WFP/UNICEF convoy attack near Al Koma

Key findings

• On 3 June, the United Nations (UN) World Food Programme (WFP) and UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) released a joint statement in response to “an attack on a joint humanitarian convoy near Al Koma, North Darfur”. 
• According to the statement, five convoy members were killed and several others injured. The convoy had been attempting to reach civilians trapped in El Fasher amid intensified fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
• Satellite imagery confirms that the convoy had arrived in Al Koma and was parked in the centre of the village by 29 May. It appears to have remained in the same formation until the night of the incident.
• CIR reconstructed a timeline based on satellite imagery and verified user-generated content, indicating that a fire broke out overnight between 2 and 3 June. The fire destroyed three trucks and damaged others, and footage suggests it began in the middle of the convoy. Some individuals appear to have attempted to move vehicles, possibly to prevent the fire spreading.
• Multiple and competing narratives emerged in the aftermath regarding the mode of attack and who was responsible. The RSF accused the SAF of conducting an airstrike, while some local sources attributed the attack to an SAF drone. Conversely, Sudanese government officials and others alleged an RSF drone strike or ground attack. 
• CIR verified that a fire destroyed several trucks but found a lack of evidence consistent with an air-dropped munition or drone strike—such as a crater, shrapnel, or fragmentation pattern—and the visible damage appeared limited. CIR was also unable to confirm the reported looting or seizure of the convoy by the RSF, though minor indicators, such as removed tarpaulin and damaged packaging, were present. Ultimately, CIR was unable to determine the exact nature of the attack or who was responsible.

Introduction

On 3 June, the United Nations (UN) World Food Programme (WFP) and UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) released a joint statement in response to “an attack on a joint humanitarian convoy near Al Koma, North Darfur” (hereinafter referred to as the ‘WFP convoy’ or ‘convoy’). According to the statement, five members of the convoy were killed and several people were injured, raising serious concerns about the targeting and obstruction of humanitarian assistance in Sudan’s conflict zones.

CIR collected and analysed satellite imagery and user-generated videos recorded in Al Koma between 29 May and 5 June, showing the convoy’s movement, and the aftermath of the attack. CIR also documented multiple and conflicting narratives regarding the mode of attack and who was responsible. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) blamed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), accusing them of conducting an airstrike, while some local sources suggested an SAF drone attack. Various Sudanese government officials claimed that the RSF seized or looted the convoy, carried out a drone or ground attack, or a combination of these.

CIR reconstructed a timeline of events indicating that the fire broke out in one of the central trucks of the parked convoy overnight between 2 and 3 June. Footage of the aftermath suggests attempts were made to prevent the fire from spreading. While CIR confirmed the destruction of three trucks, it found a lack of evidence of an air-dropped munition or drone strike, such as a crater, shrapnel or fragmentation pattern. Some neighbouring trucks remained largely intact, showing only signs of heat damage, such as melted tarpaulin and burst tyres. However, CIR could not rule out the possibility of an aerial strike, including one using a smaller munition. CIR also found no conclusive evidence that the convoy was looted, however could not rule out this possibility. CIR confirmed that the trucks were removed from the site on 7 June, and that fighters in RSF uniform were present in Al Koma one day before the incident.

Timeline of events

CIR reconstructed the convoy’s route and key events using satellite imagery and verified user-generated footage, tracing its reported departure from Port Sudan through its arrival in Al Koma and the subsequent attack. The timeline highlights when and where the convoy stopped, its position over several days, and the sequence of events leading to the destruction of at least three trucks overnight between 2 and 3 June. At the time of writing (12 June), CIR did not have access to the convoy’s travel plan that WFP claimed it shared in advance.

14 May – WFP states that assistance is on the way to El Fasher

On 14 May, the official WFP account on X posted that a convoy carrying “vital WFP food and nutrition supplies” was en route to El Fasher. WFP and UNICEF later in their joint statement on the attack confirmed that the convoy traveled from Port Sudan. 

29 May – Aid trucks parked in Al Koma

Analysis of Planet satellite imagery shows that the convoy had reached Al Koma and was parked in the centre of the village as of 29 May (see figure 1), about 1.3 kilometres from the main B26 road. Two sources claimed that the convoy stopped over in Al Dabbah, Northern State (to the north of Al Koma), prior to its arrival. These included a government official quoted by independent Sudanese media platform Beam Reports, as well as a claim by a man in a video posted by the Al Koma emergency room Facebook page on 3 June, standing in front of one of the burnt trucks. The fact that the trucks were located so far from the main road in Al Koma is consistent with these claims, however CIR was unable to independently confirm the stopover, or how the convoy arrived at this location.

29 May – WFP premises in El Fasher reportedly hit and damaged by RSF shelling

CIR verified fire damage to a WFP facility in El Fasher from an incident that likely happened on 29 May, following a statement from UN spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric on 30 May that the WFP premises in El Fasher were hit and damaged by repeated shelling from the RSF. CIR verified images posted by Mini Minawi—leader of the pro-SAF Joint Force—to X on 29 May, showing fire and dark smoke inside a WFP compound in El Fasher (figure 2), approximately 200m to the north of the airport. The post date of the images and analysis of satellite imagery from Planet and Sentinel-2 indicates the incident occured between 28 and 29 May, while Maxar satellite imagery shows damage to the facilities. On 2 June, Dujarric confirmed that the incident happened on 29 May, “causing significant damage to a key humanitarian hub”. 

31 May – Video shows convoy parked in Al Koma

CIR geolocated a video posted by a personal account to TikTok on 31 May showing the intact WFP convoy parked in Al Koma, at the same location and in the same formation as seen in the Planet SkySat satellite image captured on 29 May. Posts by the same TikTok account appear to show the same convoy at different locations over time in the weeks prior to the incident, suggesting the account may belong to someone who was travelling with the convoy.

1 June – New video posted showing the convoy at the same location

A second video, showing men in civilian clothing alongside the parked convoy, was posted to TikTok on 1 June by the same personal account. CIR geolocated the video and confirmed through visually matching features and positions that the trucks were the same ones seen in the video from 31 May and the Planet SkySat image from 29 May. Shadow analysis indicates the video was recorded in the morning, and the absence of smoke in the background suggests it was filmed prior to the alleged airstrike on the market on 1 June (see below).

1 June – Airstrike on a market

On 2 June, the Sudan Tribune published an article citing local sources who reported that an airstrike—allegedly carried out by the SAF—had targeted a market in Al Koma on 1 June. Analysis of Planet satellite imagery shows damage to a market appearing between 1 and 2 June, approximately 480 meters southwest of where the convoy was parked in the morning of 1 June (figure 3). On 3 June, a pro-SAF Facebook account posted a video, verified by CIR, showing damage to the market following the alleged strike. An overlay in the video claims it was filmed on 1 June—the date of the reported strike. CIR identified the presence of fighters in RSF uniform in the footage, who are seen inspecting damaged technicals and a burned body. CIR also collected several additional videos of the aftermath that began circulating on Facebook and Telegram in the afternoon of 1 June; these have not yet been verified.

2 June – New video of the parked trucks and report of RSF withholding a humanitarian convoy in Al Koma

A third video posted on 2 June by the same personal account on TikTok, showed the WFP convoy at the same location approximately 480 meters northeast of the market that was hit on 1 June. The video shows the trucks in the same position they were seen in on the morning of 1 June, with a group of men in civilian clothing sitting on the wall next to the trucks, waving to the camera.  

Beam Reports quoted the Director General of the Ministry of Health in North Darfur, Ibrahim Khater, as saying that the RSF was withholding a humanitarian aid convoy in Al Koma. Khater stated that the convoy originated in Al Dabbah, Northern State, and was en route to El Fasher.

2-3 June – Trucks destroyed and damaged

CIR collected and verified multiple videos posted to social media on 3 June, showing at least three trucks destroyed by fire and others damaged. No bodies are visible in the footage. High-resolution satellite imagery of Al Koma captured by Planet on 29 May and 4 June enabled CIR to compare the position and features of trucks with those visible in verified footage, to reconstruct what had happened overnight between 2 and 3 June. This included why the trucks might have dispersed from their positions, as observed in satellite imagery and footage captured after the incident. However, the imagery and footage were insufficient for definitive truck identification for all 15 trucks. For analytical clarity, CIR has labeled specific trucks with letters A-G. 

Satellite data, aftermath footage and secondary reporting all suggest the incident occurred overnight between 2 and 3 June. NASA’s Fire Information and Resource Management System (FIRMS) detected two heat signatures on 3 June at 1:07am, at the same locations where a comparison of Planet satellite imagery from 2 and 3 June shows two new burn marks, approximately 200 metres apart. Later that morning, after 6am, multiple videos and images began circulating online showing three trucks destroyed and still smoldering. CIR verified these to be at the same locations as the burn marks in satellite imagery. All this is consistent with an eyewitness statement reported by Darfur Victims Support on 3 June that the incident happened around midnight. 

Analysis of the truck positions and damage visible in the footage, supported by high-resolution satellite imagery from Planet captured on 4 June (figure 4), suggest the following sequence of events: first, a truck—Truck F—in the middle of the parked convoy caught fire; then, individuals appear to have attempted to prevent the fire from spreading by moving other trucks away. The below analysis draws on multiple sources, including a video posted by the Al Koma Emergency Room Facebook page showing the destroyed trucks from opposite angles, images shared by the El Fasher Resistance Committees , and a video posted by the same personal TikTok account that had previously shared footage of the parked convoy.

Analysis of the footage suggests Truck F first caught fire, as CIR identified damage to trucks that were likely parked around it—specifically, Trucks A, D and E—to be on the sides of the trucks that were facing Truck F. Meanwhile, Truck G, parked next to Truck F to the south, is seen fully destroyed by fire in the footage recorded on 3 June. CIR identified two trucks (D and E) with burst tyres and what appears to be melted orange tarpaulin above, in footage recorded on 3 June (figure 4). One of these trucks (Truck D) is visible in earlier footage parked next to and to the north of Truck F, with its damaged side facing Truck F. CIR was unable to identify Truck E in earlier videos, which were filmed from a northern angle and did not show the southern side of the convoy. However, based on the damage pattern—specifically the burst tyres and melted tarpaulin—and the layout visible in the footage, the most likely position of Truck E at the time of the incident was in front of destroyed Truck G and to the left of Truck F (figure 4). This positioning would be consistent with the damage observed on the right rear end of Truck E if the fire originated from Truck F.

The fourth truck with damage that was likely parked next to Truck F, and the third truck that was destroyed by fire (Truck A), is seen parked behind Truck F in the convoy video posted on 31 May (figure 4, 5). By 3 June, Truck A was observed smouldering approximately 200 meters to the west. The front section—adjacent to Truck F in the 31 May video—sustained heavy fire damage, while the rear section, where the tarpaulin had been removed, showed no signs of fire damage (figure 5). The footage suggests the tarpaulin was potentially removed in an attempt to save the humanitarian aid after the truck caught fire.

CIR identified another truck with burst tyres in the footage posted on 3 June (Truck B), seen parked at the front of the convoy in the footage posted on 1 and 2 June (figure 4). In the aftermath footage, both of Truck B’s front tyres are flat, in addition to one tyre at the back of the trailer (figure 6). 

4 June – Trucks scattered around

By 4 June, the trucks had dispersed over a distance of approximately 400 metres (figure 4). Some remained at the same location as seen on 3 June, while others were moved again. As not all trucks appear in the footage verified by CIR from 3 June, CIR was unable to construct a timeline including all trucks.

7 June – Trucks removed

CIR analysed Maxar and Planet satellite imagery from 6 and 7 June and determined that all trucks except those that were destroyed were later moved from their scattered positions seen on 4 June. Sudan Tribune reported on 6 June that Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the RSF of “proceeding to loot the remainder of the UN humanitarian aid in the Al Koma area”. CIR was neither able to verify these claims nor identify the new location of the trucks at the time of writing.

Aftermath and analysis of claims

Attribution for the incident remains unclear. CIR analysed available footage in relation to three possible claims made in the aftermath: an air-dropped munition by the SAF, an RSF drone strike, and ground seizure and looting of the convoy.

On 3 June, the RSF official Telegram channel posted multiple images of the destroyed WFP convoy, condemning the incident and directly blaming the SAF for carrying out an airstrike. Similarly, on 3 June, the Al Koma Locality emergency room Facebook page accused the SAF of bombing the convoy with drones. 

Despite these claims of an air attack, CIR has not seen sufficient evidence to suggest that a bombing occurred. CIR was unable to identify a location of munition impact, munition remnants, shrapnel damage, or a clear fragmentation pattern with debris around these trucks. In addition, the damage appears to be limited for an airstrike or drone strike with a large munition. This is supported by footage appearing to show that initial damage was limited to Trucks A, F and G—or possibly only Truck F. Trucks that were likely neighbouring these trucks when the incident occured appear to only have minor damage, such as burst tyres and melted tarpaulin, which were more likely caused by heat. However, CIR was unable to rule out the possibility of an aerial bombing. It is possible a smaller munition was dropped in between Trucks F and G, for example, with these trucks absorbing most of the blast. While CIR has documented numerous SAF airstrikes in Darfur—typically involving unguided munitions—it is unclear whether SAF currently possesses the capability to carry out drone strikes in the region. CIR is not aware of any confirmed instances of SAF drone use in Darfur at the time of writing.

On the contrary, Sudanese government officials in quotes reported by Beam Reports, Sudan Tribune and Darfur24 suggested the convoy may have been targeted by an RSF drone attack (despite RSF controlling the area). CIR did not observe evidence suggestive of a larger RSF drone strike, with the post-incident damage being relatively limited, as outlined in the paragraph above. CIR was unable to rule out the possibility of an RSF drone strike, however, especially by a commercial drone dropping munition, which would have resulted in less initial damage.

Various sources—including Sudanese government officials in quotes reported by Beam Reports, Sudan Tribune and Darfur24— claimed that the RSF seized and looted the convoy and killed aid workers. The El Fasher Resistance Committees’ Facebook page also suggested the RSF seized and damaged the convoy, while refuting the claim of a SAF drone attack. On 4 June, Mini Minawi posted on X claiming that the convoy was attacked by the RSF after its crew refused to change course from El Fasher and proceed to a different destination. 

CIR was neither able to confirm the seizure of the convoy nor any looting. In particular, one Truck (B) was observed with flat tyres while likely parked at the front of the convoy, some distance from the fire and potential impact, meaning the tyre damage was less likely caused by the potential blast or heat. The available footage shows signs that could indicate looting, such as some damaged packaging and one truck with removed tarpaulin. However, most of the trucks in the available footage and satellite imagery appear still covered and untouched. Further, the damaged packaging and removed tarpaulin could also be explained by an attempt to save trucks and aid from further damage. It should however be noted that CIR confirmed the trucks were removed from the site on 7 June. CIR also confirmed the presence of fighters in RSF uniform in Al Koma one day before the incident, as explained at the start of this report, in relation to the airstrike on the market on 1 June.