through the Gaza Valley exposes you to danger. Anyone who moves towards these areas exposes himself to danger”.*¹⁵²

Approximate size of EO0094 buffer zone: 115km² (31.5% of Gaza).

¹⁴⁸ [SAT4433](#), [SAT4338](#), and [SAT4339](#)

¹⁴⁹ [EO0135](#), [EO0094](#), and [EO0093](#)

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*

¹⁵¹ [EO0094](#)

¹⁵² *Ibid*




Figure 20: The buffer zone as outlined in the first displacement order during the ceasefire: EO0094. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 12/01/2024.

21 January 2025

At 09:15 (local time), Avichay Adraee published the following reminder for Gazans:

EO0093

"IDF forces will remain deployed in specific areas in the Gaza Strip. Do not approach IDF forces in the area until further notice. Approaching the forces exposes you to danger. Movement from the south to the north of the Gaza Strip or towards the Netzarim Road remains dangerous in light of the IDF activities in the area. We warn the population against approaching IDF forces in general and in the Netzarim axis area in particular.

If Hamas adheres to all the details of the agreement, starting next week, residents of the Gaza Strip will be able to return to the northern Gaza Strip and instructions will be issued in this regard".¹⁵³

Approximate size of EO0093 buffer zone: 122km² (33.5% of Gaza).

Changes to buffer zone: Increase of 7km² (approximately 6.1%), due to the widening of the Netzarim Corridor buffer area to the north.




Figure 21: The buffer zone increased by 6.1% in the second displacement order during the ceasefire: EO0093. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 12/01/2024.

¹⁵³ EO0093

25 January 2025

EO0135 & EO0137

At 06:17 (local time), Avichay Adraee published the following notice:

"All existing instructions remain in effect and will continue to be so until new instructions are issued with the transition to the next phase of the agreement

[...]

Movement from the south to the north of the Gaza Strip or toward the Netzarim route remains dangerous in light of the Defense Forces' activities in the area".¹⁵⁴

At 13:54 (local time), Adraee further stated:

"[...] Following up on the statements that were issued and to avoid any friction or misunderstanding:

We confirm that all the instructions we issued are still in effect, especially the ban on approaching the Netzarim axis until it is announced to open".¹⁵⁵

Approximate size of EO0135/EO0137 buffer zone: 122km² (33.5% of Gaza).

Changes to buffer zone: No changes since EO0093 on 21 January 2025.

26 January 2025

EO0095

At 01:30 (local time), IDF Arabic Spokesperson Avichay Adraee repeated the displacement order published one day prior (EO0137), stating:

"We confirm that all the instructions we issued are still in effect, especially the ban on approaching the Netzarim axis until it is announced to open".¹⁵⁶

Approximate size of EO0095 buffer zone: 122km² (33.5% of Gaza).

Changes to buffer zone: No changes since EO0093 on 21 January 2025.

27 January 2025

EO0136

At 00:34 (local time), Avichay Adraee posted an announcement which stated:

"Residents will be allowed to return on foot to the northern Gaza Strip via the Netzarim route and through Al-Rashid Street (the coastal road) starting from 07:00 AM.

Vehicle movement to the northern Gaza Strip will be permitted after inspection via Salah al-Din starting from 09:00 AM".¹⁵⁷

However, the statement further claimed:

"Approaching the forces of the Defense Army in all their deployment and positioning areas is prohibited.

In the southern Gaza Strip area, approaching the Rafah crossing area, the Philadelphia axis, and all areas where forces are stationed is prohibited.

[...]

It is forbidden to head toward Israeli territory or approach the buffer zone".¹⁵⁸

Approximate size of EO0136 buffer zone: 102km² (28% of Gaza).

Changes to buffer zone: Decrease of 20km² (approximately 16.4%), due to the removal of most buffer areas in the Netzarim Corridor.

¹⁵⁴ [EO0135](#)

¹⁵⁵ [EO0137](#)

¹⁵⁶ [EO0095](#)

¹⁵⁷ [EO0136](#)

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*




Figure 22: The buffer zone decreased by 16.4% in the sixth displacement order during the ceasefire: EO136.
Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 12/01/2024.

10 February 2025

At 09:20 (local time), 14 days after the previous displacement order, Avichay Adraee repeated the announcement that:

EO138

"[...] Residents will be permitted to return on foot to the northern Gaza Strip via Salah al-Din Street.

[...]

Residents will be permitted to return on foot to the northern Gaza Strip via the Netzarim axis, via Rashid Street (the coastal axis).

Vehicle movement to the northern Gaza Strip will continue, subject to inspection, via the Salah al-Din axis.

[...]

It is prohibited to approach IDF forces wherever they are deployed in the Gaza Strip. It is prohibited to move toward Israeli territory or approach the buffer zone."¹⁵⁹

Approximate size of EO138 buffer zone: 62.5km² (17.2% of Gaza).

Changes to buffer zone: Decrease of 39.5km² (approximately 38.7%), due to the complete removal of the Netzarim Corridor buffer and the narrowing of the buffer zone at the Israel-Gaza border.




Figure 23: The buffer zone decreased by 38.7% in the seventh displacement order during the ceasefire: EO138.
Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 12/01/2024.

¹⁵⁹ EO138

18 March 2025

EO0097

At 08:49 (local time), the IDF's Arabic Spokesperson published a new evacuation order, signalling the end of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. The evacuation order stated:

"Warning to all residents of the Gaza Strip who are in the area marked in red, specifically in the neighbourhoods of Beit Hanoun, Khirbet Khuza'a, Abasan al-Kabira and al-Jadida.

The IDF has launched a massive offensive against terrorist organizations. These designated areas are considered dangerous combat zones! For your own safety, you must evacuate immediately to the known shelters in western Gaza City and those in Khan Younis".¹⁶⁰

Approximate size of EO0097 buffer zone: 140km² (38.5% of Gaza).

Changes to buffer zone: Increase of 77.5km² (approximately 124%), as the eastern section of the Netzarim Corridor buffer was reinstated, the buffer at the Israel-Gaza border widened, and Beit Hanoun and its surrounding neighbourhoods were added.




Figure 24: The buffer zone increased by 124% within EO0097, when compared with the previous announcement on 10 February 2025. This displacement order and subsequent military action signalled the end of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 12/01/2024.

7.2 INCIDENTS DURING THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD

CIR verified a total of **33 incidents** during the ceasefire period, between 18 January 2025 and 17 March 2025, the last day before the resumption of the conflict. Of these 33, **25 incidents (76%) occurred outside the IDF-designated buffer zone**, with eight incidents occurring within the buffer. This indicates that, even if civilians refrained from approaching or entering the buffer zone, as was forbidden by the IDF, they remained at risk in areas outside of the buffer zone.

The following case studies are representative of the types of incidents verified by CIR during the ceasefire period; all three case studies occurred outside of the IDF-designated buffer zone.

¹⁶⁰ EO0097

7.2.1 PALESTINIAN JOURNALISTS RUN FROM GUNFIRE AND IDF TANK IN BEIT HANOUN IPIN2631

Footage shared on 3 February 2025 shows at least two individuals in civilian clothing running from a vantage point where they had been observing a stationary IDF Merkava IV tank approximately 300 metres away, as what appear to be shots are fired in a westerly direction in Beit Hanoun, northern Gaza.¹⁶¹

What is believed to be an individual is seen on the top of the tank, with the front of the turret pointed near the observers' position.¹⁶² Noise consistent with automatic weapons follows the two individuals as they move from the vantage point towards a building 100 metres southwest.¹⁶³ At least one shot is audible near the filmer's location.¹⁶⁴ CIR verified that one of the individuals was journalist Hessam Shabat. However, apart from holding a microphone, he does not appear to be wearing clothing identifying him as press.

Footage of the incident was cross-referenced with satellite imagery from Google Earth, which enabled CIR to verify that it was captured approximately 60 metres from a partially collapsed United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) school in eastern Beit Hanoun, at the following coordinates: 31.5359, 34.5440 (Figure 25). The incident's location falls within Block 583 on the evacuation map of Gaza. Both the individuals and the tank were positioned less than one kilometre outside of the buffer zone, as designated by the IDF on 27 January 2025.¹⁶⁵



Figure 25: CIR's geolocation of IPIN2631, showing an IDF Merkava IV tank and automatic weapons

¹⁶¹ [IP10568](#) (0:06)

¹⁶² [IP10568](#) (0:03-0:06)

¹⁶³ [IP10568](#) (0:29-0:42)

¹⁶⁴ [IP10568](#) (0:33)

¹⁶⁵ [EO0136](#)

fire near journalists in eastern Beit Hanoun, at coordinates: 31.5359, 34.5440. Sources: Google Earth Pro, 2025 Airbus, 01/12/2024; A: IP10568.¹⁶⁶

Al Jazeera reported on 3 February 2025:

“Today, Monday [3 February 2025], the Israeli occupation forces opened fire towards the Al Jazeera Mubasher team in the Al-Masryeen Street neighborhood in Beit Hanoun, northeast of the Gaza Strip.

Al Jazeera Mubasher's team was monitoring the extent of the destruction in the area, despite the occupation forces remaining on the outskirts of the city. While the team was observing the destruction at the site, the occupation forces deliberately opened fire on the team.

*The scenes showed the moment the team fled under a hail of fire from the occupation vehicles that were close to the crew during filming”.*¹⁶⁷

The IDF also stated on 3 February 2025:

“Over the past day (Monday) [3 February 2025], the IDF operated to distance a number of suspects that approached and posed a threat to the troops that are operating in several areas in the Gaza Strip”.

CIR could not independently verify whether the IDF's statement related to this incident.

7.2.2 FIVE CASUALTIES AND BOMB REMNANTS WITHIN DESTROYED VEHICLE IN BEIT LAHIA IPIN2830

Footage shared on 15 March 2025 shows at least five casualties being recovered from a destroyed car in Beit Lahia, northern Gaza Strip. Among the casualties identified, four were adults, and one was an individual whose age was unknown.¹⁶⁸ Smoke can be seen rising from the vehicle, which was positioned near what appears to be a temporary shelter.

Further imagery shows fragments from a Mikholit Glide Bomb.¹⁶⁹ This munition is manufactured by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and is reportedly used regularly by the IDF in Gaza.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ [IP10568](#)

¹⁶⁷ [SAT3248](#)

¹⁶⁸ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP11383](#) (adult casualties at 0:00, 0:03, 0:20x2; casualty of unknown age at 0:00)

¹⁶⁹ [IP11462](#) and [IP11463](#)

¹⁷⁰ [SAT4532](#)

At least one of the casualties visible in this footage can be seen arriving at the Indonesian Hospital in Beit Lahia on the same day, amongst several others.¹⁷¹ However, CIR could not independently verify whether all these casualties are related to the incident involving the impacted vehicle.

Footage of the incident was cross-referenced with satellite imagery from Google Earth, which enabled CIR to verify that it was captured on al-Salaten Street, near the northern gas station close to Atatra in Beit Lahia, at the following coordinates: 31.5551, 34.4914 (Figure 26). The incident's location falls within Block 968 on the evacuation map of Gaza, and occurred approximately 2.6 kilometres southwest of the buffer zone as designated by the IDF on 10 February 2025.¹⁷²




Figure 26: CIR's geolocation of IPIN2830 showing five casualties being pulled from a vehicle and drone remnants in Atatra, Beit Lahia, at coordinates: 31.5551, 34.4914. Sources: Google Earth Pro, 2025 CNES / Airbus, 17/06/2024; A: IP11384, B: IP11462.¹⁷³

Referring to this incident, the IDF stated:

"The IAF struck a terrorist cell yesterday [15 March 2025] in the Beit Lahia area that also included a terrorist who infiltrated Israeli territory during the Oct. 7 massacre. The terrorists struck were operating a drone intended to carry out terrorist attacks against IDF troops operating in Gaza, the drone was consistently used by the Islamic Jihad Terrorist Organization".¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP11384](#) (1:30) and [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP11382](#) (0:21)

¹⁷² [EO0138](#)

¹⁷³ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP11384](#) and [IP11462](#)

¹⁷⁴ [SAT3496](#)

CIR could not independently verify whether the casualties identified were affiliated with a designated terrorist organisation or militant group.

According to Palestine Online, “Press sources reported that Israeli aircraft targeted a vehicle belonging to the Al-Khair Foundation, killing nine people, including journalists and workers, in the Al-Attar area in the northern Gaza Strip”.¹⁷⁵ Al-Khair Foundation later stated on 16 March 2025:

“It is with great sadness and regret that we announce the demise in Gaza of eight of our team’s dedicated humanitarian aid workers. They were killed in violation of the agreed ceasefire in a drone airstrike.

*The exact circumstances are still being established but we refute utterly any suggestion that those who were killed were militant or in any way connected with Hamas”.*¹⁷⁶

7.2.3 MINOR CASUALTY AFTER ALLEGED IDF DRONE STRIKE IN RAFAH IPIN2754

Footage shared on 27 February 2025 shows a group of individuals in plain clothing carrying a minor casualty in Rafah’s al-Shaboura refugee camp in the southern Gaza Strip.¹⁷⁷

Footage of the incident was cross-referenced with satellite imagery from Google Earth, which enabled CIR to verify that it was captured on Othman Bin Affan Street within al-Shaboura refugee camp, Rafah, at the following coordinates: 31.2874, 34.2583 (Figure 27). The incident’s location falls within Block 4 on the evacuation map of Gaza, and occurred approximately 760 metres to the northeast of the buffer zone, near the Philadelphi Corridor, as designated by the IDF on 10 February 2025.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ [SAT3494](#)

¹⁷⁶ [SAT3497](#)

¹⁷⁷ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP11092](#) (0:04)

¹⁷⁸ [EO0138](#)



Figure 27: CIR's geolocation of IPIN2754, showing a minor casualty being carried along Othman Bin Affan Street in al-Shaboura refugee camp, Rafah, at coordinates: 31.2874, 34.2583. Sources: Google Earth Pro, 2025 Airbus, 24/11/2023; A: IP11092.¹⁷⁹

According to the Wafa News Agency:

“A child was seriously injured on Thursday [27 February 2025] after an Israeli occupation drone bombed a group of people in the Shaboura camp in the center of Rafah city in the southern Gaza Strip.

*Wafa correspondent reported that the child was seriously injured after an Israeli drone bombed a group of civilians in the Shaboura camp in the center of Rafah city”.*¹⁸⁰

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify the actor responsible or how the minor sustained their injuries.

8 AL-MAWASI AND BUFFER ZONES SINCE JULY 2025

Since 31 July 2025, the conclusion of CIR's investigation period, the IDF has launched a new offensive on Gaza City; IDF Spokesperson Effie Defrin announced that the “preliminary actions” of the offensive began on 20 August 2025, whilst “expanded ground operations” have been taking place since 15 September 2025.¹⁸¹

As a result of these new operations, the IDF has made changes to the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone and the buffer zone and published new communications relating to civilians' displacement. The following section provides an overview of these changes and communications.

¹⁷⁹ [WARNING: GRAPHIC] [IP11092](#)

¹⁸⁰ [SAT3386](#)

¹⁸¹ [SAT4533](#) and [SAT4534](#)

8.1 AL-MAWASI HUMANITARIAN ZONE

6 & 7 August 2025

The IDF only published three displacement orders in August 2025, representing a sharp decline compared to the 12 displacement orders published in July 2025 and the 18 orders published in June 2025. The three displacement orders were published on 6 and 7 August 2025, and all three directed civilians towards al-Mawasi.¹⁸²

27 August 2025

On 27 August 2025, the IDF's Arabic Spokesperson, Avichay Adraee, published the following announcement:

"I wish to confirm that there are vast empty areas in the southern Strip, just as is the case in the central camps and in Al-Mawasi. These areas are free of tents.

[...]

Evacuating Gaza City is inevitable, and therefore, every family that relocates to the south will receive the most abundant humanitarian aid that is currently being worked on these days, as the Defense Army has begun working on introducing tents and preparing areas to establish complexes for distributing humanitarian aid, laying water lines, and more".¹⁸³

The announcement also contained a map (shown in Figure 28) highlighting "Additional empty areas in the southern Gaza Strip for the benefit of those evacuating the northern Gaza Strip".¹⁸⁴ Some of these areas fell within the al-Mawasi zone, as outlined by the IDF in January 2025.¹⁸⁵ However, other areas fell within the most recent buffer zone, designated by the IDF on 7 August 2025 (in zones 127, 131, 2352, 2353, and 2354) making these announcements contradictory to previous communications.¹⁸⁶

CIR analysed Planet Labs SkySat satellite imagery of these areas and confirmed that they appeared to be largely devoid of tents or temporary structures on 26-28 August 2025. Imagery from 18 September 2025 confirmed that some areas had seen a large increase in the number of temporary structures (see [Appendix A](#)). However, CIR could not verify whether the IDF had established "complexes for distributing humanitarian aid" or "la[id] water lines" as claimed by Adraee.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸² [EO0176](#), [EO0177](#), and [EO0178](#)

¹⁸³ [SAT4535](#)

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*

¹⁸⁵ [EO0180](#) and [EO0133](#)

¹⁸⁶ [EO0178](#)

¹⁸⁷ [SAT4535](#)



Figure 28: The IDF published a map of “empty areas” in Gaza for evacuees (first image). Most areas fell within the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone (second image); however, some areas also fell within the IDF-designated buffer zone (third image). Sources: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024; SAT4535.¹⁸⁸

6 September 2025

The IDF’s Arabic spokesperson, Avichay Adraee, published a map on X showing the al-Mawasi humanitarian area.¹⁸⁹ This was the first time the IDF has officially mapped out the zone in an evacuation order since 12 January 2025.¹⁹⁰ Following this update, the al-Mawasi zone is approximately 42% smaller than in January 2025, decreasing from approximately 74km² to 43km².

A comparison of the 6 September 2025 humanitarian area with the previous January 2025 humanitarian zone is provided in Figure 29.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*

¹⁸⁹ [EO0184](#)

¹⁹⁰ [EO0133](#)



Figure 29: The IDF-designated al-Mawasi humanitarian zone maps from January and September 2025, indicating a 42% reduction in size. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024.

9 September 2025

An evacuation order published by Avichay Adraee is addressed to “all residents of the city of Gaza and those present in all its neighborhoods, from the Old City and Tafah to the east and up to the sea to the west”.¹⁹¹ The order further states, “For your safety, evacuate immediately via the Al-Rashid axis towards the humanitarian zone in Al-Mawasi”.¹⁹²

The al-Mawasi humanitarian zone, as highlighted in Adraee’s post from 6 September 2025, is shown in a newly published map on the IDF’s Arabic-language website.¹⁹³ Based on available information, this is the first time the website map has highlighted the humanitarian zone.

10 September 2025

Avichay Adraee publishes a second evacuation order instructing “all residents of Gaza City and those living in all its neighborhoods, the Old City and Al-Tuffah in the east to the sea in the west, who have not evacuated area” to “evacuate immediately via Al-Rashid axis toward the humanitarian zone in Al-Mawasi”.¹⁹⁴

Adraee also publishes a map of the al-Mawasi zone, with a message stating:

“Contrary to Hamas’s claims, there are vacant spots in the humanitarian zone for setting up tents. Don’t be deceived by Hamas’s lies, which seek to

¹⁹¹ [EO0186](#)

¹⁹² *Ibid*

¹⁹³ [SAT4523](#)

¹⁹⁴ [EO0187](#)

use you as human shields for its deadly goals. Hamas is putting you in danger and harming your families. You must know the truth and follow the evacuation instructions. These are life-saving instructions.”¹⁹⁵

The map included photographs of areas within the al-Mawasi zone which had not been occupied by large numbers of tents or temporary structures. CIR’s analysis of Planet Labs SkySat imagery confirmed that these areas were largely devoid of tents and temporary structures on 5 and 8 September 2025; later imagery from 18 September 2025 showed an increase in the number of temporary structures in these areas (see [Appendix B](#)).

**12 September
2025**

A post from Avichay Adraee lists various “safe relocation” areas in southern and central Gaza, including: Nuseirat, Bureij, Deir al-Balah, and al-Mawasi.¹⁹⁶ The post further states:

“Residents of Gaza City, the Defense Army is determined to decisively confront Hamas and will act with great force in the Gaza City area, as it has done throughout the sector. For your safety, please immediately head to the areas listed. Staying in Gaza City is considered extremely dangerous.”¹⁹⁷

**17 September
2025**

A post from Avichay Adraee announces that “a temporary transit route will be opened via Salah al-Din Street”.¹⁹⁸ According to the announcement:

“You will be allowed to move via Salah al-Din Street and then continue southward from Wadi Gaza.

At this stage, transit through this route will be available for 48 hours, starting today (Wednesday) 17.09.25 at 12:00 and until Friday 19.09.25 at 12:00.”¹⁹⁹

**19 September
2025**

A follow-up post from Avichay Adraee confirms that “from this moment, Salah al-Din Road is closed for southward movement,” and further states:

“The Israel Defense Forces will continue to operate with unprecedented and extreme force against Hamas and other terrorist organizations. From this moment, southward movement is possible only via Al-Rashid Street.”²⁰⁰

Activity on or near the road will be closely monitored for possible violations between 17 and 18 September 2025.

¹⁹⁵ [SAT4487](#)

¹⁹⁶ [SAT4536](#)

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*

¹⁹⁸ [SAT4537](#)

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid*

²⁰⁰ [SAT4538](#)

APPENDIX A - MORE TEMPORARY STRUCTURES IN AL-MAWASI AFTER IDF ANNOUNCEMENT ON 27 AUGUST 2025




Figure 30: Satellite imagery showing an increase in the number of temporary structures in Block 88 at coordinates 31.3359, 34.2818. Sources: Planet Labs Skysat [26/08/2025, 18/09/2025].



Figure 31: Satellite imagery showing an increase in the number of temporary structures in Block 89 at coordinates 31.3767, 34.3101. Sources: Planet Labs Skysat [26/08/2025, 18/09/2025].



Figure 32: Satellite imagery showing an increase in the number of temporary structures across Blocks 139, 136 and 133 at coordinates 31.4043, 34.3367. Sources: Planet Labs Skysat [28/08/2025, 18/09/2025].

APPENDIX B - INCREASE IN TEMPORARY STRUCTURES IN AL-MAWASI AFTER IDF ANNOUNCEMENT ON 10 SEPTEMBER 2025



Figure 33: Satellite imagery showing an increase in the number of temporary structures in Block 36 at coordinates 31.3720, 34.3146. Sources: Planet Labs Skysat [05/09/2025, 18/09/2025].

Block 131

8 September 2025



18 September 2025



Figure 34: Satellite imagery showing an increase in the number of temporary structures in Block 131 at coordinates 31.3981, 34.3465. Sources: Planet Labs Skysat [08/09/2025, 18/09/2025].

8.2 IDF-DESIGNATED BUFFER ZONE

6 & 7 August 2025

The IDF only published three displacement orders in August 2025, on 6 and 7 August 2025.²⁰¹ When compared with the previous buffer zone published on 27 July 2025, the mapped out area in these displacement orders decreased by approximately **2.9%** from 276km² to 268km², as an area south of Gaza City was removed. This would suggest the area is safe for civilians.

6 September 2025

Avichay Adraee begins to post displacement orders highlighting specific high-rise buildings in Gaza City, as well as the zones surrounding them.²⁰² These displacement orders only show satellite imagery of a high-rise building and its immediate vicinity, meaning that the buffer zone is not shown.

The most recent update to the buffer zone published by the IDF remains its post from 7 August 2025.

9 September 2025

At 08:01 (local time), Avichay Adraee published an evacuation order for “all residents of the city of Gaza and those present in all its neighborhoods, from the Old City and Tafah to the east and up to the sea to the west”.²⁰³ According to Adraee’s post:

*“The Defense Army is determined to eliminate Hamas and will operate in the Gaza city area with great force, as it has operated in various parts of the Strip. [...] Remaining in the area is extremely dangerous.”*²⁰⁴

The accompanying map did not show a buffer zone, though did show a large arrow pointing southwards from Gaza City.

On the same date, the IDF published a new map on its Arabic-language website.²⁰⁵ This map showed the newly-mapped “dangerous combat zone” or buffer zone. Based on available information, this is believed to be the first time the website map has used the phrasing “dangerous combat zone” on the interactive map itself.

The new buffer zone encompasses all areas within northern Gaza, including areas which have never previously been included within the buffer zone in western Gaza City, such as blocks 702-709 in the Zeitoun neighbourhood, and Blocks 771-774 in the Rimal neighbourhood. However, some areas which were included within the last buffer zone from 7 August 2025, such as Blocks in al-Mawasi and eastern Deir al-Balah, have now been removed.²⁰⁶

A comparison of the 9 September 2025 buffer zone with the previous 7 August 2025 buffer zone is provided in Figure 35. In total, the 9 September zone is **6.3%** larger than the 7 August zone, having grown from 268km² to 285km². The new zone encompasses 78.3% of Gaza’s total area.

²⁰¹ [EO0176](#), [EO0177](#), and [EO0178](#)

²⁰² Examples include: [EO0182](#), [EO0183](#), and [EO0181](#)

²⁰³ [EO0186](#)

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*

²⁰⁵ [SAT4523](#)

²⁰⁶ [EO0178](#) and [SAT4523](#)




Figure 35: The IDF designated buffer zone on 7 August and 9 September 2025, showing the inclusion of all of northern Gaza. Source: Google Earth Pro, CNES / Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, 01/12/2024.

10 September 2025

Avichay Adraee publishes a displacement order for northern Gaza and Gaza City at 13:21 (local time).²⁰⁷ This displacement order shows the northern section of the buffer zone, unlike the previous order on 9 September 2025.

8.3 FURTHER INSIGHTS SINCE JULY 2025

The expansion of the buffer zone over Gaza City means that **90%** of critical infrastructure is now located within the buffer zone, as a large proportion of such buildings are concentrated in Gaza City. This marks a significant increase from **51%** in July 2025 and **47%** in August 2025. To note, the number of marketplaces within the buffer zone increased to **85%** and the number of governmental buildings rose to **94%** after the expansion.

CIR has verified nine incidents in Gaza City since the first displacement order was issued during the current IDF offensive, on 6 September 2025. These incidents include six cases of damage to high-rise buildings, one incident showing damage to temporary structures, one case of damage to Al-Farabi school, and one incident

²⁰⁷ [EO0187](#)

at a reported Red Cross warehouse.²⁰⁸ CIR has also identified further footage of similar incidents in Gaza City, which is currently under review.

9 PROPOSED AREAS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION

During the course of this investigation, both CIR and the FCDO have identified various themes relating to displacement and evacuation orders, which CIR could further analyse. These themes could also form the basis of supplementary in-depth investigations, at the FCDO's request.

- **Analysis of the military necessity of evacuation orders and the proportionality of subsequent actions.**
 - CIR would be interested in collaborating with the FCDO to develop a novel methodology for addressing this challenge; however, it is essential to acknowledge the limitations of OSINT within the context of these investigations.
- **Case studies into one or two evacuation orders and relevant incidents after their publication, as well as the most commonly evacuated blocks.**
 - CIR's open-source methodology for incident verification, which relies on footage likely captured by individuals on the ground, likely contributes to the fact that only 10% of incidents occurred in evacuated areas within five days of an evacuation order being issued (see Section 6.3 in CIR's part 1 report).
 - CIR suggests that a deep dive into specific evacuation orders and relevant incidents after their publication could provide further insights into the military activity conducted after EOs. For example, EO0132 was followed by IPIN2433 and IPIN2440, and EO0108 was followed by IPIN2944 and IPIN2945.
 - A deep dive into military activity in the most commonly evacuated IDF-designated Blocks (in Jabalia - see Section 3.1 in CIR's part 1 report) could also provide further insights into the nature of IDF military activity in evacuated zones.
- **Research into instances where civilians may have been put at risk due to inconsistencies in evacuation orders**
 - CIR suggests that case studies showing inconsistencies in evacuation orders are identified, as well as dates when the number and pace of evacuation orders may have caused confusion amongst civilians, placing them at risk.

²⁰⁸ Incidents showing damage to highrises: IPIN3345, IPIN3348, IPIN3351, IPIN3355, IPIN3356, and IPIN3360; damage to temporary structures: IPIN3358; damage to Al-Farabi school: IPIN3350; damage to Red Cross warehouse: IPIN3352.

- For example, as noted in Section 3.1 of the Part 1 report, CIR found inconsistencies in the format of how the warnings were communicated, the level of detail visible on the evacuation maps, and how blocks were highlighted within evacuation maps.
- **A deep dive into IDF actions in Gaza City since the new military offensive began.**
 - As noted in Section 8, CIR has verified nine incidents in Gaza City since the first displacement order was issued during the current IDF offensive, on 6 September 2025. CIR also has further footage of similar incidents in Gaza City, currently under review.
 - CIR suggests that a deep dive be conducted into the IDF's military actions, statements, and evacuation orders since it began "preliminary actions" on 20 August 2025.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁹ SAT4533

ANNEX - METHODOLOGY

CIR ensures all information collected is preserved, verified, analysed, investigated and reported in a manner consistent with the guidelines published by the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).²¹⁰ These guidelines detail the best practices for human rights evidence safekeeping and reliance for later judicial use. The diagram below illustrates this methodology:



COLLECTION OF FOOTAGE

CIR has developed a dataset of verified incidents in Israel, Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon from open-source information. All incidents highlighted within this report have been verified and archived within CIR's dataset of incidents.

CIR conducts extensive searches in Arabic, Hebrew and English across UGC and social media platforms, including X, Facebook, YouTube, and Telegram, to identify potential human rights violations. Each piece of content verified by CIR is assigned an IP number, which links to the original footage or image. Each incident, often comprising multiple IP numbers, is also assigned an IPIN number.

CIR also collects statements from politicians and military leaders and allegations and testimonies from media outlets. These sources provide contextual information regarding the human impact of incidents. Each statement, allegation or testimony is assigned a SAT number, which also links to the original source and is archived within CIR's database. Official evacuation orders published by the IDF are separately archived within CIR's database and are assigned an EO number.

CIR categorises all pieces of content into five graphic levels, which are also noted within CIR's spreadsheet of incidents:

²¹⁰ [SAT2455](#)

1	None - Infrastructural destruction or low-level violence.
2	Mild - Verbal or minor physical violence and derogatory behaviour.
3	Moderate - Offensive verbal violence, derogatory behaviour, minor abuse of individuals, or minor injuries in which blood is not visible.
4	Severe - Graphic, subtle displays of deceased individuals or injuries.
5	Graphic - Very graphic displays of deceased individuals or severe injuries.

VERIFICATION OF FOOTAGE

CIR aims to verify the location and date of all pieces of content within its spreadsheet.

Geolocation is the process of determining the specific location of a piece of content using online tools and techniques, such as satellite and street-view imagery. By comparing footage of an incident with this online imagery, CIR geolocates the latitude and longitude of incidents and provides the coordinates of each location, up to six decimals.

This report contains several visuals showing how footage has been geolocated. In these images, coloured boxes are used to show how landmarks or distinguishing details correspond with satellite imagery in that location. A red pin indicates the precise location where the incident occurred.

CIR confirmed the date when a piece of content was captured by identifying when it was first uploaded online and cross-referencing this with local reporting. To do so, CIR completed reverse image searches using screenshots from UGC and analysing when they first appeared online. CIR also conducted metadata analysis in an attempt to identify the original recording date.

In some cases, CIR could not independently verify the date when a piece of content was recorded. In these instances, CIR notes the date when a piece of content was uploaded online.