EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Russia’s A7 network appears to have taken a significant and concerning new step: open-source evidence suggests A7 is offering cross-border payment services to unwitting international customers through at least one possible front company without disclosing any connection to A7 or to Russia. A7 also appears to be using unknowing third-party service providers to facilitate its operations.
Key Findings:
- A7 International was publicly launched by A7 on 13 October 2026 as a cross-border payments service targeting non-Russian users. It offers USDT-to-fiat transfer via the SWIFT system.
- Two further payment platforms appear to run a version of the same bespoke AI-enabled payment system as A7 International. Amani AI is operated by a company claiming to be wholly owned by the government of Togo. Qbanq is operated by a New Zealand-registered company. An additional two linked payment projects appear to be in development but not publicly operational.
- There is evidence linking these payment platforms to Russian software developers who appear to have worked for A7: The bespoke AI-enabled payments system appears to have been developed by True Code and Backend, two Russian software companies owned by the same individual, Artem Shelengovskiy. Domain registration records and the companies’ own subdomains indicate they have worked on A7 products since at least May 2025.
- There are multiple technical indicators linking A7 International, Amani AI, and Qbanq: These include mirrored website structures (including distinctive shared subdomains); near-identical technical documentation carrying the internal project name “A7T”; near-identical user interfaces, each with an “AI Concierge” chatbot; and server addresses shared only by Backend and the payment projects. No single indicator is conclusive, but together the weight of evidence that these sites are technically connected is very strong.
- Further evidence links Amani AI to A7: The website of Amani AI’s stated operator, Maison du Commerce du Togo, was registered using details previously used for A7’s infrastructure and linked to a house owned by Ilan Shor. It shares its security certificate with the website of a known A7 shell company. An individual with the same name as a lawyer at Pilot Finance, a Nigerian company sanctioned by the UK and Ukraine for its ties to A7 Nigeria, appears to have authored Amani AI’s Terms of Use. Amani AI is also linked to a Kyrgyz company, Luverta Trade.
- API specifications further link Amani AI and Finance-bot.dev to Qbanq.nz: API specifications for amani.bot, qbanq.nz, and finance-bot.dev mutually reference both Amani AI and Qbanq. For example, Qbanq’s API appears to utilise references to Amani AI’s Bank Directory, while Amani AI uses ‘qbnq’ and “Qbank” as masked rail codes, among multiple other such examples. The sites appear to be actively maintained at the same time. This appears to reflect a strong connection between the platforms at the technical level. When contacted by the Financial Times, the owner of Qbanq Limited denied any knowledge of A7 or these technical connections, stating that the platform has been built by third-party contractors.
- Amani AI targets users in Africa, Asia, the UAE, and Brazil: Nine websites funnel businesses in Nigeria, Ghana, the UAE, India, the Philippines, and Brazil towards Amani AI, again without mentioning A7 or Russia. This mirrors public announcements that A7 has made about its intended geographical expansion.
- The platforms are reliant upon third-party services: This includes a network of largely unknown payment service providers that funnel payments via the fiat banking system. CIR has also found the names, although not the definitive identities, of several providers. These third-party providers may be unaware of A7’s apparent use of their services.
- The possible purpose for using international payment platforms is to develop a source of ‘clean’ USDT for A7: A7 makes heavy use of USDT in its operations. However, USDT, which has been publicly linked to A7, Russia, or other entities associated with sanctioned activities, is at risk of being frozen by Tether. One motive behind the use of A7 International and Amani AI may be to develop a reliable source of ‘clean’ USDT from customers with no link to Russia, which can then be used in A7’s operations (notably, as of 15 October 2026, neither allowed payouts to Russia itself). It is not possible from the open-source evidence to determine the motive for building Qbanq based on the same technology.
- If this motive is correct, this marks a worrying escalation: it would suggest that A7 has moved from supplying knowing Russian clients to targeting businesses and individuals in other countries into unwittingly supplying liquidity to A7’s wider scheme.
Implications and Response
- Need for increased vigilance: A7’s use of covert tactics such as shell companies is not new, but the possible creation of fully fledged front entities that conceal their links to Russia and target international customers reflects the need for ongoing monitoring of A7’s expanding activities and tactics.
- Cross-border cooperation essential to tackling cross-border risk: The cross-border, decentralised nature of this network underlines the importance of regulators, law enforcement, and governments, especially in the targeted regions, sharing information and raising collective awareness of A7’s methods.
- An important role for cryptocurrency companies: Because USDT remains central to A7’s operations, Tether in particular may have an important role to play alongside law enforcement. Other cryptocurrency exchanges and services could also contribute.
- Tracking A7’s use of technical enablers and the private sector: A7 still depends on Western payment providers, fintechs, AI companies, software tools and other businesses, who are possibly unwittingly enabling A7 operations. Identifying these entities and preventing that facilitation could significantly impact A7 operations.
- Enhanced public awareness increases resilience: Increasing public awareness about A7 and its tactics, especially among users of cross-border payment services, could help to combat their expansion and prevent any exploitation of unwitting customers looking for international payment services. This includes developing an understanding of potential red flags to be wary of.
Points of Note
A7 has stated in previous public statements that it was created to ensure uninterrupted settlements for the Russian market, against which illegal restrictive measures have been imposed. It has also stated that it serves third countries not related to sanctions, providing legal export-import operations with consumer goods and raw materials. It has stated that it operates a modern multi-level compliance system, and all clients undergo screening that makes it possible to identify risks and excludes the servicing of individuals and organisations whose activities violate requirements.
When contacted by the Financial Times in connection with this report, the owner and registered Director of Qbanq denied any knowledge of A7 or awareness of his platform’s deep technical connections to Amani AI. He stated that the Qbanq.nz platform has been built for him by subcontractors contacted through an associate in New Zealand, with whom he had not dealt directly, and that he was unaware of whether they have any connections to Russia.
CIR did not attempt to send any payments via the platforms discussed in this investigation.
Nothing in this report is intended to allege, and it should not be read as alleging dishonesty, wrongdoing, or improper conduct by any individual or organisation, save as expressly stated and based on the evidence identified.