Holding our digital ground: addressing gendered disinformation during elections and beyond

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CIR explains how gendered disinformation works and provides actionable responses for governments and civil society.

Online abuse risks pushing women out of politics and public life. In a newly developed playbook, CIR explains how gendered disinformation works and provides actionable responses for governments and civil society.

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In what has been described as the “year of elections”, more than 80 countries – or half of the world’s voting population – will have cast ballots in 2024. Women have run for office in some of these contests, but progress toward gender parity in politics is slow. UN Women estimates that equal representation in legislative bodies will not be achieved before 2063.

Along with an array of socio-economic and cultural barriers that make it difficult for women to enter politics, many cite a relentless storm of gendered online harms as a reason for self-censoring, leaving public life, or even not pursuing public-facing positions in the first place.

Gendered disinformation is one of these harms. The Wilson Center describes it as the use of “false or misleading gender and sex-based narratives [deployed] against women, often with some degree of coordination, aimed at deterring women from participating in the public sphere”.

As part of an effort to address gendered disinformation, CIR has developed a playbook on the topic, exploring some of the key narratives and tools used against women online and outlining possible responses for governments and civil society to utilise.

It describes three key themes of gendered disinformation in the context of elections and political processes that are “universal” across information spaces: the objectification of women, sexism, and the reinforcement of traditional gender roles based on social norms and stereotypes.

Common narratives covered in the playbook include speculation about a woman’s fitness for office or commentary on a woman’s reproductive or parental status. It points to the example of former Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin, who in 2022 was a victim of a conspiracy theory that claimed she used cocaine while in office, positioning her as unfit to lead.

Sexualisation is another common tactic used against politically engaged women in an attempt to shame and humiliate them. In posts analysed by CIR’s Afghan Witness project last year, Afghan women were frequently targeted with narratives of prostitution and promiscuity. In some cases, they were sent sexually explicit photographs and threatened with sexual assault, rape, and death.

To carry out online gendered disinformation campaigns, actors turn to tools such as fake accounts, generative AI and manipulated imagery. In some cases, attacks are taken offline through techniques such as SWATting – when someone calls in a false, violent threat such as a bomb threat to a target’s home or place of employment – the leaking of personal details, known as doxxing, and strategic litigation or “lawfare”.

Women on the frontlines of democratic movements are often some of the earliest targets, the playbook notes. In 2023, an investigation by CIR’s Myanmar Witness team revealed that women in Myanmar faced a deluge of gendered and sexualised disinformation when expressing their political views online. In 50% of posts analysed, women who opposed the State Administration Council (SAC) were doxxed, with researchers finding some evidence of coordination among and between online abusers and Myanmar security forces to facilitate violence and arrests.

Experts point out that the use of gendered disinformation is not just a gender equality issue, but a national security threat. Multiple investigations and studies have detailed how the tactic is used by authoritarian states such as Russia, China and Iran against opposition figures and democratic activists.

Female journalists, activists and public figures have been targeted by hack and leak operations using spyware tools, with numerous women speaking out about how their private photographs were shared on social media in what they describe as government efforts to intimidate and silence them.

In other instances, women have been targeted by edited or manipulated imagery. Those that are crudely or overtly edited are known as “cheap fakes”, and, while less sophisticated than generative AI, they still attempt to mislead the public and discredit women. In 2022, the face of a BBC Persia journalist was photoshopped onto a pornographic image and shared with her 14-year-old son in a bid to blackmail her. And in 2023, Ukrainian First Lady Olena Zelenska was edited into an image to make it appear as if she was sunbathing topless in Israel.

The playbook provides a reference point for how gendered disinformation operates, offering real-world case studies to illustrate key aspects of the problem, and outlining possible responses for governments and civil society to utilise. It explains why gendered disinformation cannot be narrowly viewed as a “women’s issue” but instead should be understood and addressed within the fabric of broader democratic and national security activities.

‘Holding our digital ground: A playbook to mitigate gendered disinformation during elections and beyond’ is available to read and download, below:

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