Candlelight protest turns deadly: paramotor attack in Sagaing

WARNING: This article contains graphic information and imagery. While efforts have been made to blur details, the investigation includes information that some readers may find distressing.

UPDATED ON 21 OCTOBER 2025

A reported paramotor incident struck a candlelight event in Bon To village, causing multiple fatalities, injuries and damage to homes and a school.

On the evening of 6 October 2025, the Monywa town-based Northwestern Regional Military Command, a key unit of Myanmar’s armed forces, reportedly conducted an airstrike in Bon To village (ဘုံတို), Chaung-U Township (ချောင်းဦးမြို့နယ်), Sagaing Region (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး). The reported incident coincided with the Thadingyut Full Moon Day, when residents from Bon To village and nearby communities had reportedly gathered near the village school to take part in a candlelight event.

At around 20:00 local time, two alleged paramotors reportedly dropped two 120mm bombs on the crowd. According to local media outlet Red Peacock, a second strike occurred around 23:00, while people were reportedly assisting those injured from the first attack.

Regarding casualties, the National Unity Government’s Ministry of Human Rights reported 19 deaths, including three children and two women, and 40 injuries. Local reports indicate the death toll has risen in the days following the incident.

This candlelight event was reportedly part of a nationwide candlelight protest held on 6 October, calling for the release of political prisoners, and rejecting Myanmar’s conscription law and planned elections.

Before this investigation, since 25 December 2024, Myanmar Witness had documented 78 reports of incidents involving paramotors

Investigation

Geolocation

Myanmar Witness identified and geolocated several media-reported videos that show damage in Bon To village. Through cross-referencing multiple sources, including footage uploaded by Mandalay Free Press and Upper Burma News Agency, the location of the footage was verified at coordinates [21.964376, 95.173408] (figure 1).

Myanmar Witness analysed two videos uploaded by Upper Burma News Agency, which reportedly show clips of the candlelight event held in Bon To village before and after the reported incident. The analysis identified two significant matchings: the school building and its entrance, visible in both the ‘before’ and ‘after’ footage (figure 2). Despite low visibility at night, Myanmar Witness concluded that the gathering likely took place at the same location as the reported attack.

Myanmar Witness reviewed additional imagery and footage reportedly showing the aftermath of the incident to try to confirm the timing and location of the attack. Footage from TRT World, [WARNING: GRAPHIC] Red Peacock and Khit Thit Media, uploaded on the day of the reported incident and in the following days, illustrates the same area (see figure 3). In the nighttime footage reportedly captured during the incident, there are visible signs of casualties and fires that can be observed. In addition, there is a damaged school building visible in one of the videos, and this is consistent with the previously geolocated structure. 

Further footage depicts a red vehicle, which can be visible in both nighttime and daytime material uploaded by TRT World. This suggests that the vehicle was present at the scene during and after the reported incident. In the close-up footage, a casualty is visible near what appears to be the same red vehicle (figure 4). Not only does this support the assessment that the footage depicts the same location, but it also suggests the likelihood that casualties occurred as a result of the reported incident. 

Based on the visual alignment, cross-referencing of these sources, and the geolocated building, Myanmar Witness assesses with high confidence that the reported attack took place at night in Bon To village at the coordinates [21.964376, 95.173408] and this resulted in observable damage and casualties.

Chronolocation

The date of the incident has not been independently confirmed as of yet. However, the footage of the casualties and damages observed first appeared on 7 October 2025, and the timestamps on several images from People’s Spring show that they were taken around 15:00 hours local time on 8 October 2025. These are consistent with the alleged date of the incident, 6 October 2025.

Was the damaged building a school?

Myanmar Witness analysed user-generated content (UGC) to identify the damaged structure in Bon To village, as observed in footage following the reported incident. 

Multiple features visible in the footage strongly indicate that the damaged building is a school. These include a signpost reading “The Ministry of Education, Basic Education Primary School, Bon To Village, Chaung-U Township,” as well as interior details such as classroom layouts, benches and desks, which are all consistent with typical school furnishings (figure 5 and 6). 

With these findings, Myanmar Witness assesses that the reported attack in Bon To village resulted in damage to civilian infrastructure, specifically a school. 

 Casualties

Myanmar Witness analysed and documented UGC uploaded by [WARNING: GRAPHIC] Red Peacock News and other social media accounts (private source) to identify casualties from the reported incident. Fourteen figures were logged, and it was reported that the majority of the casualties were attending the protest. 

The National Unity Government’s [WARNING: GRAPHIC] Ministry of Human Rights claimed that a total of 19 people died as a result of the attack. These included:

• Fourteen men (four of them were reportedly leading the protest)
• Three children (two boys and one girl) and, 
• Two women 

The footage analysed depicts graphic injuries and fatalities. According to the [WARNING: GRAPHIC] Ministry of Human Rights, the reported attack also injured 40 people, 20 of whom were children, 13 were men, and seven were women. 

However, Mandalay Free Press stated that over 20 people had died on the day of the reported attack, and on the following day (7 October), the death toll had risen to over 40 people

In addition, as part of the death toll, Maun News (မောင်း) reported that several individuals from the Sagaing Region strike force, We are People Relief and Rescue Team, Monywa-Amyint Road Strike Leading Committee, and members from the People Defence Force (PDF) based in Monywa and Chaung U were killed in the incident. 

Myanmar Witness analysed one of the videos depicting the deceased bodies, and one clip showing a deceased individual appearing to show some resemblance to one of the individuals Maun News reported was killed. However, further verification is required to confirm this. 

As a result of the death toll reportedly increasing, Myanmar Witness cannot independently identify the number of casualties and fatalities. In addition, as a result of limitations in UGC, Myanmar Witness was not able to verify the cause of death and whether the deceased individuals observed were killed as a result of a paramotor attack. 

Actors

The actors allegedly responsible for the incident could not be confirmed, although reports suggest that the Myanmar military was involved. 

The National Unity Government’s [GRAPHIC] Ministry of Human Rights attributed the attack to the Northwestern Regional Military Command of the Myanmar Military, allegedly using a paramotor. 

On 9 October 2025, local and international news reported a statement released by the Myanmar military addressing the Bon To village incident. The statement did not directly acknowledge responsibility for the airstrike and instead stated that their forces had conducted a counter-terrorism operation in the area. It claimed that the local People’s Defence Forces (PDF) used civilians from the village as human shields during the reported attack. Additionally, the military alleged that the PDF forced individuals to gather and participate in the candlelight protest.

This absence of acknowledgement of the airstrike in the military’s account highlights the uncertainty regarding the attribution of responsibility. While the National Unity Government’s Ministry of Human Rights points to the Myanmar military as the likely perpetrator, the military’s own statement frames their actions as a legitimate security operation. Without independent verification, it also remains unclear whether this reported attack was a deliberate target.

Remnants

Myanmar Now published a video, purportedly showing scenes recorded after the attack. Myanmar Witness has identified several remnants originally belonging to mortar rounds. Figure 8 (top) shows two recovered fragments of mortar rounds, specifically the tail booms and tail fins, while figure 8 (bottom) shows a separate mortar round’s tail fin. 

Myanmar Witness is unable to determine with certainty the make, model and calibre of the original ordnance here identified. However, the employment of this type of ammunition is consistent with that observed in other paramotor attacks previously documented and analysed by Myanmar Witness. 

Was the candlelight event a protest?

Online sources gathered and analysed by Myanmar Witness, including media outlets such as Mandalay Free Press, [WARNING: GRAPHIC] Red Peacock, as well as UGC (private source), have reported that the attack was carried out during the protest. The posts from social media channels unanimously claiming that the incident took place during a protest significantly strengthen the claim. 

Upper Burma News Agency’s video shows gathered people holding candles and chanting protest songs. It’s a tradition in Myanmar that such events as these are held during the Myanmar Full Moon Day and are typically hosted in religious compounds such as Pagodas. The place where the attack happened is near a constructed religious building or likely monastery (see figure 9). Therefore, Myanmar Witness considers it highly likely that a protest was taking place when the attack occurred and that it took place close to the religious compound.

Was the candelight festival a military target?

Myanmar Witness examined the available material to assess whether the reported incident specifically targeted the candlelight protest. 

While Myanmar Witness could not independently confirm the nature of the candlelight event or its participants, reports from the Mandalay Free Press included local accounts claiming that those injured and killed in the airstrike included residents, members of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), protest participants and PDF members from Bon To village and its nearby communities. 

Given these claims, it is possible to suggest that the candlelight event may have been perceived as linked to anti-military groups and thus could have been specifically targeted. The Myanmar Air Force (MAF) has reportedly conducted similar incidents on gatherings of civilians, perceived to be resistance-aligned, which Myanmar Witness has investigated, such as the airstrike on a wedding in Mingin in June 2024.

Following the reported paramotor strike, alternative narratives in support of the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) (formerly State Administration Council (SAC)), appeared online seeking to justify the incident. 

Pro-SSPC Channels

1. Pro-SSPC channels, such as မှိုင်းဝေ on Telegram, acknowledged that such an event had happened and resulted in many fatalities (figure 10)
2. မှိုင်းဝေ channel uploaded another post that implied that a civilian reportedly under the local PDF’s control had informed the SSPC about the planned gathering (figure 10)
3. That same channel encouraged that there should have been even stronger attacks with 10 bombs, rather than just two 
4. မှိုင်းဝေ further claimed that the people killed in the incident were all members of the PDF, and therefore, the attack was justified as it was a military target
5. Another Telegram channel, Kyaw Swar, which has over 180,000 subscribers, claimed that the candlelight event took place in an area known for clashes between the PDF and the Myanmar military 
6. Finally, another channel, ဘညွန့်, doxxed people who wished well those who suffered as a result of the incident 

These claims suggest that the channels are trying to divert the direction of blame away from the military by framing the civilian deaths as legitimate and necessary within a counter-terrorism operation. 

This type of framing shapes the online information environment, making independent verification harder. This also shows how pro-military information ecosystems are working to justify civilian harm. 

While these pro-SSPC Telegram channels framed all those killed in the incident as belonging to the PDF, the [GRAPHIC] Burma Liberation Democratic Front claimed otherwise. They stated that, along with some PDF members, more than 22 civilians, including children, were reportedly killed in the Bon To village attack. 

Myanmar Witness analysed the UGC that supports this claim. Among the deceased observed, there was a corpse resembling that of a young girl. In addition, the Upper Burma News Agency’s video includes scenes of the reported candlelight protest, showing people of different ages, including young children, holding lanterns, singing songs and walking quietly. 

Given the presence of children and individuals of varying ages captured in available UGC, Myanmar Witness assesses that it is highly likely that some of those who were killed were civilians rather than members of the PDF.

Doxxing

Since the coup in 2021, instances of doxxing have become a recurring feature of the pro-SSPC online information environment. 

There have been multiple occasions where pro-SSPC Telegram channels published details or shared unverified claims about events involving the military and its operations. For example, after an airstrike on a school in Oe Htein Kwin (North) (အိုးထိမ်းကွင်း (မြောက်)), Tabayin (ဒီပဲယင်း) Township, Sagaing Region [22.65184975, 95.20942688] on 12 May 2025, several channels disseminated narratives asserting that the operation was justified as the school was being used for bomb-making. Regarding these claims, imagery of the alleged production site does not match any UGC of the stricken school, making this claim highly unlikely. 

Additionally, Myanmar Witness has previously reported on the use of doxxing as an influence tool by pro-SSPC Telegram channels in its Pro-SAC Digital Offensive report.

This trend highlights how, since the coup, doxxing has become an influential method of reinforcing official messaging, legitimising the use of force and directing narratives that align with SSPC interests.