A hidden war: Violent extremism rules in the Sahel, and is spreading south

In the central Sahel, violent extremist organisations (VEOs) have solidified their presence in Mali, and are increasingly active in Niger and Burkina Faso. CIR’s investigation indicates these groups have also penetrated further into coastal West Africa. As VEOs battle to consolidate their presence, it is civilians who pay the price.

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Origins of the crisis

Insecurity has mounted since 2012, when separatist groups and Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs) gained rapid ground following a military coup in Mali, plunging the country into crisis. The collapse of state authority in northern Mali created space for VEOs to entrench themselves and expand into neighbouring countries, and what began as a domestic issue in northern Mali quickly evolved into a regional conflict.

While a security vacuum in Mali created the initial opportunity for VEOs to develop and expand, the roots of the broader crisis lay in the regional governments’ decades-long political marginalisation and neglect of peripheral regions and communities, particularly the Arab, Fulbe, and Tuareg populations. Moreover, the conflict spillover from Mali intensified local tensions, especially the dynamics between farmers and herders, as confirmed by research conducted by the Clingendael Institute.

Instability has spilled southward across Mali’s porous borders into Burkina Faso and Niger. The Burkinabe military government, led by President Ibrahim Traore, has conducted frequent, large-scale counter-terrorism operations since coming to power in 2022. However, to date, despite government claims of widespread successes, the state has been unable to make significant progress in securing Burkinabe territory, and has the highest rate of terrorism globally, according to GTI.

While experiencing fewer attacks than Burkina Faso, a similar trend has been observed in Niger, where GTI reported that the country had witnessed a record level of terrorist violence in 2024. Niger appears to be following the same pattern as Burkina Faso, with armed groups, particularly extremist organisations, moving south and east across porous borders from Mali and Burkina Faso into the country.

As the situation escalates, the Al-Qaeda affiliated JNIM has leveraged its strong positions in Burkina Faso and Niger to stage attacks deeper into coastal West Africa. Policymakers and regional stakeholders have voiced growing concerns about this potential spillover of violence from the Sahel, particularly into Benin and Togo, with Togo recording 2024 as its worst year for terrorism since the GTI began in 2012.

CIR has been monitoring the situation closely using open-source research. The following analysis addresses JNIM’s consolidation of control along the southern borders of Burkina Faso and Niger, and the human rights abuses committed as the Sahel conflict expands southwards into Benin and Togo. CIR analysed data from more than two years of conflict and human rights monitoring across the Sahel.

Key players

According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) analysed by CIR, over the past two years, there have been 1,073 security incidents in the areas of focus in Burkina Faso and Niger. Four actors are responsible for most of these incidents: JNIM, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), the Burkina Faso Armed Forces (Forces Armées Burkinabé, FAB), and the Niger Armed Forces (Forces Armées Nigériennes, FAN).

While the majority of security incidents in the target regions have involved VEO attacks against state forces, for example the attack on Diapaga in May 2025, civilians have also been directly impacted. Despite VEO attempts to pitch themselves as “liberators”, they are continuously involved in severe human rights violations (HRVs).

Between 1 May 2023 and 31 March 2025, CIR collected and investigated 110 incidents of HRVs in the Est and Centre-Est regions of Burkina Faso and the Dosso and Tillaberi (100 km from the border with Benin) regions of Niger, in which JNIM has proved to be dominant.

Together, JNIM and ISSP were responsible for 78% of all incidents (86 of 110) and 58% of the civilian fatalities in the target regions between May 2023 and March 2025. Within Burkina Faso and Niger, the Est, Centre-Est, Tillaberi, and Dosso regions experienced the highest number of VEO-related incidents.

Satellite imagery (3-metre, Planet) of Tawori on 1 April 2024 shows new burn marks. They are mostly located around the military camp, with some inside the camp itself, indicating JNIM might have overwhelmed and temporarily occupied it. Some burn scars seem to be situated in the town, away from the army base. This suggests that JNIM also committed acts of violence near civilian structures, aligning with the announced death toll that includes over 30 civilians.

VEO-perpetrated attacks in Centre-Est

On 5 December 2024, five civilians were reportedly killed in a JNIM attack in the village of Garanga, Centre-Est region, on the RN16 road between Bittou and Cikansé. Regional security monitor Wamaps reported on X that market stalls and granaries were set on fire and shared a video showing burnt structures.

CIR’s satellite imagery analysis confirmed that the locality was affected by fire. The video was also geolocated to [11.171797, -0.139843]. Several people wounded in the attack were later evacuated for medical treatment.

Spillover to Benin and Togo

JNIM has used its strong positions in southeastern Burkina Faso and southwestern Niger as staging grounds for attacks deeper into coastal West Africa. One particularly critical location is the W National Park (Park W), which spans the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Benin, and Niger. The park, with its vast forest cover and limited state presence, has become a key hideout and transit zone for JNIM members, according to reporting from the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime.

To date, Benin has been most significantly impacted by the southward shift of insecurity. Over the two-year period, ACLED recorded 220 incidents in Benin, while only 45 were recorded in Togo. CIR assessed that this may be because JNIM is more entrenched and established in the Est Region along the border with Benin than in the Centre-Est along the border with Togo.

Increasing lethality of JNIM attacks in Benin

While JNIM is active throughout Benin’s Alibori and Atakora regions, most of the group’s activity has occurred in the Alibori region, adjacent to Park W.

JNIM has demonstrated an increasing capacity to carry out large-scale attacks on military positions in Benin over the past two years. This is particularly evident over the past six months, when, while the frequency of JNIM’s attacks in Benin remained consistent, their deadliness increased by over 50%.

The two deadliest attacks in the country’s history took place in 2025. On 8 January, JNIM conducted an attack on a Beninese military base in Point Triple in Alibori region, killing at least 28 soldiers, according to RFI reporting. JNIM claimed the attack via its media wing, Az-Zallaqa, on Chirp Wire. CIR’s analysis of videos and imagery released by JNIM confirmed the attack occurred on a military camp less than 0.5 km from the Niger border and only 1.25 km from the Burkina Faso border [11.89810833, 2.41161111]. Satellite imagery showed at least five damaged structures and several large burn scars around the camp between 5 November 2024 and 22 January 2025.

Three months later, on 17 April, JNIM conducted coordinated attacks on Beninese troops in the same area: in Koudou Falls, Point Triple, and on a patrol on the road to Point Triple in Park W, killing at least 54 according to Beninese media outlet, B24 News.

Through these large-scale assaults, JNIM captures key supplies (for example weapons, ammunition, drones, and mortar shells), providing fighters with the material needed to carry out more complex assaults.

JNIM mounts increasing attacks in Togo

According to ACLED data analysed by CIR, from 2023–2024 to 2024–2025, JNIM’s activity in Togo saw a notable surge: the number of recorded attacks rose from 18 to 29, marking approximately a 61% increase in incidents.

While JNIM has demonstrated increasing tactical sophistication in Togo, most notably with the 9 April 2025 suicide drone attack in Djignandjoaga, its operations continue to rely mainly on low-complexity methods as reported by ACLED. The majority of suspected JNIM activity in the first six months of 2025 has involved village raids, infrastructure sabotage, and civilian killings, rather than direct assaults on military positions. However, IEDs and cross-border raids remain a feature of JNIM’s activities. On 20 July 2024, according to Sahel analyst, Wassim Nasr, JNIM attacked a Togolese military position in Kpékankandi, with militants arriving on motorbikes from Burkina Faso. This pattern was most recently observed on 8 June 2025 when Togolese troops repelled an attack, sending attackers retreating into Burkina Faso, according to Togolese media outlet, Republic of Togo. Togolese forces reportedly repelled or neutralised armed elements during these incursions.

The Togolese authorities have taken several steps to respond to security threats. On 13 June 2022, the government declared a state of emergency in the Savanes region of Togo. According to Le Monde, this was a response to the first deadly attack by JNIM against the armed forces in the north of the country. The initial state of emergency was set to last for three months but has since been extended with its most recent adoption on 13 March 2025 justified by the “persistent security threats in northern Togo”.

A troubling trend

The Sahel conflict is undoubtedly spreading southwards into the coastal West African states. More specifically, JNIM has degraded the capabilities of the Nigerien and Burkinabe militaries in southeastern Burkina Faso and southwestern Niger, contributing to a spillover of violence into the northern regions of Benin and Togo.

CIR’s analysis of the central Sahel has revealed a troubling trend: VEOs, notably JNIM, have killed and kidnapped civilians as they consolidate their influence over territory.

In Burkina Faso’s Est region in particular, JNIM appears to be moving away from its typical hit-and-run tactics towards establishing durable control in peripheral regions. CIR assesses that JNIM’s dual strategy of providing services and imposing coercive power has helped the group embed itself within local communities and transform structural grievances into powerful tools for mobilisation.

In Benin, JNIM has demonstrated its ability to carry out complex strategic attacks, while it increasingly stages frequent low-level attacks in Togo. While these incidents do not pose a threat to the stability of either country, the upward trend in the number of lethal attacks in both countries indicates conflict escalation.

Monitoring this conflict remains extremely difficult. The hostile and insecure environment poses significant risks for journalists and researchers, limiting reporting on the ground, and creating challenges in fully assessing the scale of violence. As the Sahel conflict continues to spill into the coastal West African states, there is a growing need for open-source investigations and international media coverage to shed light and increase awareness on the many actors involved in human rights abuses and violations.

*The user-generated content (UGC) at the top of the article emerged online in May 2025, and shows JNIM fighters in Burkina Faso. It has been shared online by multiple social media users and local news outlets, though CIR was unable to determine the original photographer/rights holder.