



CENTRE for
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SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS A WEAPON:
CRSV IN SUDAN AND ASSOCIATED
COMMANDERS

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Sexual Violence as a Weapon: CRSV in Sudan and Associated Commanders

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Content warning: This report contains links to graphic footage and descriptions of violence, including killings and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) has been consistently perpetrated by armed actors across Sudan since the outbreak of war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023. Sudanese civil society organisations (CSOs), international organisations, the United Nations (UN), and journalists have documented rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, abduction, forced nudity, sexual assault, and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence against women, girls, men, and boys. This represents only a fraction of CRSV perpetrated, however, given severe underreporting due to stigma, fear of retaliation, insecurity, displacement, communications disruptions, and limited access to health and protection services.

This report by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) uses open-source research methods to document five geographical and temporal CRSV “hotspots” that saw particularly high volumes of reported CRSV since the outbreak of war in Sudan, and to assess which armed groups and commanders there are reasonable grounds to believe are directly or indirectly responsible. CIR identified CRSV hotspots through a triangulation approach, cross-referencing secondary reporting from highly credible and reliable sources; primary information from trusted Sudanese partner organisations; open-source “red flag” indicators in verified footage (including burnt villages, and forced separation of men and women); and analysis of gendered hate speech and incitement to CRSV in verified footage. CIR only included hotspots meeting at least three of these criteria and with sufficient data for meaningful attribution analysis. CIR assessed there to be reasonable grounds to believe that all commanders included in this report were directly or indirectly responsible for CRSV perpetrated due to (1) their verified presence in proximity to reported CRSV and CRSV indicators, (2) their verified presence in CRSV hotspots combined with a high level of command seniority, and/or (3) their explicit incitement to CRSV. Unless specifically stated otherwise, all open-source footage analysed in this report is verified, meaning two separate CIR analysts have confirmed its authenticity, geographic coordinates, and – to the extent possible – date of filming.

CIR identified **five CRSV hotspots** and **25 individual commanders** whom there are reasonable grounds to believe are directly or indirectly responsible for CRSV perpetrated across them. These commanders belonged to at least **seven armed groups and security actors** operating in Sudan: the **RSF**; the **SAF**; the RSF-aligned **Tamazuj**; the SAF-aligned **Sudan Shield Forces (SSF)**; the SAF-aligned **General Intelligence Service (GIS)**; the SAF-aligned **Special Mission Forces (SMF)**; and the SAF-aligned **Baraa Bin Malik Brigade**.

The hotspots, armed groups, and most senior commanders identified with authority over the relevant sectors or units at the time, are:

- **El Fasher (RSF), October–November 2025:** Mass and gang rape was documented by the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan (FFM-S) during the RSF assault on El Fasher and its aftermath. **Abdul Rahim Hamdan Daglo**, the RSF's Deputy (Second) Commander, was the most senior commander identified in and around the city during the assault. **Gedo Hamdan Ahmed ("Ibn Shouk")**, RSF Commander of the North Darfur sector, was also present and held direct command authority over El Fasher. This report also documents explicit incitement to CRSV by **Khademallah Khashmin Herika ("Shiraz Khalid")**, RSF Major and Commander of the female element of the RSF.
- **Zamzam (RSF), April–May 2025:** The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented at least 66 CRSV incidents involving over 100 victims during and after the RSF's offensive on Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs). **Ibn Shouk**, RSF Major General and Commander of the North Darfur sector, was the most senior commander CIR verified to be present.
- **Gezira (SAF/SAF-aligned), January 2025:** CRSV and related abuses were reported during and after the SAF-led recapture of Gezira, implicating SAF forces alongside SAF-aligned groups including the SSF, GIS, SMF, and Baraa Bin Malik Brigade. **Abdelmoneim Abdelbasit Mohamed**, SAF Major General and Commander of the Sennar (Southern) Axis, was the most senior SAF commander CIR verified in the area during the recapture. **Abuaqla Mohamed Ahmed Alwakil ("Kaykal")**, at this point in time, Commander of the SAF-aligned SSF after having defected from the RSF, was also identified in the area.
- **Wad Madani (RSF), December 2023:** The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa Network (SIHA) and Amnesty International documented a sustained pattern of CRSV during and after the RSF's takeover of the Gezira state capital. **Kaykal** was appointed RSF Commander of the 5th Division in Wad Madani on the day of the takeover and was the highest-ranking commander CIR verified in the area during the takeover.
- **Khartoum (RSF/RSF-aligned), May–July 2023:** CRSV was reported in Khartoum North (Bahri), including cases documented by Radio Dabanga, CNN, and Amnesty International in private homes and at Al-Amal Hospital. **Idris Hassan Ibrahim**, RSF Major General and Commander of the Bahri sector, was the most senior commander identified in the area during that time frame. **Moussa Anqar**, a senior commander in the RSF-aligned Tamazuj group, was also identified in Bahri in proximity to reported CRSV incidents.

CIR verified two commanders at multiple hotspots, pointing to patterns of CRSV associated with their movements over time. Kaykal was verified to be present as an RSF Commander of the Wad Madani Division during the takeover of Wad Madani in December 2023, and months later as Commander of the SAF-aligned SSF during the SAF-led recapture of Gezira in January 2025. Similarly, RSF Commander Ibn Shouk was verified to be present at both Zamzam IDP camp in April–May 2025 and El Fasher in October–November 2025, holding direct command authority over the North Darfur sector across both RSF assaults.

CIR identified a pattern of ethnic slurs, hate speech, and dehumanising language used in conjunction with, and in close proximity to, CRSV in multiple hotspots. This corroborates secondary reporting that CRSV was perpetrated against specific groups based on perceived ethnic or political identity, including Kanabi communities in Gezira state and the Zaghawa in North Darfur.

CIR identified explicit incitement to rape by the Major Commander of the female element of the RSF, Shiraz Khalid, who CIR verified to be present in El Fasher during the October 2025 RSF takeover. This is a rare instance of direct incitement to CRSV rather than inferred command responsibility alone.

2 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to document areas and time frames which saw particularly high volumes of CRSV perpetrated in Sudan since the start of the war in April 2023, and assess which actors there are reasonable grounds to believe are directly or indirectly responsible for that violence.

The report addresses three principal questions:

- Where and when are there sufficient reported incidents, indicators, and other pieces of evidence to identify patterns of CRSV or heightened CRSV risk?
- Which armed actors were operating in these locations during the relevant time periods, and what evidence exists regarding their presence, and activities?
- Which individual commanders can be identified as having exercised command authority or operational control in these locations during the relevant periods, and what evidence supports their direct or indirect connection to documented patterns of CRSV?

The report does not seek to provide an exhaustive catalogue of CRSV incidents in Sudan, nor does it attempt to document and verify each individual allegation of sexual violence. Rather, it brings together secondary reports of CRSV incidents, primary evidence where available, CRSV indicators identified in open-source data

and secondary reports, and contextual information to identify patterns of increased CRSV incidents (or “hotspots”) over time across different locations. These findings are then overlaid with verified and structured open-source evidence concerning the presence, movements, activities, and command responsibilities of armed actors operating in the same locations and time periods.

This approach is intended to add to the existing evidence base on CRSV in Sudan, in particular to support justice and accountability efforts for survivors. Open-source research cannot replace survivor testimony or other forms of direct documentation. It can, however, help corroborate reported patterns of violence, contextualise CRSV within wider patterns of armed conflict, establish the presence and activities of armed actors, identify commanders linked to reported CRSV, and preserve evidence that may otherwise become unavailable. Open-source research can also help identify circumstances associated with heightened CRSV risk where direct evidence of sexual violence is unavailable.

This report focuses on five locations and time periods in which CIR identified sufficient information to undertake this type of triangulated analysis:

- **El Fasher** from **October to November 2025**, during the RSF takeover of the city
- **Zamzam IDP camp** from **April to May 2025**, during the RSF offensive on the camp
- **Gezira state** in **January 2025**, during the SAF-led campaign to retake Gezira
- **Wad Madani** in **December 2023**, during the RSF offensive into Sudan’s Gezira state and takeover of Wad Madani
- **North Khartoum (Bahri)** from **May to July 2023**, when the RSF seized control of large parts of the city after the start of the war

For each hotspot, CIR establishes, to the extent possible:

- Patterns of reported CRSV incidents, based on secondary reporting and, where available, primary evidence shared by trusted partners;
- The presence of CRSV indicators, based on verified open-source information and secondary reporting, including indicators of heightened risk where direct evidence of sexual violence is unavailable;
- Narratives, hate speech, and incitement to violence by armed actors that may indicate heightened CRSV risk, including explicit incitement to sexual violence;
- The names, ranks, and roles of individual commanders identified in verified footage or other open-source material who can be directly or indirectly linked to the relevant armed operations and reported patterns of CRSV; and

The identification of an armed actor or commander in a hotspot does not, by itself, establish responsibility for CRSV. Rather, attribution is assessed through the cumulative analysis of evidence concerning reported CRSV, the circumstances and

patterns in which it occurred, the presence and activities of armed actors, and the relevant command relationships. Where the available evidence supports it, the report identifies actors and commanders there are reasonable grounds to believe may have been directly or indirectly responsible for relevant crimes. Where the evidence is insufficient to support such an assessment, this is stated explicitly.

CIR's methodology for researching CRSV, identifying hotspots and indicators, analysing hate speech and incitement to violence, verifying open-source material, and analysing attribution is set out in Annex 1.

2.1 CONTEXT

The war that broke out in Sudan in April 2023 between the SAF and RSF has generated a severe and continuing protection crisis for civilians. Fighting has been accompanied by mass killings, forced displacement, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, arbitrary detention, torture, and widespread CRSV. Sexual violence is not a new phenomenon in Sudan: it has historically been associated with conflict, political instability, poverty, discriminatory social structures, and entrenched gender inequality, as highlighted by [Amnesty International](#) in 2004. The outbreak of the current war, however, has dramatically increased the exposure of civilians to armed actors while weakening institutions and community structures that might otherwise provide protection or access to justice.

Over 14 million people have been displaced in Sudan by the war, as highlighted by the [UN](#), which has created acute humanitarian needs including famine and destruction of civilian infrastructure. The combination of widespread insecurity and a culture of impunity, documented by the [UN](#) and others, puts civilians at high risk of violations by armed actors, including CRSV.

Since April 2023, Sudanese CSOs, human rights defenders, international organisations, and media outlets have documented hundreds of alleged cases of CRSV across the country. These reports include rape and gang rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery, abduction, forced nudity, and other forms of sexual violence against women, girls, men, and boys. They describe patterns that are both widespread and systematic. The [UN](#) described sexual violence being perpetrated in Sudan as a “weapon of war”, noting that such acts may constitute war crimes and, where committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack, crimes against humanity.

These documented cases represent only a fraction of the likely scale of CRSV across Sudan, however. Survivors and witnesses face significant barriers to reporting, including stigma, fear of retaliation, insecurity, displacement, communications disruptions, and the risk of further harm. In many areas, health and protection services have been destroyed or are inaccessible, as noted by the [UN Population Fund](#) (UNFPA). CRSV may also occur in private homes, detention sites, temporary shelters, and other environments where independent witnesses

are absent. These factors make conventional documentation particularly difficult and create significant information gaps in the public record.

2.2 DEFINITIONS

This report uses the below definitions to describe the forms of violence documented. CIR's full methodology is set out in full in Annex 1.

- **Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)** refers to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilisation, forced marriage, and any other form of sexual and gender-based violence that is directly linked to a conflict.
- **Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)** is a broader category that includes sexual abuse, domestic violence, early and forced marriage, and female genital mutilation/cutting, among other forms of violence directed at individuals on the basis of their sex or gender. CRSV refers specifically to SGBV that is directly conflict related.
- The term **“survivor”** is used in reference to individuals who have been victims CRSV and may refer to both individuals who survived and those who did not, in line with guidance from the [International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict](#) (IICI). In some contexts, the term **“victim”** is assessed to be more appropriate, for example to accurately reflect the language of civil society actors documenting CRSV on the ground when referencing their work.
- **CRSV indicators** are observable circumstances, behaviours, or other forms of evidence that may indicate that CRSV is occurring, has occurred, or may be at heightened risk of occurring, even where there is no direct visual or testimonial evidence of the sexual violence itself. Drawing on [IICI](#) guidance, indicators include full or partial nudity of individuals in conflict setting, threats of sexual violence by conflict actors, burnt bodies or settlements, the targeting or forced separation of particular groups, unusual objects or weapons near bodies, and the armed occupation of places where civilians are held or otherwise vulnerable.

3 EL FASHER (RSF) – OCTOBER TO NOVEMBER 2025

El Fasher is the capital of North Darfur state and largest urban centre in Sudan's wider Darfur region. It was a major stronghold for the SAF and allied Joint Forces from the start of the war in April 2023 until it fell to RSF control in late October 2025, following an 18-month siege. The RSF launched its final assault on the city from 26 to 28 October in an operation that saw mass killings, detentions, displacement, and widespread abuses against civilians, including CRSV. The fall of El Fasher was a major turning point in the wider conflict, consolidating RSF control over much of Darfur and leaving civilians fleeing along routes toward Tawila, Kabkabiya, and other areas at severe risk.

This section examines reports of CRSV during and after the takeover, open-source indicators associated with heightened CRSV risk, and one case of explicit incitement to rape against women. It also identifies RSF commanders present in and around El Fasher and outlines the available evidence linking them to documented patterns of CRSV.

3.1 REPORTS OF CRSV

CRSV incidents were reportedly perpetrated in and around El Fasher during the RSF takeover from 26 to 28 October 2025. CRSV was also reported afterwards into November along routes used by civilians fleeing toward Tawila and Kabkabiya, as well as inside RSF-controlled screening and detention sites.

The [FFM-S](#) reported that RSF fighters perpetrated CRSV during the takeover against women and girls aged seven to 70, including pregnant women, predominantly targeting those from non-Arab communities and particularly the Zaghawa.¹ The FFM-S assessed that the documented CRSV cases represent only a fraction of a far wider pattern, as survivors consistently reported multiple women raped in the same incidents. Rapes were frequently accompanied by extreme physical brutality, including forced nudity, beating, whipping, and vaginal and anal rape involving the insertion of sharp objects, and consistently accompanied by ethnic slurs and threats. Survivors described sexual violence being carried out openly, with others forced to watch, and perpetrators appearing "calm, deliberate, and fully aware of their actions" rather than acting opportunistically.

26 to 28 October: CRSV during the takeover

¹ The Zaghawa are a semi-nomadic ethnic group inhabiting regions of eastern Chad, western Sudan, and part of Libya. They have their own language and have traditionally combined pastoralism with agriculture and trade. Most Zaghawa are Muslim, and they have been among the communities perceived by the RSF as aligned with the SAF and allied armed groups.

On 26 and 27 October, the [FFM-S](#) documented mass and gang rape beginning immediately upon the RSF's entry into the city, and continuing along exit routes. At the Saudi Hospital and El Fasher University, witnesses described the RSF violently and publicly gang-raping at least 19 women in rooms filled with corpses. Three RSF fighters raped a 12-year-old girl in front of her mother, shortly after her father was killed protecting her; she later died of her injuries before reaching hospital in Tawila.

During the same period, [Amnesty International](#) documented the attempted rape and killing of several women and girls fleeing towards the village of Garni, northwest of El Fasher, by RSF fighters. They also recorded a survivor testimony of a woman who, after having witnessed mass killings at the berm surrounding the city,² was forcibly marched with 10 other women and five girls to a farm near Tiktik, a village on the road to Garni, where RSF fighters raped the entire group. The [FFM-S](#) documented a survivor fleeing that day to Jabal Wana, a mountain northwest of El Fasher, where RSF fighters killed a number of children, mutilated a woman, and raped several women.

On 28 October, [Amnesty International](#) documented the testimony of a woman who was taken by RSF fighters and raped after the fighters interrogated her father in the Daraja Oula neighbourhood, in western El Fasher.

CRSV after the takeover

Garni recurs across credible sources as both a screening point for men and boys and a site of sustained sexual violence against women and girls, with thousands reported to have been detained and screened there since the takeover.³ In one case, a 17-year-old girl told [The New Humanitarian](#) that she was held at soldiers' quarters on the edge of the Garni camp, where she and other girls were divided into groups and raped over two consecutive nights by a total of six men, some in RSF uniform. Her family was then held for eight days pending payment, delaying her access to medical care in Tawila.

Many testimonies of CRSV were also collected in Tawila. [The New Humanitarian](#) interviewed seven survivors who fled El Fasher after the takeover; five described being gang-raped by RSF or affiliated fighters and two described other sexual assaults, in several cases lasting hours or days and occurring in front of family members. Cases included RSF fighters gang-raping a 20-year-old woman with 12 other women and girls over two days of captivity; RSF fighters reportedly commanded by Elfateh Abdullah Idris Adam, also known as "Abu Lulu", assaulting a nurse after accusing her of aiding the SAF; and a man in RSF uniform raping a 21-

² See [CIR's](#) report, "El Fasher: A Timeline of Violence Following the RSF Takeover".

³ See, for example, reports by [Sudan War Monitor](#) and [SIHA](#).

year-old woman in front of her family on the road to Tawila, then holding her for six days pending a ransom. Local service providers in Tawila told [The New Humanitarian](#) that around 100 survivors had sought care at one health centre alone since 26 October, and that stigma, limited specialised staff, and the absence of legal protection services meant that the true number of cases was likely far higher.

Separately, the [FFM-S](#) documented a case of sexual slavery: RSF fighters abducted a woman in late October after she identified herself as Zaghawa, took her to a remote area, tied her to a tree, left her naked, and repeatedly raped her over six days before she escaped.

3.2 CRSV INDICATORS

CIR identified three recognised indicators of CRSV in verified footage filmed during and following the RSF takeover of El Fasher: the degrading treatment of detainees and victims, gender segregation at detention and displacement sites, and the presence of female victims among the dead at the berm northwest of El Fasher.

Gender segregation at detention and displacement sites

CIR identified a recurring pattern in which footage of RSF fighters detaining or observing civilians fleeing El Fasher shows exclusively adult men, with no women or children present. This is consistent with reporting by the [FFM-S](#) that men and boys were systematically screened, detained, or executed while women were permitted, or forced, to continue fleeing separately. CIR documented this pattern on three separate days:

- 26 October: A video posted to [Telegram](#) shows a group of men being detained by fighters in RSF uniform; no women or children are visible. Separate footage from the same day posted to [X](#) and [Telegram](#) shows civilians fleeing the city. Only men are seen among those leaving, with no females visible.
- 28 October: Footage posted to [Telegram](#) filmed by fighters in RSF uniform shows only men.
- 29 October: Footage posted to [Facebook](#) shows only men fleeing El Fasher.

CIR assesses that the consistent absence of women and girls in footage of detained individuals – set against reported accounts of women and girls being raped, abducted, or held separately at the berm, in Garni, and along routes out of the city – is consistent with a broader pattern of gender-based separation of the civilian population by RSF forces during and after the takeover. Such separation increases the vulnerability of women and girls to sexual violence.

Female victims at the berm on 27 October

Footage from a site along the berm northwest of El Fasher, documented by [CIR](#) in connection with the 27 October clashes and subsequent executions, shows female victims among the dead and detained.

A video posted to [\[GRAPHIC\] Telegram](#) from the berm shows the bodies of two deceased women among the victims. In this video, the clothing of one of the women appears to have been displaced upward, exposing part of her legs above the knee. At the end of the footage, an RSF member is heard referring to the women using the derogatory expression “*banat al-azaba*” – which translates to “daughters of unmarried women” and is used pejoratively to refer to them as “daughters of whores” – while the bodies remain visible in frame. A separate video posted to [X](#) on 27 October shows another female victim at the berm. Further footage from the same location posted to [\[GRAPHIC\] Facebook](#) shows RSF commander Abu Lulu with the same female victim visible in the background. Additional footage posted on [\[GRAPHIC\] Telegram](#) shows RSF fighters celebrating over the body of a woman.

CIR assesses that the presence of female victims at an execution site otherwise dominated by male detainees, combined with the sexualised and derogatory language used by RSF personnel while filming the bodies, is consistent with women being subjected to violence, including possible CRSV. The presence of female victims at a site associated with executions, particularly when combined with other indicators CIR documented during the RSF takeover such as gendered or degrading treatment, is a recognised red flag for potential CRSV, as outlined in the [IICI](#).

3.3 INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE AND HATE SPEECH

CIR analysed statements by RSF commanders and fighters in verified footage from the takeover of El Fasher that explicitly single out women on ethnic and/or gendered grounds. CIR assesses that this rhetoric is a further indicator of elevated CRSV risk, and in some cases provides direct evidence linking named RSF commanders to the targeting of women.

RSF commander singling out individual women

In footage posted to [Telegram](#) on 27 October 2025, RSF commander Abu Lulu is heard saying: “*There’s one [woman] they call Umm Falaga, I’m [looking for her].*” ‘Umm Falaga’ translates approximately as ‘the woman with a gap between her teeth’. CIR assesses that such statements and the singling out of women are indicators of potential CRSV.

Incitement to CRSV by a female RSF commander

CIR identified footage in which RSF Major Commander Khademallah Khashmin Herika, also known as “Shiraz Khalid”, is heard directly inciting sexual violence against women as a means to “cleanse” bloodlines. In a video, allegedly filmed in El Fasher and posted to TikTok⁴ on 26 October, she addresses RSF soldiers, stating: *“The Northern state? You’ll just go for its women, so you cleanse their lineage and bring [brave] sons just like you.”* While CIR was unable to verify the exact coordinates of this specific video, CIR verified the presence of Shiraz Khalid in El Fasher in footage posted to [TikTok](#) on 27 October, and in footage from [TikTok](#) posted on 30 October, as well as in Garni in footage from [Telegram](#) posted on 29 October.

While the speech in this video refers to women in Sudan’s Northern state, the fact that Shiraz Khalid explicitly incites rape towards women in a celebration video with male fighters in RSF uniform suggests wider RSF tolerance towards CRSV, including by Khalid as a female RSF commander present in El Fasher during the takeover. Combined with reports of CRSV in other areas under RSF control and evidence that large numbers of civilians remained unable to flee after the takeover, this raises grave concerns for women and girls still trapped in El Fasher.

3.4 COMMANDERS

CIR identified a number of senior and field-level RSF commanders present in and around El Fasher during the RSF takeover and its immediate aftermath. Their presence is established through verified footage, including footage from locations associated with mass detentions, civilian screenings, executions, and the movements of civilians fleeing the city. In particular, several commanders were present at locations where CIR identified indicators of systematic gender segregation, detention, and abuse, as well as incitement to CRSV.

⁴ Original link is no longer active but a version on [X](#) is available. CIR can share an archived copy of the original on request.

As the most senior RSF commander CIR verified present in and around El Fasher during the period of reported CRSV, Dagalo held the highest position in the chain of command in the area at the time. He had direct or indirect authority over the less senior RSF commanders and personnel present during the takeover.

Gedo Hamdan Ahmed (“Ibn Shouk”)

Gedo Hamdan Ahmed, also known as “Ibn Shouk”, was the Commander of the RSF North Darfur sector at the time of the takeover. He was the highest-ranking person with direct command over El Fasher, which fell within his sector.

CIR verified Ibn Shouk’s presence at the former SAF 6th Infantry Division site on 26 October in a video posted to the RSF’s official [Telegram](#) channel. He is also seen at the berm incident site northwest of El Fasher on 27 October,⁵ near the Saudi Hospital on 6 November in a video posted to [Telegram](#), and at a tribal celebratory event east of El Fasher on 16 November in a video posted to [Facebook](#).

His repeated presence at command locations and sites associated with the takeover and subsequent RSF control is relevant to assessing the extent to which senior sector-level commanders were aware of, and exercised authority over, forces operating in and around El Fasher.

Ibrahim Gibril Omer (“Abu Wafi”)

Ibrahim Gibril Omer, also known as “Abu Wafi”, is an RSF Major and the Director of Ibn Shouk’s Office. CIR verified his presence on 26 October at locations associated with the mass detention of civilians outside El Fasher. He appears while filming a line of fleeing civilians in a video posted on [TikTok](#) and while addressing detainees and labelling them as combatants in a video posted to [X](#).

These identifications directly link Abu Wafi to the gender segregation pattern documented above. The footage shows large numbers of predominantly male civilians being detained and screened, consistent with other evidence that men and boys were separated from women and children during the RSF’s processing of civilians fleeing the city.

⁵ Video shared with CIR by a trusted partner; archived version available on request.





Figure 3: Verification of the presence of Abu Wafi at two sites northwest of El Fasher on 26 October 2025. The first video (left) shows a line of individuals in civilian clothing walking northwest [13.672775,25.286811]. The second video (right) shows Abu Wafi addressing a large group of male detainees in civilian clothing [13.668970,25.288317]. Sources: [TikTok](#),⁶ [X](#).

Hussain Ahmed Adam ("Abu Jalak")

Hussain Ahmed Adam, also known as "Abu Jalak", is a high-ranking RSF Commander overseeing artillery Unit 306. His presence was verified by CIR at the former SAF 6th Infantry Division site on 26 October in a video posted to the RSF's official [Telegram](#) channel.



⁶ Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.

Figure 4: Verification of the presence of Abu Jalak alongside senior RSF commanders at the SAF 6th Infantry Division base in El Fasher on 26 October 2025 [13.629314,25.347205]. Source: [Telegram](#).

Tijani Ibrahim Moussa Mohamed (“Al Zeir Salem”)

Tijani Ibrahim Moussa Mohamed, also known as “Al Zeir Salem”, is an RSF Commander whose presence CIR repeatedly verified on 26 October at locations associated with the mass detention and screening of civilians outside El Fasher, including in footage posted to TikTok,⁷ and Facebook.⁸ CIR also verified his presence at a tribal celebratory event east of El Fasher on 16 November in a video posted to [Facebook](#).

His repeated presence at sites where large numbers of civilians were detained is relevant to the pattern of gendered segregation documented above. The available footage places him within the RSF operational environment during the initial processing of civilians fleeing the city.

Edres Kafuti

Edres Kafuti is an RSF Commander whose presence CIR repeatedly verified at locations associated with mass detentions and civilian screenings on 26 October, including in footage posted to [Facebook](#) and TikTok.⁹ CIR subsequently verified his presence at locations around El Fasher on 27 October, including driving along the El Fasher – Kutum road while filming dead bodies in civilian clothing laying on the road in [GRAPHIC] footage posted to [Facebook](#). His repeated presence across multiple detention locations is further evidence of the organised nature of the RSF's gender segregation of civilians.

Khademallah Khashmin Herika (“Shiraz Khalid”)

Khademallah Khashmin Herika, also known as “Shiraz Khalid”, is an RSF Major Commander of the female element of the RSF and directly linked to the CRSV indicators documented in this report. CIR identified footage posted on [X](#) in which she addresses RSF fighters and incites rape against women as a means to “cleanse” bloodlines. She presents rape against women as a deliberate means of altering the ethnic composition of a targeted population.

CIR verified Shiraz Khalid's presence in Garni in footage posted to [Telegram](#) on 29 October. Garni is a location repeatedly described in survivor testimony as a site where women and girls were subjected to sexual violence after fleeing El Fasher.

⁷ Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.

⁸ Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.

⁹ Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.




Figure 5: Verification of the presence of Shiraz Khalid in Garni on 29 October 2025
[13.740238,25.231216]. Source: [Telegram](#).

Waleed Yusef Wahal

Waleed Yusef Wahal is an RSF Commander who CIR verified to be present at the former SAF 6th Infantry Division site on 26 October in a video posted to the RSF's official [Telegram](#) channel. CIR subsequently verified his presence in Garni in footage posted to [Facebook](#) on 29 October. CIR also verified Wahal's presence in footage posted by the RSF to [Telegram](#) on 29 October with Shiraz Khalid, who is separately explicitly incited rape against women.

The combination of Wahal's presence during the takeover, his association with Shiraz Khalid, and his identification at Garni all link him to the broader CRSV patterns documented during and following the takeover.

Elfateh Abdullah Idris Adam ("Abu Lulu")

Elfateh Abdullah Idris Adam, also known as "Abu Lulu", is an RSF Commander whose presence [CIR](#) verified in footage across multiple days and locations around El Fasher. CIR also verified his presence in footage posted to [Facebook](#) from the berm site in which a female victim is visible in the background.

These elements place Abu Lulu at the intersection of several strands of evidence linking him to CRSV perpetrated in El Fasher: his presence during the takeover, his identification at a site where female victims were documented, his personal killing of female victims, and survivor testimony linking fighters under his command to CRSV.

4 ZAMZAM (RSF) – APRIL TO MAY 2025

Zamzam IDP camp, one of Sudan's largest displacement camps, is located approximately 15 kilometres (km) southwest of El Fasher in North Darfur and became a major site for IDPs during the war. From 11 to 13 April 2025, the RSF launched a sustained offensive on the camp, killing and abducting civilians, forcibly displacing much of the population, and taking control of Zamzam. The offensive was significant in the wider conflict because it brought one of the largest concentrations of displaced civilians in Darfur under RSF control and formed part of the broader campaign to consolidate RSF territorial control around El Fasher.

This section examines reports of CRSV during and after the offensive, open-source indicators associated with heightened CRSV risk, and dehumanising language. It also identifies RSF commanders present during the offensive and assesses the available evidence linking them to the patterns documented.

4.1 REPORTS OF CRSV

CRSV was reportedly perpetrated in and around Zamzam during the three-day RSF offensive on the camp from 11 to 13 April 2025, with additional incidents reported along exit routes and inside RSF-controlled areas up until at least 20 May.

[OHCHR](#) documented 66 CRSV incidents perpetrated between 11 April and 20 May in and around Zamzam, involving at least 104 victims (75 women, 26 girls, and three boys). The victims were subjected to sexual violence, including rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, and sexual assault, both during the attack on the camp and along exit routes. OHCHR assessed that this figure understates the true scale of CRSV perpetrated due to underreporting by witnesses and survivors as a result of stigma, the security situation, communications disruption, fear of retaliation, and the lack of medical services to support survivors.

As of 27 May, [SIHA](#) reported receiving direct testimonies from survivors and witnesses concerning 64 cases of abduction or enforced disappearances of women and girls in connection with the RSF offensive on Zamzam and its aftermath. SIHA also reported documenting and verifying a further 14 rape cases connected to RSF the offensive as of 27 May.

11 to 13 April: CRSV reported during the RSF offensive

According to [OHCHR](#), during the RSF assault on Zamzam on 11 April, RSF fighters killed men and raped women while conducting house-to-house searches for SAF

and Joint Forces.¹⁰ In some cases, RSF fighters killed men who resisted attempts by fighters to rape their wives, sisters, or daughters in front of them. In one case, a 27-year-old Zaghawa woman reported that RSF fighters shot her husband dead in front of her and her children before raping her beside his body. Separately, [SIHA](#) received a report that RSF soldiers burned six women alive inside their house on 11 April.

On 12 April, a 33-year-old Zaghawa woman and three others were abducted near Garni village, northwest of Zamzam on the route between Zamzam and El Fasher, as documented by [OHCHR](#). The survivor was taken back to Zamzam and held for three days, during which RSF fighters gang raped her. She later learned of 17 other women reportedly held and raped in the same house. In a separate case documented by OHCHR, a 21-year-old survivor was separately abducted near Shagra, a village in the El Fasher locality, where two uniformed RSF fighters raped her.

On 13 April, RSF fighters abducted 11 women from Zamzam to the Tabit area, southwest of El Fasher, as documented by [SIHA](#). Their families were later asked for a ransom of roughly USD 8,000 for their release.

Late April to May: CRSV reported inside the camp and on exit routes

[SIHA](#) documented rape and gang rape cases inside Zamzam on 23 and 24 April, citing four different examples.

[SIHA](#) also reported an ambush of a group fleeing toward Tawila on 16 May in which roughly 30 women and girls were beaten, verbally abused, sexually harassed, and subjected to degrading body searches.

On 19 May, a group of roughly 15 RSF soldiers stopped a 24-year-old woman travelling with nine others on the road between Zamzam and El Fasher, as documented by [SIHA](#). Three of the group were killed and the remaining seven were taken to nearby farms, interrogated on their marital status and ethnicity, tortured, and raped, and three of them were subsequently abducted.

CRSV against men and boys

[SIHA](#) also received testimony that, around mid-May, RSF soldiers sexually assaulted three men on the road out of Zamzam, reportedly mutilating their genitals, killing two of the men. [OHCHR](#) separately documented three cases of CRSV against boys in connection with the RSF offensive on Zamzam and subsequent flight from the

¹⁰ The Darfur Joint Force was formed as a result of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) in 2022 as a protection force in Darfur. Since November 2023, the terms 'Joint Force' or 'Sudanese Joint Force' have been used to refer to the group comprising the Mini Minawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A-MM), Gibril Ibrahim's faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM-GI), and several other small armed groups. These groups renounced their neutrality in November 2023 to side with the SAF.

camp between 11 April and 20 May. Overall OHCHR includes three boys among its 104 documented victims. These cases indicate that CRSV was not only perpetrated against women and girls, although sexual violence against men and boys is likely to be particularly underreported because of stigma and barriers to disclosure, as outlined by the [Institute for Security Studies](#).

4.2 CRSV INDICATORS

CIR identified two red flag indicators of CRSV through analysis of open-source data surrounding the RSF assault on Zamzam: the burning of shelters within the camp during the offensive, and the segregation of women from adult men in verified footage of the offensive's aftermath.

Burning of shelters

CIR verified a pattern of fires and smoke across Zamzam during the three-day RSF offensive from 11 to 13 April. The available evidence, including verified footage showing fires and smoke in the camp and satellite-detected thermal anomalies on all three days, supports CIR's assessment that the burning was part of the wider assault on Zamzam rather than a series of isolated incidents.

CIR verified multiple videos showing smoke and fires in and around the camp during the offensive, including footage from the southern side of Zamzam. This includes footage posted on [Telegram](#) in which fighters are seen celebrating near active fires. These videos provide visual evidence of fires during the offensive.

CIR corroborated the footage with NASA'S Fire Information for Resource Management Systems (FIRMS) satellite data, which detected thermal anomalies in the area of Zamzam on [11](#), [12](#), [13](#), and [14](#) April, corresponding with the RSF offensive. The satellite observations provide independent corroboration that significant fires were present in the camp during this period.

Taken together, the verified footage and satellite data establish a sustained pattern of fires during the RSF offensive. This is consistent with the destruction and burning of civilian shelters as part of the displacement and control of the camp's population. Such conditions are recognised, as outlined in the [IICI](#), as increasing vulnerability to CRSV, particularly where they contribute to displacement, the loss of protective community structures, and increased civilian dependence on armed actors for movement and shelter.

Segregation of women and children from adult men

CIR identified a pattern of gender segregation in verified footage filmed inside Zamzam in the days following the RSF offensive, where women and children are seen in RSF-controlled areas of the camp with an absence of adult men.

A video posted to [Facebook](#) on 14 April shows women and children inside the camp while men in RSF uniform distribute food. No adult men in civilian clothing are visible.

CIR also documented the reverse pattern in three videos from the southern side of the camp, showing groups consisting exclusively of adult men. In one [\[GRPAHIC\]](#) video posted to [Telegram](#), fighters in RSF uniform are seen interrogating detained men and subsequently killing them. Taken together, these videos are evidence of gender segregation during the RSF takeover.

The repeated pattern of gender segregation in this footage, combined with the presence of RSF personnel, is consistent with reports from organisations including [OHCHR](#) and [SIHA](#) that men and boys were separated out, detained, and killed during the offensive. Women and girls meanwhile were forcibly retained within, or returned to, the camp under RSF control.

The isolation of women and children from male relatives and community members in this manner is a recognised indicator of elevated CRSV risk, as outlined in the [IICI](#). This is because it removes potential protective presences and increases the vulnerability of women and children to coercion and abuse by armed actors controlling their access to aid, movement, and shelter.

4.3 HATE SPEECH

CIR identified dehumanising language directed at women from RSF fighters.

In survivor testimony collected by [Amnesty International](#), a woman who fled Zamzam with her mother during the April 2025 offensive reported that RSF fighters stopped them on the road, referred to them as “the women of the *falangayat*”, and subsequently raped her. This term is used to describe a slave or sycophant who prioritises their leader’s benefit over their own or their people’s interests. The RSF employ the term primarily to refer to SAF-allied forces from the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A-Mini Minawi) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), whose fighters are predominantly Zaghawa and other non-Arab groups native to Darfur – groups that have historically faced systemic racism in Sudan.

This survivor’s testimony illustrates how RSF fighters used dehumanising language against civilians on the basis of their perceived political and ethnic identity before perpetrating CRSV against them. The use of dehumanising language and hate speech against civilians is a recognised indicator of elevated CRSV risk. In the context of the Zamzam assault, the testimony also indicates that civilians perceived as aligned with the Joint Forces and/or belonging to targeted Darfuri communities faced a particularly elevated risk of CRSV.

4.4 COMMANDERS

This section identifies RSF commanders whose presence CIR verified in open-source footage at locations and time windows in which the offensive on Zamzam and associated CRSV occurred. Among those identified are the RSF Commander of the North Darfur sector and the Commander of RSF Group 146.



Figure 6: Map showing the verified presence of RSF commanders in Zamzam in April and May 2025.
Sources: Esri, TomTom, Garmin, FAO, NOAA, USGS, © OpenStreetMap contributors, and the Geospatial Graphic Information System User Community. Annotations by CIR.

Gedo Hamdan Ahmed ("Ibn Shouk")

Ibn Shouk is an RSF Major General and was Commander of the RSF North Darfur sector at the time of the takeover. He is the most senior commander CIR verified to be present in Zamzam during the takeover. He was present at the GSLF base area on 11 April in footage posted to X,¹¹ the same day [OHCHR](#) documented RSF fighters conducting house-to-house killings and rapes during searches for SAF and Joint Forces members.

Hamdan al-Kajli

¹¹ Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.

Hamdan al-Kajli is the Commander of the guards for Abdul Rahim Hamdan Daglo, the RSF's Deputy (Second) Commander. While al-Kajli is not as senior in rank as Ibn Shouk, his connection to Abdul Rahim Dagalo creates another direct link between the violence perpetrated against civilians during the RSF takeover of Zamzam and the highest ranks within the RSF. Al-Kajli was present at the eastern entrance of the camp near the GLSF base on the first day of the offensive on Zamzam in footage posted to [Telegram](#). This places him in the same area by the GLSF base as Ibn Shouk on the same date.




Figure 8: Identification of RSF commander Hamdan al-Kajli in the eastern part of the Zamzam IDP camp on 11 April 2025 [13.488435,25.314243]. Source: [Telegram](#).

Abdelbagi Dahab Talbo

Abdelbagi Dahab Talbo, an RSF Colonel, was present at the western part of Zamzam during the takeover on 13 April in footage posted to [X](#). This is the same day [SIHA](#) documented RSF fighters taking 11 women from Zamzam to the Tabit area, southwest of Zamzam, and holding them for ransom.



Figure 9: Verification of the presence of Abdelbagi Dahab Talbo at the western part of the Zamzam IDP camp on 13 April 2025 [13.476683, 25.291557]. Source: [X](#).

Mustafa Abdullah Ahmed Shenibat

Mustafa Abdullah Ahmed Shenibat, RSF Commander of Group 146, was present at the western part of the camp during the third day of the takeover on 13 April. He was co-located with Abdelbagi Dahab Talbo (above) in the same video posted to [X](#).

5 GEZIRA (SAF/PRO-SAF) – JANUARY 2025

The SAF-led campaign to retake Sudan's Gezira state began in late 2024 and progressed through the state over several weeks, with SAF and allied forces recapturing towns and villages before reaching Wad Madani. SAF and allied forces retook the state capital on 11 January 2025, reversing the RSF's control of the state that had begun with its capture of the city in December 2023. The campaign marked a significant shift in control, restoring a major agricultural and humanitarian centre to SAF and allied forces control while exposing civilians in areas retaken from the RSF to a new phase of violence.

This section focuses on reports of CRSV associated with the SAF-led recapture of Gezira and its aftermath. This includes reported abuses against Kanabi¹² communities and male detainees, indicators of heightened CRSV risk, and SAF and allied commanders verified to have been present in Gezira during the period of increased CRSV reports.

5.1 REPORTS OF CRSV

CRSV was reported in and around Wad Madani during and after the SAF-led recapture of the city in January 2025. This includes reports involving SAF personnel, as well as fighters from the Baraa Bin Malik Brigade and the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF). The Baraa Bin Malik Brigade is a SAF-aligned Islamist armed group that has participated in military operations alongside SAF forces since the start of the war, while the SSF is a SAF-aligned armed group that played a prominent role in the recapture of Gezira.

[OHCHR](#) and independent Sudanese media outlet [Radio Dabanga](#) reported that the SSF abducted 13 women and one man from Tayba Camp, 20 km east of Wad Madani, on 10 January 2025. [Human Rights Watch](#) later reported that armed men who entered a home in Tayba Camp on the same day threatened women and their husbands while identifying themselves as forces affiliated with Abuaqla Mohamed Ahmed Alwakil ("Kaykal"), Commander of the SSF, corroborating their presence in the area on that day.

On 15 January, [Radio Dabanga](#) also reported allegations that the SSF committed rape and other forms of sexual violence in Tayba Camp and other Kanabi communities. [Salam Media](#), an independent Sudanese peace and media

¹² The Kanabi settlements were set up by the British colonial government during the twentieth century across central and eastern Sudan for migrant agricultural workers arriving from Darfur, Kordofan, and West Africa. In recent history, these marginalised communities have faced limited access to housing and education, and low pay, as reported by [Rift Valley Institute](#).

organisation, reported on 14 January that the attacks on Kanabi communities were coordinated between the SAF and Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, based on information reportedly received from the Coordination of the Resistance Committees in El Fasher.

On 17 January 2025, [Sudan War Monitor](#), an independent open-source research and reporting platform focused on the Sudan conflict, reported that SAF fighters beat and directed sexually abusive language at a 50-year-old woman in Naim Allah village, southwest of Wad Madani.

On 28 January 2025, the [Sudanese National Observatory for Human Rights](#) reported allegations of forced nudity and torture committed by the Baraa Bin Malik Brigade against male prisoners. Later in 2025, [Beam Reports](#) separately reported on alleged incidents of rape, torture, and abuse in detention centres across Gezira state.

5.2 CRSV INDICATORS

CIR identified four open-source indicators of heightened CRSV risk during the SAF-led recapture of Gezira in verified and unverified footage. These include the gender-based separation and detention of civilians, threats and degrading treatment, the destruction of civilian homes, and sexually abusive and gendered language directed at civilians.

In a video posted to [X](#) on 16 January 2025, fighters wearing uniforms consistent with SAF and SAF-affiliated forces are seen driving a group of men in a line while threatening to kill them. One fighter chants “Jeesh Googo”, a praise associated with the SAF and SAF-affiliated groups. Another says, “*We didn’t [spare] anything from it. That’s their Kambo [camp],*” while pointing towards visible smoke. All detained individuals in the footage are adult men, indicating possible gender-based separation of detainees. Such gender-based separation, particularly when accompanied by threats, detention and coercion, is a recognised indicator of heightened CRSV risk.

CIR also analysed satellite imagery showing the burning and destruction of at least 10 civilian homes in Tayba Camp around the time of the 10 January attack reported by [OHCHR](#). Further imagery revealed fires and burn scars affecting four Kanabi communities around the same period, including the Al Shekaba Al Jack, Mabrouka, Tayba, and Al Hideba Dar Al Salam camps. This provides independent corroboration of the reported attacks on and destruction of civilian property. The burning and destruction of civilian homes is a recognised indicator of heightened CRSV risk, particularly where it contributes to displacement, removes protective community structures, and increases civilians’ exposure to armed actors and other forms of violence.

On 13 January 2025, a video posted to Telegram¹³ shows a civilian-clothed man being beaten and, killed after being subjected to dehumanising and sexually abusive language. CIR geolocated the footage to Hantoub Bridge, and identified uniform patches worn by the perpetrators of the Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, GIS, and SMF. The victim is subjected to degrading treatment before he is pushed off the bridge. The person filming is heard using a gendered homophobic slur while insulting the victim: *"Beat the animal, do you want to fall? Come on, run, run, [I] fuck your family. [...] In revenge for all our martyrs. [...] Beat the 'Luti' 'Um Kaukat'".* The term "Um Kaukat" is commonly used by SAF and SAF-affiliated groups to refer to alleged RSF members, while the term "Luti" is a gendered and homophobic slur meaning "gay man", and is used in a degrading manner.

CIR also verified another video shared to [X](#) on 13 January, showing fighters detaining men lined up on the ground while threatening to shoot them in the head. The fighters wear uniform colours associated with SAF-affiliated groups, and one fighter can be heard saying "Amn ya Jin", a chant typically used by individuals affiliated with the GIS. The footage provides further evidence of the detention and segregation of male civilians during the recapture of Gezira state.

5.3 INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE AND HATE SPEECH

CIR identified gendered, sexually abusive, and threatening language in footage associated with the SAF-led recapture of Gezira. The footage includes sexually degrading language directed at a woman, as well as threats against civilians perceived to have supported or cooperated with the RSF.

In a video published by [Sudan War Monitor](#) on 17 January 2025, a man filming but not visible in frame is heard saying to a woman: *"The people of Naeem Allah whom you humiliated, and you set the RSF on them? [...] The RSF fucked you, you rotten whore. [...] You gave the RSF water [...] This is Maryoma man, [...] have her go with you there, she will fuck you until you're pleased."* The person filming is also seen striking the woman multiple times with a stick.

Another individual in the video is seen wearing a SAF uniform. The language combines gendered humiliation, sexualised abuse, and threats of sexual violence against a woman. Such rhetoric is relevant as an indicator of an environment in which sexual violence and other forms of CRSV may be normalised or encouraged.

On 10 January 2025, Hassabo Dafallah Al Sinnari, a pro-SAF influencer, broadcast a livestream on [Facebook](#) in which he threatened people remaining in Wad Madani whom he characterised as RSF collaborators or looters. He claimed that the SMF had compiled a list of approximately 6,800 alleged collaborators and warned those

¹³ Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.

on the list that they would be killed if they remained in the city. He also used the term “*bal*”, a derogatory term used by SAF-aligned actors for people perceived to be associated with the RSF.

The threats are significant in the context of the SAF-led recapture because they explicitly identify civilians perceived to be affiliated with the RSF as targets for violence or forced displacement. Such threats and dehumanising rhetoric contribute to an environment in which civilians perceived to belong to a targeted group may face heightened risk of violence, including CRSV.

5.4 COMMANDERS

CIR verified the presence of several senior SAF and SAF-aligned commanders in Gezira during the SAF-led recapture in January 2025 during the time period and geographic area in which CRSV and other abuses were reported. This includes members of the SAF itself, GIS, SSF, SMF, and Baraa Bin Malik Brigade.



Figure 10: Map showing the verified presence of SAF and SAF-aligned commanders in Gezira state in January 2025. Sources: Esri, TomTom, Garmin, FAO, NOAA, USGS, © OpenStreetMap contributors, and the Geospatial Graphic Information System User Community. Annotations by CIR.

Abdelmoneim Abdelbasit Mohamed

Abdelmoneim Abdelbasit Mohamed is a SAF Major General who CIR verified to be present in Wad Madani on 12 January, during the SAF takeover, in footage posted to [Telegram](#). He was the most senior SAF commander CIR verified associated with the SAF-led recapture of Gezira and served as Commander of the Sennar (Southern) Axis at the time.




Figure 12: Verification of the presence of Mohamed in Wad Madani, Gezira on 12 January 2025 [14.426926, 33.501562]. Source: [Telegram](#).

Abuaqla Mohamed Ahmed Alwakil ("Kaykal")

Abuaqla Mohamed Ahmed Alwakil ("Kaykal") is a Major General and was the Commander of the SAF-aligned SSF at the time of the SAF recapture of Gezira. He was previously the RSF's appointed commander of the Wad Madani Division during the RSF's December 2023 takeover of Gezira (see section 6.3). He later defected to the SAF-aligned side in October 2024 and played an instrumental role in the recapture of the state.

CIR verified Kaykal's presence in footage posted to [X](#) on 11 January 2025 filmed in Wad Al Mehidi, approximately 12 km east of Wad Madani. He is also seen in footage from the same day posted to [Telegram](#) in Wad Madani, confirming his presence in Gezira during the SAF-led military campaign.




Figure 13: Verification of the presence of Kaykal outside the Wad al Mehidi Hospital, Gezira on 11 January 2025 [14.4084426, 33.6666876]. Source: [X](#)

Siddig Ali Al-Basha ("Al-Diheesh")

Siddig Ali Al-Basha ("Al-Diheesh") is a SAF Commander who CIR assesses to have led the Abdullah Jamaa Battalion, also known as Martyr Al-Diheesh, under the SAF's 4th Infantry Division based in Ad Damazin, Blue Nile during the campaign. CIR verified his presence in Hajj Abdallah, Gezira, on 8 January in footage posted to [X](#). CIR also verified his presence in Wad Madani in footage posted to [Telegram](#) on 12 January during the SAF-led takeover capture of the city.




Figure 14: Verification of the presence of Al Basha in Wad Madani, Gezira on 12 January 2025 [14.398719, 33.531956]. Source: [Telegram](#)

Mohamed Osman ("Gambal")

Mohamed Osman ("Gambal") is a Major in Sudan's SAF-aligned GIS. CIR verified his presence in Mahala village, Gezira, on 8 January in a video posted to [X](#), and at Al Kireeba gate west of Wad Madani on 11 January in a video posted to [Telegram](#). Gambal is a Major in the GIS Operations Authority and served as Commander of the "Dagashak" Unit within the SAF-aligned SMF, which was active during the SAF recapture of Gezira.




Figure 15: Verification of the presence of Gambal at the Al Kireeba gate wear of Wad Madani, Gezira on 11 January 2025. [14.417341, 33.452958]. Source: [X](#)

Mohamed Siddig

Mohamed Siddig is a GIS Major, who CIR identified in Wad Madani on 11 January during the SAF takeover in a footage posted to [Telegram](#), where he appears alongside Kaykal, Commander of the SSF.

Abdelmoniem Mudawi Taha

Abdelmoniem Mudawi Taha is an Islamist, SAF-aligned Commander who CIR identified wearing a GIS uniform and patch on two different occasions. Taha is the Commander of the Sennar "Osood Al Areen Convoy" and is referred to as "Amir Al-Mujahedeen". This title translates to "leader of the Mujahedeen" and is commonly used to denote a leader of Islamist mobilised fighters in Sudan. CIR verified his presence in Wad Madani in footage posted to [Telegram](#) on 12 January.




Figure 16: Verification of the presence of Taha in Wad Madani, Gezira on 12 January 2025 [14.371948, 33.526312]. Source: [Telegram](#)

Murtada Osman Mohamed Abdallah ("Wad Abu Falaja")

Murtada Osman Mohamed Abdallah, also known as "Wad Abu Falaja", was a SSF First Lieutenant at the time of the campaign. CIR verified his presence in Wad Madani on 11 January in footage posted to [Telegram](#).

Baraa Bin Malik Brigade

CIR identified multiple fighters affiliated with the Baraa Bin Malik Brigade at several locations in Wad Madani during the SAF-led recapture. CIR did not identify any commanders within the brigade in verified footage, however the repeated presence of fighters in locations relevant to CRSV indicators corroborates credible reports of CRSV perpetrated by members of the brigade against the Kanabi community. CIR verified footage showing fighters, including one with a Baraa Bin Malik Brigade patch, detaining and beating a civilian-clothed man in Wad Madani in footage posted to [X](#) on 12 January. CIR also verified footage posted to [Facebook](#) on 13 January showing fighters involved in beating, denigrating with sexually humiliating language, and ultimately killing a detained man at Hantoub Bridge (see section 5.2), wearing black shirts with Baraa Bin Malik Brigade insignia printed on them.

6 WAD MADANI (RSF) – DECEMBER 2023

Wad Madani, the capital of Sudan's Gezira State, lies on the Blue Nile southeast of Khartoum. In the early months of the war in Sudan, it was a major destination for people displaced by earlier fighting in the capital. From mid-December 2023, the RSF launched an offensive that brought Wad Madani and the surrounding areas of Gezira state under its control, with the city itself falling into RSF control on 19 December 2023.¹⁴ The takeover was significant in the wider conflict because it extended RSF control into central Sudan, displacing many of the IDPs Wad Madani had itself been sheltering and disrupting a region that had functioned as a humanitarian and agricultural hub.

This section examines reports of CRSV during and after the RSF takeover, open-source indicators associated with heightened CRSV risk, and the RSF commanders CIR identified at the relevant locations and dates.

6.1 REPORTS OF CRSV

A high volume of CRSV incidents were reported in and around Wad Madani and elsewhere in Gezira state from mid-December 2023 into early 2024, in the period leading up to, during, and following the RSF's takeover of the city.

[Amnesty International](#) documented one instance of RSF soldiers gang raping a woman in her house in eastern Wad Madani on 16 December 2023, three days before the takeover. [SIHA](#) documented six cases of sexual assault by the RSF in Rufaa city, north of Wad Madani, as well the attempted kidnap and rape of two women in the Al Zamalek area of the city on 19 December, the day of the takeover.

[SIHA](#) went on to document a sustained pattern of CRSV perpetrated by the RSF across the city and its surroundings in the days that followed:

- 20 December: Rape of a woman in the Wad Azrag area of Wad Madani;
- 21 December: Attempted rape and killing of a pregnant woman in Wad Madani's Matar neighbourhood;
- 22 December: Multiple women raped in Maranjan, a town southeast of Wad Madani;
- 24 December: Seven women raped in the Wad Madani Industrial School;
- 26 December: Two women raped in Darja neighbourhood;

¹⁴ See [Washington Post's](#) report: Paramilitary force takes city in heart of Sudan's breadbasket; 300,000 flee

- 27 December: Three cases of sexual assault on the road between Khartoum and Wad Madani.

6.2 CRSV INDICATORS

CIR identified three indicators associated with increased CRSV risk in secondary reports and verified footage from Wad Madani before and during the RSF takeover: forced nudity and torture, fires, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. Forced nudity and torture can be indicators of CRSV where they occur alongside other forms of abuse, while fires and the destruction of civilian property can increase vulnerability to CRSV by displacing civilians and disrupting protective structures, as outlined in the [IICI](#).

Footage [\[GRAPHIC\]](#) posted to [X](#) on 16 December 2023 shows an undressed man being tortured in Wad Madani. The footage is consistent with the broader pattern of violence reported during the RSF offensive, including [Amnesty International](#) documentation of sexual assaults in eastern Wad Madani.

On 18 December, Sudanese CSO [Emergency Lawyers](#) reported on an attack by RSF soldiers on Rufaa Teaching Hospital, including killings inside the facility. The following days, [SIHA](#) documented numerous CRSV incidents in the town (see 6.1). The attack on the Teaching Hospital is relevant as an indicator of the broader breakdown of civilian protection during the RSF advance, particularly because the facility was a civilian medical site.

Footage posted to [X](#) on 19 December shows a fire at the Central Bank of Sudan's Wad Madani branch with RSF soldiers visible. CIR geolocated the video to approximately 1.5 km from the Zamlek area, where [SIHA](#) documented two CRSV incidents that same day. Fires and the destruction of civilian infrastructure can increase CRSV risk by contributing to displacement, loss of shelter and protective structures, and increased civilian exposure to armed actors.

6.3 COMMANDERS

This section identifies RSF commanders whom CIR identified in verified open-source footage at the same dates and relevant geographic areas of reported CRSV incidents during the RSF takeover of Wad Madani.



Figure 17: Map showing the verified presence of RSF commanders in Wad Madani in December 2023. Sources: Esri, TomTom, Garmin, FAO, NOAA, USGS, © OpenStreetMap contributors, and the Geospatial Graphic Information System User Community. Annotations by CIR.

Abuaqla Mohamed Ahmed Alwakil ("Kaykal")

Kaykal was appointed Commander of the RSF 5th Division in Wad Madani, Gezira state, on 19 December 2023, the day of the RSF takeover, according to an official RSF statement posted to X.¹⁵ Kaykal is the highest-ranking RSF commander CIR verified to be present in Wad Madani during the takeover of the city. A further video posted to Tiktok¹⁶ on 19 December shows Kaykal inside an office in Wad Madani, corroborating his presence in the city during the time frame of reported CRSV incidents.

CIR further verified Kaykal's presence at the SAF 1st Division base on 24 December 2023, the same date SIHA documented the rape of seven women at the Wad Madani Industrial School. This places him in the city on two separate dates on which CRSV was reportedly perpetrated.

¹⁵ Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.

¹⁶ Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.



Figure 19: Verification of the presence of Kaykal in the SAF 1st Division base on 24 December 2023 [14.398838, 33.531956]. Source: [Telegram](#).

Mohamed Obeidallah Ahmed Rashid

Mohamed Obeidallah Ahmed Rashid is an RSF Commander who CIR verified to be present in Wad Madani on 19 December 2023 in footage posted to [Telegram](#). This is the same day as the RSF takeover. This is also the same date SIHA documented the Rufaa and Al Zamalek CRSV incidents described above (see section 6.1)




Figure 20: Verification of the presence of Rashid in the SAF 1st Brigade base (left) [14.428415, 33.509404], and the Hantoub bridge roundabout (right) [14.426965, 33.500865] on 19 December 2023. Source: [Telegram](#).

Issam Uddin Mukhtar

Issam Uddin Mukhtar is an RSF Commander whom CIR verified to be present in Wad Madani in a video the RSF posted to [Telegram](#) on 25 December 2023. This is within the same general timeframe of SIHA's reports of RSF fighters raping seven women being at the Wad Madani Industrial School on 24 December and two women in the Darja neighbourhood on 26 December. The Wad Madani Industrial School is located approximately 750 meters (m) from where Mukhtar appeared in the following days.

Samar Ibrahim Tirab

Samar Ibrahim Tirab is an RSF Captain whom CIR verified to be present in Wad Madani alongside RSF commander Issam Uddin Mukhtar in a video the RSF posted to [Telegram](#) on 25 December. In the video, Tirab denies what she calls "rumours [of looting], theft [of property], and rapes" occurring in Wad Madani, claiming they were "Kizan"¹⁷ lies". This appearance falls within the same general timeframe and proximity to locations in which CRSV incidents were reportedly perpetrated between 24 and 26 December, at the Industrial School and the Darja neighbourhood, respectively.




Figure 21: Verification of the presence of Tirab and Mukhtar in Wad Madani on 25 December 2023 [14.393437, 33.509717]. Source: [Telegram](#).

¹⁷ 'Kizan' is a term used to refer to members associated with the Sudanese Islamic Movement and National Congress Party (the party of Sudan's former president, Omar al-Bashir).

7 KHARTOUM (RSF) – MAY TO JULY 2023

Fighting between the RSF and the SAF broke out in Khartoum on 15 April 2023 at the outset of the war, with the RSF rapidly seizing control of large parts of the capital, including Khartoum North (Bahri).

This section examines reports of CRSV in Bahri during the early months of the war, open-source indicators of CRSV corroborating the pattern of reports, and the RSF commanders CIR verified to be present at the locations and dates of reported CRSV.

7.1 REPORTS OF CRSV

Reports of CRSV in Bahri emerged within the first weeks of the RSF's takeover of the area and continued through the following months:

- 16 May: [Radio Dabanga](#) reported that RSF members raped two women in Bahri, one of whom suffered severe bleeding as a result. The outlet reported a separate case of RSF soldiers raping a 15-year-old South Sudanese girl on the street on the same day in Kafouri, Bahri.
- 17 June: [CNN](#) published verified and geolocated footage showing a man wearing clothing matching RSF uniform raping a girl believed to be 15 years old in Khartoum, while another similarly dressed fighter stood guard. The footage was shared with CIR by the Dalil Program, an open-source project led by a Sudanese CSO. CIR independently verified and geolocated it to Kafouri Block 4 in Bahri.
- Mid-July: [Amnesty International](#) documented an RSF soldier raping a pharmacist in her home in Bahri, in the presence of her children. According to Amnesty, the perpetrators told her they were raping her because she had been unable to save the life of one of their injured comrades the previous day.
- 16-17 July: [Amnesty International](#) reported that RSF fighters abducted a nurse ("Nurse A") from her home in Kafouri, Bahri, on 16 July and took her to Al-Amal Hospital in Bahri, where she was forced to treat injured RSF soldiers. On 17 July, 13 RSF soldiers gang raped her. She was subsequently held at the hospital and forced to continue treating injured RSF personnel for 45 days.
- 18 July: [Amnesty International](#) reported that RSF personnel killed a female doctor inside Al-Amal Hospital after she resisted rape.

These reports indicate a pattern of RSF forces perpetrating CRSV in Bahri in private residences as well as locations controlled or occupied by the RSF, including Al-

Amal Hospital. The reported cases also indicate that sexual violence was at times accompanied by abduction, coercion, and the forced provision of medical services.

7.2 COMMANDERS

CIR verified the presence of several RSF and RSF-aligned commanders in footage from Bahri during periods in which CRSV was reportedly perpetrated, including in and near Kafouri. This includes senior RSF commanders, the RSF Commander of the Bahri sector, and a senior commander from the RSF-aligned Tamazuj group.




Figure 22: Map showing the verified presence of RSF and RSF-aligned commanders in Bahri from May to July 2023. Sources: Esri, TomTom, Garmin, FAO, NOAA, USGS, © OpenStreetMap contributors, and the Geospatial Graphic Information System User Community. Annotations by CIR.

Idris Hassan Ibrahim

Idris Hassan Ibrahim, an RSF Major General, was verified by CIR on Al Hawa Street, Kafouri Block 4, Bahri, on 11 June 2023 in footage posted to Facebook.¹⁸ At time the footage was filmed, he was the RSF Commander of the Bahri sector. He is the

¹⁸ Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.

most senior commander CIR verified to be present in Bahri during the time frame of reported CRSV incidents and had direct command authority over the sector.

His presence and command position are particularly relevant to the rape footage verified by CIR to have been filmed in Kafouri Block 4. The identification of Ibrahim in the same neighbourhood, which falls within his area of responsibility, shows that senior RSF leadership were present in the area during the period in which the rape was reportedly filmed.

Musa Hamid Ambello

Musa Hamid Ambello, an RSF Colonel, was verified by CIR to be present alongside Idris Hassan Ibrahim on Al Hawa Street, Kafouri Block 4, Bahri, on 11 June 2023, in footage posted to Facebook.¹⁹ This places him in a position of seniority, alongside the senior RSF commander, in the same area and timeframe as the Kafouri rape footage.




Figure 24: Verification of the presence of Ibrahim and Ambello in Kafouri Block 4, Bahri, on 11 June 2023 [15.655889, 32.581917]. Source: Facebook.²⁰

¹⁹ Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.

²⁰ Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.

Moussa Anqar

Moussa Anqar was verified by CIR to be present in open lots north of Kafouri on 14 July 2023 in footage posted to X.²¹ [Reuters](#) identified Anqar as a senior commander with Tamazuj, an RSF-aligned armed group. His identification near Kafouri on that date indicates the presence of a senior RSF commander in the area where Nurse A (see above) was abducted three days later and subsequently gang raped by RSF personnel, as reported by [Amnesty International](#).




Figure 25: Verification of the presence of Anqar in Bahri on 14 July 2023 [15.691144, 32.565358]. Source: X.²²

²¹ Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.

²² Link is no longer active, but CIR can share an archived version on request.

8 CONCLUSION

CRSV has been consistently perpetrated by warring parties in Sudan across different states and military operations since the start of the war. CRSV is not occurring in a vacuum, nor is it confined to a particular geography, time frame, or armed group. Rather, the evidence examined by CIR indicates that CRSV is an entrenched and recurring feature of the conflict, occurring across successive military operations and in areas controlled or contested by different armed actors.

RSF, SAF, and allied commanders with direct authority over sectors, units, and operations linked to significant CRSV reporting continue to operate with impunity. This contributes to the normalisation of CRSV and poses grave threats to civilian populations facing a fourth year of war in Sudan.

The overwhelming majority of survivors of CRSV are women and girls, though civil society and UN organisations have also documented CRSV against men and boys. Individuals with intersecting identities – in particular women and girls from marginalised ethnic and political groups – face especially high risks.

The incidents documented in this report represent only a fraction of CRSV perpetrated during the war. Stigma, fear of retaliation, insecurity, displacement, communications disruptions, and limited access to health and protection services contribute to severe underreporting. More than four years after the onset of war in Sudan, the risk of further CRSV remains acute.

The international community must take urgent action to prevent further CRSV and support survivors, including:

- Support Sudanese survivor-centred organisations providing services, documenting CRSV, and supporting survivors on the ground.
- Pursue accountability for those responsible for CRSV, including through international and national justice mechanisms.
- Publicly condemn CRSV and ensure it remains a central component of international responses to the conflict.
- Scale up health, protection, psychological, and legal services for survivors across Sudan.
- Support efforts to end the war and protect civilians, including a credible civilian-led peace process and measures to restrict the flow of weapons, fighters, and financing to the warring parties.

9 ANNEX 1: COMMANDERS IDENTIFIED

Name	Dates identified	Locations identified	Reason included
Idris Hassan Ibrahim	11 June 2023	Al Hawa Street, Kafouri Block 4, Bahri	RSF Major General, Commander of the Bahri sector at the time; most senior commander verified present in Bahri; present in same neighbourhood as verified Kafouri rape footage
Musa Hamid Ambello	11 June 2023	Al Hawa Street, Kafouri Block 4, Bahri	RSF Colonel, co-located with Idris Hassan Ibrahim in same area/timeframe as Kafouri rape footage
Moussa Anqar	14 July 2023	Open lots north of Kafouri, Bahri	Senior commander of Tamazuj (RSF-aligned group); present three days before, and in the area of, a nurse's abduction and subsequent gang rape
Abuaqla Mohamed Ahmed Alwakil ("Kaykal")	<i>Wad Madani (Dec 2023):</i> 19 Dec 2023; 24 Dec 2023. <i>Gezira (Jan 2025):</i> 11 Jan 2025	<i>Wad Madani (Dec 2023):</i> office in Wad Madani; SAF 1st Division base. <i>Gezira (Jan 2025):</i> Wad Al Mehidi; Wad Madani	Appointed RSF Commander of Wad Madani Division on day of the Dec 2023 takeover; highest-ranking RSF commander verified present; later defected and, as Major General and Commander of the SSF, was present during the Jan 2025 SAF-aligned recapture of Gezira; verified to be present during both periods of reported CRSV
Mohamed Obeidallah Ahmed Rashid	19 Dec 2023	SAF 1st Brigade base / Hantoub bridge roundabout, Wad Madani	RSF Commander verified present on the same day as the takeover and as SIHA's Rufaa/Al Zamalek CRSV reports
Issam Uddin Mukhtar	25 Dec 2023	Wad Madani	RSF Commander present ~750m from the Wad

			Madani Industrial School within the timeframe of reported rapes there and in Darja
Samar Ibrahim Tirab	25 Dec 2023	Wad Madani	RSF Captain, present alongside Mukhtar; denied rumours of rape/looting on camera; same timeframe and proximity as Industrial School and Darja CRSV reports
Abdelmoneim Abdelbasit Mohamed	12 Jan 2025	Wad Madani	SAF Major General, most senior SAF commander verified present in Gezira; Commander of the Sennar (Southern) Axis
Siddig Ali Al-Basha ("Al-Diheesh")	8 Jan 2025; 12 Jan 2025	Hajj Abdallah, Gezira; Wad Madani	SAF commander, led the Abdullah Jamaa Battalion (Martyr Al-Diheesh) under SAF's 4th Infantry Division
Mohamed Osman ("Gambal")	8 Jan 2025; 11 Jan 2025	Mahala village, Gezira; Al Kireeba gate west of Wad Madani	GIS Major, Commander of the Dagashak Unit within the SMF
Mohamed Siddig	11 Jan 2025	Wad Madani	GIS Major, verified present alongside Kaykal during the SAF takeover
Abdelmoniem Mudawi Taha	12 Jan 2025	Wad Madani	Islamist SAF-aligned figure, Commander of the Sennar "Osood Al Areen Convoy," referred to as "Amir Al-Mujahedeen"
Murtada Osman Mohamed Abdallah ("Wad Abu Falaja")	11 Jan 2025	Wad Madani	SSF First Lieutenant
Gedo Hamdan Ahmed ("Ibn Shouk")	<i>Zamzam (Apr 2025): 11 April 2025. El Fasher (Oct–Nov 2025): 26 Oct 2025; 27 Oct</i>	<i>Zamzam (Apr 2025):</i> GSLF base area. <i>El Fasher (Oct–Nov 2025):</i> former SAF 6th Infantry Division site; berm site; near Saudi Hospital; tribal event east of El Fasher	RSF Major General, Commander of the North Darfur sector; most senior commander verified present at Zamzam; highest-ranking commander with direct authority over

	2025; 6 Nov 2025; 16 Nov 2025		El Fasher, which fell within his sector
Hamdan al-Kajli	11 April 2025	Eastern entrance of Zamzam camp, near GSLF base	Commander of the guards for Abdul Rahim Dagalo, RSF Deputy (Second) Commander; direct link to senior RSF leadership
Waleed Yusef Wahal	26 Oct 2025; 29 Oct 2025	Former SAF 6th Infantry Division site; Garni	Verified present at former SAF 6th Infantry Division site and at Garni alongside Shiraz Khalid, who explicitly incited rape
Abdelbagi Dahab Talbo	13 April 2025	Western Zamzam	RSF Colonel, verified present on the same day RSF abducted 11 women from Zamzam to Tabit for ransom
Mustafa Abdullah Ahmed Shenibat	13 April 2025	Western Zamzam	RSF Commander of Group 146; verified present with Talbo
Abdul Rahim Hamdan Daglo	26 Oct 2025; 4 Nov 2025	Former SAF 6th Infantry Division site; Saudi Hospital, El Fasher	RSF Deputy (Second) Commander; highest-ranking RSF commander verified present during the El Fasher takeover; voice matched giving field orders to Abu Jalak
Ibrahim Gibril Omer ("Abu Wafi")	26 Oct 2025	Sites northwest of El Fasher	RSF Major, Director of Ibn Shouk's Office; directly linked to mass detention/screening of male civilians (gender-segregation pattern)
Hussain Ahmed Adam ("Abu Jalak")	26 Oct 2025; 27 Oct 2025	Former SAF 6th Infantry Division site; berm site	High-ranking RSF field commander (artillery Unit 306); directly instructed by Dagalo (voice-matched) to pursue vehicles fleeing the berm site
Tijani Ibrahim Moussa Mohamed ("Al Zeir Salem")	26 Oct 2025; 16 Nov 2025	Sites outside El Fasher; tribal event east of El Fasher	Repeatedly verified present at mass detention/screening sites

Edres Kafuti	26 Oct 2025; 27 Oct 2025	Detention/screening sites outside El Fasher; site with bodies in civilian clothing	Repeatedly present across multiple detention locations, evidencing organised processing of civilians
Khademallah Khashmin Herika ("Shiraz Khalid")	26 Oct 2025; 27 Oct 2025; 29 Oct 2025; 30 Oct 2025	Two locations in El Fasher; Garni	RSF Major, Commander of the female element of the RSF; explicit, verified incitement to rape against women
Elfateh Abdullah Idris Adam ("Abu Lulu")	Multiple days, incl. 27 Oct 2025	El Fasher; berm site	Field commander implicated by survivor/FFM-S testimony (killing of a pregnant woman; assault on a nurse by fighters reportedly under his command); verified present at site with female victim visible

10 ANNEX 2: METHODOLOGY

This section outlines the methodology CIR used to identify CRSV “hotspots” in Sudan since the start of the war, and the actors it has reasonable grounds to believe were directly or indirectly responsible. It covers:

1. Definitions of sexual violence used in this report
2. The open- and closed-source data relied on in this report
3. CIR’s approach to identifying CRSV “hotspots” across Sudan by triangulating:
 - a. Secondary reports from credible sources
 - b. Primary reports from trusted Sudanese partners
 - c. Proxy indicators in open-source data and/or secondary reports
 - d. Analysis of hate speech and incitement to violence
4. CIR’s approach to analysing hate speech and incitement to violence
5. CIR’s approach to attribution analysis
6. Risks and mitigations associated with researching CRSV in Sudan

In line with Principle 4 of the [Murad Code](#) (“Add Value or Don’t Do It”),²³ CIR designed this report to support justice and accountability efforts for survivors of CRSV in Sudan. CIR focused on CRSV hotspots where there was sufficient, verified open-source data on conflict actors who there are reasonable grounds to believe were directly or indirectly responsible. By focusing on perpetrators, this report adds to the evidence base of who might have been responsible for those CRSV incidents and packages this evidence to be as useful as possible for actors seeking justice and accountability for CRSV survivors. CIR also collaborated with trusted, survivor-centred Sudanese organisations to further ensure the scope and format of the report would add value to survivors.

10.1 DEFINITIONS

This report uses the term “conflict-related sexual violence” (CRSV) to refer to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilisation, forced marriage, and any form of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) that is directly linked to a conflict. SGBV includes sexual abuse, domestic violence, early and forced marriage, genital mutilation/cutting, so-called “honour killings”, forced nudity, and the trafficking of persons for the purpose of sexual violence and/or exploitation.²⁴ In Sudanese contexts, forced nudity and stripping

²³ Four [CIR](#) members contributed to the [IICI](#) “Open-Source Practitioner’s Guide to the Murad Code”, including two investigators on CIR’s Sudan Witness project.

²⁴ Definitions from the 2024 [UN](#) Secretary-General Report on CRSV, published 15 July 2025.

can cause significant humiliation, shame, and social stigma, particularly due to cultural and social norms around privacy and modesty.

The term “survivor” is used in reference to individuals who have been victims CRSV and may refer to both individuals who survived and those who did not, in line with guidance from the [IICI](#). In some contexts the term “victim” is assessed to be more appropriate, for example to accurately reflect the language of civil society actors documenting CRSV on the ground when referencing their work.

10.2 IDENTIFYING SOURCES

CIR recognises that the collection and analysis of open-source data reduces the reliance and burden on survivors, as outlined in Principle 8 of the [Murad Code](#) (Gather Information from Other Sources). To this end, CIR relied as much as possible on open-source data for this report; CIR only included closed-source information collected and shared by trusted partners to fill significant data and analytical gaps, and only when that information had already been collected.

10.2.1 OPEN-SOURCE DATA

CIR relied on open-source data as much as possible for this report, corroborating user-generated content (UGC) with satellite data and credible secondary reporting. Most UGC analysed consisted of videos or photos uploaded to social media, often by fighters. In terms of satellite data, CIR relied primarily on satellite imagery and thermal sensing data (the latter to support analysis of conflict-related fires and chronolocation more broadly). CIR has a well-established [methodology](#) for collecting, archiving, and verifying UGC and a separate [methodology](#) for documenting conflict-related fires in Sudan.

10.2.2 CLOSED-SOURCE DATA

CIR also analysed closed-source information on CRSV for this report collected by trusted partners, but only when necessary to fill significant data and analytical gaps, and where that information was already collected. This included anonymised testimony as well as audiovisual recordings of CRSV incidents shared by trusted partners. CIR does not collect closed-source information on CRSV itself or engage directly with survivors. Instead CIR worked with trusted Sudanese CSOs which provide services to survivors of CRSV and document their lived experiences. CIR conducts thorough due diligence on all CSO partners to ensure they have appropriate safeguarding practices in place and take survivor-centred and trauma-informed approaches to documenting CRSV. CIR does not directly engage with survivors or witnesses.

10.3 IDENTIFYING CRSV HOTSPOTS

CIR relied on a **triangulation approach** to identify CRSV hotspots across Sudan since the start of the war in April 2023, drawing on a combination of:

1. **Secondary reports** of CRSV incidents from credible and reliable sources.
2. **Primary reports** of CRSV incidents from trusted CSO partners, including anonymised testimony and audiovisual CRSV content²⁵
3. **Proxy or “red flag” indicators** of CRSV in verified open-source data and/or credible and reliable secondary reporting
4. **Analysis of online narratives, hate speech, and incitement to violence** in verified footage and social media posts, in particular speech targeting groups on the basis of gender or perceived ethnicity or political affiliation

Hotspots were selected if they met at least three of the above criteria **and** CIR had sufficient data to conduct meaningful attribution analysis (see below), in line with Principle 4 of the [Murad Code](#) (“Add Value or Don’t Do It”).

10.3.1 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY REPORTS

The main types of secondary sources used in this report to collect and corroborate reported CRSV incidents included non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international NGOs (INGOs), local and international media outlets and journalists, and human rights defenders – in particular Sudanese, survivor-centred groups providing services to survivors and documenting CRSV on the ground in Sudan.

[CIR](#) has a robust methodology for assessing the reliability and credibility of secondary sources, and only included A-B grade sources in this report. This means all sources are considered highly reliable (“almost always correct” or “usually correct”) and highly credible (“strong reputation for expertise, transparency, and minimal bias” or “good reputation, low bias, and minor factual inconsistencies”).

CIR only used primary source information shared by trusted partners to fill significant data or analytical gaps (see “Identifying sources” above).

10.3.2 PROXY OR “RED FLAGS” INDICATORS

CIR also examined a range of proxy or “red flag” indicators of CRSV in open-source data and secondary reports recognised by the [IICI](#), including:

- Visible genitalia
- The presence of full or partial nudity
- Threats of sexual violence

²⁵ See above on how CIR identified trusted partners who provided supporting closed source data.

- Use of gendered hate speech by armed forces
- Burnt villages or bodies
- Separation of men/boys from women/girls
- Armed occupation of a place or area
- Presence of weapons or strange objects near bodies
- Transfer of gendered populations

10.4 ONLINE NARRATIVES, HATE SPEECH, AND INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE

CIR analysed speech audible in footage, typically by fighters and commanders, to enrich its contextual understanding of what the footage is showing and identify instances of hate speech or incitement to violence. This includes gendered hate speech, a recognised indicator of CRSV, as well as explicit incitement to CRSV. It also includes the use of ethnic or racial slurs, which can indicate the targeting of specific communities on the basis of their identity; this is also recognised as an indicator of CRSV. This analysis was undertaken and reviewed by Sudanese researchers with the required depth of cultural, contextual, and linguistic expertise.

10.5 ATTRIBUTION ANALYSIS

CIR's approach to attribution analysis for CRSV is as follows:

1. Identify commanders in verified footage
2. Map commander presence over time in CRSV hotspots

It is important to note that, due to data limitations, CIR cannot attribute individual responsibility to specific commanders for specific CRSV incidents. Instead, CIR notes patterns of repeated appearances of specific armed groups and commanders in geographic and temporal proximity to reported CRSV incidents.

10.5.1 IDENTIFY COMMANDERS IN VERIFIED FOOTAGE

For this report, CIR visually identified commanders present in footage. All commander sightings are independently verified by two separate analysts to ensure accurate identification.

Where applicable and available, CIR includes supporting information about commanders, such as ranks, positions, and aliases. This is based on official statements by warring parties, as well as contextual audio and visual information in verified footage, for example statements made by fighters or patches visible on their uniform indicating their name and/or rank.

10.5.2 MAP COMMANDER PRESENCE IN CRSV HOTSPOTS

After establishing the “who”, “when”, and “where” elements of footage showing commanders, CIR mapped the verified appearances of commanders in CRSV hotspots. This helps identify individuals who there are reasonable grounds to believe were directly or indirectly responsible for CRSV incidents.

CIR included commanders meeting at least one of the below criteria per hotspot:

- Appeared in geospatial proximity to reported CRSV incidents; and/or
- Appeared in geospatial proximity to CRSV indicators; and/or
- Directly incited CRSV; and/or
- Held senior positions of command in the relevant geographic area and time frame *and* appeared at least once in verified footage during the relevant geographic area and time frame (even if not in close proximity to CRSV incidents or indicators).

In some cases, commanders met more than one of the above inclusion criteria.

10.6 RISKS AND MITIGATIONS

CRSV data is often under-represented and difficult to verify in open sources due to the normalisation of violence, stigma and risks associated with reporting CRSV, occurrence of CRSV in closed environments, differential access to technology, and mis- and dis-information surrounding CRSV claims. Verifiable content is often shared without survivors' consent (for example, by witnesses or perpetrators) and at significant risk to them.

There are also significant risks and ethical considerations for attempting to identify and contact survivors to understand their intent for later use and support their access to services. Finally, there are ethical risks associated with identifying perpetrators of CRSV, and risks of vicarious trauma to researchers analysing primary or secondary material on this topic.

To mitigate these risks, CIR designed a bespoke methodology for documenting and investigating CRSV for this report, in line with the [Murad Code](#). In addition to the measures outlined above, CIR took the following steps to mitigate the risks and challenges of conducting investigations on CRSV:

- Selecting an experienced, women-led, majority-Sudanese, and majority-female research team
- Enforcing strict controls on the participation in, and handling of, CRSV data:
 - Ensuring this was only undertaken by nominated experienced researchers with the appropriate training and experience
 - Segregating audiovisual CRSV data from standard project databases with need-to-know access

- o Only collecting data essential for the research project, in line with CIR's Data Protection Policy
- Taking a flexible methodological approach including macro-analysis of reported CRSV by corroborating with other reliable and verified sources where in-depth investigations on particular incidents are not possible
- Taking a trauma-informed approach to research, including:
 - o Implementing CIR's policies graphic content, vicarious trauma, and report writing, which set out guidance for handling graphic content, appropriate language, and respectful reporting
 - o Regular welfare check-ins with researchers with free access to 24/7 mental health support via CIR's Employee Assistance Program.