Myanmar military election Phase 2: Conflict persists, and key states remain excluded from voting

With the final stage of voting just around the corner, incidents recorded during Phase 2 of Myanmar’s military-led elections reinforce that the military’s definition of “stable” voting areas is relative, not absolute.

While fewer incidents may have been documented than in Phase 1 (28 December 2025), it is evident that where townships are officially cleared for voting, conflict continues to shape who can participate. Ongoing airstrikes, paramotor surveillance, fires and casualties indicate that safety remains uneven and several states (especially those that are ethnically diverse) remain largely excluded from voting. 

This is Myanmar’s first election process since the 2021 military coup, and is being referred to as the ‘2025 Multi-Party Democratic General Election’. Phase 1 of the voting process began on 28 December 2025, Phase 2 on 11 January 2026, and Phase 3 will start on 25 January 2026. The areas where voting is permitted have been limited to townships officially designated as “stable” by Myanmar’s military authority. 

Since the announcement of the election in August 2025, Myanmar Witness has been monitoring and assessing whether townships selected for Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the election are, in practice, free from recent conflict incidents.

Myanmar Witness had identified and documented 94 conflict-related incidents in the townships designated as active and “stable” places of voting in Phase 1 of the elections. This article builds on that previous work. Regarding Phase 2, Myanmar Witness has identified and documented 52 conflict-related incidents in the townships outlined as active and “stable”. 

Of the 100 townships permitted to vote on 11 January 2026, Myanmar Witness identified that 12 townships experienced at least one conflict-related incident in the four months from when the election period was announced (August 2025 – November 2025).

On 17 January 2026,  the Union Election Commission announced that the military-supported Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won 52 out of 78 seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw parliament (House of Nationalities) and 175 seats out of 202 seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) after two rounds of voting were held in 202 of Myanmar’s 330 townships. 

Overall, these findings raise concerns about voters’ safety, access, and the credibility of the electoral process, as well as the areas described as “stable” in Myanmar.

Background and Context

After the two phases of voting in 202 of Myanmar’s 330 townships, the USDP leads the election by a wide margin. As in previous systems, 25 per cent (%) of parliamentary seats are reserved for military-appointed representatives, limiting the proportion of seats open to popular vote. 

The elections are taking place amid intensified violence, as well as intimidation and arbitrary arrests, particularly under the newly enacted ‘Election Protection Act’ that carries long sentencing terms and the death penalty. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Volker Türk, highlighted that these conditions leave little space for free or meaningful participation in these elections. 

Although Phase 2 was built on Phase 1 by allowing 100 additional townships to vote, voting was still restricted in townships classified as a security risk.

Official results for the entire election cycle are expected to be published by the end of January 2026, after Phase 3, which covers the final 63 constituencies, commences on 25 January 2026. 

To Note:  The list of townships participating in each phase was taken from English publications on Myanmar government websites and the Global New Light of Myanmar (GNLM), state-run media. Several inconsistencies were found and corrected by cross-referencing with the Data 4 Myanmar map.

Conflict incidents in Phase 2 voting areas

Myanmar Witness recorded 52 incidents across the voting townships involved in Phase 2 of the election. Within the studied timeframe, 12 of the 100 “stable” Phase 2 townships reported at least one conflict-related incident. Compared with Phase 1, these incidents were less frequently clustered within the same townships.

Analysis by State:

Myanmar Witness’s analysis shows that some states and regions, including Yangon, Shan, Mon and Ayerwaddy, had no Phase 2 townships with recorded incidents. In contrast, states that did record incidents experienced more than one, indicating that insecurity is uneven and concentrated in certain areas. This further supports the varied and complex security conditions across areas designated as “stable” for voting.

Several states did not participate in Phase 2 at all. Nay Pyi Taw had no townships voting, as all were included in Phase 1. Similarly, Chin and Rakhine were fully covered in Phase 1, despite Phase 1 including fewer than 25% of townships, leaving more than 75% of their townships excluded from the electoral process. In contrast, Mon State was fully included by this stage of the elections and recorded no conflict-related incidents.

Sagaing, a region with a long-standing record of conflict dynamics since the coup, had three townships affected by conflict-related incidents, with eleven incidents recorded between them.

Moreover, the graph below illustrates the ranking of states and regions by the number of townships included in Phase 1 [grey], Phase 2 [orange], and Phase 3 [red]. This analysis highlights the uneven inclusion between states and shows which ones were largely excluded from the overall electoral process.

Alongside documented conflict-related incidents across states and regions, the table below shows Phase 2 townships’ inclusion, highlighting significant variation in both participation and security challenges. A full breakdown is available upon request. 

Myanmar Witness’s documentation of recorded incidents across states and regions with both high and low Phase 2 inclusion, as reflected above, suggests that the designation of “stable” townships is a relative assessment rather than the absence of recent conflict, as some townships are still experiencing incidents of conflict.

Analysis by theme:

Airstrikes

Myanmar Witness recorded airstrikes in eight townships that were selected for Phase 2 between August and November 2025. Even isolated airstrikes can cultivate a pervasive climate of fear and discourage civilians from gathering publicly, travelling, or participating in religious or educational activities. In this context, the continued risk of airstrikes suggests that participation may be nominal rather than substantive, with residents prioritising personal safety over electoral engagement.

Paramotors

In 2025, paramotors became a more widely cited part of the conflict in Myanmar, and seem primarily to be used by the Myanmar military. Paramotor-related incidents were recorded in six townships selected for Phase 2 of the voting process. The presence or suspected presence of paramotors may further constrain political participation by increasing insecurity and fear, limiting civilians’ willingness or ability to travel, including to vote. For many voters, especially in rural areas, the risks associated with movement under aerial threat may outweigh the perceived benefits of participating in the electoral process, particularly where political participation has already been restricted in the period leading up to elections.

Fires

Fires were recorded in six townships that were selected for Phase 2 of the election. Fire incidents resulting from either military operations or armed clashes affect homes and livelihoods in Myanmar. These incident types can disrupt community cohesion, displace residents, and result in the loss of documentation necessary for voter registration and participation in the electoral process. In Phase 2, township residents who experienced such incidents may be discouraged from political engagements as a result of their lived realities, reducing not only public confidence in the legitimacy and relevance of the process but also their administrative ability to engage.

Casualties

Myanmar Witness recorded incidents involving casualties in nine townships selected for Phase 2. Injury and death linked to conflict-related harm further suppress political participation and reinforce fear in communities already affected by instability and the ongoing conflict.

Conclusion

Myanmar Witness documented 52 conflict-related incidents in townships designated as “stable” places of voting in Phase 2 of the elections, challenging the military’s narrative of safe electoral spaces. Over 75% of townships in Chin and Rakhine were excluded from local voting, highlighting clear restrictions in the more ethnically diverse states. Even if Phase 2 townships were intended as safer areas for later participation, the recorded incidents suggest that safety is relative rather than absolute. 

The persistence of airstrikes, paramotor presence, fires and casualties indicates that political participation in these areas is shaped by fear and insecurity rather than genuine choice. Phase 2 participation should not be interpreted as evidence of broad political stability or inclusive democratic engagement; uneven inclusion of townships and ongoing conflict incidents raise serious concerns about the inclusiveness, safety, and credibility of Myanmar’s military-led elections.