Sexual violence as a weapon of war in Sudan

Since war broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, armed actors from both sides of the conflict have perpetrated conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) consistently across the country. Rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, abduction, forced nudity, and sexual assault have been documented against women, girls, men, and boys by Sudanese civil society organisations, international organisations, the United Nations, and journalists.

The true amount of CRSV is likely higher than what has been reported. Local service providers in Tawila told The New Humanitarian that around 100 survivors had sought care at one health centre alone since an RSF takeover of El Fasher on 26 October 2025, but stigma, limited specialised staff, and the absence of legal protection services meant that the true number of cases was likely far higher. While survivors are unable to access support or share their stories, commanders continue to operate with impunity.

Using innovative open-source research methods, CIR investigated five geographical and temporal “hotspots” where particularly high volumes of sexual violence were reported. This is one of the first systematic attempts to map country-wide CRSV patterns in Sudan, where access restrictions, insecurity, and survivors’ fear of reprisals limit conventional documentation. CIR went beyond identifying patterns of violence to also identify armed groups and commanders for whom there are reasonable grounds to believe were directly or indirectly responsible.

Mapping the violence

CIR relied on a triangulation approach to identify five CRSV hotspots across Sudan since the start of the war in April 2023, drawing on a combination of:

• Secondary reporting from highly credible and reliable sources;
• Primary source information from trusted Sudanese partner organisations;
• Open-source “red flag” indicators in authentic and verified footage such as photos and videos posted to social media (including burnt villages, nudity, and forced separation of men and women);
• Analysis of gendered hate speech and incitement to CRSV in authentic and verified footage.

CIR only analysed hotspots that met at least three of these criteria and held enough data for meaningful attribution analysis. Unless stated otherwise, all footage in CIR’s report is verified, meaning two separate analysts confirmed its authenticity, geographic coordinates and, when possible, date of filming.

Command responsibility

Across all five hotspots, CIR identified 25 individual commanders whom there are reasonable grounds to believe are directly or indirectly responsible for sexual violence perpetrated on the ground. These commanders are members of seven different armed groups active in Sudan: the RSF; SAF; RSF-aligned Tamazuj; SAF-aligned Sudan Shield Forces, SAF-aligned General Intelligence Service, SAF-aligned Special Mission Forces, and SAF-aligned Baraa Bin Malik Brigade.

CIR analysts identified these commanders in open-source footage from each hotspot, focusing on individuals meeting at least one of the below criteria per hotspot:

• Appeared in geospatial proximity to reported CRSV incidents; and/or
• Appeared in geospatial proximity to CRSV indicators; and/or
• Directly incited CRSV; and/or
• Held senior positions of command in the relevant geographic area and time frame and appeared at least once in verified footage during the relevant geographic area and time frame (even if not in close proximity to CRSV incidents or indicators).

The hotspots

CIR identified the following CRSV hotspots, and senior commanders with authority over the relevant sectors or units at the time:

El Fasher (RSF), October to November 2025. The UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan documented mass and gang rape during and after the RSF takeover of El Fasher from 26 to 28 October 2025. Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, the RSF’s Second (Deputy) Commander, was the most senior commander CIR verified to be present during the takeover. Gedo Hamdan Ahmed (“Ibn Shouk”), RSF Commander of the North Darfur sector, was also present and held direct command authority over the city.

Zamzam (RSF), April to May 2025. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights documented at least 66 CRSV incidents involving more than 100 victims during and after the RSF’s offensive on Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons. Ibn Shouk was the most senior commander verified to be present.

Gezira (SAF/SAF-aligned), January 2025. CRSV and related abuses were reported during and after the SAF-led recapture of Sudan’s Gezira state. Abdelmoneim Abdelbasit Mohamed, SAF Major General and Commander of the Sennar (Southern) Axis, was the most senior SAF commander CIR verified in the area. CIR also verified the presence of Abuaqla Mohamed Ahmed Alwakil (“Kaykal”), commander of the SAF-aligned Sudan Shield Forces.

Wad Madani (RSF), December 2023. The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa Network and Amnesty International documented a sustained pattern of CRSV throughout the RSF’s takeover of Wad Madani in December 2023. Kaykal, at the time aligned with the RSF and appointed RSF Commander of the 5th Division on the day of the takeover, was the highest-ranking commander CIR verified to be present.

Khartoum (RSF/RSF-aligned), May to July 2023. Radio Dabanga, CNN, and Amnesty International documented CRSV in Khartoum North (Bahri), including in private homes and at Al-Amal Hospital. Idris Hassan Ibrahim, RSF Major General and Commander of the Bahri sector, was the most senior commander CIR verified to be present.

Patterns found beyond individual incidents

Commanders who appear more than once. CIR verified the presence of two commanders at multiple hotspots, suggesting patterns of CRSV that follow their movements. Kaykal was present as RSF Commander of the 5^th Division in Wad Madani in December 2023, and months later as Commander of the SAF-aligned Sudan Shield Forces during the SAF-led recapture of Gezira in January 2025. Ibn Shouk was present at both Zamzam and El Fasher, holding direct command authority over the North Darfur sector during both RSF assaults.

Identity-based violence. In several hotspots, CIR identified ethnic slurs, hate speech, and dehumanising language used by fighters alongside and nearby CRSV. This corroborates reports that people were targeted because of their perceived ethnic or political identity. In a survivor testimony collected by Amnesty International, a woman who fled Zamzam with her mother reported that RSF fighters stopped them on the road, referred to them as “the women of the falangayat”, and subsequently raped her. This term is used to describe a slave or sycophant who prioritises their leader’s benefit over their own or their people’s interests. The RSF employ the term primarily to refer to SAF-allied forces from the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, whose fighters are predominantly Zaghawa and other non-Arab groups native to Darfur – groups that have historically faced systemic racism in Sudan. CIR also documented reports of CRSV perpetrated by SAF and aligned fighters specifically against members of the Kanabi community during the SAF-led recapture of Gezira state in January 2025. The use of dehumanising language and hate speech against civilians is a recognised indicator of elevated CRSV risk.

Direct incitement to CRSV

CIR documented explicit incitement to rape against women to “cleanse” bloodlines by Khademallah Khashmin Herika (“Shiraz Khalid”), RSF Major and Commander of the female element of the RSF. Shiraz Khalid was present during the RSF takeover of El Fasher in October 2025. This is a rare instance of direct, documented incitement rather than inferred command responsibility alone.

How CIR uses open-source evidence

Most documentation of CRSV relies on survivor testimony. Open-source research cannot replace survivor testimony or other forms of direct documentation. It can, however, help corroborate reported patterns of violence, contextualise CRSV within wider patterns of armed conflict, establish the presence and activities of armed actors, identify commanders linked to reported CRSV, and preserve evidence that may otherwise become unavailable.

By cross-referencing open source “red flag” indicators in verified footage with testimony and reporting, CIR can identify commanders who were present and in senior positions of authority during armed campaigns with high levels of reported CRSV incidents. CIR also analysed satellite imagery and thermal sensing data from NASA to verify the locations and coordinates of pieces of footage, and corroborate reports of fires destroying civilian homes, a recognised indicator of CRSV.

Evidence for accountability

Due to data limitations, CIR cannot attribute individual responsibility to specific commanders for specific CRSV incidents. Instead, CIR notes patterns of repeated appearances of armed groups and commanders in geographic and temporal proximity to reported sexual violence.

By focusing on perpetrators and command responsibility, this report adds to the evidence base of who might have been responsible for those CRSV incidents and packages this evidence to be as useful as possible for actors seeking justice and accountability for CRSV survivors. CIR also collaborated with trusted, survivor-centred Sudanese organisations to further ensure the scope and format of the report would add value to survivors.

Read the full report for more details on CIR’s findings and methodology, including its approach to analysing attribution.