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ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE FORTIFICATIONS IN
NORTHERN WEST BANK

1 April 2025

ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE FORTIFICATIONS IN NORTHERN WEST BANK

CIR In-depth Investigation

1 April 2025

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CIR has investigated the possible establishment of Israel Security Forces (ISF) fortifications in the northern West Bank areas of Jenin ([Section 4](#)), Nour Shams ([Section 5](#)), Tulkarm ([Section 6](#)) and al-Fara'a ([Section 7](#)) between 1 December 2024 and 17 March 2025. These specific areas were selected for analysis due to the concentration of ISF militarised activity identified at these locations.

CIR analysed satellite imagery and user-generated content (UGC) from these locations, which showed indications of ISF fortifications. CIR primarily focused on content which suggested the following:

- The establishment of forward operating bases (FOBs) and checkpoints.
- Clearances and demolitions.
- The installation of structures such as generators or fuel tanks.
- The construction of defensive walls.

From this UGC, CIR has highlighted 17 case studies representing its findings showing possible FOBs, checkpoints, clearances, and damage to transport infrastructure and residential buildings.

At the time of writing, CIR did not identify UGC or satellite imagery showing the installation of new temporary or permanent structures or defensive walls in the northern West Bank. ISF activity within the northern West Bank appears to rely on the existing urban landscape to “occupy homes” as “command centers”.¹

This report is the second iteration of the possible Israeli positions in Jenin, which was sent to the FCDO on 13 March 2025. CIR’s initial findings are summarised in the table below:

	Jenin	Nour Shams	Tulkarm	Al-Fara'a
Concentration of activity	Southwestern Jenin city, northwestern and southern Jenin refugee camps	North and southeastern Nour Shams refugee camp	Northeastern Tulkarm city and eastern Tulkarm refugee camp	Eastern and southern al-Fara'a refugee camp
Possible FOBs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Possible Checkpoints	None	None	Yes	Yes
Road damage	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Residential building damage	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

¹ SAT3594

2 REPORT DETAILS

CIR has identified incidents which indicate possible ISF activity in the northern West Bank locations of Jenin, Nour Shams, Tulkarm and al-Fara'a. These incidents have been verified and archived within CIR's dataset. The locations of these areas of focus are highlighted in figure 1.




Figure 1: Location of Jenin, Nour Shams, al-Fara'a and Tulkarm in northern West Bank. Source: Google Earth.

In order to investigate potential fortifications in the northern West Bank, CIR has primarily focused on the possible establishment of forward operating bases (FOBs) and checkpoints, clearances and demolitions, the building of defensive walls such as T-walls, and the placement of structures. CIR has defined these terms in the following table:

Checkpoint	A permanent or temporary self-contained post where security forces may stop traffic or individuals to check documents or search vehicles. ²
Forward Operating Bases (FOBs)	A fortified position established to support operations. Such bases are commonly built using HESCO barriers, defensive earthworks or concrete barriers. ³
Clearances and demolitions	The destruction of buildings, roads, farmland, or vegetation through means such as controlled explosives or vehicles, including bulldozers.
T-Walls	Modular, prefabricated concrete walls, primarily designed to protect an area from low-trajectory fire, shrapnel, and blasts. ⁴
Structures	Within this report, CIR defines structures as objects such as generators, fuel tanks, or water tanks, which could indicate long-term fortified positions.

When conducting its investigation, CIR did not identify UGC or satellite imagery showing the installation of new temporary or permanent structures or defensive walls in the northern West Bank. Instead, ISF activity within northern West Bank appears to rely on the existing urban landscape to “occupy homes” as “command centers”.⁵ This was previously reported by Human Rights Watch in 2002, which stated that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has historically manipulated the dense urban environment, having “converted civilian houses into military positions” and used “armored bulldozers to demolish residents’ homes” to “clear paths” for military access.⁶

² [SAT3474](#)

³ [SAT3472](#)

⁴ [SAT3475](#)

⁵ [SAT3594](#)

⁶ [SAT3617](#)

2.1 LOCATION SCOPE

In this report, CIR identified potential ISF positions in the northern West Bank to assess the potential development of fortifications. This report has specifically focused on Jenin, Nour Shams, al-Fara'a and Tulkarm due to the level of ISF presence and impact reported within these areas.⁷ Allegations from media outlets indicate that the IDF has been “destroy[ing] hundreds of buildings and levell[ing] much of their infrastructure”, “carving wide roadways”, “converting other buildings into military barracks”, and establishing “outposts”, making these areas “uninhabitable”.⁸

2.2 DATE SCOPE

CIR's investigation focuses on the period between 1 December 2024 and 17 March 2025, with most incidents occurring after the IDF's “large-scale military operation” Iron Wall was launched in Jenin on 21 January 2025.⁹ Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on the same day:

*“Under the direction of the Political-Security Cabinet, the IDF, Shin Bet, and the Israel Police today [21 January 2025] launched a large-scale and significant military operation to eradicate terrorism in Jenin - ‘Iron Wall.’ This is another step towards achieving the goal we set - strengthening security in Judea and Samaria [West Bank]”.*¹⁰

While ‘Iron Wall’ commenced in Jenin, operations subsequently “expanded to Tulkarm, Nur Shams, and El Far’a”, resulting in “the largest wave of forced displacement in the Occupied West Bank since 1967”.¹¹

⁷ [SAT3471](#), and [SAT3510](#)

⁸ [SAT3471](#), and [SAT3467](#)

⁹ [SAT3587](#)

¹⁰ [SAT3002](#), and [SAT3326](#); The term “Judea and Samaria” is used by, but is not limited to, the State of Israel to refer to the West Bank region.

¹¹ [SAT3510](#) and [SAT3587](#)

3 TIMELINE OF NOTABLE EVENTS

The following timeline provides an overview of notable events in the northern West Bank from 1 December 2024 to 17 March 2025, including media allegations, official statements by Israeli Government officials, and verified incidents from CIR's spreadsheet. Where possible, CIR indicated the date of each incident within this timeline, though has noted where the exact date could not be independently verified.

19 January 2025	Start of the Gaza-Israel ceasefire. ¹²
21 January 2025	Operation 'Iron Wall', a "large-scale and significant operation to eradicate terrorism in Jenin," commenced with the start of raids in Jenin. ¹³
27 January 2025	Operation 'Iron Wall' officially expanded into Tulkarm. ¹⁴
29 January 2025	Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz allegedly announced IDF intent to remain in Jenin "without a withdrawal date". ¹⁵
2 February 2025	Israeli military activity expands into al-Fara'a. ¹⁶
9 February 2025	Israel military activity expands into Nour Shams. ¹⁷
21 February 2025	Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Defence Minister, Israel Katz, visit Tulkarm refugee camp. ¹⁸
23 February 2025	Israeli tanks deployed into the northern West Bank. ¹⁹

¹² [SAT3651](#)

¹³ [SAT3002](#), for example: [IPIN2481](#) ([IP9890](#)), [Warning: GRAPHIC] [IPIN2476](#) ([IP9880](#), [IP9916](#), and [IP9967](#)), [IPIN2488](#) ([IP9907](#), and [IP9948](#))

¹⁴ [SAT3627](#), for example: [IPIN2539](#) ([IP10277](#), [IP10274](#), [IP10258](#), [IP10257](#), [IP10233](#), and [IP10234](#))

¹⁵ [SAT3626](#)

¹⁶ [SAT3272](#)

¹⁷ [SAT3627](#)

¹⁸ [SAT3623](#)

¹⁹ [SAT3462](#)

4 JENIN

Concentration of incidents	Southwestern Jenin city as well as northwestern and southern areas of Jenin refugee camp
Satellite imagery used	Planet Labs
IDF presence verified	Yes
Possible FOBs	Yes
Possible detention centre	Yes
Possible checkpoints	No
Damage	Residential building and transport infrastructure damage

In its previous report titled 'Possible Israeli Positions in Jenin', CIR verified eight incidents in Jenin which showed possible fortification activity. Within this follow-up report, CIR has highlighted an additional five case studies. Israeli military activity in Jenin officially expanded on 21 January 2025 with the commencement of Operation 'Iron Wall'.²⁰ These incidents were concentrated in the southwestern area of Jenin city and within the northwestern and southern areas of the Jenin refugee camp, as highlighted in figure 2.

²⁰ [SAT3002](#), and [IPIN2804](#) ([IP10918](#))



Figure 2: CIR identified incidents showing activity in Jenin refugee camp and the surrounding area.
Source: Google Earth.

4.1 POSSIBLE FOBs AND CHECKPOINTS

This section examines four case studies that show indications of possible FOBs in Jenin. CIR verified what appeared to be continued ISF presence and activity within these case studies, which could be consistent with FOB locations.

Although CIR did not identify the construction of new checkpoints, a wider pattern of utilising existing structures as FOBs or checkpoints was observed.

In addition, on 15 February 2025, the Jenin Camp 24 Hours Telegram channel wrote, “Military Outposts: These are spread around the camp”.

> LOCATION 1: POSSIBLE DETENTION CENTRE IN KHERBET AS-SOHA (IPIN2519)

Content shared on 24 January 2025 shows a group of Israeli soldiers appearing to escort at least one individual in plain clothing from Farhan al-Sa’di Street to al-Madina al-Munawara Street in the Kherbet as-Soha residential area in Jenin, West Bank at coordinates 32.4561, 35.2918.²¹ The individual appeared to have both hands behind their back and one soldier holding their right arm. Three Israeli military vehicles are

²¹ [IP10153](#)

also seen positioned in front of the same residential building, and the soldiers with the individual appeared to walk in its direction (figure 3).²²

The incident occurred on the same day as IPIN2527, which took place less than 140 meters to the northwest.²³ The incident also occurred at the same location as IPIN2483, which shows two military vehicles positioned in front of the residential building, with at least one casualty visible, on 21 January 2025.²⁴ This incident (IPIN2483) was detailed in the previous report, 'Possible Israeli Positions in Jenin'.

> LOCATION 2: POSSIBLE DETENTION CENTRE IN KHERBET AS-SOHA (IPIN2526 and IPIN2527)

CIR identified two incidents shared on 24 January 2025 that occurred approximately 30 metres apart at coordinates 32.4554, 35.2931 and 32.4552, 35.2929.

Footage of the first incident (IPIN2526) shows at least five Israeli soldiers and one individual appearing to be unarmed and in plain clothing walking towards a residential building in the Kherbet as-Soha area of Jenin. The individual's right arm appeared to be held by one of the soldiers. One of the soldiers appeared to knock on the building's front door, which was subsequently opened.²⁵

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify whether the individual was being detained or who was inside the residential building.

Footage of the second incident (IPIN2527) shows at least five individuals in plain clothing, appearing unarmed, being escorted by armed Israeli soldiers in Kherbet as-Soha, Jenin.²⁶ The aforementioned group of Israeli soldiers was stationed under a structure in front of a residential building nearby.

Two of the individuals appear to have their hands behind their backs as they walk toward a residential building on al-Madina al-Munawara Street, approximately 154 meters northwest, where an ongoing Israeli military presence had been previously documented (IPIN2483 and IPIN2519).²⁷

The locations of IPIN2519, IPIN2526, and IPIN2527 are highlighted in figure 3.

²² [IP10153](#), [IP10154](#), and [IP10155](#)

²³ [P10183](#), [IP10184](#), and [IP10185](#)

²⁴ [IP9893](#), [IP9922](#), [IP9925](#), and [IP9921](#)

²⁵ [IP10181](#), 0:04

²⁶ [IP10183](#), [IP10184](#), and [IP10185](#)

²⁷ [IP9893](#), [IP9922](#), [IP9925](#), [IP9921](#), [IP10153](#), [IP10154](#), and [IP10155](#)




Figure 3: CIR geolocated IDF military presence at multiple residential buildings on two separate dates in the Kherbet as-Soha residential area, Jenin at coordinates: 32.4561, 35.2916, 32.4554, 35.2931 and 32.4552, 35.2929. Sources: GovMap, A: IP10152, B: IP10181 and C: IP10183.²⁸

On 24 January 2025, the IDF stated that, “Security forces have been operating in Jenin, in the Menashe Brigade, to thwart terrorism for the past three days. So far, the forces have eliminated more than ten terrorists, arrested about 20 wanted individuals, and confiscated many other weapons and ammunition. During the operation, forces located and destroyed a laboratory for the production of explosives”.²⁹

While the above incidents occurred within Jenin, CIR could not independently verify whether the statement corresponds to the seemingly detained individuals shown within the incidents.

Further, on 24 January 2025, WAFA News Agency reported that “The Israeli occupation forces detained several residents from the Abdullah Azzam neighborhood and other areas within the camp”.³⁰

A second WAFA article from 25 January 2025 claimed that:

“The occupation forces launched a large-scale detention campaign that targeted several local residents from different neighborhoods and homes in the Jenin refugee camp. Additionally, the Israeli soldiers broke into the home of the

²⁸ [IP10152](#), [IP10181](#), and [IP10183](#)

²⁹ [SAT3086](#)

³⁰ [SAT3085](#)

*detainee Zakaria Al-Zubaidi, detained his wife and children, and stormed the homes of his two siblings in the Jaberbat area and destroyed their contents”.*³¹

> LOCATION 3: ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE (IPIN2900)

Content shared on 11 March 2025 shows Israeli soldiers placing a possible covered casualty into a military vehicle outside the Dr. Munther al-Omari Mosque in Kherbet as-Soha, east of Jenin refugee camp, at coordinates 32.4568, 35.2923.³² CIR could not independently verify the contents of the covered form.

Israeli forces, some of whom appear armed, are further seen standing on the front porch of a residential building on University Street, less than 60 meters north of the mosque, and five armoured vehicles are parked nearby.³³ A group of individuals wearing what appeared to be civilian clothing were visible standing outside the aforementioned residential building in earlier footage.³⁴ From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify whether the location was being used as a possible FOB. This incident is highlighted in figure 4.

The incident occurred approximately 100 meters from IPIN2483.³⁵




Figure 4: CIR geolocated military presence at a residential building in the Kherbet as-Soha residential area, Jenin at coordinates: 32.4568, 35.2923. Sources: GovMap, A: IP11466, B: IP11467, and IP11472.³⁶

³¹ SAT3087

³² IP11809, and IP11810

³³ IP11467 and IP11472

³⁴ IP11466

³⁵ IP9893, IP9922, IP9925, and IP9921

³⁶ IP11466, IP11467, and IP11472

On 12 March 2025, Al Ayyam reported:

“Israeli special forces from the ‘Mista’arvim’ units infiltrated the eastern neighbourhood of the city and positioned themselves around a house.

Simultaneously, occupation soldiers besieged a site and a warehouse on the Jenin-Haifa road west of the city, stormed the Khillet al-Souha neighbourhood, and evacuated the ‘Al-Adeeb’ residential building after forcing its residents to leave, present their identification cards, detaining them, and subjecting them to field interrogations before raiding the apartments and destroying their contents”.³⁷

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify whether residents were forced to leave the building which Israeli forces were standing outside of, or whether individuals were interrogated.

> LOCATION 4: POSSIBLE FOB IN AL-JABRYAT (IPIN2790, IPIN2820)

Footage shared on 23 January 2025 shows a possible FOB, with at least five Israeli soldiers positioned on the balcony of a residential building in the al-Jabryat neighbourhood, southwest of Jenin refugee camp, at coordinates 32.4571, 35.2825 (IPIN2790).³⁸

Separate footage shared on 15 February 2025 shows Israeli forces at the same residential building (IPIN2820).³⁹ At least three Israeli soldiers appear to be connecting an unidentifiable object on wires near the residential buildings’ rooftop.⁴⁰ Both incidents are highlighted in figure 5.

³⁷ [SAT3595](#)

³⁸ [IP9970](#)

³⁹ [IP11208](#)

⁴⁰ [IP11208](#)



Figure 5: CIR geolocated ISF military presence at a residential building in al-Jabyat neighbourhood, Jenin, at coordinates: 32.4571, 35.2825. Sources: GovMap, A: IP9970, B: IP11208.⁴¹

On 21 January 2025, Al Jazeera reported:

*“Military and strategic expert Brigadier General Elias Hanna said that [...] the occupation is following a strategy that aims in the first stage to evacuate the camp of its residents, as about two thousand families have been displaced, in an attempt to isolate the resistance, revealing that the size of the force used exceeds one military division, with intensive air support”.*⁴²

On 23 January 2025, a press release from Chief of the General Staff, LTG Herzi Halevi, was shared on the IDF official website which included the statement, “We need to be prepared to continue in the Jenin camp that will bring it to a different place - we are denying the enemy opportunities to harm our forces”.⁴³

At the time of writing, CIR could not independently verify the presence of a designated terrorist organisation or militant group in the area.

Palestinian journalist Younis Tirawi shared a post on X on 12 February 2023, claiming the residential building visible in the incident was allegedly used by Israeli forces, before the conflict started on 7 October 2023.⁴⁴ CIR verified that the building in Tirawi’s

⁴¹ [IP9970](#), and [IP11208](#)

⁴² [SAT3450](#)

⁴³ [SAT3092](#)

⁴⁴ [SAT3449](#)

post was in the same location shown in IPIN2790⁴⁵ and IPIN2820;⁴⁶ however, CIR could not independently verify the presence of Israeli forces before 7 October 2023.

4.2 CLEARANCES AND DEMOLITIONS

Further to the clearance activity examined in the previous report, CIR identified an additional notable case study showing possible clearance activity by Israeli forces. According to Reuters, Israeli bulldozers “appear to be carving wide roadways through its once-crowded warren of alleyways, echoing tactics already employed in Gaza as troops prepare for a long-term stay”.⁴⁷

> DEMOLITIONS AND ROAD CLEARANCE ON MAHYOUB STREET (IPIN2821, IPIN2901)

Footage shared on 12 February 2025 shows an Israeli military presence for at least four days on Mahyoub Street in the al-Jabryat neighbourhood of Jenin, including several armoured vehicles and bulldozers at coordinates 32.4580, 35.2866 (IPIN2821). A new road is visible cutting through the refugee camp, with several residential buildings having been destroyed to make way for it.⁴⁸

Further imagery shared on 17 March 2025 shows an area on the same street, less than 100 metres southeast, where several residential buildings were destroyed, and new roads appear to have been paved at coordinates 32.4585, 35.2873 (IPIN2901).⁴⁹ One clearing extends northward toward the centre of the camp, while another appears to cut into the southeastern blocks. Nearby residential buildings along the newly constructed road appear to have sustained damage. CIR could not independently verify the actor responsible for the damage to this exact area from the available footage.

Both incidents are highlighted in figure 6.

⁴⁵ [IP9970](#)

⁴⁶ [IP11208](#)

⁴⁷ [SAT3467](#)

⁴⁸ [IP11210](#), [IP11211](#), [IP11212](#), [IP11213](#), [IP11214](#) and [IP11215](#)

⁴⁹ [IP11811](#), first image




Figure 6: CIR geolocated clearing activity in the al-Jabryant neighbourhood, Jenin at coordinates: 32.4580, 35.2866 and 32.4585, 35.2873. Sources: GovMap, A: IP11811, B: IP11214, and IP11210.⁵⁰

CIR identified satellite imagery of the incident location from Planet Scope.⁵¹ A comparison of imagery from 29 January 2025 and 23 March 2025 shows damage, clearance and widening of roads (figure 7). However, CIR could not independently verify the exact date the damage occurred.

⁵⁰ IP11811, IP11214 and IP11210

⁵¹ CIR used Planet Scope Scene imagery from Planet Labs, which has a resolution of three metres per pixel and can be used to observe significant changes to the landscape, such as large areas of cleared structures or newly constructed roads.




Figure 7: Satellite imagery of Mahyoub Street, Jenin from 29 January 2025 and 23 March 2025. Source: Planet Labs.

According to an Al-Ghad article published on 17 March 2025:

“The occupation army expanded its demolition operations in the Abdullah Azzam neighbourhood, Mahyoub Street, and the Samran neighbourhood, while Israeli military bulldozers are working to destroy some of the damaged roads around the camp”.⁵²

On 21 March 2025, Haaretz reported:

“The Israeli army announced its intention this week to demolish about 95 homes in the Jenin refugee camp and around 85 homes in the Al Ein refugee camp near the West Bank city of Nablus. The stated goal is to change the routes of roads inside the camps and widen them so they’ll be accessible to armored vehicles”.⁵³

At the time of writing, CIR did not identify the original IDF statement which made these claims.

⁵² SAT3596

⁵³ SAT3598

5 NOUR SHAMS

Concentration of incidents	North and southeastern Nour Shams refugee camp
Satellite imagery used	Planet Labs
IDF presence verified	Yes
Possible FOBs	Yes
Possible detention centre	No
Possible checkpoints	No
Damage	Residential building and transport infrastructure damage

CIR has examined four case studies in the Nour Shams refugee camp, east of Tulkarm, showing possible fortification activity, consisting of possible FOBs and damage to road infrastructure and buildings. Israeli military activity officially expanded into Nour Shams on 9 February 2025, reportedly removing residents “out of their homes in the camp and turn[ing] them into military outposts” while Israeli bulldozers began demolition activities.⁵⁴ The majority of the incidents occurred in northern Nour Shams refugee camp, with one verified in the southeast. These incidents’ locations are highlighted in figure 8.

⁵⁴ [SAT3627](#)




Figure 8: CIR identified incidents showing activity in Nour Shams refugee camp and the surrounding area. Source: Google Earth.

5.1 POSSIBLE FOBs AND CHECKPOINTS

CIR verified two locations of what appear to be FOBs in Nour Shams. While CIR did not identify the construction of new checkpoints, it observed the possible utilisation of existing structures as fortified positions within the refugee camp.

For example, BBC News alleged on 23 February 2025 that “Israel’s Defence Minister Israel Katz said the camps in Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams were now ‘empty’ and would be occupied by the Israeli military for the coming year”.⁵⁵ At the time of writing, CIR did not identify Katz’s original statement which made these claims.

> LOCATION 1: ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE ON ROUTE 57 (IPIN2907)

Footage shared on 13 February 2025 shows an IDF armoured construction vehicle damaging a road and a hangar-like structure while pushing soil into it, with at least two Israeli Border Police armoured vehicles and four armed Border Police personnel

⁵⁵ [SAT3645](#)

nearby on Route 57 in the Nour Shams refugee camp, at coordinates 32.3193, 35.0551.⁵⁶ A Panther Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) is also seen departing from the parking lot of a neighbouring warehouse, and later in the footage, five additional armed personnel are observed exiting the multi-storey building adjacent to it.⁵⁷

Further footage shared on 14 February 2025 shows at least four armed uniformed personnel in front of the same multi-storey building, with one appearing to stand guard.⁵⁸ The incident is highlighted in figure 9.



Figure 9: CIR geolocated Israeli military presence on Route 57, Nour Shams, at coordinates: 32.3193, 35.0551. Sources: Govmap, A: IP11840, B: IP11834.⁵⁹

On 9 February 2025, the IDF stated:

"Security forces expand operation in northern Samaria: The Ephraim Brigade combat team began operating in Nur a-Shams as part of the operation to thwart terrorism in the Judea and Samaria [West Bank] Division. Numerous IDF, Shin Bet and Border Guard forces began operating overnight to thwart terrorism in Nur a-Shams in the Ephraim Brigade.

⁵⁶ [IP11840](#), and [IP11835](#)

⁵⁷ [IP11840](#), 0:44-1:02

⁵⁸ [IP11834](#), top left, 0:54-2:20

⁵⁹ [IP11840](#), and [IP11834](#)

*The fighters have so far struck down several terrorists and arrested additional wanted individuals in the area”.*⁶⁰

On 13 February 2025, the IDF published an article which stated:

*“Yesterday (Wednesday) [12 February 2025], Maglan Unit forces killed three terrorists in a face-to-face exchange of fire in Nur a-Shams in the Ephraim Brigade. The IDF and security forces will continue to work to thwart terrorism throughout Judea and Samaria [West Bank] in order to maintain the security of the residents of the State of Israel”.*⁶¹

At the time of writing, CIR could not independently verify the presence of a designated terrorist organisation or militant group in the area and did not identify footage of any shooting incidents in Nour Shams.

According to Anadolu Agency:

“The Israeli army on Wednesday [12 February 2025] ordered Palestinian residents in the Nur Shams refugee camp in the occupied West Bank to evacuate amid a military offensive in the area, witnesses said.

*‘The Israeli army, via loudspeakers, ordered Palestinians to leave their homes in the camp,’ east of Tulkarem city, an eyewitness told Anadolu”.*⁶²

CIR did not identify any official evacuation orders published online by the IDF in Nour Shams on 12 February 2025.

> LOCATION 2: ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF NOUR SHAMS REFUGEE CAMP (IPIN2908)

Footage shared on 9 February 2025 shows at least 15 armed IDF soldiers carrying large bags, disembarking from two Israeli military vehicles and appearing to move into a tower block located on the outskirts of Nour Shams refugee camp at coordinates 32.3149, 35.0634.⁶³ The incident is highlighted in figure 10.

⁶⁰ [SAT3270](#)

⁶¹ [SAT3619](#)

⁶² [SAT3268](#)

⁶³ [IP11766](#)



Figure 10: CIR geolocated Israeli military presence on the outskirts of Nour Shams refugee camp, Tulkarm, at coordinates: 32.3149, 35.0634. Sources: Govmap, A: IP11766.⁶⁴

On 9 February 2025, the IDF published a statement which read, “Security forces expand operation in northern Samaria: The Ephraim Brigade combat team began operating in Nur a-Shams as part of the operation to thwart terrorism”.⁶⁵

The Palestine Post X account, which shared the footage on 9 February 2025, included the caption, “The occupation forces raided a building in the vicinity of Nour Shams camp in Tulkarm”.⁶⁶

In an article from 9 February 2025, the WAFA News Agency reported that Israeli forces had escalated “their military operations in Nur Shams [...]. Israeli soldiers conducted extensive searches and house raids within the camp and its surrounding areas, forcibly evacuating residents and turning their homes into military outposts”.⁶⁷

5.2 CLEARANCES AND DEMOLITIONS

This section includes two case studies showing damage to roads and buildings in the Nour Shams refugee camp. According to Al Quds, Israeli bulldozers have reportedly

⁶⁴ [IP11766](#)

⁶⁵ [SAT3270](#)

⁶⁶ [IP11766](#)

⁶⁷ [SAT3261](#)

caused “complete destruction to the infrastructure” in the camp, including “residential buildings that include homes inhabited by dozens of families” and the “demolition of everything surrounding the targeted homes”.⁶⁸

An assessment of Planet Scope Scene satellite imagery between 10 January 2025 and 24 March 2025 shows the northeastern part of Nour Shams refugee camp having sustained notable damage, with what appears to be damaged buildings and the widening of Nablus Street visible. A comparison of the satellite imagery can be seen in figures 11 and 12.




Figure 11: Satellite imagery of the Nour Shams refugee camp from 10 January 2025, prior to damage to buildings and roads. Source: Planet Labs.

⁶⁸ [SAT3414](#)



Figure 12: Satellite imagery of the Nour Shams refugee camp from 24 March 2025, showing damage to buildings and what appears to be a widened road. Source: Planet Labs.

> INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE IN NOUR SHAMS CAMP (IPIN2393, IPIN2394)

CIR verified two incidents showing infrastructure damage to roads and buildings approximately 400 metres apart.

Footage shared on 9 January 2025 shows extensive damage to road infrastructure and a partially collapsed building at a junction connecting Nour Shams refugee camp and Nablus Street in Tulkarm, at coordinates 32.3192, 35.0631 (IPIN2393).⁶⁹ An expanse of road surface at least 50 metres in length is turned to dirt with vehicle track marks visible on the surface.⁷⁰ The corrugated tin roof of what appears to be a garage can be seen collapsed, with damage visible to a concrete supporting wall.⁷¹ The incident is depicted in figure 13.

At the time of writing, CIR could not independently verify when the damage to the building and road was sustained; however, a comparison of Planet Scope Scene satellite imagery from shows that the damage and the widening of the impacted road likely occurred between 10 January 2025 and 24 March 2025 (figures 11-12).

⁶⁹ IP2618

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Ibid, 0:06-0:10



Figure 13: CIR geolocated road infrastructure damage in Nour Shams refugee camp, Tulkarm, at coordinates: 32.3192, 35.0631. Sources: Geomolg, A: IP2618 and B: Mapillary.⁷²

Footage shared of another incident on the same date shows a destroyed car and minor road infrastructure damage adjacent to the Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq Mosque in the main square of Nour Shams refugee camp at coordinates 32.3187, 35.0589 (IPIN2394).⁷³ Footage shows scorch marks next to a destroyed car and a mound of earth next to the vehicle. Additionally, the road surface in the square can be seen turned to dirt.⁷⁴ The incident is depicted in figure 14.

At the time of writing, an assessment of satellite imagery could not determine the exact date the damage was sustained due to low-level imagery coverage.

⁷² *Ibid*

⁷³ IP9624

⁷⁴ *Ibid*




Figure 14: CIR geolocated road infrastructure damage in the main square of Nour Shams refugee camp, Tulkarm, at coordinates: 32.3187, 35.0589. Sources: GovMap, A and B: IP9624.⁷⁵

On 9 January 2025, Anadolu Agency reported:

“Israeli forces besieged the Nur Shams refugee camp in the city and staged house-to-house searches in the area [...].

Witnesses said the Israeli army deployed additional forces in the camp with military bulldozers destroying infrastructure in the Nur Shams and Tulkarem refugee camps in the city.”⁷⁶

At the time of writing, CIR could not identify footage capturing the damage to the two locations as it occurred and, therefore, could not identify the actor responsible for both incidents.

> DEMOLITION OF A RESIDENTIAL BUILDING (IPIN2922)

Footage shared on 12 March 2025 shows an excavator, likely armoured, demolishing a residential building in the Nour Shams refugee camp at coordinates 32.3175, 35.0598.⁷⁷ Footage shows the excavator demolishing the three-storey building, which causes it to collapse. The incident is highlighted in figure 13.

⁷⁵ [IP9624](#)

⁷⁶ [SAT2896](#)

⁷⁷ [IP11929](#), [IP11931](#), and [IP11932](#)




Figure 13: CIR geolocated the demolition of at least one residential building in the Nour Shams refugee camp, at coordinates: 32.3175, 35.0598. Sources: GovMap, A: IP11929 and B: IP11931.⁷⁸

Al Jazeera Mubasher reported on 12 March 2025:

"Images obtained by Al Jazeera Mubasher showed demolition operations carried out by Israeli occupation bulldozers in Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm, in the northern occupied West Bank.

Israeli occupation forces have been conducting a military operation in the city of Tulkarm and its camp for 45 days, and in Nur Shams camp for 32 days".⁷⁹

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify the actor responsible.

⁷⁸ [IP11929](#), and [IP11931](#)

⁷⁹ [SAT3636](#)

6 TULKARM

Concentration of incidents	Northeastern Tulkarm city and eastern Tulkarm refugee camp
Satellite imagery used	Planet Labs
IDF presence verified	Yes
Possible FOBs	Yes
Possible detention centre	No
Possible checkpoints	Yes
Damage	Residential building and transport infrastructure damage

CIR identified five case studies that occurred in Tulkarm and showed possible fortification activity, including a potential FOB and one possible checkpoint and three incidents showing damage to residential buildings and transport infrastructure. These incidents primarily occurred in the northeastern region of Tulkarm city and the eastern Tulkarm refugee camp.

Israeli military activity officially expanded into Tulkarm on 27 January 2025.⁸⁰ On 21 February 2025, Netanyahu visited the Tulkarm refugee camp and made the following statement:

"I came here to the Tulkarm refugee camp, to be with our heroic soldiers. They are doing a wonderful job. In the past year, we have greatly increased our activity: We are entering the terrorist strongholds, razing entire streets that are used by terrorists, their homes. We are eliminating terrorists, commanders.

*I have also instructed to launch additional operational activity against terrorist centres."*⁸¹

The location of these incidents are highlighted in figure 19.

⁸⁰ [SAT3627](#)

⁸¹ [SAT3630](#) 0:00-0:48



Figure 19: CIR identified incidents showing activity in Tulkarm city and Tulkarm refugee camp. Source: Google Earth.

6.1 POSSIBLE FOBs AND CHECKPOINTS

CIR verified what appeared to be a possible FOB and a potential checkpoint in Tulkarm. While CIR did not identify the construction of new checkpoints, the possible utilisation of existing structures as fortified positions within the refugee camp was observed.

> LOCATION 1: POSSIBLE FOB AT A RESIDENTIAL BUILDING IN TULKARM (IPIN2879)

Footage shared on 12 March 2025 shows a group of IDF soldiers and at least three IDF armoured vehicles outside of two residential multi-storey buildings in Tulkarm, at coordinates 32.3191, 35.0384. A flatbed truck was seen loaded with what appears to be one water tank approximately 45 metres from the location. What seems to be at least four civilian vehicles, with one appearing to have items on the roof, are seen driving away from the site.⁸² The incident is shown in figure 20.

⁸² [IP11219](#)

The incident occurred approximately 120 metres from IPIN2909⁸³ and 250 metres from a damaged portion of Route 57 (IPIN2583),⁸⁴ which are discussed within this section and Section 6.2, respectively.




Figure 20: CIR geolocated a possible FOB at a residential building in Tulkarm, at coordinates: 332.3191, 35.0384. Sources: GovMap, A, B and C: IP11219.⁸⁵

On 12 March 2025, Quds News Network claimed:

“The Israeli army has forcibly removed the residents of a residential building at Nablus Street in the city of Tulkarm, converting it into a military outpost to oversee the ongoing offensive in the area, now in its seventh week”.⁸⁶

CIR could not independently verify whether residents were “forcibly removed” from the building as claimed by Quds News Network.⁸⁷

⁸³ *Ibid*

⁸⁴ [IP10330](#), [IP10324](#), [IP10309](#), [IP11947](#), and [IP10309](#)

⁸⁵ [IP11219](#)

⁸⁶ *Ibid*

⁸⁷ *Ibid*

> LOCATION 2: POSSIBLE CHECKPOINT ON ROUTE 57 (IPIN2909)

Footage shared on 17 February and 6 March 2025 shows what appears to be an Israeli checkpoint outside of multi-storey residential and commercial buildings on Route 57, Tulkarm, at coordinates 32.3181, 35.0381.⁸⁸

Footage shared on 6 March 2025 shows at least three IDF armoured vehicles, one bulldozer, and at least three individuals in a uniform consistent with the IDF outside of the same buildings. At least one of the individuals was visible standing next to two individuals, appearing to be in plain clothing, seeming to inspect what appeared to be a civilian car.⁸⁹ The incident is highlighted within figure 21.

The incident occurred approximately 120 metres from a possible FOB (IPIN2879)⁹⁰ and occurred on the same road and less than 300 metres east of IPIN2583⁹¹, which are both discussed in this section and Section 6.2, respectively.



Figure 21: CIR geolocated ISF presence on Route 57, Tulkarm, at coordinates: 32.3181, 35.0381. Sources: GovMap, A: IP11482 and B: IP11352⁹²

⁸⁸ IP11482, and IP11352

⁸⁹ Ibid, 0:04

⁹⁰ IP11219

⁹¹ IP10330, IP10324, IP10309, IP11947, and IP10309

⁹² IP11219

On 17 February 2025, Al-Jarmaq News reported, “Israeli occupation forces set up a checkpoint on Nablus Street in the city of Tulkarm, which has been facing a large-scale assault for the past three weeks”.⁹³

On 6 March 2025, Quds News Network shared footage of the incident with the caption, “Israeli occupation soldiers detain Palestinians and search their vehicles during Israel’s ongoing invasion of Tulkarm refugee camp in the occupied West Bank”. However, CIR could not independently verify whether individuals were detained.

On 17 February 2025, the IDF stated, “Security forces continue to operate throughout Judea and Samaria [West Bank] to thwart terrorism in order to maintain the security of the residents of the State of Israel”.⁹⁴

Further, on 6 March 2025, the IDF wrote, “During the week, security forces operated throughout Judea and Samaria [West Bank] to thwart terrorism, arresting 90 wanted individuals, confiscating 14 weapons and hundreds of thousands of shekels of terrorist funds”.⁹⁵

While the incident occurred in northern West Bank, CIR could not independently verify whether the IDF statements correspond to this incident.

6.2 CLEARANCES AND DEMOLITIONS

This section focuses on three incidents, two occurring in the same location, showing damage to residential buildings and transport infrastructure. According to Al Quds, Israeli bulldozers have reportedly caused “complete destruction to the infrastructure” in Tulkarm, including “residential buildings that include homes inhabited by dozens of families” and the “demolition of everything surrounding the targeted homes”.⁹⁶

> DEMOLITION OF ROUTE 57 (IPIN2583)

Content shared on 28 January 2025 shows Israeli construction vehicles damaging a portion of Route 57, leading into central Tulkarm at coordinates 32.3177, 35.0351.⁹⁷ Footage shows earth and rubble piled on each side by residential and commercial buildings, as well as a mound of rubble in the middle of the street and broken water

⁹³ [IP11482](#), and [IP11352](#)

⁹⁴ [SAT3608](#); The term “Judea and Samaria” is used by, but is not limited to, the State of Israel to refer to the West Bank region.

⁹⁵ [SAT3607](#)

⁹⁶ [SAT3414](#)

⁹⁷ [IP10309](#), top left image and [IP10300](#)

pipes.⁹⁸ Israeli military vehicles were also seen at this location.⁹⁹ The incident is highlighted in figure 22.

Two other incidents (IPIN2909¹⁰⁰ and IPIN2879¹⁰¹) discussed in [Section 6.1](#) occurred within 350 metres northeast of this location and showed a possible checkpoint and a possible FOB, respectively.



Figure 22: CIR geolocated the demolition of Route 57, at coordinates: 32.3177, 35.0351. Sources: GovMap, A: IP10330, B: IP10324.¹⁰²

On 28 January 2025, Palestine Post reported that “Occupation bulldozers begin destroying the main street at the entrance to Tulkarm camp”.¹⁰³ On the same date, Al Jazeera reported, “Exclusive images obtained by Al Jazeera showed Israeli occupation forces carrying out bulldozing operations on several streets in the city of Tulkarm, in the northern occupied West Bank”.¹⁰⁴ Al Jazeera Net also wrote on 28 January 2025 that:

“Intense clashes continue between Palestinian resistance factions and the Israeli occupation army in Tulkarm refugee camp after the occupation expanded its

⁹⁸ [IP10324](#), top images; [IP10309](#), top images; and [IP11947](#), 0:278.

⁹⁹ [IP10309](#), [IP11947](#), and [IP10300](#)

¹⁰⁰ [IP11219](#)

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*

¹⁰² [IP10330](#), and [IP10324](#)

¹⁰³ [IP10330](#)

¹⁰⁴ [SAT3615](#), 0:01-0:33

*military operation in the northern West Bank. Meanwhile, occupation forces have forced thousands of families to flee their homes in Jenin and Tulkarm”.*¹⁰⁵

At the time of writing, CIR did not independently verify any “clashes” between Israeli forces and a designated terrorist organisation or militant group.¹⁰⁶

> ROAD DAMAGE IN A RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL STREET (IPIN2580)

Content shared on 28 January 2025 shows a damaged, overturned road with piles of concrete on either side next to what appears to be commercial and residential buildings in Tulkarm, at coordinates 32.3112, 35.0322.¹⁰⁷ The incident is shown in figure 23.




Figure 23: CIR geolocated road damage in a commercial and residential area of Tulkarm, at coordinates: 32.3112, 35.0322. Sources: GovMap, A: IP10332, B: IP10340.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ SAT3614

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

¹⁰⁷ IP10332, IP10340

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

Comparison satellite imagery from 27 January 2025 and 18 March 2025 shows what appears to be damage to and widening of the road, appearing to extend closer to the nearby buildings. However, CIR could not independently verify the exact date the damage occurred (figure 24).



Figure 24: Satellite imagery of the street shown in IPIN2580 in Tulkarm from 27 January and 18 March 2025. Source: Planet Labs.

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify the actor responsible; however, on 28 January 2025, Palestine Post shared content of the incident with the caption “The effects of the occupation’s bulldozing of the infrastructure on Al-Muqata’a Street in Tulkarm”.¹⁰⁹

In addition on 28 January 2025, the WAFA News Agency reported, “The Israeli occupation forces continue the aggression on the city of Tulkarm and its camp for the second day in a row, imposing a tight siege, and causing widespread destruction of citizens’ property and infrastructure”. WAFA News Agency added to this claim by stating, “These forces also bulldozed and destroyed the infrastructure in the city’s streets [...]”.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ [IP10340](#)

¹¹⁰ [SAT3589](#)

> DAMAGE OF RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS AND TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE TULKARM REFUGEE CAMP (IPIN2867)

Footage shared on 18 February 2025 shows three IDF armoured construction vehicles operating among heavily damaged residential buildings and transport infrastructure on Mohamed Ibn al-Qasem Street in the Tulkarm refugee camp, at coordinates 32.3136, 35.0371. One of the vehicles, an excavator, is seen reducing a residential building to rubble,¹¹¹ while the other two vehicles are seen actively pushing debris and soil onto both the main street and a side street.¹¹² Additionally, at least two armed IDF soldiers are seen monitoring the situation.¹¹³

Satellite imagery reveals significant damage and ground disturbances, including excavating, in the surrounding area between 18 February 2025 and 28 February 2025.

The incident is highlighted in figure 25.



Figure 25: CIR geolocated road and residential building damage in a residential area of Tulkarm, at coordinates: 32.3136, 35.0371. Sources: GovMap, A: IP11485.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ IP10847

¹¹² IP10846; IP10847; and IP11485, 0:57-1:30

¹¹³ IP10854, 1:46-3:35; and IP11485, 0:09-0:57

¹¹⁴ IP11485

On 18 February 2025, Anadolu Agency reported:

“The Israeli army demolished 16 Palestinian homes in the Tulkarem refugee camp on Tuesday [18 February 2025], in the largest demolition operation in the occupied West Bank since last month.

*The army has been conducting military operations in the northern West Bank since Jan. 21, killing more than 55 Palestinians and displacing thousands, according to Palestinian officials. Witnesses said military bulldozers moved into the camp and started to demolish the structures”.*¹¹⁵

7 AL-FARA'A

Concentration of incidents	Eastern and southern al-Fara'a refugee camp
Satellite imagery used	Planet Labs
IDF presence verified	Yes
Possible FOBs	Yes
Possible detention centre	No
Possible checkpoints	Yes
Possible damage	Transport infrastructure damage

CIR identified three case studies in al-Fara'a showing possible fortification activity. On 2 February 2025, the Israeli military expanded activity into al-Fara'a refugee camp,¹¹⁶ where “occupation forces” allegedly caused “significant damage to infrastructure.”¹¹⁷ The location of these incidents occurred mainly in the southern region of al-Fara'a refugee camp and are highlighted in figure 15.

¹¹⁵ [SAT3584](#)

¹¹⁶ [SAT3272](#)

¹¹⁷ [SAT3631](#)



Figure 15: CIR identified incidents showing activity in al-Fara'a refugee camp. Source: Google Earth.

7.1 POSSIBLE FOBs AND CHECKPOINTS

CIR verified what appeared to be one possible FOB in al-Fara'a. While CIR did not identify the construction of new checkpoints, the possible utilisation of existing structures as fortified positions within the refugee camp was observed.

> LOCATION 1: POSSIBLE FOB ON AL-FARA'A ROAD (IPIN2906)

Content shared between 3 and 11 February 2025 shows the continued presence of Israeli military and construction vehicles as well as IDF soldiers in front of a residential building on al-Fara'a Road, in al-Fara'a refugee camp, at coordinates 32.2900, 35.3431.¹¹⁸ Part of the road near the building appears to be damaged, with a pile of dirt and debris in the middle of the road visible.¹¹⁹ Previous damage to these roads was observed between 5-7 February 2025 (IPIN2641), discussed in [Section 7.2](#).¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ [IP11582](#); [IP11588](#); [IP11591](#); and [IP11600](#), top right image

¹¹⁹ [IP11586](#)

¹²⁰ [IP10611](#), [IP10598](#), [IP10595](#), [IP10627](#) and [IP10690](#)

Footage shows several soldiers entering the building.¹²¹ Notably, imagery from 11 February 2025 shows a large cluster of at least 20 Israeli soldiers gathered around the building entrances.¹²² Content also shows IDF presence within an approximate 200-metre radius of the building during this period.¹²³

This incident occurred along the same road as a possible checkpoint, located at the camp entrance approximately 345 metres to the northeast, where at least two earth mounds and five IDF soldiers were seen (IPIN2659).¹²⁴ This incident is discussed below.



Figure 16: CIR geolocated ISF presence on al-Fara'a Road, al-Fara'a refugee camp, at coordinates: 32.2900, 35.34311 Sources: GovMap, A and B: IP11600.¹²⁵

On 9 February 2025, Al Arabiya Net reported that:

"As Israeli military operations and incursions in the West Bank continue for the 20th consecutive day, the Israeli army deployed reinforcements today, Sunday [9 February 2025], to al-Fara'a refugee camp, south of Tubas.

Ahmed Al-Asaad, the governor of Tubas, told Al Arabiya/Al Hadath that the Israeli military operation is a comprehensive assault targeting al-Fara'a camp.

¹²¹ [IP11591](#), 0:00-0:13

¹²² [IP11600](#), top right image

¹²³ [IP11582](#), 0:46-1:07; [IP11591](#); and [IP11600](#), left image, bottom right image

¹²⁴ [IP10730](#)

¹²⁵ [IP11600](#)

He added that Israeli forces are forcing camp residents to leave, but they have refused despite the threats".¹²⁶

At the time of writing, CIR could not independently verify whether Israeli forces forced residents to leave the camp.

> LOCATION 2: POSSIBLE CHECKPOINT AT THE EASTERN ENTRANCE TO AL-FARA'A CAMP (IPIN2659)

Footage shared on 9 February 2025 shows at least five IDF soldiers, three of whom are armed, standing by two earth mounds by the eastern entrance to al-Fara'a Camp on Highway 588. Soldiers can be seen talking to members of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS).¹²⁷ A damaged civilian vehicle is present in front of one of the earth mounds.¹²⁸

PRCS ambulances and Disaster Services Unit vehicles are seen parked along the road by the mounds. PRCS Members appear to guide individuals dressed in civilian clothing carrying what looks like personal belongings east, along Highway 588, towards Tubas.

This incident occurred along the same road approximately 345 metres northeast of IPIN2906.

¹²⁶ [SAT3611](#)

¹²⁷ [IP10730](#), 0:30-0:44

¹²⁸ [IP10730](#), 0:12



Figure 17: CIR geolocated a possible checkpoint at the eastern entrance to the al-Fara'a refugee camp, al-Fara'a, at coordinates: 32.2917, 35.3462. Sources: GovMap, A and B: IP10730.¹²⁹

¹²⁹ IP10730

On 9 February 2025, The New Arab reported:

“The Israeli occupation forces did not only force dozens of families in the Far’a camp, south of Tubas, in the northern West Bank, to leave their homes by force under threat of arms, but also turned the homes into military barracks, while its soldiers performed Talmudic prayers in those homes, in the context of an ongoing aggression and siege for the tenth consecutive day.

Yasser Abu Kishk, one of the displaced people from Al-Far’a camp, told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, ‘The occupation soldiers performed Talmudic rituals in the house after they forced him and his family of four to leave the house without taking their personal belongings’.”¹³⁰

From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify the circumstances surrounding the incident.

7.2 CLEARANCES AND DEMOLITIONS

CIR verified two incidents which highlight potential clearance and demolition activity in al-Fara’a. On 14 February 2025, Al Jazeera reported that “Narrow alleys [...] were bulldozed, flattening everything – walls, parked cars, utility poles – leaving behind a trail of destruction”.¹³¹

> ROAD DAMAGE IN AL-FARA’A REFUGEE CAMP (IPIN2641, IPIN2646)

CIR identified two incidents showing road damage in the al-Fara'a refugee camp, approximately 40 metres apart.

Footage of the first incident was shared between 5 and 6 February 2025 and shows extensive road infrastructure damage on the main street in the al-Fara'a refugee camp, at coordinates 32.2918, 35.3451 (IPIN2641). Two 150-metre sections of the road can be seen reduced to dirt, with cracked tarmac visible along the edges outside three UNRWA schools.¹³² Additionally, an adjacent road is similarly damaged over an expanse of at least 50 metres.¹³³

Further footage of the incident shared on 7 February 2025 shows an Israeli military bulldozer with its rear ‘ripper’ attachment digging into the same section of the main

¹³⁰ [SAT3259](#)

¹³¹ [SAT3612](#)

¹³² [IP10611](#) and [IP10598](#)

¹³³ [IP10598](#), 0:02

road, with road piping appearing to be caught in the 'ripper' attachment.¹³⁴ Aftermath content shows that the previously damaged section of road, as seen on 6 February 2025, has sustained even deeper surface damage.¹³⁵ This incident is highlighted in figure 18.

In addition, content shared on 8 and 9 February shows notable damage on a sidestreet by the entrance to al-Fara'a refugee camp, with earth piled against the sides of the road 30 metres from IPIN2641, at coordinates 32.2918, 35.3454 (IPIN2646).¹³⁶ In this footage, a large cluster of what appears to be unarmed individuals, including women and children, are seen standing with personal belongings in the presence of up to 11 Israeli soldiers. From the footage available, CIR could not independently verify if forced displacement occurred. This incident is highlighted in figure 18.

Comparing satellite imagery from 8 January and 24 March 2025 shows what appears to be damage to multiple roads (figure 19). However, CIR could not independently verify the exact date all visible damage in the content occurred.

¹³⁴ [IP10595](#)

¹³⁵ [IP10627](#), [IP10690](#), and [IP10598](#)

¹³⁶ [IP10677](#), left video, [IP10719](#), and [IP10661](#)



Figure 18: CIR geolocated damage and ISF presence on al-Fara'a Road, al-Fara'a refugee camp, at coordinates: 32.2918, 35.3451 (IPIN2641) and 32.2918, 35.3454 (IPIN2646). Sources: GovMap, A: IP10690 and B: IP10627, C: Mapillary, D: IP10719.¹³⁷



Figure 19: Satellite imagery of al-Fara'a Road, al-Fara'a from 8 January and 24 March 2025. Source: Planet Labs.

¹³⁷ [IP10690](#), [IP10627](#), and [IP10719](#)

ANNEX - METHODOLOGY

CIR ensures all information collected is preserved, verified, analysed, investigated and reported in a manner consistent with the guidelines published by the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).¹³⁸ These guidelines detail the best practices for human rights evidence safekeeping and reliance for later judicial use. The diagram below illustrates this methodology:



COLLECTION OF FOOTAGE

CIR has developed a dataset of verified incidents in the West Bank, as well as Gaza, Lebanon, and Israel from open-source information. All incidents highlighted within this report have been verified and archived within CIR's dataset of incidents.

CIR conducts extensive searches in Arabic, Hebrew and English across UGC and social media platforms, including X, Facebook, YouTube, and Telegram, to identify potential human rights violations. Each piece of content verified by CIR is assigned an IP number, which links to the original footage or image. Each incident, often comprising multiple IP numbers, is also assigned an IPIN number.

CIR also collects statements from politicians and military leaders and allegations and testimonies from media outlets. These sources provide contextual information regarding the human impact of incidents. Each statement, allegation or testimony is assigned a SAT number, which also links to the original source and is archived within CIR's database. Official evacuation orders published by the IDF are separately archived within CIR's database and are assigned an EO number.

CIR categorises all pieces of content into five graphic levels, which are also noted within CIR's spreadsheet of incidents:

¹³⁸ [SAT2455](#)

1	None - Infrastructural destruction or low-level violence.
2	Mild - Verbal or minor physical violence and derogatory behaviour.
3	Moderate - Offensive verbal violence, derogatory behaviour, minor abuse of individuals, or minor injuries in which blood is not visible.
4	Severe - Graphic, subtle displays of deceased individuals or injuries.
5	Graphic - Very graphic displays of deceased individuals or severe injuries.

VERIFICATION OF FOOTAGE

CIR aims to verify the location and date of all pieces of content within its spreadsheet.

Geolocation is the process of determining the specific location of a piece of content using online tools and techniques, such as satellite and street-view imagery. By comparing footage of an incident with this online imagery, CIR geolocates the latitude and longitude of incidents and provides the coordinates of each location, up to six decimals.

This report contains several visuals showing how footage has been geolocated. In these images, coloured boxes are used to show how landmarks or distinguishing details correspond with satellite imagery in that location. A red pin indicates the precise location where the incident occurred.

CIR **confirmed the date** when a piece of content was captured by identifying when it was first uploaded online and cross-referencing this with local reporting. To do so, CIR completed reverse image searches using screenshots from UGC and analysing when they first appeared online. CIR also conducted metadata analysis in an attempt to identify the original recording date.

In some cases, CIR could not independently verify the date when a piece of content was recorded. In these instances, CIR notes the date when a piece of content was uploaded online.