Conflict, displacement, and infrastructure damage across South Kordofan

Content warning: This report contains links to graphic footage and descriptions of violence

As the RSF continues its eastward advance through central Sudan, CIR has been tracking and verifying conflict activity across South Kordofan throughout March and April 2026. Using satellite data and verified footage, CIR documented evidence of conflict activity near civilian infrastructure in Dilling and Al Hamadi, including by a hospital, university, and major water reservoir.

Key findings

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been conducting a sustained eastward expansion through central Sudan since taking full control of Darfur in October 2025. This report covers verified conflict activity in Dilling, South Kordofan, and Al Hamadi — a town northeast of Dilling approximately 5 kilometres (km) from the North Kordofan border — where reports of increased fighting have emerged in recent weeks. Al Jazeera reported both locations to be under Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) control as of January 2026.

• CIR verified the presence of fighters in RSF uniforms in and around Dilling on 19 March, and fighters in SAF uniform in the centre of the city on 6 April. CIR also verified the presence of both RSF and SAF forces in Al Hamadi on 18 April, located northeast of Dilling on the main route toward the North Kordofan border and the regional capital, El Obeid.
• CIR observed evidence of conflict activity in the vicinity of civilian infrastructure across Dilling between 1 March and 16 April. Satellite analysis confirmed burn scars near residential areas, Dilling University, the military hospital, and the city’s water reservoir. CIR could not confirm the extent of damage to infrastructure based on available data, but analysis suggests these burn scars are linked to repeated shelling near civilian infrastructure.
• Just over a week later, on 18 April, CIR verified the presence of both RSF and SAF in Al Hamadi. Geolocated footage confirms a significant build-up of military vehicles and intense fighting on the main road through the city.
• CIR confirmed large-scale fires across Al Hamadi on 18 April, corroborating reports of armed clashes in the area. NASA FIRMS detected at least 70 heat signatures in and around the city, with Planet satellite imagery from 17 and 19 April confirming burn scars in the vicinity of residential areas — both an indicator and a driver of civilian displacement.
• Both the RSF and SAF made competing claims about who had control of Al Hamadi following the clashes on 18 April. CIR verified the presence of fighters in RSF affiliated uniforms in central Al Hamadi on 19 April, however, contradicting SAF claims that the RSF had retreated from the area.
• CIR is unable to confirm who controls Dilling or Al Hamadi at the time of writing, and therefore the extent to which the RSF has made further inroads into the Kordofan region.
• Over 100 civilians were killed in Dilling between February 2026 and 20 April, according to Radio Dabanga, with more than 50,000 at acute risk. The United Nations International Organisation for Migration’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM DTM) recorded over 88,000 displaced from Kordofan between October 2025 and January 2026, before the clashes in March and April, 37% of whom originated from South Kordofan.

RSF eastward advance

The ongoing fighting across Kordofan is the latest phase of the RSF’s sustained eastward advance across Sudan following the RSF takeover of El Fasher in October 2025, which granted the group control over all five of Sudan’s Darfur states. CIR reported on the RSF takeover of Babanusa on 1 December 2025, which marked an inflection point, opening routes further east into the Kordofan heartland, as reported on by Sudan Witness in January 2026. Babanusa is a strategically significant city in West Kordofan due to its roads leading south towards Heglig and the South Sudan border.

In the weeks that followed, the RSF continued to push east through South Kordofan. Radio Dabanga reported on 3 March that the RSF had engaged in sporadic clashes around Al Kuwayk and Kadugli, indicating an expanding front line across the region ahead of the fighting in Dilling and Al Hamadi documented in this report. CIR verified the presence of fighters in both RSF and SAF uniforms across South Kordofan in March and April 2026, including in Dilling, Al Hamadi, Kazgil, Dubeibat, and Shawaya.

The RSF’s continued eastward advance toward and into Dilling, South Kordofan, and the subsequent northward spread of fighting toward the North Kordofan border, represents a sustained effort to consolidate territorial control across central Sudan.

Dilling: systematic damage occurring near civilian infrastructure

Armed actor presence

Since the SAF broke the siege on Dilling in January 2026, as reported by Al Jazeera, fighting between the SAF and RSF has continued in the region. The RSF is reportedly being supported by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North (SPLM-N), according to Sudan Tribune on 28 March. CIR verified the presence of combatants in SAF-affiliated uniforms in the city and RSF-affiliated uniforms on the outskirts of the city in March and April 2026.

On 19 March, a pro-RSF Telegram channel shared a video showing men in uniform, commonly worn by RSF fighters, at the Petrolins Crude Oil (PETCO) site in Dilling, confirming an established RSF foothold close to the city.

CIR also verified two videos posted on 6 April on a pro-SAF Telegram channel showing military vehicles driving through Dilling. One video, shared on Telegram on 6 April, showed soldiers celebrating on the outskirts of Dilling. The other video, also posted to Telegram, shows what appear to be the same SAF vehicles as seen in the first video reaching the centre of the city.

Evidence of conflict activity

CIR identified burn scars appearing in the vicinity of civilian infrastructure across Dilling between 1 March and 16 April 2026, including residential areas, healthcare facilities, educational institutions, and the city’s primary water supply. CIR is unable to verify the cause of these burn scars, and fires spread easily during this time of the year. However, the changes observed on satellite imagery are consistent with conflict activity seen in other areas of Sudan during the conflict.

Burn scars consistent with conflict activity appear on Planet satellite imagery across residential neighbourhoods on the western side of Dilling between 1 and 30 March, in the city centre on 14 March, in southern Dilling between 25 and 28 March, and in two further southern areas between 12 and 13 April and 14 and 16 April (figure 2). By 14 April, burn scars also appear in residential areas in northern Dilling.

The burn scars observed extend beyond residential areas toward essential infrastructure. CIR analysis of Planet satellite imagery from 1 to 5 March confirmed the development of burn scars next to buildings and on the perimeter of Dilling University, on the northern edge of the city. Burn scars were also observed near the Dilling military hospital, visible in Planet satellite imagery from 1 to 12 March, and near the Dilling reservoir, the city’s primary water infrastructure, between 14 and 23 April, as seen in Planet satellite imagery (figure 3).

Conflict on the Kordofan border

Verified clashes at Al Hamadi

Shortly following the reports and indicators of fighting between RSF and SAF forces in Dilling, CIR documented evidence of clashes further to the north in Al Hamadi, on the border of South and North Kordofan. CIR verified the presence of soldiers in both RSF and SAF uniforms in Al Hamadi, South Kordofan, located approximately 5km from the North Kordofan border. CIR verified three videos showing fighting active fighting and the aftermath of combat claimed to be in Al Hamadi. One video posted to a pro-RSF Telegram channel on 18 April was filmed on the main road running through Al Hamadi and shows a build-up of military vehicles accompanied by intense gunfire (figure 4). CIR assessed that the footage was most likely filmed on to 18 April, by corroborating smoke plumes seen in the distance with heat signatures detected by NASA FIRMS on the same day.

Both the RSF and SAF issued competing claims about the outcome of the fighting. On 18 April, the SAF stated via their official Facebook page that they had successfully destroyed RSF elements in Al Hamadi, Kazgil, Dubeibat, and Shawaya. The RSF, in a video statement posted to their official Telegram channel on the same day, instead claimed to have repelled a SAF attack in Al Hamadi and Kazgil, reporting over 500 SAF deaths and the seizure of 85 military vehicles.

CIR verified footage contracting SAF-linked claims of an RSF retreat, however. A video posted by Sudan War Updates on 19 April, was geolocated by CIR to a building in central Al Hamadi adjacent to the main road. The footage was likely filmed on 19 April, as the speaker explicitly states, “today is the 19th of April,” while addressing events in Al Hamadi.  In the footage, an armed man wearing a beige camouflage uniform appears to identify with the RSF, as he mentions the “Commander-in-Chief” and “second commander”, in apparent references to RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”) and RSF Deputy Commander Abdulrahim Dagalo.

including commanders and drone units, praising their role in the previous day’s fighting. The speaker states that RSF soldiers from Groups 117 remain inside Al Hamadi and had not withdrawn, adding that they are still present in the area. He also references casualties among Groups 115, 117, and 456, praising those killed, wounded, or captured during the clashes. Repeated statements that “their mothers gave birth to them” appear to be an expression commending their bravery. The footage contradicts SAF-linked claims that RSF elements had withdrawn from Al Hamadi following recent engagements.

CIR could not confirm who currently controls the town at the time of writing. However, the scale and intensity of recent fighting in and around the area is consistent with available satellite imagery showing indicators of active conflict.

Evidence of large-scale fires

CIR analysis of satellite imagery confirms that widespread fires broke out across Al Hamadi during the period of reported fighting, further corroborating the reported clashes and verified appearances of combatants. The burn scars visible on imagery are similar to those appearing in Dilling and other locations in Sudan at times of reported conflict, showing a pattern of repeated damage to and nearby civilian infrastructure. NASA FIRMS data from 18 April showed at least 70 heat signatures in and around Al Hamadi, with a further two east of Al Dubeibat, consistent with large fires (figure 5). CIR is unable to verify the cause of these burn scars at the time of writing, and fires spread easily during this time of the year. However, the spread of heat signatures detected at the same time in different locations, corroborated with reports of conflict activity, is consistent with the aftermath of repeated shelling. This indicates conflict activity and shelling near civilian infrastructure.

Comparative analysis of Planet satellite imagery from 17 and 19 April confirms the development of widespread burn scars in and around Al Hamadi following the fighting (figure 6). Further analysis of Planet satellite imagery shows burn scars appearing over a residential neighbourhood in the northeast of the city (figure 7).

Humanitarian outlook

The consequences for Dilling’s civilian population are severe. On 20 April, Radio Dabanga, an independent local news outlet, reported that over 100 civilians had been killed in the city since February 2026 as a result of indiscriminate shelling and airstrikes on residential neighbourhoods. The same report indicated that over 50,000 civilians remained at acute risk, with significantly restricted access to food and humanitarian aid. Additionally, the Sudan Tribune, an independent Sudanese news outlet, reported on 22 April that the SAF had returned to deploying manned aircraft over the area, marking a significant shift from the drone operations that had characterised recent weeks. At the time of writing, CIR is unable to independently verify SAF airstrikes in the area.

As of 9 January, the cumulative impact of armed conflict across the Kordofan region represented one of the most acute humanitarian crises in Sudan, according to the World Health Organisation (WHO). The IOM DTM reported that over 88,000 people were displaced from Kordofan between October 2025 and January 2026, with 37% of that figure originating from South Kordofan. That figure is likely to have increased in the context of continued clashes and damage to and near residential neighbourhoods and critical infrastructure during March and April, as outlined above.

In March 2026, the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS) assessed that several areas of Sudan face a risk of famine between March and September 2026. Critically, both South Kordofan and North Kordofan were assessed as meeting IPC Phase 5[1], the most severe classification, indicating catastrophic food insecurity and famine conditions. This assessment was made before the escalation of fighting in Dilling in April and the spread of conflict toward the North Kordofan border, suggesting the humanitarian situation is likely to have worsened since FEWS NET’s findings were published.

The risk of damage to water infrastructure, healthcare facilities, and residential areas documented in this report, combined with restricted humanitarian access, means that civilians remaining in affected areas face compounding risks. CIR will continue to monitor the situation in coming months.

[1] The IPC is an acute food security classification rating to categorise famine levels.